Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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XXVI

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TheSecretTriptoMoscow

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departedforMoscow onaPresidentialaircraftshortlyafteroneo’clockinthe

morningofThursday,April20.WithmeweremyaidesHalSonnenfeldt,

WinstonLord,JohnNegroponte,PeterRodman,twoSecretServiceagents,

twosecretaries—andalsoAnatolyDobrynin,sinceitwasthequickestwayforhim

togettoMoscow.ASovietnavigatorwasaboardtoguideusoverSovietterritory.



Thedeparturetimehadbeenchosen,asonalmostallofmytrips,topermit

metoarriveinMoscowtoolateintheeveningforserioustalks.Thisreducedthe

effectsofjetlagbyguaranteeinganight’srestbeforeimportantconversations.

TwicewhenIviolatedthisprincipleandwentstraightfromanovernightflightto

negotiationswithLeDucTho,Ipaidapsychologicalprice.TheNorthVietnamese

methodinthosedayswastowearusoutbymovingataglacialpace,repeating

thesamebasicspeechateachsession,andrefusingtoacknowledgetheslightest

meritinanyideaweputforward.Toshowthatwewereequallypatient,I

normallyrespondedbybanterorbyraisingthesameissuesagainandagain,orby

makingthesameconcessioninmyturnoverandoverasifitwerenew.Butwhen

Iwentdirectlyfromatransatlantic flightintotalks,IfoundIwasonthevergeof

losingmytemperatNorthVietnameseinsolence—nearlyfallingintotheirtrapby

playingtheroletheyhadassignedtome.FromthenonIneverbegana

negotiationimmediatelyafteralongflight.



MyMoscowtripwassecret;itwastobeannouncedonlyafterIhad

returned.TheSovietshadpressedformonthsforaclandestinevisit,almost

certainlyforthesimplereasonthatPekinghadhadasecrettripandtheywere

entitledtoequality!Nixonalsowelcomedthesecrecybecause,amongother

reasons,itpostponedanargumentwithhisSecretaryofState.Ifavoredsecrecy

becauseitfreedmefromthenecessityoflivinguptocriteriasetbeforehandby

themediaandcritics.Whenwegavebriefingsaftertheevent,wewouldbeable

todosointhecontextofwhateverhadbeenachieved,notwhatotherpeople 

expectedordesiredorinvented.



IarrivedinMoscowatabouteightintheevening,localtime,ofthesame

day.Ourairplanetaxiedtoadarksecludedcornerofamilitaryairfield.Greeting

meatthefootoftherampwasFirstDeputyForeignMinisterVasilyV.Kuznetsov,

agrizzledveteranoftheSovietForeignOfficeintheGromykomold:professional,

disciplined,moreconcernedwiththetacticsthanwiththestrategy.Hewas

accompaniedbyKGBGeneralSergeiAntonov,whowouldberesponsiblefor

Nixon’ssecurity.WhereChineseprotocolhadusedmeasaguineapigfor

Presidentialscheduling,Antonovusedmeasatestofhissecurityprocedures.



Aterrifyingmotorcadewhiskedusataseeminglyhundred‐mile‐an‐hour

cliptothecomplexofguesthousesintheLeninHillsoverlookingtheMoscow

River,neartheStalinistGothicskyscraperofMoscowUniversity.Thearchitecture

oftheguesthouseswasalmostidenticalwiththatofPeking;itwasoneSoviet

exporttoChinathat hadstoodthetestoftime.Theylookedlikethevillasof

uppermiddle‐class,self‐madeindustrialiststryingtoconveytheirnewsolidityby

thesolemnityoftheirappearanceandthescaleofthefurniture.Thechief

differencewasthelocation. TheChineseguesthousesaresituatedaroundalake

inalargeparkfromwhichtheotherresidencesarevisible,thoughsoldiersblock

accessfromonetotheother.TheSovietstakenochancesonhumanfrailty.Each

houseisself‐containedbehindwallsandclosedgates.Nootherdwellingisvisible,

onlyMoscowstretchingbeforeone’sgazeacrosstheriverontheendlessRussian

plain.



Theguesthousewasextremelycomfortable.TraditionalRussianhospitality

wasinthiscaseblendedwithlegendar ySovietsubtlety.Intheroomsetasidefor

astaffofficewasasafe,whichthemanageroftheguesthousegraciouslyinvited

ustouseforstorageofourclassifiedpapers.Itwasaricketyoldcontraption

whoseconstructionsuggestedthatitsinnerchambersmightevenbemoving

parts;onecouldeasilyimaginethatitsshelves,likedumbwaiters,wouldtransport

thecontentsdownstairsforourhosts’leisurelyovernightreview.Wepolite ly

declinedthekindoffer.Ourclassifiedmaterialswerekeptinabigtinboxthatwas

guardedduringallwakinghoursbySecretServiceAgentGaryMcLeod.Atnightit

satintheroomhesharedwithAgentJackReady,betweentheirbeds.

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Thetripalsomarkedmyintroductiontotheuseofthe“babbler.”Thiswas

acassettetapeIhadbroughtwithme,whichplayedabizarrerecordingofwhat

seemedlikeseveraldozenvoicestalkinggibberishsimultaneously.IfIwantedto

conferwithmycolleagueswithoutbeingoverheardbylisteningdevices,we

wouldgatheraroundthebabbler,speakingsoftlyamongourselves.Wecould

understandeachother,buttheoreticallyanyonelisteninginwouldbeunableto

distinguishtherealconversationfromthecacophonyofrecordedvoices.

Whetheritworkedornotwecouldneverbesure.Theonlycertaintywasthat

anyonetryingtotalkthroughthemind‐numbingbabbleforanylengthoftime

wouldlosehisownsanity. Thusweusedits paringly.Usuallywespokeelliptically

orwrotenotestooneanother.AcolleagueandIsometimestookawalkinthe

garden,eventherewhisperingtoeachotherbecauseWillyBrandt’ssecurity

peoplehadwarnedusthatthetreescontainedlisteningdevices.Ioncejokedto 

Gromykothattherewasastrangetreeinthegardenwhosebranchesfollowed

myeverymovement.OurrespectfortheKGBwassuchthatoursecretariesused

manualtypewritersbroughtfromhomelestthe“telemetry”ofelectricmachines

bereadbyoursolicitous hosts.



GromykoandDobrynincalledonmeattheguesthouseat11:00p.m.to

settlethenextday’sprogram.Ihadmysecretary,JuliePineau,sitintotakenotes.

ItclearlymadeGromykouncomfortable.Apparentlynotwantingastenographic

recordkept,hespokequietlyinEnglish,asiftryingtomakeitdiff icultforherto

hear.Gromykodidnotmindnotestakenbystaffmembers;itwasthesecretary

whowasbotheringhim.Femalestenographers offendedeitherRussianmale

chauvinismorSovietsecretiveness(untilBrezhnevafewyearslaterhadtwo

Sovietgirlssitinonameeting,perhapstoimpressme.)



GromykotoldmethatBrezhnevwouldconductallthediscussionsonthe

SovietsideexceptonSunday,whenhewouldattendhisgranddaughter’s

wedding.IstressedtohimthatmyprimarymissionwastoremoveVietnamasan

obstacletothesummit.Ourtwocountries’abilitytodestroyhumanityimposed

anobligationtoimproveourrelationship.Anopportunitynowexisted,butitwas

beingthwartedbyHanoi.Iwasauthorizedtodiscussabroadrangeofissues,butI

wasinstructedabovealltoexploremeanstoendthewarinVietnam.Gromyko

affirmedBrezhnev’sreadinesstodiscussthewarindetail—initselfan

unprecedentedstep.Hespentmostofhistimestressingtheimportancethatthe

Sovietleadershipattachedtothesummitandtheearnestnesswithwhichthey

werepreparingthemselvestomeetthePresident.Gromyko’s eagerness,within

fourdaysafteramassiveB‐52attackintheHaiphongarea,dramatizedtomethat

thesummitcouldbeusedasarestraintonSovietconductwhilewepursuedour

strategyforendingthewar.

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<<Contents>>

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****



PreparingtheSummit

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ummitpreparationshadbeguninearnestwhenDobryninhadreturnedfrom

MoscowbyJanuary21,filledwithgoodcheer.Heclaimedthathehadhad

importantsessionswiththeSovietleaderswhowereeagerforthesummittobe

successful.HebroughtwithhimaletterfromBrezhnevto Nixonurgingthatthe

twosidesgetdownto“practicalwork”onthesummitby“periodicallycomparing

ourviewpointsonthekeyaspectsofthemostimportantissues.’’Thesewere

definedasSALT;theMiddleEast;Europeansecurity;removalofobstaclesto

tradeandeconomiccooperation;andexpandingexchangesinscienceand

technology,includingouterspace,protectionoftheenvironment,andpublic

health.Withthesummitasadeadlineitwashopedthatagreementswouldbe

signedinMoscowinseveralofthesefields.Brezhnev’sletterendedbyassuring

Nixonofthe“greatsignificancethatweattachtotheforthcomingmeetingwith

youaswellastothekindofsituationitwillbetakingplacein.”Thisclumsyphrase

indicatedSovietnervousnessoverNixon’sChinatrip,orperhapsrevealedhis

premonitionofwhatwasaheadinVietnam.



Dobryninbubbledover,ItoldNixon,with“effusivecordiality.”Dobrynin

blamedtheVietnamdeadlockontheChinese—neverunintentionallyfailingto

remindusoftheopportunitiesopenedtousbySovietsensitivities.Iwarnedhim

thatwewouldrespondtoanoffensivewiththestrongestpossibleaction,

whateveritseffectonUS‐Sovietrelations.AfterdiscussionwithNixon,itwas

agreedIshouldaccepttheinvitationto MoscowonconditionMoscowmade

somemovetoendthewar,preferablybyproducinganinterlocutorfromHanoi

empoweredtosettle.



Summitpreparationsnowspeededup,and,asusual,theystartedwithan

internalrowoverwhowouldsupervisethem,SecretaryofStateRogersorI.By

thistimeourrelationshadsodeterioratedthattherewasnolongeranypretense

thatitcouldbedonejointly.Symptomaticofthestateofaffairswastheannual

battleoverdraftingandpublicationofourlengthyforeignpolicyreportstothe

Congressandpublic.ThreetimestheStateDepartmentputoutavoluminous

reportonitsown,sidebysidewiththePresident’sonthesamesubject.Ithad

neverdonesobeforetherewasaPresidentialreport;ithasneverdonesosince.

Theoretically,thetworeportswerecomplementary.TheWhiteHousedocument,

draftedbyafewassociatesandme,wasanalytical,relativelyshort,andconfined

togeneralprinciples.TheStatedocumentreflectedthebureaucraticimperatives

oftheDepartment.Itwasdraftedbycommitteeandwasthereforevaguer.Atthe

sametime,itwasexhaustivelycomprehensive;everybureauandcountrydirector

madesurehisareaofconcernwasincluded.Inevitably,thisproduceda

stupefyingcatalogueofcountriesandtechnicalissues.Eachyeartherewere

bitterdisputesbetweentheWhiteHouseandtheStateDepartmentover,among

otherthings,whosereportwouldappearfirst.Predictably, thePresident’salways

did.Thisrivalrywasnotalwaysontheplaneofhighpolicy.Isawtoitthatthe

President’sreportalwaysgavesome credittoSecretaryRogers,thoughofcourse

stressingthecentralroleofthePresidentandbyimplicationmyown.TheState

Departmententeredreadilyintothespiritofthecompetition.In1972theState

Department’sreportreferredtothePresident172times,toRogers96times,and

tomeonce—inreprintingthetextoftheannouncementofthePresident’stripto

China,fromwhichIsimplycouldnotbedeleted.Itincludedfourphotographsof

thePresident,eightofRogers,noneofme.Thiswasnotmuchtoshowforayear

inwhichitwasrevealedthatIhadmadeasecrettriptoChinaandengagedin

sevensecretsessionswiththeNorthVietnamese,nottomentiontheSALT

breakthroughandtheBerlinagreement.Someoneonmystaffcountedthe

references;Idonotknowwhichwasmorepetty,State’ssnubormynoticingit.



ItwasinthisatmospherethatRogerssentamemotothePresidenton

March14sayingthatheplannedto“takepersonalcharge”ofMoscowsummit

preparations.AnyonefamiliarwithNixonknewthatthiswas nevergoingto

happen.OnNixon’sorderHaldemansentacarefulreplyaskingthateveryState

DepartmentcontactwithDobryninbeclearedinadvancebytheWhiteHouse.

Whenthisdidnotdothetrick,onMarch17Nixondroppedinononeofmy

meetingswithDobryninandtoldhimthatIwastosuperviseallmajorsummit

preparations.Technicalnegotiationsoneconomicrelationsorscientificorcultural

exchangeswereturnedovertotheCabinetdepartments,withtheState

Departmentplayingtheleadrole,butthekeypolicyissuesweretobehandledin

theChannel.



OurinterestinthesubjectslistedinBrezhnev’sJanuaryletterwasnot

uniform.WewerepreparedtofinishSALT.WethoughtaEuropeanSecurity

ConferenceshouldwaitontheBundestag’sratificationoftheGerman‐Soviet

treaties,whichinturnweconsideredasaninducementtorestrainedSoviet

conductoverallandonVietnaminparticular.AstotheMiddleEast,wesawno

possibilityofa settlementonthetermstheSovietshadheretoforeproposed.Our

strategyinthatarea,asIhavedescribed,wasmoredesignedtodemo nstratethe

limitationsofSovietinfluencethantoachieveacooperativesolution—atleastso

longasMoscowsupportedextremeArabdemands.Withrespecttotheeconomic

andtechnicalagreements,Dobryninknewourapproachtolinkagewellenoughto

recognizethatnothingwouldbeconcludeduntilthefundamentalissueswereout

oftheway.Andofcoursewewouldhavetoworkoutacommuniquéasthe

preparationsadvanced.



OnSALT,majorissueshadbeennarroweddowntothree.TheSoviets,after

firstinsistingthatanagreementlimitingABMsbeconcludedbeforeweturnedto

limitationofoffensivesystems,hadagreedintheMay1971announcementto

dealwithbothissuessimultaneously.ButthenatureoftheABMlimitationwas

stillindispute.WeinsistedthatwebepermittedtwoABMsites(eitherthetwo

wewerebuildingatMalmstromandGrandForks,oroneofthoseplus

Washington),whiletheSovietsystembeconfinedtotheexistingonearound

Moscow.TheSovietsproposedequality;eachsideshouldbefreeto protectits

capitalandanequivalentnumberofmissiles.SinceSovietmissilefieldswere

smallerthanours,thismeantthatunderthisproposaltheSovietswouldhave

threesitestoourtwo.Second,wehadagreedtofreezethedeploymentofICBMs,

butthedurationofthefreezewasunsettled.TheSovietshadcharacteristically

begunbysuggestingamoratoriumoffromoneandahalftotwoyears.We

wantedfiveyears.BythetimeofmyMoscowtriptheSovietshadhintedthat

theymightsettleforafreezeofthreeyears.ThethirdproblemwastheSoviets’

unwillingnesstolimitsubmarine‐launchedballisticmissiles(SLBMs)atall.



Asalways,ournegotiatingstancewasheavilyinfluencedbyourunilateral

decisionsinthedefensebudget.Ihadbeenconcernedatthe growingdivergence

betweenourSALTpositionsandourdefense decisions.OnDecember2,1971,I

hadwrittentoLairdtoconveythePresident’sdecisionsontheforthcoming

defensebudgetforFiscalYear1973.Astrongdefenseposturewasvitalforour

foreignpolicy,Iwrote,especiallyinthecomingyear“asweundertakediplomatic

initiativesthatrequirebargainingfromstrength,notweakness.”Forlev erageon

thenegotiationsthenewbudgetshouldplanforfourABMsiteseventhoughwe

mightwindupwithonlytwoifaSALTagreementwereconcluded.Similarly,I

requestedLairdtogivefavorableconsiderationto“anexpandedstrategic

submarineprogram”inawaythatwashighlyvisibletotheSoviets.ItoldLaird

thatthePresidenthaddirectedasubstantialincreaseinthedefensebudgetto

accomplishtheseobjectives.



TheABMdirectivewentthewayofmanyotherPresidentialinstructionsto

theDefenseDepartment.Oppositionwassimplytoopowerful.SincetheCongress

hadrepeatedlydeprivedtheprogramofmilitarysignificance,theserviceswere

reluctanttospendscarceprocurementfundsforit;thePentagongaveitatbest

halfheartedsupport.TheSenateArmedServicesCommitteehadalreadyin1971

declinedtoauthorizemorethantwosites.TheStateDepartmentleanedtowarda

totalbanonABMandsupportedGerardSmith’spreferenceforasinglesite.

SmithtestifiedbeforetheArmedServicesCommitteeonMarch16insupportof

theconclusionswhichithadalreadyreached.Forhispurposes, heargued,

authorizationfortwositeswouldbeenough;fundsforadditionalsitescouldbe

putintoescrowpendingtheoutcomeofthenegotiations.Withthenegotiation

nearingitsclimaxandthesummitonlytwomonthsaway,thePresident’sdecision

toexpandABMwasineffectbeingignored.



ThequestionofSLBMswasmorecomplex.Wewerebuilding none;our

predecessorshadhaltedconstructionafterreachingaceilingofforty‐onePolaris‐

andPoseidon‐carryingnuclearsubmarines.TheSovietswerestartingabouteight

newsubmarinesayear,carryingatotalofninety‐sixto128missiles,depending

onthetypeofsubmarine.[

TheY‐class,withsixteenmissileseach,wascomparabletoour

Polaris;theD‐class,withtwelvemissileseach,wascomparabletoourPoseidon—althoughour

submarineswerebetterandquieter.

]BytheSovietshadalreadylaunchedorlaidthe

keelsforforty‐threesubmarines.Ourestimatewasthattheirnumbercould

exceedeightyby1978.



Wefacedamajorprocurementdecisionthatinturnwoulddetermineour

SALTposture.Wehadtwochoices:toproceedrapidlywiththeproductionofan

improvedversionofthePoseidonvessels;ortowaitfortheentirelynewTrident

submarine,whichcouldnotbeproducedbefore1978attheearliest.Ifwechose

tobuildimprovedPoseidons,wewouldprefertoleavesubmarine‐launched

missilesoutoftheSALTfreeze;wewouldhaveanopportunitytomatchthe

SovietUnionbybuildingnewsubmarinesrapidly.Ifontheotherhandwechose

toinvestinthenewTridentprogram,wewouldhavetoinsistontheinclusionof

SLBMsinSALTsoastofreezeSovietnumberswhileweusedthefive‐yearperiod

todevelopournewsystem.



ThePentagonoptedfortheTridentprogram,formanygoodreasons.

Resourceswerebetterspentonanewgenerationofsubmarinesandmissiles

thanonamodifiedversionoftheexistingPoseidonsystem.Acrashprogramto 

buildnewPoseidonswould,bytyingupshipyards,competewithotherbuilding

programs.SecretaryLairdina memorandumofJanuary4,AdmiralMoorerata

VerificationPanelmeetingofMarch8,andbothLairdandMoorerataNational

SecurityCouncilmeetingofMarch17arguedpassionatelythatitwasbetterto

haveanewsubmarinein1978,evenatthecostofhavingfewerstrategic

submarinesintheinterval.AdmiralElmoZumwalt,ChiefofNavalOperations,

tookthesameposition.

MelLairdsummeduptheargumentsagainstvarious

optionstobuildmoreofexistingtypes:“Eachoftheseoptions…reflectsmoreof

anemergencyreactionthanadeliberate,constructive,long‐rangeprogram;these

maythereforebecounte rproductive,politicallyanddiplomatically.”



IfwechosetheTrident,however,wehadtomoverapidlytoreach

agreementonanSLBMfreeze.IthadtobenegotiatedbeforetheSoviets

understoodthatwehaddecidedtobuildnoadditionalmissile‐carrying

submarinesduringthemoratoriumperiod.Otherwisetheywouldhaveno

incentivetoagreetoafreeze,andwemightwindupwiththeworstofall

solutions:anunrestrictedSovietprogramnotcounteredbyanynewAmerican

sea‐basedmissilesforseveralyears.Unlesstherewasafreezeonoffensive

weapons,includingSLBMs,thenumericalgapagainstuswouldwidenwithevery

passingmonth.ButhowcouldweinducetheSovietstostopaprogramwhenwe

hadnoneandcouldnothaveoneforfiveyears?LairdonJanuary18cameupwith

aningenioussolution.Ina memorandumtothePresidentheurgedarapid

negotiationofanoffensivefree ze;inordertogetsomehandleonthesubmarine

questionhewouldfavorpermittingtheSovietstocontinuebuilding SLBMs—ifat

aslowerrate—providedthattheydismantledolderICBMsandSLBMsonaone‐

to‐onebasisasatrade‐in.WeestimatedthattheSovietshadsome209older

ICBMsandaboutthirtyolderSLBMsonnuclear‐poweredboats,makingatotalof

about240.IftheSovietsexercisedtheirfulloption,wewouldhave eliminated

severalhundredoftheirolderheavy‐throwweightmissiles,whichbecauseoftheir

vulnerabilitywereusefulonlyforaSovietfirststrike.Atthesametimewewould

keepthetotalnumberofSovietsubmarine‐launchedmissilesatnearly200below

whatAdmiralMoorerestimatedtheirpotentialprogramwas.



Laird’sschemewasdiscussedbytheVe rificationPanelonMarch8andby

thefullNSConMarch17withgeneralapproval(though,aswashiscustom,the

Presidentdefer redafinaldecision).AttheMarch8VerificationPanelmeeting,

bothGerardSmithandUnderSecretaryofStateJohnIrwinurgedthattheSLBM

issuebeleftforthePresidenttonegotiateinMoscow.Idemurredontheground

thatIhadahorrorofthePresident’shavingtonegotiateatthelast minuteonan

issueinvolvingsomanytechnicaljudgments.Ifearedthatthepressurestosettle

mightprovetoo greatforareasonableoutcome.(Thisexchangeisironicinthe

lightoflat erclaimsthattoomanyissueswerenegotiatedinMoscowduringthe

summitundertoogreatapressureoftime.Infact,allexceptoneofthekeyissues

weresettledbeforethesummitandthatonewasmuchlesscomplexthanthe

SLBMquestion.)



ThePresidentagreedwithme,butratherthanfighthisarmscontrol

negotiatorandState,heaskedmetoputLaird’sschemetoDobrynininthe

specialChannel.IftheSovietsacceptedit,wecouldarguewiththebureaucracy

then;iftheyrejectedit,noharmwouldhavebeendoneandmuchcontroversy

avoided.IdidthisonMarch9,“thinkingoutloud”asifitweremyownideafor

breakingthedeadlock;Dobryninshowednointerest.Ithreatenedthatwewould

undertakeacrashprogramtobuildsubmarines.(Theimpactofmythreatcould

nothavebeenhelpedbythebuddingpresscampaignattackingLairdforhis

Tridentprogramandurgingthatweexchangetheconceptofanewgenerationof

submarinesforamoratoriumonallsubmarineconstruction.)

Dobryninurgedthe

samelineasourcritics:HethoughtitbesttocompleteonlytheABMagreement

andICBMfreeze;SLBMsshouldbeleftforlater.Iinsistedthatwewouldnotlet

SovietSLBMsrunfree;Dobryninindicatedthatinthatcaseadeadlockwas

probable.ByearlyApril,DobryninhintedthattheSovietleadershipwasstudying

theSLBMissue,buthegavenoindicationoftheirconclusions.Andtherematters

restedwhenIleftforMoscow. 



Theotherimportantsummit problemonwhichsignificantexchangeshad

takenplaceintheChannelwasthefinalcommuniqué.Dobryninhadbroachedthe

subjectinagingerlyfashiononJanuary21,askingmewhetherwewerethinking

ofasingledocumentthatlistedtheissuesdiscussedorwhetherwewereopento

aseparate“DeclarationofPrinc iples.” TheSovietsaremuchaddictedto

declarationsofprinciples.Probablytheyseeinthemanacknowledgmentof

equalityandadevicetocreatetheimpressionthatmajorprogressistakingplace

inbilateralrelations.PerhapsthereissomethinginRussianhistorythatleads

themtovalueritual,solemndeclarations,andvisiblesymbols.Whateverthe

reason,bythetimeoursummitpreparationswerewelllaunched,theSoviet

UnionhadsignedalongandeffusiveDeclarationofPrincipleswithPresident

Pompidou,andonewithTurkey;andaprotocolonconsultationwithCanada,not

tomentiontheGerman‐Sovietnonaggressiontreaty.IrespondedtoDobrynin

noncommittally,althoughIknewwewereplanningtoincludeastatementof

principlesinourcommuniquéfromChina.Ithoughtitimportanttoavoidany

impressionofUS‐Sovietcondominium,andIdelayeduntiltheChinesetripwas

behinduslestpreliminarydraftsbeplayedbackmisleadinglytoPeking.



NixonandIagreedthat,giventheprecedents,adeclarationofprinciples

wouldbehardtoavoid. Thereforewesoughttouseittoachievesomepositive

ends.Wecouldelaborateourprinciple s ofinternationalrestraint—suchasthose

NixonhadenunciatedinhisaddresstotheUnitedNationsinOctober1970—

whichifimplementedwouldeasetensions,andiffloutedcouldprovidearallying

pointforoppositiontoSovietaggressiveness.SowhenDobryninraisedthematter

againonFebruary7(stillbeforethePekingsummit),Itoldhimwewouldbeglad

tolookataSovietproposal.Dobryninwastoonimbleforthat;hewasafraidthat

hisowngovernment’ssubmissionwaslikelyto berejected.Ataminimum,the

finaldraftwouldshowthattheSovietshadmademajorconcessions.OnMarch9,

afterNixon’sChinatrip,DobryninsuggestedweusetheFrenchdeclarationasa

model.Iagainasked foraSovietdraft.Dobrynindemurredonthegroundthat

onceaSovietdraftexistedanymodificationwouldrequiregovernmentapproval;

long‐distancenegotiationswouldproveextremelycomplicated.



BythemiddleofMarchIthoughtthatenoughtimehadpassedsincethe

Pekingsummit.WiththePresident’sapprovalIhandedDobryninonMarch17a 

draftcommuniquéspellingout,asdidtheShanghaiCommuniqué,theprinciples

wethoughtshouldgovernUS‐Sovietrelations.Weemphasizedmutualrestraint,