Kissinger Henry. White House Years

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

someofhishumanimpulses,whotooktheinitiativetoleadAmericatowarda

conceptofpeacecompatiblewithitsnewrealitiesandtheawfulperilsofa

nuclearage,andthattheforeignleaderswhobestunderstoodthiswerethetwo

grizzledveteransoftheLongMarch,MaoandChou,whoopenlyexpressedtheir

preferenceforRichardNixonoverthewaywardrepresentativesofAmerican

liberalism.TheirpraiseofNixonwasmorethansubtleChineseflattery.“A

sentimentalpolicyknowsnoreciprocity,”wroteBismarckoveracenturyearlier.

Forsovereignnations,predictabilityismorecrucialthanspasmodicbrillianceor

idiosyncraticmoralisticrhetoric.Theymustgeartheiractionstotheperformance

ofothersoverextendedperiodsoftime;theirdomesticsurvivalandinternational

securityalikemaydependuponit.Anditwasonthislevelofsharedgeopolitical

interesttranscendingphilosophiesandhistorythattheformerRed‐baiterandthe

crusadersforworldrevolutionfoundeachother.



Outofthesecontacts,meticulouslynurturedintheyearstocome,grewa

relationshipinwhichAmericaandChinareinforcedeachotherwhilealmostnever

coordinatingtacticsexplicitly.FromanearlyhostilitytotheAmericanalliance

withJapan(stilltobefoundintheShanghaiCommuniqué),theChineseleaders

sooncame,inpartunderourpersistentpersuasion,toviewitasaguaranteeof

America’scontinuedinterestintheWesternPacificandareinonJapanese

unilateralism.SoontheystronglysupportedcloserelationsbetweenJapanand

America.OnoneoccasionMaowentsofarastoadvisemetomakesurethat

whenIvisitedAsiaIspendasmuchtimeinTokyoasinPeking;Japan’spride

shouldberespected.Iacceptedtherecommendation.TheChinese,indeed,came

tostressthatUS‐JapaneserelationsweremoreimportantthanUS‐Chinese

relations.OneoftheadvantagesofourrelationshipwithPekinghasbeenthat

neitherwenortheJapanesehavebeenpressuredbyChinatomakeachoiceof

prioritiesorinducedto jockeyforPeking’sfavor.



OvertheyearsChina’sinterestinaneconomicallyandmilitarilystrong

WesternEuropegrewtothepointthatIonlyhalf‐jokinglycalledthePeople’s

RepubliconeofourstrongerNATOallies.SurelythelecturesthatWestEuropean

leadersheardinPekingabouttheimportanceofAtlanticdefensewereifanything

moresternthantheonestheyreceivedinWashington.And,aswithJapan,the

ChineseurgedcloserelationsbetweenAmericaandEurope.Chinatacitly

encouragedourpresenceinthePhilippinesandThailandand,whileitfollowed

Pyongyang’sbasicline,itneverreallypressedustoremoveourforcesfrom

Korea.ItcorrectlyjudgedthatthevisiblepresenceofAmericanpowerwascrucial

formaintainingabalanceofpowerinAsiaandEurope.Onmyeveryvisitthe

ChineseleadersurgedustopaycloseattentiontothecrucialSouthernrimof

Eurasia—Turkey,Iran,andPakistan—threeclosefriendsoftheUnitedStates(and

China),whosesecuritywasabarriertoaSovietbreakthroughtotheIndianOcean

andacheckonpro‐SovietradicalismintheMiddleEast.IntheMiddleEastitself

theycontinuallyencouragedournegotiatingefforts,knowingthatthiswasthe

bestmeansoferodingSovietinfluence.WhiletheyhadlittleinterestinLatin

America,theircontemptforCubaasaSovietagentwasevident.TheChinesehave

shownagreaterconcernwithandunderstandingofthespreadofSoviet ‐

sponsoredradicalisminAfricathananyWesterncountrywiththeexceptionof

France.



InmostcriticalareasChinahasbeenastabilizingforce.Itsmotives,tobe

sure,arenottofosterAmericandesignsbuttocontainSovietexpansion.Butthis

approachisanti‐SovietonlyifMoscow’scompulsiontospreaditsinfluenceisso

inherentintheSovietsystemthatitcannotsurvivewithoutit.Thereisnothing

incompatibleincloserelationswithbothPekingandMoscowsolongasMoscow

pursuesarestrainedforeignpolicy.



ItwouldbedangerousintheextremetoassumethatChineseobjectives

andoursareinallrespectsidentical. Pekingwouldprefertoseeussoembroiled

withtheSovietsthatitneedpaynopriceatallforacollaborativerelationship

withWashington.Insuchconditions,theprotectionaffordedbytheAmerican

optionwouldbe“free.”Chineseleadersunquestionablywouldaspiretoaclear‐

cutalignmentratherthananAmericanpolicyofequidistancebetweenMoscow

andPekingthattiltedtowardPekingonlybecauseitwastheweakerandmore

threatenedoftheCommunistgiants.Forourpart,wedidnothaveanyillusions

aboutthepermanenceofthenewrelationship.PekingandWashingtonwere

enteringamarriageofconveniencetransformedintoanemotionaltieprimarily

byChinesepsychologicalskillandAmericansentimentalrecollectionofaChina

thatnolongerexisted,ifeverithad.OnceChinabecomesstrongenoughtostand

alone,itmightdiscardus.Alittlelateritmighteventurnagainstus,ifits

perceptionofitsinterestsrequiresit.Beforethen,theSovietUnionmightbe

drivenintoagenuinerelaxationoftensionswithus—ifithasnotfirstsoughtto

breakoutofitsisolationbyamilitaryassaultonChina.ButwhateverChina’slong‐

termpolicy,ourmedium‐terminterestwastocooperate,andtosupportits

securityagainstforeignpressures.



TounderstandthecontributionoftheChinainitiativetointernational

stability,wemerelyneedtoaskourselveswhattheworldwouldhavebeenlikeif

ChinesepressuresinAsiahadbeenaddedtoSovietglobaladventurismduringthe

Vietnamwarandafterward.ByrestoringhopetotheAmericanpeople,italso

gaveusachancetoshapea newconceptofinternationalorderevenwhile

emergingfromadebilitatingwarandawrenchingdecadeathome.Theultimate

significanceoftheopeningtoChinathusresidedlessintheformalexchanges

thaninthetacitunderstandingsthatgrewoutofNixon’svisit.Theyprovidedthe

foundationforacommonifinformalstrategy,bywhichdifferent—even

clashing—purposespro ducedanextraordinaryparallelisminaction. Itwasa

triumphoftheintangibleintheconductofforeignpolicy.



ThepresscorpsaccompanyingNixondidnotconcernthemselveswiththe

long‐rangeimplicationsofthejourney.Maddenedbyaweekwithoutbriefings,

drivenaroundthebendbyendlessbanquetsanddeadlytoasts,perhaps

convincedintheirheartsthatnothinggoodcouldpossiblycomeofaNixon

initiative,satiatedbutunstimulated,theyfellontheShanghaiCommuniquélike

tigersonrawmeatthrownintotheircage.TheWashingtonPostofFebruary28

beganitsstory:



PresidentNixonhasaccededtoChineseCommunistdemandsbypubliclypledging,for

thefirsttime,towithdrawallAmericanforcesandmilitaryinstallationsfromTaiwan…The

considerableconcessionsbythePresidentappearedtohavebeenmadeinreturnfora

relativelyminorChineseagreementto“facilitate”bilateralscientific,technological,cultural,

sports,journalisticandtradeexchangesbetweentheUnitedStatesandChina.



WeighingtheconcessionsmadebythePresident,manyobserversherefeelthatthe

Chinesegotthebetterofthebargain…Chineseofficialsappearedpleasedbytheoutcomeof

thediscussion.



Thesectiononhegemonyandrenunciationofforcetotallyescapedthe

writer,asdidtheconditionalityofourundertakingtowithdrawfromTaiwan.



Onetelevisioncommentator,notingthattherewasnowrittenmentionor

affirmationoftheAmericandefensecommitmenttoTaiwan,concludedthatin

thecommuniquéChinahadwon“agiantstep”andgivenawaylittle.China’s

omissionofitscustomarycondemnationofourdefensetreatywithTaiwancould

equallybecitedasaChineseconcession,asindeedCh’iaoKuan‐huaarguedto

me,sinceitseemedtoabandonalong‐heldChineseposition.Inanycase,the

samecommentatorignoredthatonChinesesoilIreiteratedourdefense

commitmenttoTaiwan.



OnFebruary28intheDetroitFreePress,anequallyprofoundobserverwas

quoted:“TheygotTaiwan;wegoteggrolls.”Newsdayheadlineditsstories:

“Goodbyewaves;wavesofshock”and“Consensus‐USPaidHighTollfor

DiplomaticBridgetoChina.”TheBostonGlobeheadlined:“NixonMakes

ConcessionsonTaiwan,PledgesPullout.”ItquotedanAustralianreporteras

givingthisexpertassessment:“Choubattledallweek”fortheTaiwansection

“andhegotwhathewanted.”LikewisethePhiladelphiaBulletin:“Nixonflying

Home;YieldedonTaiwan.”ThatthedealwasstruckwhentheChineseaccepted

ourformulationswouldhaveseemedasimplausibleintheeraofthecredibility

gapasitwastrue.



Eventually,theluridheadlinescalmeddown,particularlyafterNixon’s

arrivalstatementinWashingtonreiteratingthatourcommitmentswere

unaffected.TheChristianScien ceMonitorwrotewiselythat“WhatPresident

Nixonagreedtowaswhathewasdoinganyway.” Solongasthedefensetreaty

remainedinforce,“nothingischanged.”TheWashingtonPostinaneditorialof

February29analyzedtheShanghaiCommuniquéintelligentlyanddefendedNixon

againstaccusationsof“sellingout”Taiwan—accusationsfosteredamongothers

byitsowncorrespondent.Negativestorieswereinanyeventoverwhelmedby

thevisualimpactofNixon’svisittoPeking,whichnearlyeveryAmericanfamily

hadbeenableto witnessonitstelevisionscreen.ForonceaWhiteHousepublic

relationsstrategysucceeded,andperformedadiplomaticfunctionaswell.

Picturesoverrodetheprintedword;thepublicsimplywasnotinterestedinthe

complexanalysesofthedocumentafterhavingwatchedthespectacleofan

AmericanPresidentwelcomed inthecapitalofanerstwhileenemy.



Andwhatfollowedleftnodoubtabouttherealprioritiesofbothsides.For

yearstheUnitedStateswastheonlycountryenjoyingpoliticalrelationswith

PekingthatdidnothavetoseveritsdiplomatictieswithTaipei.Againandagainin

theyearsfollowingtheNixonvisit,theChineseleadersstressedtousMao’s

preceptthatTaiwanwasasubordinateproblem;themajorcommonissuewas

themaintenanceoftheinternationalequilibrium.Weenjoyeddiplomatictiesin

allbutname;wehadthroughoutaregularchannelofintimatecommunicationat

thehighestlevelandmorefrequentexchangesthanhadmostoftheWestern

governmentswhichhadrecognizedPekingmanyyearsearlier.Afterthe

formationofliaisonOfficesineachother’scapitalsin1973(followingtheVietnam

settlement),thetwocountriesevenhaddefactoembassiestopromotethe

broadereconomic,cultural,andpeople‐to‐peopleexchangesthatcharacterize

relationsbetweenfriendlystates.Theonlyelementlackingwasthewillingnessof

ChineseleadersactuallytosetfootinWashingtonwhilearivalembassywas

present.



Majorexpansionoftradeandexchanges,whichsomesawasgoalswewere

disappointedinnotobtaining,wereofsecondaryimportancetobothsides.On

theChineseside,thereluctancemostlycamefromMao’sideologicalandMiddle‐

Kingdomfaithinself‐reliance,notfromtheabsenceofdiplomaticrelations;no

othercountrydidmuchbetterthanwedidinthisregardaslongasMaowasalive.

In1977andespecially1978,anewChineseleadershipmovedoutaggressivelyto

expandeconomicandeducationalexchangewiththeWest;theUnitedStateswas

amajorparticipantandsufferedlittlepenaltybecauseoftheabsenceofformal

diplomaticrelationsbeforeJanuary1,1979.



Butthisevolutionbeingthenunknown,therewasanoddsenseof

ambivalenceontheplanebackfromPeking.Nixonunderstoodinternational

affairstoowellnottograspthathehadsealedagenuinediplomatictriumph.But

hewasalsosufficientlypoliticaltorecognizethedangerhemightfacefromhis

oldconservativesupportersifthefirstpressaccountsdeterminedthenational

mood.PatBuchanan,aspeechwriterwhoconsideredhimselfNixon’s

conservativeconscience,wasmorose.InthebesttraditionofPresidential

entouragesheblamedperniciousadvisers(meaningme)forthePresident’s

departurefromgrace.(RayPrice,theliberalconscience,oftenhadthesame

tendencyandthesametarget.)Nixonstewedinhiscabin,notknowingwhathe

wouldfindonhisreturn.Itwasunnecessary.ThepicturesofaPresidentworking

forpeacemovedacountrythatwasexhaustedbyyearsofturmoiloveran

inconclusivewar.NixonreceivedatriumphalwelcomeatAndrewsAirforceBase

fromabipartisangroupofSenatorsandCongressmenheadedbytheVice

President.Nixonusedtheoccasiontoremindlistenersofhisachievementsbut

alsotomakeclearthatwehadnotgivenup“anyUnitedStatescommitmentto

anyothercountry.”Withinfiveminutesofreachingmyofficeatteno’clockinthe

eveningIcalledtwoleadingconservatives,GovernorRonaldReaganandSenator

BarryGoldwater.BothpromisedtheirsupportifthePresidentdidnotdeviate

fromthecommitmenttoTaiwanexpressedbymeinShanghaiandbythe

PresidentatAndrewsAirforceBase.ReaganjokedthattheChinavisithadbeena

greattelevision“pilot”andoughttobemadeintoaseries.



ThenextdayNixonmetwiththebipartisanleadershipofbothHousesof

Congressandreceivedstrongsupport.Euphoric,heeventhoughthemightsettle

allhisproblemsinonefellswoop.AsthemeetingbrokeuphestoppedSenator

FulbrightandurgedhimtoendhispubliccriticismofVietnambecauseitwasa

verydelicateissueandthe“stringcouldbreak”iftherewereacontinuinghassle

overit.NixonpointedhisfingeratthestartledFulbrightandsaid,“OK,Bill,

agreed?”ThedistinguishedSenatorstoodthereinsomedisbelief,nodding(or

maybeshaking)hishead—thechronicler,TomKorologosoftheCongressional 

liaisonstaff,isnotpreciseonthispoint.



IbriefedthepressingreaterdetailthanwaspossibleinShanghaiandalso

metinformallywiththeSenateForeignRelationsCommittee.Themachinerythat

accompaniesgreateventsmovedintoaction.Ambassadorshadtobeinformed.

ThemostpainfulwasmymeetingwithAmbassadorJamesShenfromTaiwan;we

hadnotinfactmadeanycommitmentsundercuttingTaiwan’ssecurity,butthe

entireprocesswasboundtobeinimicaltoitsstatus.Themostthorough,

inquisitivecallerprovedtobetheAmbassadorfromJapan,whohavingearlier

missedmysecrettriptoPekingwasnotabouttofailtounearthsomenewgreat

secretifitcouldbeaccomplishedthroughpersistence.



Thetripwasincreasinglyperceivedasagreatsuccess.AstheAmerican

publicgainedhopefromtheChinavisit,Vietnambecamelessanobsessionand

moreachallengetobemastered.TheAdministrationthathadrevolutionized

internationalrelationscouldnotsoeasilybeaccusedofneglectingthedeepest

concernoftheAmericanpeople.



Oncemore,though,weencounteredthecurious phenomenonthatsuccess

seemedtounsettleNixonmorethanfailure.Heseemedobsessedbythefearthat

hewasnotreceivingadequatecredit.Heconstantlybadgeredhisassociatesto

pressapublicrelationscampaignthatwouldcallmoreattentiontotheChina

visit.Hefollowedthepresscarefully,sothatanycriticismcouldbeimmediately

countered.Hereadsomecommentator’scriticismthattheChinesestatementsof

theirpositionintheShanghaiCommuniquéweremoreaggressivethanthe

statementsofourposition.OnMarch9,therefore,hesentmeamemorandum

askingmetomakecleartothepressthedeepthoughtandanalysisthatlay

behindthis“decision”tostateourpositionmoderately.Hispreferenceforthis

approachdatedback,hesaid,toaspeechhegaveintheSovietUnionin1959,

whichheurgedmetoreadinhisbooksixCrises.ThoughChouEn‐laihad

originallyproposedtheideaofseparateandconflictingstatements,thoughChou

andIhaddraftedalmostallofthatpartofthetextinOctober1971without

referencetoWashington,andthoughNixonhadlearnedofboththeapproach

andthecontentonlyafterIreturned,hewantedmetoexplaintothepress—and

Ibelievehadconvincedhimself—thathehadconceivedit:



YoucouldbeginbypointingoutthatImadethedecisionwithregardtothetoneofthe

statementofourpositionfortwobasicreasons.First,themoreaggressivewestatedour

positionthemoreaggressivetheChinesewouldhavetobeinstatingtheirposition.Asaresult

ofourpresentingourpositioninaveryfirm,butnon‐belligerentmanner,theirposition,whileit

wasalsouncompromisingonprinciple,wasnotnearlyasroughinitsrhetoricashasbeenthe

caseinpreviousstatementstheyhaveissuedovertheyears…



Iwasdeterminedthatinthisdocument,whichwouldbethefirsttimeChineseleaders,

andcadres,andtoacertainextentevenChinesemasses,wouldeverheartheAmerican

positionexpressed,Ihadtomakethestrongestpossibleefforttosetitinatonewhichwould

notmakeittotallyincrediblewhentheyheardit.Itwouldnothavebeencredible,ofcourse,

hadwesetforthourpositioninmoreaggressivetermsbecause22yearsofpropagandaatthe

otherextremewouldhavemadeitimpossibleforthereaderofthecommuniqué,orthosewho

hearditreadonradio,tobelieveitatallifthetonewastooharsh.



Nixon,ofcourse,deservesfullcreditfortheShanghaiCommuniqué.A

Presidentisalwaysresponsibleforthepolicy,nomatterwhodoesthetechnical

labors.AlesscourageousPresidentcouldhavepulledbackfromtheseparate

statements,whenIpresentedthemtohimuponmyreturninOctober,infavorof

amoreorthodoxpresentation.Thistrivialincidentdoesnotderogatefrom

Nixon’sboldnessinhishistoricopeningtoChina.Whatitillustrates,however,is

thetendencyforillusiontobecomereality,abroodingandinvolutedstreakthat,

togetherwithstarkercharactertraits,atfirstflawed,andlaterdestroyed,a

Presidencysorichinforeignpolicyachievements.



WhatNixonhinted,Haldemanmadeexplicit.OnMarch14Haldemansent

meamemorandumwhosethrustwasthatmybriefingsdevotedtoomuchtime

tosubstance;IwouldservethePresidentbetterbystressingtothepressand

aboveallontelevisionthegreatpersonalqualitiesthatmadetheachievements

possible.Helpfully,Haldemanrecitedacatalogueofsometenofthem.Since

Haldemanneversatinonthenegotiations,hecouldonlyhavegottenallthis

informationfromonesource.ForanyonefamiliarwithOvalOfficeprocedure,the

memorandumevokedafamiliarscene:Haldeman,equippedwiththeyellowpad

thateveryWhiteHousestaffer(includingme)carriedwithhimasifpartofour

uniform,jottingdownthemusingsofthechief.SomeofHaldeman’sdescriptions

wereonthemark;otherswerebizarre;thewholeconceptwasirrelevant.Leaders

dobestbyemphasizingperformance;surelythisisallthathistorycaresabout.

TheconvictionthatNixon’sstandingdependedlessonhisactionsthanontheir

presentationwasabaneofhisAdministration.Itconveyedalackofassurance

evenduringhisgreatestaccomplishments.Itimpartedafreneticqualitytothe

searchforsupport,anendlessquestthatprovedtobeunfulfillable.Itmadeit

impossibleforhimevertotrustthemomentumofevents.Itcausedhimtoseek

toembellishhismostincontestableachievements,ortolookforinsuranceinthe

faceofeventhemostoverwhelmingprobabilityofsuccess.Itwasthe

psychologicalessenceoftheWatergatedebacle.



In1972Ireadthesememorandawithamusementtingedwith

exasperation,forIwasstilltoocloseto events.TodayIfindthemnotwithout

pathos—ofalonelymaninhishourofhighachievementreassuringhimselfwitha

catalogueofaccomplishmentsandlaudatoryadjectiveswhenthedeedspokefor

itself.Nixonhadtriumphedinthemostimportantpurposeofthevisit.Leadersof

twopowerfulnationshadtakenthemeasureofea chotherandjudgedthatthey

couldconductcompatibleforeignpolicies,revolutionizingworlddiplomacy. 



Thebipolarityofthepostwarperiodwasover.Therewouldbegreater

demandsonAmerica’screativity,endurance,andsophistication—but alsonew

opportunities.Attheendoftheprocessstoodwhatwehadlongedandsuffered

forduringfourtumultuousyears:anhonorablenegotiatedpeaceinVietnam. 



<<Contents>>



****



XXV



HanoiThrowstheDice:

TheVietnamSpringOffensive



Invasion



urweeksafterourreturnfromChina,thelong‐awaitedoffensivein

Vietnamfinallybrokeoverus.OnMarch30NorthVietnameseartillery

andinfantryunitslaunchedcoordinatedattacksagainstSouth

VietnamesebasesinnortheastQuangTriprovince.Intotaldisregardofthe

understandingsassociatedwiththebombinghaltfouryearsearlier,threeNorth

VietnamesedivisionspouredacrosstheDemilitarizedZone(DMZ),supportedby

morethantwohundredtanksandlargenumbersofnew130mmrecoilless

artillery,allfurnishedbytheSovietUnion.Freshunitswerepoisedtoinvadethe

NorthernpartofSouthVietnamfromLaosalongRoute9,reversingthedirection

oftheSouthVietnamesethrustintoLaosthepreviousyear,andtoattackthrough

theAshauValleytowardHué.Therewereominoustroopconcentrationsinthe

CentralHighlandsthreateningthecitiesofKontumandPleiku.ThreeNorth

VietnamesedivisionsfromCambodiaweremovingintoMilitaryRegion3,which

includedSaigon.Anenemyoffensivewasexpectedthereatanymoment.The

pretensethattheVietnamconflictwasa“people’swar,”a guerrillauprisinginthe

South,wasover;thiswasaninvasionbytheNorthVietnameseregulararmyin

divisionstrength.



InWashington,asisusualattheonsetofgreatevents,itwashardtofind

outexactlywhatwastakingplace.AsearlyasMarch31(GoodFriday)secretary

Lairdreportedthattheenemyoffensivewasamajorone.Butaccountsfromthe

Pentagonwereinitiallysoothing.GeneralAbrams,weweretold,didnotconsider

thattheattackhadyetreachedacriticalstage;SouthVietnamesefire‐support

basesseemedtobeholding. Therewasnoneedfordecisionsatthehighestlevel.

Fortwodaystheattacksweretreatedasonlyamajorenemyprobe,partly

becausethebattleseemedtobegoingwell;perhapsalsobecausecivilianofficials

wereafraidthatNixonmightbetemptedtoimplementhisoft‐repeatedthreatof

anall‐outresponseifthiswasthelong‐awaitedCommunistoffensive.



OnApril1,NixonauthorizedAmericanairattacksagainstmilitary

concentrationsinNorthVietnam,limitedtowithintwenty‐fivemilesnorthofthe

DMZ.ButweencounteredoneoftheperennialfrustrationsoftheVietnamwar:

badweatherpreventingairoperations.Sincetheceilingwasconstantlybelow

2,500feet,veryfewmissionscouldbeflownintotheNorth.IcalledAdmiral

Moorerseveraltimesadaytoaskifwewereyetintheair;hisanswerforthefirst

forty‐eighthourswasnegative.PoorMoorer,whowasnotto blame,enduredmy

badgeringandsarcasm.ItseemedtomethatourentireAirforceconsistedof

delicatemachinescapableofflyingonlyinawarinthedesertinJuly.Isuggested

thatiftheycouldnotflymaybetheycouldtaxiNorthfortwenty‐fivemiles.[

The

highrateofcancellationofairsortiesbecamenearlyanobsessionofmine.Amemorandumby

LairdonAugust19,submittedatmyrequest,gavetheglumstatistics.BetweenMay8and

August12,1972,53percentofallscheduledstrikesagainstprimarytargetsinNorthVietnam

werecanceled,42percentbecauseofweather.]



OnApril2theSouthVietnamesewereforcedtoevacuatefourteenbases

justSouthoftheDMZ.Therewasnolongeranydoubtthattheenemyoffensive

wasunderway.ThenexttwomonthswouldbeadecisivetestofVietnamization.

Wewouldnowseewhethertheeffortandagonyofthepastthreeyearshad

beenproductiveorwouldvanishlikeawispofsmokeinabreeze.



Iwasconvincedthat,whatevertheoutcomeoftheoffensive,itwouldend

thewar.ThiswasHanoi’s lastthrowofthedice.Onewayoranother,therewould

nowbeseriousnegotiations;theirsubstancewoulddependuponwhichside

prevailedonthebattlefield.IfSouthVie tnamcollapse d,thewarwouldhave

endedinadebacle.IfSaigon,withourhelp,heldbacktheentireNorth

Vietnamesearmy,Hanoiwouldhavenochoicebuttocometoterms.



Therewerelargerstakes.IfwecollapsedinVietnam,thepatientdesignof

ourforeignpolicywouldbeinjeopardy.TheMoscowsummitwouldtakeplace—

ifatall—againstthebackgroundoftwosuccessfulassaultsonAmericaninterests 

madepossiblebySovietweaponry(firstIndia‐Pakistan,andnowIndochina).Our

negotiatingpositionintheeyesofthecoldcalculatorsofpowerintheKremlin

wouldbepatheticallyweak.ChinamightreconsiderthevalueofAmericanties.

Allies,whatevertheythoughtofthemeritsofourVietnampolicy,wouldquestion