Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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ourjudgmentandourmaster yofevents.Inotherpartsoftheworld,thosewho

believedinthearbitramentofarmswouldbeemboldened;thismightunhinge

theMiddleEast.Thegraveconsequencesthatwethoughtwouldflowfroma

politicalsurrenderwouldbeaggravatedbyamilitarycollapse.Wewere

determinedtopreventthisdisaster;wewouldblunttheoffensiveandconclude

thewaronhonorableterms.Thelast,butperhapsmostpainful,ordealofthe

VietnamWarwasuponus.



<<Contents>>



****



TheBuildup



heenemyoffensiveof1972hadlongbeenanticipated.TheNorthVietnamese

haddemonstratedin1968thattheyunderstoodtheimpactofamajorblowin

aPresidentialelectionyear.Nowitsonslaughtcoincidedwiththecriticalmoment

intheprocessofVietnamizationwhenourownforceshadbeenreducedtoa

residuallevel,temptingHanoitodeterminewhetherinfacttheSouthVietnamese

couldtakeovertheirowndefense.TheprincipalpurposeofourCambodian

incursionof1970andLaotiandry‐seasonoffensiveof1971hadbeentodisrupt

Hanoi’stimetableforthecontingencywewerenowfacing. Sinceoffensiveswere

technicallyfeasibleonlyinthedryseasonfromDecembertoJuly,ourblowshad

forcedHanoitospendprecioustimeeachyearrebuildingsupplylinesand

replenishingstocks.Everymonthgainedwould,wehoped,bringastrengthening

ofSouthVietnam’scapacitytoresist;everyweakeningofHanoi’spowerwould

reducetheeffectivenessoftheattackwhenitcame.AndindeedtheNorth

Vietnameseoffensivecametwomonthsafterweexpecteditandnevergaineda

coordinatedmomentum.

T



Throughoutthesecondhalfof1971Hanoi’spublicstatementshadturned

ominous.OnSeptember20,1971,DickHelms,briefinganNSCmeeting,reported

considerableenemyreinforcementsandgreatpotentialforoffensiveactionjust

acrosstheDMZ.AtaboutthattimeitwasbecomingapparentthatHanoi’s

interestinsecretnegotiationswithushadobviouslyflagged;theconversations

aboutthesevenpointsandtheninepointswerebrokenoffbyLeDucTho.Our

newproposalpresentedtoHanoibyGeneralWaltersinOctober1971had

receivednoreply;ameetingwithLeDucThoscheduledforNovember20was

canceledonthreedays’notice,allegedlybecauseofillness;ouroffertomeeton

anothermutuallyconvenientdatewasignored.



StartingonJanuary4,1972,GeneralAbramswarnedofanimminent

offensive.InadispatchofJanuary20,hepredictedthattheenemywouldattempt

“tofaceuswiththemostdifficultsituationofwhichheiscapable.”Abrams

predictedanoffensiveforasearlyasthefirstpartofFebruary,justbeforeNixon’s

triptoPeking.Herequestedauthoritytodisrupttheenemy’spreparationsbyair

attacksnorthoftheDMZ.Heconcludedwithareminderthatthiswouldbethe

decisivebattleandthatheasfieldcommanderneededthemaximumflexibilityin

advance.“Inthefinalanalysis,”Abramsaddedperceptively,“whenthisisallover,

[the]specifictargetshitintheSouthernpartofNorthVietnamwillnotbeamajor

issue.TheissuewillbewhetherVietnamizationhasbeenasuccessorafailure.”



IconvenedameetingoftheSeniorReviewGrouponJanuary24toconsider

GeneralAbrams’srequests.NoonewaseagertorenewattacksontheNorth.The

WhiteHousethoughtitwouldinterferewiththetriptoPeking;theState

Departmentfeareditwouldruintheprospectsofnegotiation;Defensewasloath

toassumenewbudgetaryburdens.Everybodydreadedthepublicoutcrysureto

beunleashedbyourresumingthebombingoftheNorth,eveninalimitedarea.

Sometookrefugeinminimizingthethreatwefaced,anotinfrequentdeviceto

evadetheneedfordecision.Theconsensusofthegroupwasthattheassault

wouldcomeintheCentralHighlands;therewasdisagreementoverGeneral

Abrams’sconcernwiththeenemy’sconcentrationsjustabovetheDMZ.On

January26MelLairdfoundaclassiccompromise.Herecommendedthatthe

PresidentletAbramshavepartofhiscakebutnotthebombingoftheNorth.He

approvedinsteadstepped‐upairactivityintheSouthandtheplacingofmore

sensorsintheDMZ.Ofcourse,thesensorswouldtelluswhetheranattackwas

takingplace;theydidnotpreventitorincreaseourcapabilitytoresistit.Iwent

alongwithLaird’srefusaltoauthorizenewattacksontheNorthfortworeasons:

ItseemedunwiseinthetwoweeksbeforeNixon’svisittoChina;andIthought

thatbombingmadesenseonlyifitweresustained,whichitcouldnotbeexceptin

reactiontoanoverwhelmingprovocation.Wehadtoleanoverbackwardto

neutralizethosereadytoblametheirowngovernme nt foreverycrisis.Itherefore

favoreddelayinggivingauthorityforresumedbombinguntilwecouldjudgeany

offensive’sdimensions.



Ifavoredusingtheperiodofwaiting,however,tostrengthenourselvesto 

themaximumextentpossible.IpressedLairdtochangethecompositionofour

withdrawalssothatweretainedasmanyhelicoptersaspossibleformobility.I

alsorecommendedbeefingupourB ‐52s,ourall‐weatheraircraft,andouraircraft

carriers.ToaccomplishtheseobjectivesNixoncalledanNSCmeetingonFebruary

2towhichheinvitedTreasurysecretaryJohnConnally,ashedidinallcases

whereoppositiontoastrongcoursewaslikelyandsupportwasneeded.The

President’slinereflectedthetalkingpoints’Ihadprepared(Icannotfindarecord

ofthemeeting):



IwillnotacceptanyfailurewhichcanbeattributedtoalackofavailableUSsupportor

shortcomingsinourownleadershipordecisiveness.WemustdoallwecantoassisttheSouth

VietnameseandtoensurethattheyhaveboththemeansandthewilltomeetHanoi’s

challengethisyear.



Inthefinalanalysiswecannotexpecttheenemytonegotiateseriouslywithusuntilhe

isconvincednothingcanbegainedbycontinuingthewar.Thiswillrequireanalloutefforton

ourpartduringthecomingdryseason.Icanthinkofnomorecrucialperiodinthispainful

conflictandIexpecteachofyoutobringpromptlytomyattentionanyproposalyoumight

haveforadditionalstepswhichmightbetakentoguaranteesuccess.



NixonmadedecisionsatNSCmeetingsonlyintherarestofcases.He

wantedtoavoidpressurewhilehewasintheroom.Hedidnotlikethe

implicationthattheNSChadanyroleotherthanadvisory.Thereforehewaited

untiltheafternoontoorderthereinforcements:anothercarrier,moreB‐52s,and

additionalall‐weatherplanes.



Meanwhile,wewereconfrontedwiththecontradictorynecessitiesofour

domesticsituation.Theseundercutatleastpartofourreadinessmeasures.On

January13,evenwhileNorthVietnameseforcesweremassing,wethoughtit

necessarytoannounceawithdrawalofanother70,000AmericantroopsbyMay

1.Inlessthanthreeyearswehadwithdrawn480,500ofthe545,000troopsthat

wehadfoundinVietnamwhenweenteredoffice.Wehaddonesowhile

improvingthemilitarysituationandextendingtheareacontrolledbythe

governmentinSouthVietnam.Buttheappetiteforwithdrawalswasinsatiable;

retreathadbecomeanendinitself.AndsobyearlyMarch,withadecisive

offensiveclearlyapproaching,wefoundourselvesintheanomalouspositionof

augmentingwithforcesthatdidnotcountagainstthetroopceiling—B‐52s,

aircraftcarriers—whilecontinuingthepromisedwithdrawalsofgroundtroops

andplanningtheannouncementofthenextroundofwithdrawals,whichwould

beexpectedaboutMay1.NeitherNixonnorIthoughtwecouldrisk themost

sensibledecision,whichwouldhavebeento haltwithdrawalswhenamajor

offensivewasimminent.



Marchthusturnedintoaperiodofwaitingandofdecisionsthatreflected

thenationalschizophrenia:withdrawalswerecombinedwithreinforcements;

threatsofretaliation alternatedwithfleetingmomentsofhopethatmaybefor

onceHanoiwasbluffing.Wewereneitheranxiousnorconfident,butrather

resignedtoevents.GeneralAbrams,expectingsimultaneousattacksacrossthe

DMZandintheCentralHighlands,nowbegantocontemplatethefurther

possibilityofa thirdconcurrentenemythrustfromacrosstheCambodianborder

facingMilitaryRegion3.OnMarch10ItoldNixontoexpectanattackwithinten

daysonthreefrontsinSouthVietnam.I urgedhimtostayhishandagainstthe

Northitselfuntilanyfair‐mindedpersoncouldseethatitwasnotwewhohad

soughtatestofarms;thenweshouldhitingreatforce.Inthemeantimethe

recentlyarrivedairreinforcementsshouldbeusedtointerrupttheenemybuildup

inSouthVietnam,Laos,andCambodiaandinhibit thelaunchingoftheoffensive

foraslongaspossible.Nixonsuggestedwhatheconsidereda“Churchillian

strategy”:tostanddownallouraircraftinsoutheastAsiafora fewdaysandthen

usethemallatonceinone massiveblow.Isawneitherharmnorgreatsenseinit.

Lairdagreedtodoit.Fortwodaysallplanesstooddownandonthethirdtheyall

flew.Idonotknowwhetheritmadeanydifference;itsurelymusthavedriven

Hanoi’sintelligenceanalystscrazytryingtofigureoutwhatwewereupto.

Whateverthereason,whetherbecauseoftheairattacksorouroffensivesofthe

previoustwodryseasons,thedatefortheoffensivewasconstantlyslipping.Our

intelligencewasgrowingdaily,however,thatitwouldbeuponusinfullforce

beforetoomanyweekshadpassed.



<<Contents>>



****



Diplomaticmaneuvers



sthenorthVietnamesemilitarypreparationsthreatenedthreefrontsin

Vietnam,sowewereactiveonthreediplomatic fronts—withHanoi,Moscow,

andpeeking.WecontinuedthestrategysurfacedbyNixoninhisJanuary25

speech,whenherevealedoursecretnegotiationswithHanoi,tobringhometo

theAmericanpeoplethattheirgovernmenthadexploredeveryavenuetoward

peaceandtomakecleartoHanoithatthenegotiatingoptionwasstillopen.Asi

toldawhitehousepressconferenceonJanuary26,thedayafterthepresident’s

speech:nowthequestionis:istheretobeanotherroundofwarfare?Webelieve

thatwecancontaintheoffensive,anditisevenpossible,ma ybeevenprobable,

thatthereasontheymaketheoffensiveisasapreludetoasubsequent

negotiation.Thisatleasthasbeentheirpatternin1954andwastheirpatternin

1968.Sothisisanattempttosaytothemonceagain,“itisnotnecessary.Let’s

getthewaroverwithnow.”LaterthatdayImade thesamepointprivatelyto

anotherjournalist.ItoldhimthattheNorthVietnamesewouldprobably“shoot

theirwad”militarilylaterintheyearand,iftheeffortfailed,wouldnegotiateon

thebasisofsomethinglikeourcurrentproposal.



NixonandIbothsought toendthewarasrapidlyaspossible.Buttherewas

anuanceofdifferencebetweenusoverthestrategyfordoingso.Myaimwasto

weaveacomplexwebthatwouldgiveusthegreatestnumberofoptions.Though

favoringastrongmilitaryreaction,Ineverwantedtorelyonpoweraloneor,for

thatmatter,onnegotiationbyitself.Inmyviewdiplomacyandstrategyshould

supporteachother.Ialwaysfavoredprecedingoratleastaccompanyinga

militarymovewithadiplomaticone,evenwheniratedthechancesofsuccessas

low.Ifitwereaccepted,wewouldachievethegoalofourdiplomacy.Ifrejected,

aconciliatoryofferwouldhelpsustainourmilitaryeffortwithourpublic.By

preemptingcritics’chargesthatwehadsomehowmissedopportunities,we

wouldenhanceourenduranceinholdingoutforhonorableterms—whichwasthe

nameofthegameinVietnam.Tobesure,ourexchangeswiththeNorth

Vietnameseweresecret.ButIalwaysconductedthemwiththeirultimatepublic

impactinmind.Ifpressedtoofar,wehadtheoptiontodisclosethemaswehad

doneinNixon’sspeechesofNovember3,1969,andJanuary25,1972.



Nixonwasingeneralwaryofnegotiations.Hewaslessinterestedin

increasingouroptionsthanhewasinthepublicimpactoffailure.Hewasafraid

thatHanoi—aswellashisconse rvativeconstituency—mightconfusenegotiations

withweakness.IagreedwithhimthatHanoiwasseeking tousenegotiationsto

undermineourdomesticsupport.Ididnotthinkwecouldcounteractthisstrategy

byrefusingtonegotiate.Thiswouldonlyputusinthepositionofbeingthe

intransigentpartyandmobilizeagainstusthesamepressuresthathadbrought

downLyndonJohnsonandsplitourcountry.Iwasconfidentthatifweaccepted

Hanoi’sdiplomaticchallengewecouldturnittoouradvantagebyelaboratingour

definitionofanhonorablepeace;attheveryleastwewoulddefusetheargument

thatwewerenotdoingenoughtoendthewar.



ThereforeialwaysadvisedNixontokeepsomeofferbeforeHanoi—evenif

onlyanoffertomeet.Thiswouldenableustodealwiththeperiodicnew

communistproposals(theeightpoints,thesevenpoints,thetwo‐point

elaboration,andsoon)fromastanceofhavinganalternativeprogram.Itgaveus

anopportunitytotestwhetherHanoiwaswillingtosettleandaprograminthe

nameofwhichtoresistifhonorabletermsremainedunavailable.Onthefew

occasionswhenwegaveupthisposture—bycancelingplenarymeetingsor

refusingtosendanambassadortothepeacetalks,forexample—wesoonfound

ourselvesbuffetedbythenorthVie tnameseandourmediaandcongressional

criticsinapublicdebate overproceduralissues.Ithereforeurgedthatwecouple 

Nixon’sJanuary25speechwithaprivatemessagetoHanoisuggestingthe

resumptionofprivatemeetings.Nixonreluctantlywentalong.Themessagewas

sentonJanuary26. 



Atthesametime,wecommunicatedwithMoscowandPeking.Nixonsent

alettertoBrezhnev;anotewasdeliveredbygeneralWalterstoHuangChen,the

ChineseambassadorinParis,whowasstillfunctioningasourprincipalcontact.

Bothcommunicationsmade essentiallythesamepoint:wehadgonetothelimit

ofwhatwecouldhonorablyoffer.WewouldreactstronglyifHanoiresponded

withamilitaryoffensive.



BothPekingandMoscowwerebecomingrestless.Neitherwantedtobe

perceivedasderelictinitsdutytoitsNorthVietnameseally,lestitlosesupportin

therivalrywithinthecommunistworld.Neitherwaseagertopullourchestnuts

outofthefire.YetbothfearedthatHanoiinitsintractabilitymightthwartmajor

designswithusthathadmaturedoveraper iodofyears.Andtheyfearedthatour

militaryreactionwouldsharpentheirdilemma.Bythreateningseriousreprisalsif

Hanoichallengedus,wedidourbesttofeedthenervousnessofMoscowand

Peking.



Peking’sreply—intheprivatechannelusedwheneverchina(orMoscow,

forthatmatter)soughttoavoidapublicrow—disclaimedallknowledgeofthe

Vietnamnegotiations;itassertednonationalorideologicalinterest,onlyitsmoral

obligationtowardabeleagueredpeopletowhichitowedanhistoricaldebt.China

hadneveraskedtheUnitedStatestomakeanycommitmentsoverVietnam,the

notestatedsignificantly;norhadchinamadeany,whichwastrue.Chinarejected

anyeffortto“enmesh”itinIndochina.ItseemedtousthatPekingwasineffect

washingitshandsofthewholeaffair.SinceitsmaterialsupportforHanoiwas

marginalbecauseofitslimitedresources,aposture ofindifferencedidnot

conflictwithourpurposes.Andwedidnotpresschinafurther.



Moscowwasmoreassertive,thoughitsbasicthrustwasthesame.Itwas

notsecureenoughtoadmitignoranceofthenegotiations;onthecontrary,the

sovietsflauntedtheirfamiliaritywiththenegotiatingrecord.Ingeneral,Moscow

supportedHanoi’spositionbutwithoutfervor.OnFebruary7Dobrynin,in

conveyingBrezhnev’sreplytoNixon’smessage,tookcaretopointoutthatthe

argumentsmadeagainstourlatestproposalwerenotputforwardinMoscow’s

name;theywereallascribedtothenorthVietnamese.Moscowcouldnotstickto

thiscomplexpositionforever.Butthesovietunionprocrastinatedforan

uncommonlylongperiod—welloveraweek—beforefinallyendorsingHanoi’s

negotiatingposition.EventhatendorsementwaselicitedonlyaftertheNorth

VietnameseambassadorhadcalledonpremierKosygin.Thatmeetingwas

describedbyPravdaashavingtakenplaceattheambassador’srequest—which

indicatedasovietefforttodissociatefromitsclient.Andtheirtalktookplaceina

spiritof“friendshipandcomradelyfrankness,”whichincommunistparlance

generallymeanssomedisagreement.TheTasscommentarywasnoticeablycool.



ButwecouldnotletMoscow disengageaseasilyastheChinese.Almostall

oftheweaponsbeingassembledforHanoi’sassaultweresoviet.IfMoscowdid

notencourageHanoi’smilitaryeffort(asitconstantlyclaimed),itsurelymadeit

possible.Wehadlongsincedecided,therefore,toturnonMoscowifanoffensive

developed.IwarnedDobryninrepeatedlythattheMoscowsummitwouldbe

jeopardizedifHanoisoughttoforceamilitarydecision.TogiveMoscowan

additionalincentivetopressitsallyiacceptedearlyintheyeartheKremlin’s

repeatedinvitationtogotoMoscowtohelppreparethesummitwiththesoviet

leadership.However,ImademyvisitconditionalonsomemovebyMoscowto

endthewar,preferablyaNorthVietnamesenegotiatorinMoscowempoweredto

settle.



TheremattersrestedwiththeSovietUnionwhileNixonvisitedchina.After

returning,wereceivedlow‐keyprotestsfromPekingandMoscowaboutalleged

AmericanbombingattacksagainstNorthVietnamese.ApparentlyHanoiwas

givingitsalliesthesamemisinformationitusedtoinfluenceourpublicopinion

andasapretexttodelaynegotiations.Therewasinfactnobasisforthecharge,

becausewehaddeliberatelyheldourfireagainstNorthVietnamduringthe

president’svisittoPeking,despitetheincreasinglyominous NorthVietnamese

buildupinJanuaryandFebruary.Andwerestrainedourairoperationsinmarchto

avoidtheperennialdebateastowhetherwehad“provoked”thecommunist

assault.Hanoihadobviouslyputupits“fraterna l”communistalliesto their

demarches;theycouldnotrefusetoma kethem,buttheyshowedtheir

discomfortbysimplygoingthroughthemotions.



Whileallthemajorpowers—theUnitedStates,China,andtheSoviet

Union—werepaintingonacanvaslargerthanIndochina,therewasonegroupof

menwithonlyoneconcernandamonomaniacalpassion:thePolitburoinHanoi.

Notusedtobeingonthedefensive,theyrespondedtothePresident’sJanuary25

speechbyannouncingonFebruary2their“two‐pointelaboration”oftheseven

pointstheyhadputforwardthepreviousJuly.Butthesepointsweresoobscure

andemptythattheywerenotembracedevenbythemostardentofHanoi’s

supportersinthewest.OnFebruary14wereceiveda replytoournoteofJanuary

26,whichhadproposedanothermeetingwithLeDucTho.Toourastonishment

Hanoiaccepted.Itbrokewithprecedentbyproposing adateforanytime

convenienttousafterMarch15.



Weshouldhavebeenalertedbytheexcessivelyconciliatorytone,sooutof

keepingwithpastNorthVietnamesepracticeandsoinconsistentwiththefrantic

militarypreparationsgoingonabovethedemilitarizedzone.Neverbeforehad

Hanoiproposedadatesofarahead.(Thieu,beingVietnamese,spottedthislast

featureimmediatelywhenweinformedhim,aswealwaysdid.)Neverhaditleft

thedatetoourconvenience. Hadwereflected,wemighthaveconcludedthat

Hanoiwasgearingtheresumptionofnegotiationstothetimingofitsforthcoming

offensive.Itwantedtohavetalkstakeplaceunderconditionsofmaximum

pressureanddiscomfitureforus.Butevenifwehadcometothatconclusion,we

wouldnothavechangedcourse.DelayingacounterblowagainstNorthVietnam

untilaftertheoffensivehadstartedwouldstillputusintothebest politicaland

psychologicalpositiontoovercometheapproachingonslaughtandtosustainour

retaliationpublicly.



OnFebruary16,theeveofourdepartureforchina,werespondedtoHanoi

byproposingMarch20forthemeetingwithLeDucTho.Wewarnedthat“The

attempttoplaceonesideundermilitaryduressbyescalatingthelevelofmilitary

activityisinconsistentwiththepurposeofthesemeetings.” OnFebruary29(after

wehadleftchina),VoVanSung,Hanoi’sdelegateinParis,summoned General

WalterstoinformhimthatHanoiwas“ofcourseagreeabletoameetingonthe

20thofMarchat11:30,”astheUnitedStateshadproposed.Thatgenteel

formulation,too,wasunusual.Itwasfarfroma matterofcoursethatHanoi

wouldacceptadateweproposedthisfarahead;itwasdownright

unprecedented.Again,wepaidthenuancenospecialheed.



AfewdayslaterHanoimadeanabout‐face.OnMarch6itinformedusthat

March20wasnolongersuitable;itwantedtopostponethemeetingtoApril15.

Thepretextwasweak,evenfishy:thattheUnitedStateshadengagedin

extensiveaerialattacksjustbeforeandjustafterthePresident’striptoPeking.

Notonlywasthechargeuntrue,itwasabsurd,forHanoihadacceptedthemarch

20datetwoweeksaftersomeofthefictitiousairattackswereallegedtohave

takenplace.AsforattacksafterHanoihadreplied, theywouldhavebeentotally

inconsistentwithourstrategy.Wewerestayingwellclearofthenorthprecisely

toavoidthissortofaccusation.



Bynowithadbecomeevidenttousthatitwastheforthcomingoffensive

whichcontrolledthetimingofNorthVietnamesediplomacy.Theywouldlaunch

theassaultthattheyweresofreneticallypreparingandthenusemymeetingwith

LeDucThotoinhibitourmilitaryresponse;theythoughtwewouldhesitateto

attackwhilea“negotiation”wasgoing on.Butthistimethemaneuverwastoo

crude;Hanoihadoverplayeditshand.Thebetterourpublicrecordforhaving 

soughtanegotiatedalternative,thebetterourpositiontorespondviolentlytoan

offensive—asweweredeterminedtodo.Ourrecordofhavingsought

negotiationswouldnowbeimpeccablewhenwemadeitpublic.Nofair‐minded

personcouldbeunderanyillusionaboutHanoi’scynicism.



Sowereactedonlyverbally.OnMarch13wereturnedaverysharpnote

goingovertherecordofourexchanges.We“utterlyrejected”Hanoi’scharges:“a

carefulrecheckingofthefactsmakesclearthattheallegationsofU.S.aerial

attacksintheperiodMarch1toMarch6istotallyunfounded.”Indiplomatic

languagewewerecallingtheleadersinHanoiliars.Wedeclinedtheoffertomeet

onApril15(IhadtentativelyplannedavisittoJapanforthatdate)andsuggested

April24.Weusedtheoccasiontorepeatourwarningagainstescalationof

militaryactivity.



AllthistimetheplenarysessionsinPariswereproceedingacrosstheround

tableatavenueKléber.Startingthemhadrentourcountryin1968.Butthey

alreadyhadachievedagreatdistinctio nintheannalsofdiplomacy.Infouryears

ofnegotiationandmorethan140meetingsnoteventhemostminorissuehad

beensettled;itwastheonlyregularconferenceofsuchlengththatcouldnot

pointtoasingleaccomplishment,howevertrivial.(Norwasthisrecordevertobe

broken;thesettlementwasachievedinadifferentforum;theconference’sonly

roleinthepeacemakingprocesswasthefinalsigningceremonyontheaccords

after174fruitlessmeetings.)Eachweektheplenipotentiariesassembledinthe

HotelMajestic.Eachambassadorreadasetspeechandmadeonerebuttal;then

theyadjourned.Afterwardeachbriefedthepressseparatelyabouthis(orher)

eloquentpresentation.ForXuanThuyandMadameNguyenThiBinh,thepress

conferenceswereclearlymoreimportantthanthemeetingsthemselves.



ThreedistinguishedambassadorshadrepresentedtheAmericanside

duringthischarade:HenryCabotLodge,DavidBruc e,andnowWilliamPorter.

Notenoughcanbesaidforthededicationandabilitywithwhichtheyacquitted

themselves.EachwasbackedupbyoneofthemostextraordinaryForeignService

OfficersIknow:PhilHabib,anenergeticandindomitablede puty, whoheldour

delegationtogetherandbuttressedhissuperiorsuntilhewasappointed

ambassadortoKoreain1971.Toendureweeklyharangueswithoutanyhopefor

abreakthrough,whichtheyknewmustcomeintheprivatechannel,required

unusualreservesofpatience,devotion,andself‐discipline.Theywereallnow

briefedfullyaboutmymeetingswithLeDucTho,andIoftensoughttheiradvice.

(IhadeveninvitedDavidBrucetositin,butsincehisSouthVietnamesecolleague

wouldnotbeattending,Brucethoughtitbesttobeinformedratherthanto

participate.WilliamPorterfinallysatinonthelaststageofthenegotiationsin

1972.)