Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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NixonhadneverlikedtheplenarysessionsatavenueKléber.Heassociated

themwiththebombinghalt,whichhethoughthadnearlycosthimtheelectionin

1968.HeconsideredthattheygavetheNorthVietnameseaweeklyforumon

televisiontoundermineourdomesticsupport.Andheconstantlysoughtwaysto 

diminishtheirimportance.In1969hehadrefusedtonameareplacementforthe

retiredLodgeforsevenmonths.Nowheseizedtheoccasionagain.

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WhenHanoididnotrespondtoourmarch31noteforaweek,Nixon

suspendedtheParissessions.InhisMarch24newsconferencehesaidthatwe

weretryingto“breakafilibuster”;theenemywasusingtheParisforumfor

propagandaandonthisbasis“therewasnohopewhatever.”

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Iwasnotmuchinfavorofthismove.Inmyview,itwouldhavebeenbetter

toreserveabreak‐offinParisasretaliationfortheoffensive.TheNorth

Vietnamesewereboundtoattackitasfurtherevidenceofourintransigence.

Theywouldstartapropagandacampaigntogetusbacktotheconferencetable.

Americancriticswouldpickupthetheme.Soonerorlaterwewouldyield;what

hadstartedasapressuretacticwouldthusbeseenintheendasadiplomatic

retreat.Andthisisexactlywhathappened.Hanoiwasnotabouttogiveupits

propagandaforum;itsawintheParisconferencethelegalunderpinningofthe

bombinghalt.Justasin1969theyhadreactedtoourrefusaltoreplaceLodgeby

makingprogressconditionalonourappointingaseniorrepresentative,sonow

theydidtheirutmosttoresurrecttheParisconference.OnMarch27,withits

offensivepreparationsnearlycomplete,HanoiacceptedourdateofApril24fora

privatemeeting—onconditionthatthepublictalkswereresumedbeforethen.

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IsuggestedtoNixonthatwegoalong.Wewouldbeata propaganda

disadvantageifthesecretmeetingsfailedsimplybecausewerefusedtoattend

plenarysessionswhosesubjectmatterwasafteralllargelyinourcontrol.Since

plenarysessionswerealwaysscheduledaweekinadvance,Isuggeste dthat

AmbassadorPorterproposeanewplenarysessionforApril13.Ifthesecret

meetingonApril24provedsterile,wecouldtheninterrupttheplenarysessions

again.Bythenwewouldknowmoreabouthowtheoffensivewasgoing.Nixon

agreed.

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OnApril1,whenwewereasyetuncertainwhethertheattackacrossthe

DMZwasamajoroffensiveoraprobe,wereturnedourreplytotheNorth

Vietnameseproposals.Ourpur pose,asIinformedBunker,wasto“writean

impeccablerecordofreasonableness”andtogiveHanoialastwarningthatwe

werereachingthelimitsofourrestra int.WetoldHanoithatPorterwould

proposeaplenar ysessionforApril13andonthisbasiswewereplanningfora

secretmeetingonApril24.Themessageconcludedwithanothergravewarning:

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TheU.S.sidepointsoutthatthemilitaryoperationslaunchedbytheNorthVietnamese

inrecentdaysneartheDemilitarizedZoneandelsewhereandthefiringofmissilesfromNorth

VietnameseterritoryintoSouthVietnameseairspaceareinconsistentwiththepurposeofthese

meetings.TheU.S.sidehasbeenshowinggreatrestraintinitsresponseinordertogive

negotiationseverychancetosucceedbutitcannotremainindifferentifthestep‐upofmilitary

operationscontinues.

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Thediplomaticminuetwasabouttobeoverwhelmedbythefuryofthe

battle.OnApril2,thedayourmessagewasdeliveredtotheNorthVietnamese,

thefullextentoftheoffensivebecameclear,includingitsblatantviolationofthe

1968understandingstorespect theDemilitarizedZone.Butthistimewehad

preparedourgroundwithgoodeffect.Havingtriedourutmosttoheadoffatest

ofarms,wewereinastrongpsychologicalpositiontoresist;andmilitarilywe

weredeterminedtoprevail.

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<<Contents>>

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****

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Whatstrategy?

O

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ncethescaleoftheoffensivebecameapparent,severalschoolsofthought

developedwithinourgovernment.Animportantgroupofofficialsthought

thatweshouldleteventstaketheircourse,continuingourpresentlevelof

assistancebutnotaugmentingitforthecrisis.Thisview—heldbythecivilian

officialsinDefense,muchoftheStateDepartment, andthesystemsanalysis

expertsonmystaff—restedonthepropositionthattheconclusivetestof

Vietnamizationwasathand.Therefore,weshouldstrengthenSouthVietnam’s

capacitytodefenditself;weshouldnotincreaseourowneffort.“Weall

recognize,”saidasummarymemorandumsubmittedtomebymystaff,“thatthe

keyisnotwhatwedobutwhattheSouthVietnamesedo.”

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ButneitherNixonnorIrecognizedanysuchthing.NorthVietnamhad

brutallyandcynicallychosenatestofarms.Ithadplayedwithusformonths,

usingnegotiationsasasmokescreenforamassiveinvasion.Forthreeyearsithad

rejectedalleffortstonegotiateseriously.OnMarch20,tendaysbeforethe

offensive,NorthVietnamesePremierPhamVanDongmadeanegregiouspublic

speechrejectingtheveryconceptofcompromise:“Now,asinthepast,theU.S.

aggressorsareindulginginthiscontention:‘eachsidemustgohalfwayin

negotiation,thesevenpointsmustbeconciliatedwiththeeightpoints,andso

on.’thisisthelogicofagangster.”PeacecouldcomeonlyiftheUnitedStates

ceased“allitssupportandcommitmentstotheNguyenVanThieupuppet

regime.”Now,asbefore,weweregivenonlyonewayoutofthewar—to

dismantleourallyandwithdrawunconditionally.Wehadrejectedsurrenderat

theconferencetable;wewouldrefuseitonthebattlefield.

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StartingonApril2,NixonandIreviewedthesituationseveraltimesaday.

TheWashingtonSpecialActionsGroupmetvirtuallyeveryday.OnApril3Itold

thePresidentthattheattackwouldnowprecipitatematters;wewouldgetno

awardsforlosingwithmoderation.Ifwedefeatedtheoffensive,wewouldgeta 

settlementoutofit.TheNorthVietnamesehadthrowneverythingintotheir

effort;ifitfailed,theywouldhavenochoiceexcepttonegotiate.Iftheywaited

untilaftertheelection,theymighthavetofaceapresidentwhoseunpredictable

reactionstheyhadcometofearandwhowasfreedfromanyelectoralpressures

duringhisfinalterm.



Nixonneedednoreminders.Hehadwarnedforyearsthathewouldreact

stronglytoaNorthVietnameseoffensive.Andhewasasgoodashisword.

Againstintensebureaucraticopposition,heorderedrepeatedaugmentationsof

ourairandnavalforcesinSoutheastAsia.Hetookoffallbudgetaryrestraintson

airsorties.Hedirectednavalattacksextendedtwenty‐fivemilesupthecoastof

NorthVietnam.OnApril4heauthorizedtacticalairstrikesuptotheeighteenth

parallelinNorthVietnam(seethemapbelow).TwentyadditionalB‐52s,four

moresquadronsofF‐4fighter‐bombers,andeightmoredestroyersweresentto

SoutheastAsia.OnApril4ItoldtheWSAGthatthepresidentwasdeterminedto

defeattheoffensive.IfwewererunoutofVietnamundertheseconditions,our

entireforeignpolicywouldbeinjeopardy.Hanoihadcommittedsomany

resourcestotheeffortthatoncestopped,itwouldalmost certainlybeobligedto

settle.Iaskedeveryagencytogiveabsoluteprioritytodefeatingtheoffensive.

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Butitproveddifficulttotranslatethisdeterminationtothebattlefield.One

reasonwasthefoulweather,which,toourfrustration,groundedmostofour

planesduringthefirstweek.Morefundamentalwastheframeofmindthathad

developedamongourmilitaryleadersduringadecadeofrestraintsandthree

yearsofwithdrawal.“Ourimpression,”ItoldtheWSAGonApril5,“isthatour

commandershavehaditdrilledintotheirheadsthatwewantaminimumof

activityandthattheywillreceiverewardsforgettingoutfast.Theyarenot

aggressiveenough.”Evenafterthemessagehadgottenacross,serious

differencesdevelopedbetweenthefieldcommander(backedbyLaird)andthe

WhiteHouse.ForfouryearsGeneralAbramshadperformed,withdignity,oneof

themostthanklessjobseverassignedtoanAmericangeneral.Hetookovera 

forceof540,000menin1968butwasimmediatelyshackledbymounting

restrictions.Hewascontinuallygivenassignmentsthatmadenomilitarysense.

Startinginthemiddleof1969,hewasaskedtodismantlehiscommandatan

ever‐acceleratingratewhilemaintainingthesecurityofSouthVietnamand

puttingtheSouthVietnameseforcesintoapositionfromwhichtheycould

undertaketheirowndefense.Hesucceededtoaremarkabledegree.Bythetime

Hanoistruckin1972,moreofthecountrysidethaneverbeforewasunder

Saigon’scontrol;mostoftheSouthVietnameseunitshadvastlyimproved.Still,

deepdown,GeneralAbramsknewthathewasengagedinaholdingactionina

battleforwhichevenasmallstrategicreserveofAmericangroundforceswould

almostsurelyhavebeendecisive.Forthreeyearshiscommandhadbeenturned

intoawithdrawalheadquarters.Nowhewasurgedtowinthecrucialfinalbattle.



Itisintendedasnoderogationofa superbmilitaryleadertosaythat

GeneralAbramscouldnotadjustrapidlytothisnewsituation.Ihadmethimfor

thefirsttimein1961duringmyshorttenure asWhiteHouseconsultantwhen,as

thecommanderofthearmoreddivisionresponsibleforBerlincontingency

planning,hehadgivenmeabrilliantbriefing.Hehadthenexudeddaringand

imagination.ButfouryearsoffrustrationinSaigonhadtakentheirtoll.Torn

betweenhisconvictionsandhisobediencetocivilianauthority,heincreasingly

tookrefugeinro utine.Hisrefusaltochangenormaloperatingprocedureseven

fortheLaosoperationcontributedtoitsfailuretoachievedecisive results.(The

basicfault,however,wastoattemptdecisiveresultswithinsufficientforces,for

whichallseniorofficials,includingmyself,mustbeartheresponsibility.)Andin

1972hesawtheNorthVietnameseoffensiveinstrictlylocalterms.Forthree

yearsWashingtonhadbeenhurryinghimoutofVietnam;nowitsuddenlyurged

himtoprevailwithhisshrunkenassets.Hisresponsesweretesty,occasionally

pedantic,disquisitionsontheprerogativesofthefieldcommander.Thisfinally

drovemeatonepointtotellMoorerinexasperationthattheCommander‐in‐

Chiefhadsomeprerogativesaswell.



OneoftheobstaclesthatpreventedAbramsfromraisinghissightswasthe

bizarrewaytheaircampaignhadbeenorganizedthroughoutthewar.Ittold

moreaboutthePentagonbureaucracythanaboutmilitaryrealities;indeed,it

showedthatWashington’sorganizationa lrequirementsoverrodestrategy.For

purposesofairoperationsNorthVietnamwasslicedintomanysegments—called

RoutePackages—withdifferentmilitarycommandershavingjurisdictionover

particulartargetareas.(seethemapabove.)OnlythePacificCommandinHawaii, 

CINPAC,fourthousandmilesaway,wasresponsibleforthewholecampaign.How

andbywhatreasoningtheseRoutePackageswereestablishedin1965mustbe

leftforastudentofbureaucraticpsychology.



TheSeventhAirForcehadresponsibilityfortargetsintheHanoiarea,the

northwestraillines,andabovetheDMZ(RoutePackages1,5,and6a).The

SeventhFleetcontrolledtheplanestargetedagainstHaiphongandnortheastern

NorthVietnam(RoutePackages2,3,4,and6b).Alltheseunitsexceptone

reportedtocommandersofthePacificAirForceandPacificFleet,respectively,

whointurnreportedtoCINPACinHonolulu.GeneralAbramshadauthorityonly

overtargetsinsouthernmostNorthVietnam(RoutePackage1);inthatareathe

SeventhAirForcereportedtohim.AllocationofB‐52swasseparateandequally

complex.ThesewerecontrolledbyourStrategicAirCommand(SAC)and

allocatedincoordinationwithAbramsforSouthVietnamandsouthernmost

NorthVietnam;fortheotherRoutepackages,SACcoordinatedwiththe

appropriatecommand.



Inshort,therewasinstitutionalizedschizophrenia.Assoonasaircraftleft

targetsinRoutePackage1,Abramshadnofurthercontroloverthem;he

thereforecouldnottellwhethertheaircampaignintheNorthwaseasingthe

immediatepressuresonhimordivertingresources.Hetendedtothelatterview.

TheairwarintheNorthwasconceptuallyandorganizationallyseparatedfrom

thewarintheSouth.This,atleastasmuchaspoliticalrestrictionsfrom

Washington,producedtherandomqualityoftheaircampaignandtheconstant

disputesoverpriorities.Nixonatmyurgingmadeseveralattemptstochange

thesecommandarrangements;indeed,heorderedachangejustbeforethe

resumptionofunrestrictedbombingofNorthVietnam.ButLairdandMoorer

resistedfuriously.Thesamevestedintereststhathadproducedtheoriginal

patternopposedanychange;LairdandMoorerfeltthattheyhadenoughontheir

handswithouttakingonaninternalrowthislateinthegame.Likealmostallof

Nixon’sattemptsatreorganization,itaborted.Nixondecidedthathecouldnot

riskaninternalsplitjustashewasenteringthebiggestforeignpolicycrisisofhis

Presidency.



AdisputewasthereforeinevitablebetweenthecommandinSaigonand

otherdecision‐makersoverwhetherourairassetsshouldbeconfinedtothe

battleintheSouthorwhetherweshouldstartbombingNorthVietnamasNixon

waseagertodo.NowthatthereweremoreairplanesavailablethanAbrams—or

thePentagon,forthatmatter—hadeverrequested,thecommandinSaigon

neverthelesswantedallofthemtargetedonSouthVietnam.Lairdsupported

AbramsbecausehethoughtthiswouldbestprovethevalidityofVietnamization.

Nixon(asdidI)sawitproducing astalemate.Itwouldnotgenerateenough

pressureonHanoioritsSovietandChinesepatrons;Hanoicouldsimplyhaltits

advanceandsitonitsnewlyconqueredterritory;MoscowandPeking wouldhave

nodecisionstomake.NorthVietnamwouldgetafreeridedespiteitscynical

disregardofthe1968bombinghaltunderstandings.Nowthatthegauntlet had

beenthrowndown,Nixonwasdeterminedonashowdown.Hesawnopointin

furtherdiplomacyuntilamilitarydecisionhadbeenreached.



IagreedwithNixonthatwehadtocarrythewartoNorthVietnam;only

thiscouldnowforceaconclusionofthewar.Atthesametime,ithoughtthatthe

NorthVietnamesehadactedpartlyoutofweakness.Therepeated

postponementsoftheprivatemeetingsindicatedthatHanoimusthavebeen

havinggreatdifficultyinassemblingthenecessaryforcesfortheoffensive.It

occurredtwomonthsafterthedateGeneralAbramshadconsideredtheoptimum

timeforHanoi,andeventhentheNorthVietnamesenevermanagedto

coordinatetheirthree‐prongedoffensive.TheattacksintheCentralHighlands

andonAnLocwerespacedsufficientlyfaraparttoletusthrowthewholeweight

ofourairpoweragainsteachofthemseparately;andevenSaigon’sstrategic

reservecouldbemovedagainsttheuncoordinatedattacksinalimitedway.These

NorthVietnamesedifficultiesreflectedthecombinedimpactoftheCambodian

andLaotianoperationsandofourairinterdiction.Moreover,Hanoiwas

undoubtedlyfeelingthepsychologicalpressureofouroverturestowardPeking

andMoscow.WehadseenreportsofdisagreementsbetweenHanoianditstwo

powerfulalliesformonths.Hanoi’sdispleasurewithPeking,inparticular,found

itswayintosomeofLeDucTho’scommentstome.



WhileNixonandIagreedontheimportanceofanall‐outmilitaryresponse,we

differedonhowtotreatHanoiinrelationtoitspatronsinMoscow andPeking.

WewereincompleteagreementthattherecouldbenoSovietsummitifthe

NorthVietnameseoffensivesucceeded.HecouldnotgotoMoscowaftera

humiliationimposedbySovietarms.ButwhereasNixonwantedtoconfrontHanoi

anditspatronsasagroup,Ipreferreddifferentiatingourpressuresagainst

Moscow,Peking,andHanoisoastoisolateNorthVietnamanddemoralizeit.

Nixonsawindiplomacyasignofpotentialweakness;Iconsidereditaweapon.

NixonwantedtolumpthepurposesofPekingandespeciallyofMoscowwith

Hanoi’s.Ifavoredsharpening thedistinctionbetweentheinterestsofthepatrons

ontheonehandandtheclientontheother.Ultimately,Nixongavehisapproval

formyproposedstrategyofseekingtosplitHanoifromthecommunistgiants,so

longasthisdidnotinterferewithstepped‐upairactionagainsttheNorth.Buthe

wasneverreallycomfortablewithit,ashewastoshowatseveralcrucial

juncturesduringthenextfewweeks.



IbeganbymovinginthedirectionNixonfavored,totheextentofholding

MoscowresponsibleforHanoi’soffensive.Atthesametime,togiveMoscowan

incentivetodissociatefromNorthVietnam,Iemphasizedthelargerinterestsit

wasjeopardizing.OnApril3IsawDobryninintheMapRoomoftheWhiteHouse

andaccusedtheSovietUnionofcomplicityinHanoi’sattack.Iftheoffensive

continued,wewouldbeforcedintomeasurescertaintopresentMoscowwith

difficultchoicesbefore thesummit.Inthemeantimewewouldhavetocalloff

somestepsofspecialconcerntoMoscow.Forexample,Moscowhadaskedusto

sendamessagetoWestGermanleaderstourgetheratificationoftheEastern

treaties,scheduledforavoteinaboutamonth’stime.Wehadbeenre luctantto

intervenetosuchanextentinGermany’sinternalpolitics.WeusedtheNorth

Vietnameseoffensiveasapretexttoavoidwhatwewerereluctanttodoinany

event.Undercurrentconditions,ItoldDobr ynin,wecouldnotbeactiveinBonn.

MoscowcouldnotaskforourassistanceinEuropewhileunderminingour

positioninSoutheast Asia.TheKremlinwasputonnoticethatNorthVietnamese

actionsmightjeopardizesomefundamentalSovietgoals.



ThatsamedayIsentWinstonLordsecretlytoNewYorktoseeHuangHua,

theChineseUNAmbassador.TheformalreasonwastoreplytoaChineseprotest

(conveyed,itshouldbenoted,privately)attheintrusionofAmericanvesselsinto

whatChinaclaimedasterritorialwatersaroundtheParacelIslands(achainof

islandslyingoffthecoastofVietnam).Itwaspartlyadisputeoverthedefinition

ofterritorialwaters.Pekingclaimedtwelvemiles;ourhistoricalpositionhadbeen

threemiles.Lord,knowntotheChinesebecausehehadbeenoneverytripto

ChinaandattendedeverymeetingwithChineseleaders,handedoveran“oral

note”informingHuangHuathatwithoutprejudicetoourlegalpositionon

territorialwatersourNavywouldbeinstructedtostayatadistanceoftwelve

milesfromtheislands.Butthemainportionofournote wasaremindertoPeking

ofourstakeinVietnam.Inthesharpestlanguageeverusedinanyofour

messagestotheChinese,weprotestedChina’spublicbackingoftheNorth

Vietnameseinvasion.Wepoint edoutthatPekingcouldbeunderno

misapprehensionabouttheprofoundimportanceoftheissuefortheUnited

States.Indeed,weemphasized—presciently—thatitcouldnotbeinthelong‐

terminterestofChinafortheUnitedStatestobehumiliatedinIndochina.The

notewarnedthat“majorcountrieshavearesponsibilitytouseamoderating

influenceonthisissueandnottoexacerbatethesituation.”Attemptsto“impose

amilitarysolutionupontheUScanonlyleadtounfortunate consequences.”We

repeatedthatweattached“extremeimportance”totheimprovementofour

relationswithChina—implicitlywarningthatVietnamwasanobstacle.



Onthefollowingday,April4,webegantoholdtheSovietUnionpublicly

accountablefortheoffensive.OnmyinstructionsHaigaskedRobertMcCloskey,

theStateDepartmentpressspokesman,topointoutathisregularbriefingthat

theNorthVietnameseinvasionoftheSouthwasmadepossiblebySovietarms.

McCloskey,perhapstheablestpressofficerIhaveknown,carriedoffthe

assignmentsowellthathetriggeredaseriesofconfirmingcommentsfromother

agencies,raisingspeculationthattheentireUS‐Sovietrelationship,includingthe

summit,wasinjeopardy.Thiswasalittlemorethanwewanted,butiterredin

therightdirection.



Onthesameday,wealsodecidedtobringhometoHanoithatwemeant

business.WehadinformeditthatwewouldresumeplenarysessionsoftheParis

conferenceonApril13.Followingtheelaborateproceduresthatwereininverse

proportiontothesignificanceoftheagenda,thiswouldnormallyhaverequireda