Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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unpredictableconsequencesbothforEast‐Westrelationsandevenforthe

securityofChina.



Anabruptreversalofourstrategy,implicitinmakingaperemptorydemand

theSovietleaderscouldnotpossiblyfulfill,cutdirectlyacrossourlong‐term

strategyfordealingwiththeSovietUnion.TheconceptualproblemthatAmerica

facesintheeraofSovietpower,inmyview,isthatourliberalpragmatictradition

canmakeusunwillingtoconfrontchallengesintheirincipientstagewhenthey

areambiguous,whileourmoralisticbent,initsanti‐Communistincarnation,can

holdusbackfromexploringrealisticopportunitiesforamoreconstructivelong‐

termrelationship.Itwasessentialtoreactstrongly,ifnecessaryviolently,inthe

earlystagesofSovietexpansion—IadvocatedthisoverCienfuegos,Jordan,India‐

Pakistan,andwastodosooverAngola.InMayIwaspreparedtorisktheMoscow

summitforwhateverwasnecessarytobreakHanoi’soffensive.Itwasmandatory

topreventtheSovietUnionfromgainingsomuchmomentumthatwewerefaced

witheitherthecollapseofthebalanceofpoweroracolossalconfrontation.



Butalsowehadnevertolosesightofthedutyimposedbythenuclearage.

Peaceisagoalthatthehorroroftheirtechnologycompelsthetwosuperpowers

topursueindef ianceofideology,greed,andthemomentumofthepast.The

optionforpeaceshouldneverbeclosedoff.AsthePresident’s1972Foreign

PolicyReportsuggested:



TheUSSRhasthechoice:whetherthecurrentperiodofrelaxationistobemerely

anotheroffensivetacticortrulyanopportunitytodevelopaninternationalsystemrestingon

thestabilityofrelationsbetweenthesuperpowers.Itschoicewillbedemonstratedinactions

priortoandafterourmeetings.



Theseweretheconsiderationsthatimpelledmetodiscussthesummit

agendawithBrezhnev—notindefianceofPresidentialinstructions,whichwere

toolateandtoovague,butintheexecutionofourconsistentpolicyoftwoyears

andourtacticsagreedonlyafewdaysearlier.



IreportedfullytoWashingtonattheendofeachday.Thereactiontomy

firstday’sreportwasacomplaintfromHaigaboutpoorcommunicationsand

Nixon’swarningagainstaprecipitate“deal”onVietnam.(Ireceivedthisatthe

endofthedayonApril21.)Thiswasirrelevantsincenosuchdealwasinthe

making.HeaskedmetoreturntoWashingtonbytheeveningofSundaythe

twenty‐third.IhadplannedtostaythroughnoonofMondaythetwenty‐fourth

(havingarrivedThursdaynight)becauseofBrezhnev’sbeingunavailableonthe

Sundayofhisgranddaughter’swedding.IhadconsumedFridayandpartof

SaturdayoverVietnam.TheSovietleadersknewIwasfreebecausetheyknewof

myoriginaloffertomeetwithLeDucThoonthatdate.Thepracticalresultof

goingbacktoWashingtonwouldhavebeentoendallseriousdiscussionswith

BrezhnevonSaturday.Isentbackasomewhatill‐temperedreplytoHaigearlyon

April22:



Thesituationseemstomeasfollows:Brezhnevwantsasummitatalmostanycost.He

hastoldmeineffectthathewouldnotcancelitunderanycircumstances.Heswearsthathe

knewnothingoftheoffensive.Hetoldmetheydidnotstepupaiddeliveries.Eventhough

untrue,thisgivesusthreeopportunities:



(a)Wemaygethelpindeescalatingorendingthewar.



(b)Ifnot,wecanalmostsurelygethisacquiescenceinpushing[NorthVietnam]tothe

limit.



(c)WecanusethesummittocontroltheuproarintheU.S.



Wehavegottothispointbyajudiciousmixtureofpressureandflexibility.Butherewe

haveshownnoflexibilitywhatever.Whyblowitnow?Andforwhat?…



IhavedemandedconcreteprogressattheMay2meeting[withLeDucTho]inthe

toughestpossibleterms.TodayIshallgiveBrezhnevourprogramdemandingthewithdrawal

acrosstheDMZ.,releaseofsomeprisoners,etc.Theyhaveallbutpromisedtotrytohelp.It

seemstomebettertostepupactionsSouthofthe20thparallelthisweek,gototheprivate

meeting[onMay2]andthengoall‐outifitfails.Theverypeoplewhoarenowscreamingfor

bloodwillcollapsewhenthegoinggetsreallytough.ButyoumayassurethePresidentthat

undernorepeatnocircumstanceswillIagreetoanendofbombinghere;norhaveSovietseven

askedforit.ItishoweveressentialthatIplayoutthestringandnotbeprovocative.Andabove

allhemusttrustme.Ihavenotexactlylethimdownonothermissions.



Iamcountingonyoutohelpkeepthingsinperspective.Wearewithinsightofallour

objectives.Letuskeepsteadyonthehomestretch.YoumayalsoshowthistothePresident.



Haig’sreplymadeclearwhatIhadsuspected.Nixonwastemptedtocancel

thesummitmainlybecausehefearedthattheSovietswoulddosoifhestepped

upthepressureonNorthVietnam,asbothheandIweredeterminedtodoifmy

projectedMay2meetingwithLeDucThofailed.EvenbeforeIleftforMoscowhe

hadbeenconsideringcancellation. Icametosuspectthatitwasanothergnawing

fearderivedfromhispoliticalpast,likehisneuralgiaaboutCubawhichIhave

explainedinChapterXVI.Hewasconvincedthathehadbeendefeatedin1960by

twoforeignpolicyeventsaboveall:hisrestraintonCubainthedebatewith

Kennedy,andKhrushchev’scancellationofEisenhower’sprojectedMoscow

summit.Nixonwantedtobetheonetocancel,ifitcametothat;thiswouldbe

lesshumiliatingthanhavingtheSovietsknockthesummitoutfromunderhimin

anelectionyear.Yetanotherfactorinfluencedthetough‐soundingmessagesthat

IwasreceivingfromHaig:“YoushouldbeawarethatPresidenthasreceived

resultsofSindlingerPollwhichindicateshispopularityhasrisensharplysince

escalationoffightinginVietnam…Asyoucansee,President’ sstarchymoodhas

sincethisafternoonincreasedimmeasurably,”Haigtoldme.



Whateverhisdoubts,Nixonintheendauthorizedmetostaythrough

Monday—provideditwaswarrantedby“progressontheVietnamquestion.”This

againcastdoubtonwhetherNixonwasreallyinaccordonthestrategyorwas

merelyneedling;inseventy‐twohoursitwassimplyimpossibletechnicallytoget

concreteresultsonVietnamfromMoscow.HaigdescribedthePresident’s

increasingnervousness:



PresidentisalsoincreasinglyrestlessinCampDavidandhasaskedmetoadviseyouthat

youmustbeatCampDavidnotlaterthan6:00p.m.WashingtontimeMondayevening.This

meansyourdeparturefromMoscowmusthaveoccurredby1:00p.m.Moscowtime.AsI

completedthismessage,thePresidentjustcalledagainandaddedthatheviewsSoviet

positionsonSouthVietnam asfrenziedandfrivolousand,therefore,isdeterminedtogo

forwardwithadditionalstrikesonHanoiandHaiphongunlesssomemajorbreakthroughoccurs.

Ihaveinsistedwithhimthattwentydegreerestrictionmustbemaintaineduntilcompletionof

May2meetingbutPresidentterminatedconversationwiththefollowing:“Itmayormaynot

hold.”



TosaythatmyresponsetoHaigwascharitablewouldbestretchingthe

truth:



Iamreadingyourmessageswithmountingastonishment.Icannotsharethetheoryon

whichWashingtonoperates.IdonotbelievethatMoscowisindirectcollusionwithHanoi.At

thistimetheleadershereseemextremelyembarrassedandconfused.Theirsummitobjectives

gofarbeyondVietnamandwouldbemuchmoreeasilyachievablewithoutit.Theymaywantto

disintegrateNATO,ruinourotheralliances,andsoftenusupbyaneraofseeminggoodwill.

ButtheydonotneedVietnamforthat.IndeedrightnowVietnamisanobstacletoit.



MoreoverwhatinGod’snamearetheygettingoutofallthis?Theyseemethreedays

afterwebombHanoi.Theiragreeingtoapublicannouncementmustinfuriateanddiscourage

Hanoi.TheyarewillingtoseethePresidentwhileheisbombingNorthVietnam…wecanget

thebestofallworlds:(1)inflictingmaximumpunishmentonHanoi,(2)appealingtohawks,(3)

appealingtodoves,(4)makinghistoricprogressonSALT,(5)gettingahighlyacceptable

communiqué.Idonotseehowwecanevenconsiderblowingitallbythekindofattitudes

whichyoudescribe…Pleasekeepeverybodycalm.Weareapproachingthesuccessful

culminationofourpolicies.Mustweblowitinoureagernesstobombtargetswhichwillnot

moveandwhenthedelayisonlyoneweek?



ItwaslefttoAlHaigtoconveymythoughtsmoretactfullytothePresident

oftheUnitedStates.Therewasmorebackandforthalongthesamelines,butthe

basicissuewasclear.ThePresidentwaseagertogoalloutagainstNorthVietnam

immediatelyandpreferredtocancelthesummitratherthanforgothisoption.I

favoredthesamemeasurestodefeattheNorthVietnameseoffensive,butI

soughttousetheimminenceofthesummitandanothermeetingwithLeDucTho

togainmaneuveringroomathome,leveragewiththeSoviets,andtheisolation

ofHanoi.NixoninApril1972wasfocusedalmostexclusivelyontheimpactofthe

immediatecrisisinVietnamonAmericanpublicopinion;Ibelievedthatweshould

relateittoawiderstrategy;wedemoralizedHanoimore—andultimatelygained

morepublicsupport—bysharpeningdifferencesbetweenitanditspatronsthan

byforcingMoscowandHanoitogether.Noonecouldspareusthenecessityof

confrontingtheNorthVie tnameseiftheypursuedtheiroffensiveandrefusedto

negotiate.Buttosustainastronglineathome,wehadtohaveaclear

demonstrationofNorthVietnameseintransigence.Thus,paradoxically,we

neededanothermeetingwithLeDucTho.AndtoisolateHanoi,wehadto

continuethepreparationsfortheMoscowsummit.



AfewweeksearlierNixonwouldhavebeenelatedattheaccomplishments

ofmytriptoMoscow:Asuccessfulsummitwasguaranteed;SALT wouldbe

concludedessentiallyonthebasisofourownproposals;wehadasummit

communiquécompatiblewithourprinciples.ButaloneinCampDavid,withonly

Rebozoforcompany,Nixonwasinafeistymood.WhilemyassociatesandIwere

awareofmajorbreakthroughs,wewerebeingbombardedwithmissivesfrom

Washingtonthatwehadbeen“takenin”bythewilySoviets.Nixonwasobsessed

withthefearthatwemightbetrickedintotheverykindofbombinghaltfor

whichhehadattackedJohnsonin1968andwhichhebelievedhadnearlylosthim

theelection.Thattherewasnottheslightestevidenceforthis,thatneither

BrezhnevnoranySovietleaderhadevenaskedforit,didnotinanywaycalmhis

suspicions.NordidIsucceedinconvincingNixonthatBrezhnevwasnot

maneuveringtodeprivehimofcreditfortheresultsofthesummit,thatallthe

evidencepointedintheoppositedirection:afterall,Brezhnevhadasbigastake

asNixonhadinbeingassociatedwithaSALT agreement.



ThefullrangeofPresidentialapprehensionswasfinallycataloguedinalong

memorandumhedictatedatCampDavid.(Becauseofthetimediffere nce itdid

notinfactreachmeuntilalltheMoscowmeetingswereconcludedandthe

communiquéannouncingmyvisitwasagreed.)Nixonbeganwithcompliments

aboutmy“skill,resourcefulness,anddetermination,”whichhethenineffect

retractedinthesubsequentparagraphsthatsuggestedIhadbeendoingitall

wrong:“ItseemstomethattheirprimarypurposeofgettingyoutoMoscowto

discussthesummithasnowbeenservedwhileourpurposeofgettingsome

progressonVietnamhasnotbeenserved,except,ofcourseinthevery

important,intangiblewaysyouhave pointedout…”Nixoncontinuedtofearthat

ourreturningtotheParisplenariesinthewakeofmyMoscowtripwouldappear

asaretreat.Wewouldbeattackedfromboththerightandtheleftforgoingto

MoscowandfailingtosettleVietnam.IfHanoiprovedintransigentattheMay2

meeting,“thenwewillhavetogoall‐outonthebombingfront.”Hecouldnotgo

toMoscowhimselffromapositionofweakness.Nixoncontinuedtoseea

problemonSALTinthatSemenovhadgivenSmith“exactlythesameofferthat

yousetforthinyourmessageofApril22.”SincethedetailsoftheSALT

negotiationsdidnotinteresthim,Icouldnotconvincehimthatthisquitesimply

wasnotso.SemenovhadindicatedonlythatMoscowwasstudyingtheissue;he

hadgivennodetailsofanykind.SALT,inanycase,arguedNixon,wasofconcern

onlyto“afewsophisticates”;themainissuewasVietnamandtherewehad

failed.ButlestIbediscouraged,Nixonendedonafriendlynoteofreassurance:

“Howeveritallcomesout,justrememberweallknowwecouldn’thaveabetter

maninMoscowatthistimethanKissinger.Rebozojoinsusinsendingour

regards.”Inthelightofthepreviouscatalogueoferrorsonecouldonlyconclude

thattheAdministrationwasinparlousshapeindeedifitsbestmancouldnotdo

betterthanthat.



IrepliedambiguouslyfromtheplanethatNixon’scablehadmeantagreat

dealtome.IdisagreedwithhimabouttheParisplenaries:



Idonotshareyourfear.First,aftertheMoscowtripannouncementeverybodywill

figurethatmoreisgoingonthanmeetstheeye.Second,wecanstronglyhintthatthisistiedto

privatemeetings.Third,wecanconfinetheplenarytoadiscussionofhowtoendtheNorth

Vietnameseinvasionandmakeclearthatweshalldiscussnoothersubjecttillthatisdone.



AndImadeonemoreefforttoexplainmyproposedstrategyinalong

memorandumtothePresidentdraftedontheairplane:



Brezhnev’sperformancesuggeststhathehasmuchridingonthesummit…Wemay

haveanelectioninNovember;heactsasifhehasonenextweekandeveryweekthereafter…

Sovietoptionsinthepresentsituationarebesetwithdilemmas.Iftheystaypassivevis‐à‐vis

Hanoiwhiletheoffensivecontinues,theymustnowassumeyouwillgoalloutagainstthe

North.Togoforwardwiththesummitinthosecircumstancesisforthempsychologicallyand

politicallyanagonizingprospect.TocanceltheSummitmay,intheirview,leadtoyourdefeatin

November,butnotwithoutourhavingmeanwhilepulverizedtheDRVandBrezhnev’sWestern

policyhavingcollapsed.MuchthesamewouldhappenifyoucancelledtheSummitorifyou

camebutwerehobbledbyright‐wingpressures.Butthe[Soviets’]alternativetoallthis—

pressureonHanoitodesist—meansthebetrayalofasocialistally,thelossofinfluenceinHanoi

andnoassurancethatHanoiwillstoptheoffensive,andweourretaliation.



Insum,IwouldhavetoconcludethatBrezhnevpersonally,andtheSovietscollectively,

areinoneoftheirtoughestpoliticalcornersinyears.TheymustwanttheVietnamesesituation

tosubsideandIwouldjudgethatthereisjustachancethatofallthedistastefulcoursesopen

tothemtheywillpickthatofpressureonHanoi—nottohelpusbutthemselves.Thedispatch

ofBrezhnev’sconfidant,Katushev,toHanoitendstobearthisout.



Thestickofyourdeterminationandthecarrotoftheproductive summitwithwhichI

wenttoMoscow,whichIusedthereandwhichwemustnowmaintain,giveusourbest

leverageinKremlinpoliticsaswellasthebestpositioninourown.



BythetimeNixonreadmymemorandumhehadcalmeddownsufficiently

towrite“Superbjob”onit.Thismighthavereflectedhisrealjudgment,orhis

acceptanceofafaitaccompli.FortheresultsoftheMoscowmeetingswere

gainingtheirownmomentum.Eventsprovedthatnooptionshadbee ngivenup

andthatinfactourfreedomofmaneuverhadgreatlyincreased.OnApril23,from

Moscow,wesenttheproceduralproposaltotheNorthVietnamesethroughour

Parischannel.(GeneralWaltershavingbeenappointedDeputyDirectorofthe

CIA,thatchannelwasnowoperatedefficiently,iflessflamboyantly,byourair

attaché,ColonelGeorgesR.Guay.)IfweimmediatelyreceivedHanoi’sagreement

toasecretmeetingonMay2,wewouldbepreparedtoannounceonApril25our

returntotheplenarysessionofApril27.Inotherwords,wegaveHanoitwenty‐

fourhourstoreply.AndHa noi,whichhadkeptuswaitingforweeksandeven

monthsonprev iousexchanges,acceptedourproposalthenextday.



OnApril25weannouncedattheWhiteHousethatIhadbeeninMoscow.

Myestimateoftheimpactprovedcorrect.Laterthatdayandlongenough

afterwardinthenewscycletohaveaseparateeffect,weannouncedour

willingnesstoresumetheplenarysessionsoftheParispeacetalks.Withoutany

hintsonourpart,themediatendedtolinkthistomytalksinMoscowasI

predicted.AndwhenLeDucTho’sdepartureforParisbecameknown,hopeful

speculationaboutdiplomaticinitiativesreceivedadditionalimpetus.



TheimportanceofhavingseparatedSovietandNo rthVietnamesepolicies

becameeverclearer.OnApril19theNewYorkTimes,inastingingeditorialcalled

“StrategyofFailure,”hadcastigatedtheAdministrationforriskingaSALT

agreementbyitsbombingofNorthVietnam.ButonApril26,aftermyMoscow

tripwasdisclosed,amuchmoresanguineeditorialexpressedtheconvictionthat

itwouldbesurprisingifmyvisittoMoscow“hadnotaddedanotherchapterto

thehistoryofsecretdiplomacyaboutVietnam.”Otherjournals,includingthe

WashingtonPostandtheWallStreetJournal,reflectedtheconsensus.



MytriptoMoscowhadconveyedtheimpressionthatwemightnothaveto

choosebetweenourSovietandourVietnampolicies;itthushadgainedussome

time.Butithadnotansweredourbasicquestion:HowfarwecouldpushMoscow

withoutriskingthesummitandtheresultingdomesticturmoil?Myvisitto

MoscowhadgiventheKremlinanincreasedstakeinthesummitbecauseithad

whettedtheSovietappetiteandpracticallyguaranteedasuccessfuloutcome.It

hadremovedthecongenitalsuspicionthatwemightreversecourse.Butithad

notenabledustoso lve theriddleofthepreciselimitsofSoviettolerance.The

answertothiswoulddependontwofactors:thesuccessoftheNorthVietnamese

offensive,andtheoutcomeofmyprivatetalkwithLeDucThoonMay2.



<<Contents>>



****

XXVII



TheShowdown:Miningof

NorthVietnameseHarbors



PreparingforDecision



stheshowdowninVietnamneared,wewereinastrongposition,both

militarilyandpolitically.TheSouthVietnamesehadheld;wehadnot

panicked.Ourairandseapowerhadbeenmassivelyreinforced;bombing

oftheNorthhadresumed.MytriptoMoscowandthePresident’sdramaticvisit

earliertoChinahadeaseddomesticpressuresatleasttemporarily.Itwasclear

thatourdiplomacywasnotparalyzedbythewar,andthattheAdministration

wasmakingmajorandsuccessfuleffortstoconstructanewinternational order.

MoscowandPeking,waryofeachotherandawareoftheirstakesinrelations

withus,distancedthemselvescarefullyfromtheirNorthVietnameseally.

A



ButHanoistillhadanoffensivepunchleft;itwouldnotquitwithoutatleast

onemoreall‐outeffort.OnApril24,theverydaythatitacceptedourproposalfor

aprivatetalkonMay2,HanoilaunchedamilitaryoffensiveintheCentral

Highlands.ApowerfulassaultthreatenedtheprovincialcapitalsofKontumand

Pleiku,intheprocessdestroyingabouthalfoftheSouthVietnamese22nd

Division.AttacksalsomultipliedagainstAnLoc,anotherprovincialcapitalsixty

milesNorthofSaigon. Clearly,theNorthVietnamesedidnotbelieveintheutility

ofthosegesturesofgoodwillsoincessantlyurgedonusbyourcritics.They

wantedusinapositionofmaximummilitarydisadvantagewhenthetalks

resumed;theyhopedtobringaboutaSouthVietnamesecollapsebeforeour

pressures,politicalormilitary,couldwork.



Nevertheless,wehadtogothroughwiththemeetingofMay2withLeDuc

Tho,howeverpainfulitwastowaitbeforeretaliati ngtothenewoffensive.Our

challengewasasmuchpsychologicalandpoliticalasmilitary.Weneededtokeep

ourdomestic,diplom atic,andmilitarymovesintandem.Whenweretaliated,it

hadtobeclearthatitwasHanoithathadchosenatestofstrengthratherthana

negotiatedsettlement.Domesticsupportwasforusanessentialpartofthe

effectivenessofanymilitarymeasure.Andtheclosertothesummitwecouldact,

themoretheSovietleadershipwouldbecommittedtoitssuccessandthemore

likelywoulditrespondminimallytoanymilitarymovewemade.



Atfirst,everythingseemedtofallintoplace.OnthemorningofApril25we

revealedmysecrettriptoMo scow;intheeveningweannouncedresumptionof

theParisplenaries.Thenextmorning,April26,Nixonannouncedthenextsliceof

troopwithdrawals.Thiswasimposeduponusonceagainbythecompletionof

the70,000‐manwithdrawalannouncedthreemonthsearlier,andwithitcame

thedilemmathatintensifiedwitheveryincrementofourretreat.Thefewer

troopswehadleft,thedeeperwouldbetheimpactifwekeptwithdrawals

constant.Atthecurrentratewewouldsoonhavenoresidualforcesleftas

negotiatingcounters.Butifweslowedthemdown,ourcriticswouldproclaim

Vietnamizationafailureandaddanotherdomesticcomplicationtothegrowing

uneasinessabouttheoutcomeoftheNorthVietnameseoffensive.



CaughtbetweentheScyllaofourinabilitytostopwithdrawalsandthe

CharybdisofnotwantingtocompoundtheburdenalreadybornebySa igon, we

wentthroughourusualinteragencymaneuvering.Laird,asalways,favoredthe

maximumwithdrawalasthebestmeansoftranquillizingpublicopinion.He

wantedtopullout54,000troopsbetwee nMay1andDecember31,1972.This

wouldbringusdowntoaresidualforceof15,000which,heargued,would

demonstrateourconfidenceinourabilitytowithstandtheoffensivewhile

convincingourpublicthatwithdrawalswouldcontinue.Idisagreed.Thereduction

seemedtomeexcessiveinthefaceoftheimmediatethreatandmuchtoo

inflexiblefromanegotiatingpointofview.ItcoulddemoralizeSaigonandgiveup 

ourremainingleverageonHanoi.Nixonfinallysettledonafigureof20,000over

twomonths,havingreachedanotherunderstandingwithGeneralAbramsthat

mostofthewithdrawalswouldoccurattheendoftheperiod;bythen,we

expectedtheNorthVietnameseoffensivetohaverunitscourse.Themajor

advantageofannouncingthewithdrawalswasthatNixoncouldreportaboutthe

militarysituationontelevisioninacontextthatofferedhope,ratherthaninthe

crisisatmospherethatwouldhavesurroundedaPresidentialspeechaddressed

solelytotheNorthVietnameseoffensive.Nixon,speakingfromtheOvalOffice,

mixeddeterminationwithconciliation.Hecontrastedourrecordofpeace

proposalswiththeenemy’ssteadybuildupforanewoffensive.This“invasion”

was“aclearcaseofnakedandunprovokedaggressionacrossaninternational

border.”TwelveofNorthVietnam’sthirteenregularcombatdivisionswerein

SouthVietnam,Laos,orCambodia.TheSouthVietnameseforcesweredoingthe

groundfighting,withUnitedStatesairandnavalforcesengagedinsupport.Nixon

announcedthe20,000‐manwithdrawal.HisinstructiontoAm bassadorWilliam

Portertoattendtheplenarysessionthenextday(announcedbyZieglertheday

before)wasasignofourreadinesstonegotiate.Nixoncouldtakejustifiablepride

intherecord:



ByJuly1wewillhavewithdrawnover90percentofourforcesthatwereinVietnamin

1969.Beforetheenemy’sinvasionbegan,wehadcutourairsortiesinhalf.Wehaveoffered

exceedinglygeneroustermsforpeace.Theonlythingwehaverefusedtodoistoaccedetothe

enemy’sdemandtooverthrowthelawfullyconstitutedGovernmentofSouthVietnamandto

imposeaCommunistdictatorshipinitsplace.



Noamountofrighteousindignationaboutourbombingcouldobscure the

factthatthiswasthesoleremainingissue. AndNixon,regardedbyhisopponents

asanimmoralman,increasedtheirhostilitybyreiteratingwhathebelieved—and

Iagreed—wasthefundamentalmoralissue:



Idonotknowwhowillbeinthisofficeintheyearsahead.ButIdoknowthatfuture

PresidentswilltraveltonationsabroadasIhaveonjourneysforpeace.IftheUnitedStates

betraysthemillionsofpeoplewhohavereliedonusinVietnam,thePresidentoftheUnited

States,whoeverheis,willnotdeservenorreceivetherespectwhichisessentialiftheUnited

Statesistocontinuetoplaythegreatrolewearedestinedtoplayofhelpingtobuildanew

structureofpeaceintheworld.Itwouldamounttoarenunciationofourmorality,an

abdicationofourleadershipamongnations,andaninvitationforthemightytopreyuponthe

weakallaroundtheworld.Itwouldbetodenypeacethechancepeacedeservestohave.This

weshallneverdo.



ThecourseofeventssincehadunderscoredthatNixonwasright;thefate

ofthepeoplesofIndochinahasbeenpreciselywhathepredicted.Hisopponents

wereentitledtotheirdistressatthewar—itwassharedbythePresidentandhis

Administration.Buttheyowedhimtherecognitionthattheyhadnomonopolyof

anguishorvirtue,andthattheirgovernmentwastryingtodealdecentlywitha

complexproblemwhichwouldaffectourfutureandthelivesoftensofmillions.

