Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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formalproposaltobesubmittedaweekbefore,orbyApril6.Withtheoffensive

mountinginfurybytheday,ithadbecomeabsurdtorequestaplenarysession.

Therefore,weforwardedamessagetoParistobedeliveredonApril6,informing

Hanoithatwehadchangedourminds:



TheGovernmentofNorthVietnamhasintensifiedmilitaryoperationsagainstthe

territoryoftheGovernmentofSouthVietnamtoincludethemostflagrantviolationsofthe

understandingsof1968.Becauseofthisgraveescalationofmilitaryactivity,andtheflagrant

violationoftheGenevaAccordsandtheunderstandingsof1968,AmbassadorPorterwillnot

nowproposeaPlenarySessionforApril13,1972.AdecisionaboutthePlenarySessionforApril

20willdependonthecircumstancesexistingatthattime.



WesaidnothingaboutthesecretmeetingofApril24;weputtheonuson

Hanoitocancelthatifitchose.



Asithappened,ournoteofApril6crossedaNorthVietnamesemessage(in

replytoourpreliminaryproposalofApril1)thatillustratedwhatHanoipromised

itselffromthesecretmeeting.Inthemidstofanoffensivethatviolatedevery

previousunderstanding,ourinsolentinterlocutorsmadetheiragreementtoa

privatemeetingconditionalonourkeepingour“engagement”tohaltthe

bombingoftheNorth.Infact,wehadnotyetreallyresumedbombingbecauseof

theweather.Nevertheless,ittookextraordinarygalltotrytoholdtheUnited

Statestoan“engagement,”everyprovisionofwhichNorthVietnamhadalready

broken.



OnApril6,too,IhadanothermeetingwithDobrynin.Itoldhimthepresent

situationwasintolerable.AsIhadwarnedhiminJanuary,aNorthVietnamese

offensivewouldforceustobringthewartoadecisivemilitaryconclusion.Asfor

theSoviets,eithertheyhadhadahandinplanningitortheirnegligencehad

madeitpossible.Eitherinterpretationraisedunpleasantprospects.Ibriefly

reviewedourpreparationsforthesummit,togiveMoscowa senseofwhatit

stoodtoloseintermsofthevariousagreementsshapingup.Wewouldnow

insist,Istressed,onendingthewarbynegotiationifpossible,byforceif

necessary.



Whileputtingonthediplomaticpressure,wecontinuedthebuildupofour

forces.OnApril9twenty‐eightmoreB‐52sweresenttoGuam.OnApril10afifth

aircraftcarrierwasorderedtoVietnam.ThecruiserNewportandanothercarrier

weremovedfromtheAtlantictoSoutheastAsia.Bytheendofthefirstweekof

ApriltheweatherhadliftedenoughtobeginbombingoftacticaltargetsinNorth

Vietnam.AuthoritywasgiventoattackasfarNorthasthenineteenthparallel.



Antiwarcriticswhodepictedthemilitaryestablishmentaschampingatthe

bittosowdeathanddestructionwouldhavebeenamazedthatalmostall

reinforcementsoccurredovertheoppositionofatleastthecivilianleadershipof

thePentagon.Concernedbythebudgetarycosts,eagertousetheoffensiveto

settlethefateofVietnamization,thePentagonciviliansonthewholemaintained

thattheforcesinthefieldwerealreadysufficie nt. Thismighthavebeenaccurate

enoughbythesophisticatedcalculationsofsystemsanalysis;itwasnotadequate

forthepoliticalgoalofbringingmatterstoaheadandoverawingoutside

intervention.Ifwewantedtoforceadiplomaticsolution,wehadtocreatean

impressionofimplacabledeterminationtoprevail;onlythiswouldbringabout

eitheractiveSovietassistanceinsettlingthewarorelseSovietacquiescencein

ourmountingmilitarypressures,onwhichweweredeterminedshoulddiplomacy 

fail.Nixon’sdrivingleadershipshookthePentagonoutofthetorporinducedby

yearsoffrustration;andIbackedhimupintheday‐to‐daymonitoringofthe

implementationofhisdecisionsandbythedesignofthediplomaticstrategy.



AsthenewforceswerebeingassembledinSoutheastAsia,mystaff

preparedcontingencyplansfortheiruse.AplanningpaperbyAlHaigdatedApril

6,basedonmyinstructions,outlinedourcourseofactionshouldSouth

Vietnameseforcesfailtohalttheoffensive.Itprovidedforthebombingofall

militarytargetsthroughoutNorthVietnam(exceptinabufferzonealongthe

Chineseborder)andfortheminingofallNorthVietnameseports.Itwasineffect

theplanthatwouldbeimplementedonMay8.



Nixonbrieflyplayedwiththeideaofgoingontelevisiontoreportonthe

offensivetotheAmericanpeople.Safirewasassignedtowritethespeech.

The

projectwasabandonedasprematureafterafewdays,aroundApril10.Ifthe

SouthVietnameseheld,therewasnoneedtocreateacrisisatmosphere.Ifthe

NorthVietnameseassaultgainedmomentum,wewouldhavetotakedrastic

measures;thatwouldbetherightmomentforaPresidentialspeech.ButasItold

thePresident,ifwefailed,noteventenspeecheswoulddousanygood.Wehad

asomber,philosophicalconversation.Nixonmusedthatifwefailed,itwas

becausethegreatforcesofhistoryhadmovedinanotherdirection.Notonly

SouthVietnambutthewholefreeworldwouldbelost. “No,”Ireplied,“ifitfails,

we’llhavetotightenourbeltsandturntheforcesaround.”



Wekeptupthediplomaticpressure.OnApril8IsentanotetoEgonBahr,

WillyBrandt’sadviser,warninghimthatwewerereassessingourentireSoviet

policy.TwomilitaryoffensivesagainstAmericaninterestsmadepossiblebySoviet

armswithinthespaceofsixmonthswastoomuch.Wedoubtedthevalueofa

policyofdetenteinthesecircumstances.Bahr,withtheratificationofBrandt’s

Easterntreatieshanginginthebalance,wascertaintoconveythesesentiments

totheSovietAmbassadorinBonn.AndMoscowwouldberemindedthatwewere

notwithoutmeansofpressure.



OnApril9,inwhatsurelywasauniqueexerciseoftriangularpolitics,I

invitedAnatolyDobrynintotheWhiteHousetowatchChinese‐madefilmsofmy

Pekingvisits,whichhehadexpressedaninterestinseeing.AttheendDobrynin

complainedthatourbuildupinSoutheastAsiawasgrowingominous.“Anatol,”I

replied,“wehavebeenwarningyouformonthsthatiftherewereanoffensivewe

wouldtakedrasticmeasurestoendthewaronceandforall.Thatsituationhas

nowarisen.”DobryninvolunteeredthatMoscowwasextremelyinterestedina

successfuloutcomeofmyprojectedprivatemeetingofApril24withLeDucTho

andhadinformedHanoiaccordingly.



Clearly,Moscowwasgettingnervous.IwarnedDobryninthatwewouldno

longeragreetotalkwhilethefightingwasgoingon.Wewouldinsistonanendto

theoffensiveorwewouldtakeevenmoreseriousmeasures.Hedidnotbristleat

thisthreat.TheSovietsrarelybullywhentheybelievetheopponenttobestrong

andserious.DobryninrepliedthathewouldtransmitthiswarningtoMoscow;he

wascertaintherewouldbeanearlyresponse.



AsIhavepointedoutinotherchaptersdescribingcrises,onceembarkedon

confrontationitismoredangeroustostopthantoproceed.Apauseinone’s

movescausestheothersidetowonderwhetherithasseenthelimitofthe

responseandtotestwhetherthestatusquocanbesustained.Confrontations

endwhentheopponentdecidesthattherisksarenotworththeobjective,and

forthistherisksmustbekepthighandincalculable.Wethereforecontinuedto

raiseboththediplomaticandmilitarystakes.OnApril10thePresidentattendeda

StateDepartmentceremonyatwhichhesignedamultilateralconventionbanning

biologicalweapons.Dobryninwaspresent.Nixontooktheoccasiontoremindthe

SovietUnionthata“greatresponsibilityparticularlyrestsuponthegreatpowers”

notto“encouragedirectlyorindirectlyanyothernationtouseforceorarmed

aggressionagainstoneofitsneighbors.”Itwasanothernottoosubtlewarning

thatweheldMoscowaccountableforHanoi’soffensive.



IspoketoDobryninanhourlatertoelaborateonthePresident’sremarks.

WewouldnotstandstillforthetacticbywhichHanoihadwhipsawedusinthe

lasttwoseriesofsecrettalks.IfHanoionceagainpublishednewproposalsinthe

middleofnegotiations,thesecretchannelwouldbeatanend.Dobryninusedthis 

occasiontomentionthatwecouldtakeahundredreporterstothesummitin

Moscow.Clearly,nothinghadyethappenedtochangetheKremlin’spriorities.



Tokeepupthepressure,IaskedHalSonnenfeldt,myprincipaladviseron

Sovietaffairs,whatnegotiationswiththeUSSRwecouldslowdownthatwereof

substantialinteresttotheKremlinleaders.Sonnenfeldtproposed:ensuringthat

theUS‐SoviettalksinMoscowongrainsalesyieldednoresultsfornow;avoiding

unnecessarilyfriendlycontactsduringothernegotiations;maintainingourtough

demandsinthetalksonaLend‐Leasesettlement;freezingotherbilateral

negotiations;usingtheWashingtonvisitofSovietMinisterofCommerceNikolai

Patolichev,scheduledinearlyMay,togetacrossourtoughline;cancelingthe

Patolichevvisitifthesituationdeteriorat ed.Iapprovedallthesesteps.Theone

recommendationIdisapprovedwastoharassSovietshipsonthewaytoCuba—

thisseemedundulyprovocative.



WherewesteppedupourmilitarypressurewasinVietnam.Evenbefore

thePresidentputtheSovietsonnoticeattheStateDepartmentceremony,

twelveB‐52shadstrucksupplydumpsneartheNorthVietnameseportofVinh,

about150milesNorthoftheDemilitarizedZone.ItwasthefirstuseofB‐52sin

NorthVietnambytheNixonAdministration.[

B‐52shadbeenusedagainstNorth

VietnambytheJohnsonAdministrationin1967.

]Itwasawarningthatthingsmightget

outofhandiftheoffensivedidnotstop.



April10wasabusyday.TheChineseForeignMinistryissuedararepublic

criticismofourairattacksonNorthVietnamandhailedCommunistvictoriesin

theSouth.Despiteitspolemictone,weconsideredthestatementtobeminimal

fortheoccasion.Itscondemnationofourbombingdemonstratedideological

solidarity;thecatalogueofCommunistvictoriesforestalledanyclaimon

additionalChineseresources. WenotedthattheChinesestatementfailedto

pledgetheconventional“resolute”supportnordiditdema nd—as previous

statementshad—thattheUnitedStatesacceptHanoi’sterms.Throughoutthe

springandsummer,Chinaconfinedmostofitsproteststotheprivatechannel,

andeventhere,inalmosteverycase,protestedonlyinstancesofAmerican

aircraftorvesselsimpingingonChina’ssovereignairspaceorterritorialwaters.



Bynowtheoffensivewasinfullswingon allthreefronts.Several

CommunistdivisionswereknifingacrosstheDMZdeepintoQuangTriprovincein

MilitaryRegionI.Anattackwasdeveloping intheCentralHighlands,andfurther

SouthagainsttheprovincialcapitalofAnLoc.WerespondedonApril11by

cancelingtheplenarysessionscheduledforApril20.WetoldHanoi:“Inlightof

thecontinuedflagrantviolationoftheDemilitarizedZonebytheNorth

VietnameseandtheextensionofmilitaryoperationsintoMilitaryRegions3and4

ofSouthVietnam,nousefulpurposewouldbeservedbytheholdingofaplenary

sessionoftheParisConferenceonApril20.”Ournoteofferedtoproceedwiththe

secretmeetingofApril24andtoresumeplenariesshouldthatmeetingprove

successful.



ButthepressurewasbeginningtotellonHanoiaswell.Thoughits

offensivewasnowinhighgearitfacedanAmericanbuildupthatwasasmenacing

asourbombingwasunexpected.TheSouthVietnamese,thoughgraduallybeing

drivenback,werestillholding.Toocautiousinattack,theywerefighting

adequatelywhenonthedefensive.OnApril15Hanoiturneddowntheproposed

privatemeetingwithLeDucThoforApril24untilweagreedtoresumethepublic

sessions.Butitdidsoinanuncharacteristicallyhalfheartedwaythatshowed

profoundconfusion.ItsuggestedApril27forresumingtheplenariesandMay6

forthesecretmeeting;May6waschosen,thenotesaid,togiveLeDucThotime

totravel.RarelybeforehadHanoiansweredsorapidlyorofferedanexplanation

foranyofitsdecisions.



Wedecidedtosticktoourstrategy.OnApril16weproposedthatthe

secretmeetingtakeplaceasscheduledonApril24,afterwhichwewouldattend

theplenarymeetingonApril27.TheNorthVietnameserepliedonApril19—again

withunprecedentedspeed.Aftercondemningthe“atrocious”intensificationof

theairandnavalwaragainstNorthVietnam,includingtheB‐52raidsagainst

HanoiandHaiphong(seebelow),Hanoiaddedaslightsweetenertoitsprevious

proposal.ItstucktoApril27fo raplenaryandMay6forasecretmeeting,but

saidthatiftheUnitedStatesannounceditswillingnesstoreturntotheplenaries,

LeDucThowouldleaveimmediatelyforParis.



Bothsideswereclearlyshadowboxing,half‐wantingasecretmeeting,half

not,carefulabovealltoavoidtheonusofcanceling.Ineffect,bothsoughtto

keepthepossibilityopenuntiltheopportunemoment.TheNorthVietnamese

wantedtotimeameetingforthemomentofourmaximumhumiliatio n aftera

massivedefeat.WewantedtoholditonlyaftertheSovietshadbeenbrought

fullyintothegame.Itwouldhavebeena simplematterforustofixsomeformula 

forsimultaneousagreementonsecretandplenary meetings;thiswouldquickly

haveresolvedthematter.ButIwantedtoplaythatcardwithMoscow.



AgreatdealnowdependedonourexchangeswiththeSovietUnion.The

SovietshadbeguntoengagethemselvesinearnestonApril12.Duringaluncheon

toreviewsummitpreparations,Dobryninletitbeknownthatmyplanned(but

shortlytobecanceled)meetingwithLeDucThowascrucial.Heassure dmethat

hisleadershipwasnotinterestedinashowdown.IrepliedthattheSovietshad

putthemselvesintothepositionwhereamiserablelittlecountrycouldjeopardize

everythingthathadbeennegotiatedforyears.TheSovietUnionmust have

knownwhenitsignedtwosupplementaryaidagreementsduringtheyearthatit

wasgivingtheNorthVietnamesethewherewithalto launchanoffensive.What

didtheSovietleadersexpect?DidtheythinkthePresidentwouldruntheriskof

beingdefeatedandhaving 69,000Americanstakenprisoner?Dobryninobjected

thattheNorthVietnamesehadoftenofferedtorepatriateallAmericans

immediately.Isaid“Anatol,thisisnotworthyofcomment,andthatsituationwill

notarise.Theremustbeameetingthismonth.Itmustleadtoconcreteresults,

andifitdoesnottherewillbeincalculableconsequences.”



DobryninrepliedthatitseemedtohimthatavisitbymetoMoscow,which

hadbeendiscussedsinceearlyintheyear,wasnowurgent.Theagendacouldbe

Vietnam,aswellasacceleratedpreparationsforthesummit. ItoldDobryninI

wouldputthisideatothePre sident.



ThepropositionevokedthemostdiverseemotionsinNixon.Helongedfor

thesummit.TobethefirstAmericanPresidentinMoscowstimulatedhissenseof

history;togowhereEisenhowerhadbeenrebuffedwouldfulfillhisambitionto

outstriphisoldmentor.Tobesure,heoftenspokeofcancelingthesummit.But

anyonefamiliarwithhisstyleknewthatsuchqueries,likeoccasionalmusings

abouthisdispensability,

werereallyacallforreassurance.AsIhadlearned

painfullyduringtheIndia‐Pakistanwar,oneactedonthesemusingsatone’speril.

Ontheotherhand,NixondidnotwanttogotoMoscowinapositionof

weakness,andhewassuspiciousofaSovietploytodelayorcomplicateour

plannedmilitarycampaignagainstNorthVietnambydraggingmeintoprolonged

negotiationsinMosc ow.NottheleastofNixon’sconcernswashowhewould

explaintoRogersyetanothersecretmissionbyhissecurityadviser,thistimeto

Moscow,whichhehadpreventedhisSecretaryofStatefromvisitingfornearly

fouryears.(RogershadwantedtomakeanadvancetriptoMoscowtomatchmy

advancetripstoPeking;Nixonhadturnedhimdown.)



Vanitycanneverbecompletelydissociatedinhighofficefromthe

perceptionofnationalinterest.Myeagernesstogowasnodoubtaffectedbymy

senseofthedramatic.Butitsseriousbasiswasthatwehadlittletoloseand

muchtogain.ForthefirsttimeMoscowhadofferedtoengagedirectlyin

discussionsonVie tnamatahighlevelandwithoutconditio ns.Thatmerefactwas

boundtodisquietHanoi.TheKremlincouldnotstringusalong;itcouldgainno

moretimethanthedaysIspentinMoscow.Asforthesummitpreparations,they

providedthevehiclebywhichtoseparateMoscow’sinterestsfromHanoi’s;the

summitwasMoscow’sincentiveeithertopressHanoitowardcompromise orto

acquiesceifweforcedtheissuebymilitarymeans.Ifmytripadvancedthe

prospectsforthesummit—aswaslikely—itwouldhelpneutralizeaSoviet

responsetoourretaliationinSoutheas tAsia;Moscowwouldthenknowclearly

whatpriceitwouldpaybyreactingagainstus.Itwas,ofcourse,possiblethat

Moscowwasplayingthesamegame.Butwehadmoretolose inVietnamthan

Moscowstoodtogainbyourhumiliation.Thusinanoddwayourbargaining

positionwasstronger;ourthreatsweremoreplausible. 



Nixonatfirstagreedwithmyarguments.OnApril12heauthorizedmeto

informDobryninthatIwouldarriveinMoscowonApril20.Ievenresurrectedthe

proposaltomeetaseniorNorthVie tnameseofficialinMoscow,anofferunlikely

tobeacceptedbutusefulinkeepingtheKremlinonthedefensiveandusinthe

positionofbeingreadytonegotiate.ButNixon’smoodfluctuated.OnApril12he

urgedmetodiscussnotonlyVietnaminMoscowbutalso thesummit.However,

byApril15hewasworriedthatBrezhnevwould“filibuster”meandourhands

wouldbetiedmilitarilyforaweek.Thesummitwassuretogodownthedrainif

weplayedour“holecard” ofblockadeagainsttheNorth.Perhapsweshould

preemptbycancelingthesummitourselves,hetoldme.Iassuredhimthateven

whileIwasinMoscowwecouldbomballoverNorthVietnamexceptinthe

sensitiveareaofHanoiandHaiphong.Moreover,mytriptoMoscowwoulditself

bea“holecard” toneutralizedomesticcr iticsandSovietresponses.NordidI

believethatcancellationofthesummitwasacertainty.Nixonthenagreedthat

mytripwas“agoodthingtodo…Ithinkit’sright;you’vejustgottogo,” hesaid.

Henowwassurethat“thestrategy,whichyouandIbothagreeon,istheright

one”—butheclearlywantedreassurance.Atanyrate,Nixon’smemoirsleaveno

doubtthatbytheendofthedayonApril15hecamebacktotheconclusionthatI

shouldproceed.



TomakesurethatbothHanoiandMoscowunderstoodourdetermination,

Ihadrecommended,andNixonhadapproved,adramatictwo‐dayB‐52attackon

fuelstoragedepotsintheHanoi‐Haiphongareatogetherwithashore

bombardmentbynavalgunfire.IttookplaceontheweekendofApril15‐16—over

theoppositionofAbramsbutwiththesupportofLaird.BychanceApril15was

thedaythatHanoiturneddownourproposalforameetingonApril24,adecision

which—allowingfortransmissiontimefo ritsmessages—itclearlyhadmade

beforetheattack.Thispostponementgaveustheopportunitytoassumethe

offensive.Whenoneisrunningrisks,itisalmostalwayspreferabletobebold.We

sentastrongmessagetotheSovietsonApril15questioningwhetherany

progresscouldbemadeonVietnamduringmyvisittoMoscowiftheSovietUnion

couldnotbringaboutevenone meetingonanagreeddate.



ThateveningDobrynincametomyhometodiscussthemessageandto

urgemetogoaheadwiththeplantovisitMoscow.Dobrynin,whomusthave

knownfromthenewstickersoftheB‐52attacks,didnotmentionthem.Inan

extremelyfriendlymannerhesuggestedthatgreatpowersmustbeabletoput

localdifferencesasidetosettlefundame ntalissues.Isaid,“Anatol,forusitisn’t

justaninternationalproblem;ithasnowbecomeamajordomesticproblem.We

cannotpermitourdomesticstructuretobeconstantlytormentedbythiscountry

tenthousandmilesaway.Thewarmustnow bebroughttoaconclusion,andwe

willdoiteithertogetherwiththeothergreatpowersoralone.”



Thenextmorning,April16,DobryninreadmeamessagefromtheSoviet

leadershipstatingthattheyhadbroughtmycomplaintabouttheabortedsecret

meetingtotheattentionofHanoi.Hanoi“couldagree”toasecretmeetingon

April24iftheplenarymeetingswerealsoresumed;thiswaspuzzlingsinceHanoi

thedaybeforehadrejectedameetingonApril24.Therewasalsoanim plication

thatitsagreementwasdependentonahalttothe“expanded”bombingofNorth

Vietnam.HanoihadnotyetrespondedtomysuggestiontomeetwithNorth

VietnameserepresentativesinMoscow.Hanoiwasclearlythrashingaround.Its

replylackedtheinsolentself‐assuranceofpreviousyears.



Finally,attheendof theday,aformalSovietprotestarrived.Ourbom bing

hadaccidentallyhitfourSovietmerchantshipsinHaiphongharbor,withlossof

life.LiketheChinese,theSovietprotestsaboutthebombingofNorthVietnam

tookonagravetoneonlywhenSovietlivesorpropertywereinjeopardy.About

theB‐52attacksMoscowconfineditselftoanexpressionofregretbecauseit

“seriouslycomplicatesthesituation.”Nevertheless,theKremlinassuredusthat

ourviewswerebeingconveyedtoHanoi.Consideringthatwewerebombing

HanoiandHaiphongfourdaysbeforemyvisittoMoscow,thiswasrestraintofa

highorder.Whatwassignificant wasnotthatthecriticismstoppedwellshortofa

protestbutthatMoscowmaintaineditsinvitationeveninthefaceofan

unprecedentedassaultonitsclient.Moscowobviouslywouldnotlightlyhazard

theforthcomingsummitafterNixonhadalreadyvisitedPeking.



InthenextfewdaysNixonrevertedtohisworrythatmytripmightprove

“indecisive”—anauguryofhislaterunease.I answeredthatmytriptoMoscow

wasastageinaprocesstoputourselvesintothebestpossiblepositionfora

showdownwithHanoi;itcouldnotpossiblybedecisiveinitself.Butevenan

indecisivetripcouldcontributetoadecisiveoutcome.



Thatleftonlyonemoreworry:howtotelltheSecretaryofState.Nixon

decidedtoresorttothetestedmethodusedsomanytimesduring theprevious

year.HewouldgotoCampDa vidwhileIwasinMoscow;hewould,infact,bemy

“cover,”sinceitwouldbeannouncedthatheandIwerereviewing thesituation

together.Fromthere,afterIhadleft,hewouldbreakthenewstohisoldfriend

thatwehadreceivedasuddeninvitationfromBrezhnevtodiscussVietnamand

thatinviewofitsurgencyhehadaccepteditonthespurofthemoment.



AsforPeking,onApril12wehadreceivedastiffreplytoournoteofApril3

intheprivatechannel.ChinaexpressedsolidaritywithNorthVietnamandwarned

usthatweweregettingboggeddownfurther.Butthenotemadenothreatsand

concludedwithareaffirmationofChineseinterestinthenormalizationof

relationswiththeUnitedStates.



AsIdepartedonmysecrettriptoMoscow,Ireflectedthatwehadnot

beenpanickedbytheoffensive;wehadassembledmassivepowertobluntit

shouldHanoirefusenegotiations.WewereintheprocessofseparatingHanoi

fromitsallies.Thenextweekswouldtellwhethertherewouldbeanegotiationor

anotherbrutaltestofarms.

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