Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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SovietscouldgainbydeliberatelymistranslatingwhatIsaidtoBrezhnevorwhatBrezhnevsaid

tome.Foralldocumentstobesigned,wewereabletoexaminetheRussian‐languagetext.]



ItturnedoutthatBrezhnev’snewpaperineffectacceptedLaird’sformula

ofJanuary18,whichIhadputforwardwhile“thinkingoutloud”withDobryninin

March.TheSovietUnionagreedtoaceilingof950submarine‐launchedballistic

missiles(atleast200lessthanourestimateoftheircapacitytoreachoverthat

period)andwould“tradein”olderSLBMsandolderICBMstostayunderthat

figure.(Thenumbertobetradedinstillneededtobenegotiated.)Brezhnevalso 

agreedthattheagreementlimitingoffensiveforcescouldlastforfiveyears,aswe

hadsought,ratherthanthreeyears,whichtheSovietdelegationinHelsinkiwas

stillmaintaining.Ispenttherestofthemeetingprobing theexactmeaningofthe

“trade‐in”provisionsanddiscussinghowtoconducttheofficialSALTnegotiations

soastoconcludebeforethesummit.ItoldBrezhnevthathehadmadeamajor

stepforward.Wewouldconveyourreplywithintendaysofmyreturn.



Brezhnev’sofferonSLBMsandofafive‐yearmoratoriumrepresented

majorSovietconcessions.ConsideringthatourTridentprogramwouldproduce

nonewsubmarine‐launchedmissilesforfiveyears,puttingaceilingonthe

Soviets’programbelowtheirpotentialwasalimitationthataffectedonlythem.

Andthedismantlingofseveralhundredoldermissileswasanotherboon.Afive‐

yearmoratoriumcoveredexactlytheperiodweneededtodevelopthenew

weaponstofillthegapcausedbythedecisionsoftheSixties,whichhadineffect

stoppedourdevelopmentofnewstrategicmissiles.



Attheendofthesession,withfurtherjokingandbanter,Brezhnevcameup

withyetanotherdocument,anewdraftoftheDeclarationofPrinciples.The

SovietshadtakenthesixprinciplesIhadsubmittedonMarch17,splittheminto

twelve,andflavoredthemwithPravda‐likerhetoric.Brezhnevmusthavebeen

warnedbyGromykoorDobryninthatIwouldneveracceptthisversion,even

thoughitincludedmanyofourideasonrestrainedinternationalconduct,forhe

urgedmeto“strengthen”hisdocument,promisingmetheaccoladesofhistoryifI

tookhisadvice.EvenwithmyproverbialvanityIdidnotbelievethathistory

wouldrememberasetofprinciples sowatereddownastobeequallyacceptable

totheprincipalcapitalistandthestrongestCommuniststate.ButIrecognized

thathavingcomethisfar,theSovietleaderswouldnotletthedocumentfailover

theirownrhetoric.Hisinvitationto“improve”thedocumentclearlyimpliedthat

therewasroomforbargainingtoproduceaversionacceptabletous.Itwasleft

thatIwouldtrymyhandata newdraftandthatGromykoandIwouldreviewit

thenextday(Sunday)whileBrezhnevwouldbeathisgranddaughter’swedding.



TheonlyothereventofnotewasthatBrezhnevandGromykoaskedforour

assistancewiththeratificationoftheEasterntreatiessoontocometoavote

beforetheBonnParliament.(TheywantedustohelpBrandtwintwocrucialby‐

elections,asifwehadanymeansofdoingso.)Irepliedinafriendlybut

noncommittalway;IpointedoutthatHanoi’soffensivemadeitdifficulttobeof

realuse.Indeed,theSoviets’eagernesstocompletethesetreatieswouldbeone

ofourassetsifVietnamshouldreachcrisisproportionsintheweeksahead. From

ourpointofview,havingtheEasterntreatiesinabeyancewasexactlytheideal

posture.



OnSundayGromykoandIcompletedthe“BasicPrinciplesofUS‐Soviet

Relations”onthebasisofacounterdraftthatSonnenfeldtandIprepared

overnight.Itemphasizedthenecessityofrestraintandofcalmingconflictsinthe

world’stroublespots.Bothsidesrenouncedanyclaimforspecialprivilegesinany

partoftheworld(whichwe,atleast,interpretedasarepudiationoftheBrezhnev

DoctrineforEasternEurope).



TherewasaninconclusivediscussionoftheMiddleEast.Gromykosought

tocommitmetosomegeneralprinciplesthattheUnitedStatesandSovietUnion

couldjointlyendorse.Ratherthanturnhimdownflatly,Irepliedsoothinglywith

commentslongongoodwill,sparseonspecifics.Isuggestedthatadetailed

discussionbedeferredtothesummit.Infact,aMiddleEastcondominiumwasa

cardthatwehadnointerestinplayingatall.Myobjectiveshereweremodest:to

gaintimeandtousetheprospectoffutureUS‐Sovietconsultationsforwhatever

effectitmighthaveasanincentiveforSovietrestraint.



Finally,GromykoandIfinishedthetextofabriefannouncementofmy

visit.TheSovietswantedtoleavetheimpressionthatwehadaskedforthe

meetingandthatitsagendawasconfinedtosummitpreparations.Nixon’s

instructionwasexactlytheopposite:to stateorimplythatIhaddiscussed

VietnaminMoscow—inordertounnervetheNorthVietnameseandencourage

ourpublic.Iwaspreparedtoleaveopenthequestionofwhohadoriginatedthe

invitationsolongasitwasnotimpliedthatwewerethesupplicant.Wefinally

agreedonthefollowingtext:



BetweenApril20,andApril24,Dr.HenryA.Kissinger,AssistanttothePresidentfor

NationalSecurityAffairs,wasinMoscowtoconferwiththeGeneralSecretaryoftheCentral

CommitteeoftheCPSUBrezhnev,andForeignMinisterGromyko.Thediscussionsdealtwith

importantinternationalproblems,aswellaswithbilateralmatters,preparatorytothetalks

betweenPresidentNixonandSovietleadersinMay.Thediscussionswerefrankanduseful.



“Importantinternationalproblems”wasatthatpointinhistory(three

weeksafterHanoi’soffensive)anobviousreferencetoVietnam.



IhadanothersessionwithBrezhnevthefollowingmorning.Hebeganwith

alongemotionaldiscourseonVietnam,stoppingwellshortofendorsingHanoi’s

objectives.BrezhnevstressedthatMoscowwasnotbehindtheoffensive;Hanoi

hadbeenhoardingSovietweaponsfortwoyears;Americawasbeingchallenged

notbyMoscowbutbythoseopposedtothesummit,principallytheChinese,and

alsoHanoi.BrezhnevinsistedthathewascommittedtoanimprovementofUS‐

Sovietrelations.Hewasproceedingwiththesummitintheteethofaformal

requestbyHanoitocancelit,hesaid.Andhewastransmittingourproposalsto

Hanoi.



Talkthenturnedtoeconomicrelations.Brezhnevhailedthepotential

benefitsof jointventuresinSiberia.Hearguedforsuchprojectsonthegroundsof

altruism;theywouldbeofgreatbenefittotheUnitedStatesbecauseofour

impendingshortageofnaturalgas.Brezhnev’ssolicitudeabouteasingAmerican

economicdifficultieswasasheartwarmingasitwaspreposterous.Brezhnev

spokeofMFNstatusandcredits.Shrew dly,hedidnotmentionhisrealneed,

whichwasgrain.Myapproachwastodefereconomicprogramsuntiltherehad

beenpoliticalprogress.Ifrelationswentashopedforatthesummit,Itoldhim,

then“duringthesummitwecanworkoutacompleteprojectandmakeit

concreteinthesummer.”ButIdidnotfailtonotethatCongressionalreaction

wouldbeaffectedbyVietnam:“Itisalittletoughwhenthetruckscarrying

weaponsinVietnamareRussian.”



Brezhnevnonethelesswasinanexpansivemood.Heaskedtoseemealone

andsuddenlyintroducedtheideaofan“understanding”nottousenuclear

weaponsagainsteachother.Hecalleditastepof“immensesignificance,”a

“peacefulbomb.”Thatitwas.ItwouldhaveproducedanexplosionintheNATO

Alliance,inChina,andthroughouttheworld.Itwouldhavebeenconsidered

eitheraUS‐SovietcondominiumoranAmericanabdication.Ipolitelyturnedit

aside.(TheSovietsdidnotstoppursuingtheidea.WeeventuallyagreedinJune

1973onablandsetofprinciplesthathadbeensystematicallystrippedofall

implicationsharmfultoourinterests.)



ThenBrezhnevdepartedforwhatheclaimedwasaPolitburomeeting,

sayingthathethoughttheannouncementofmyvisitwhichGromykoandIhad

workedonthedaybeforewasgenerallyacceptableexcept for“someminor

alterations,”whichhehadmarkedonhiscopy.Hethrewitacrossthetableand

marchedout.ThedocumentturnedouttobetheoriginalSovietdraftthatIhad

rejectedthepreviousday.Thepurposeofmyvisitwasstatedtobesummit

preparationsexclusivelyandtheimpressionwascreatedthatwehadsoughtthe

invitation.



Predictably,Iexploded.Gromykoclaimedthatmychoicewasbetween

Brezhnev’sdraftornone,sincehecould notinterruptaPolitburomeeting.I

warnedhimthatitwouldmakeadevas tatingimpressiontoconcludethevisit

withoutanannouncement.Itcouldonlybereadasanadmissionoftotalfailure

bythepublicandthepress.ButIwouldratherfacethisthandeviatefromthe

requirementthatadiscussionof“internationalproblems”hadtobementioned

(ascodewordsforVietnam).Gromykocontinuedtopleadhisinabilitytochange

thetext.Iwasadamant.Finally,GromykodecidedthatBrezhnevmightbe

reachableafterall.Heexcusedhimselfforafewminutes,andwhenhereturned,

hequicklyacceptedaslightlymodifiedversionofthedraftheandIhadagreed

uponthedaybefore.Theprincipalchangewastodropthefinalphrasethatthe

talkshadbeen“frankanduseful”;however,GromykoagreedthatIcouldusethis

phraseinbriefingsandthattheSovietswouldconfirmit.Inotherwordsthere

wouldbeaversionforAmericaandanotherforHanoi.



Theepisodeissignificantpreciselybecauseitwassopetty.Anythingthat

couldconceivablybegainedbysuchacrudemaneuvermustsurelybe

outweighedbyitspowerfulreminderthatindealingwithSovietleadersonemust

beconstantlyonone’sguard.ItisillustrativeoftheSoviettendencytosquander

goodwillformarginalgainsandofanearlycompulsivetendencytoscorepoints

meaningfulonly,ifatall,intermsofthePolitburo’sinternalrivalries.



Afterthatstormysession,allwasagainsereneandjovial,asisthewayof

Sovietnegotiatorswhentheyhaveatlastdiscoveredwhatthenegotiatinglimit s

are.GromykobroughtupVietnamagain.Hesaidhewasauthorizedtotellme

thatMoscowhadnotbeenfullyawareoftheseriousnessofthesituationuntilten

dayspreviously.TheSovietsnowneededsometimetomaketheirinfluencefelt.

Theyweregoingtotrytohelpbringaboutarapidsolutionofthewar.Therewas

noreferencetoanendofbombing.



BeforeleavingMoscowIhadonelastpainfuldutytoperform:tobriefour

Ambassadoraboutmyvisit.JacobBeamwasatrueprofessionalwhohadearned

Nixon’sgratitudebytreatinghimrespectfullywhileNixonwasoutofoffice.He

conductedhimselfwithgentle,unassumingskillduringhistourofdutyin

Moscow.Hedeservedbetterthanthisapparentvoteofnoconfidencethatour

strangesystemofgovernmentimposedonhim.Heconductedhimselfatour

meetingwithdignityandtheattitudethatstressedthewordServiceinhistitleof

ForeignServiceOfficer.Afterthat,InevervisitedMoscowagainwithouthaving

ourAmbassadorparticipateinthemeetings.



ThusmysecretMoscowvisitended.MylastreportingcabletoNixon

summedupwhatIbelievedwehadaccomplished: 



(a)Moscow’sreadinesstoreceivemethreedaysafterwebombedHanoiandHaiphong

andwhilewewerebombingandshelling[NorthVietnam].



(b)AnannouncementthatwhenproperlybriefedmakesplainVietnamwasdiscussed.

Thedistinctionbetweenimportantinternationalproblemsandbilateralmattersrelatedtothe

summitisaeuphemismforVietnam.



(c)SovietwillingnesstotransmitourproceduralproposalstoHanoiandtourgeprivate

talksevenwhilewecontinuebombing.



(d)SovietwillingnesstotransmitaverytoughsubstantiveproposaltoHanoi.



(e)SovietrecognitionthatwearedeadlyseriousaboutVietnamandthateverythingelse

isdependentonit.



(f)ASALTofferwhichculminatestheprivatechannelandacceptsmostofourproposals.



(g)Agreementonadeclarationofprinciplestobepublishedatthesummitwhich

includesmostofourproposalsandindeedinvolvesaspecificrenunciationoftheBrezhnev

doctrine.



(h)AgreementtobeginexploringMBFR.



(i)AgreementnottogobeyondtheFRG[WestGermany]inpushingtheGDR[East

Germany]admissiontoUN.



(j)Enoughholdingactionsinbilateralmatterstogiveusacontroloverthe

implementationoftheabove.



ForallthiswegiveupthebombingofHaiphongforoneweek.



<<Contents>>



****



ADisagreementwiththePresident



nfortunatelyformypeaceofmind,Washingtondidnotsharemyperception

ofsuccess.ThroughoutmystayinMoscowIwas,infact,embroiledontwo

fronts:withBrezhnevacrosstheconferencetable,andwithNixonbroodingin

CampDavid.

U



Atbottom,thoughhenevercategoricallyinsistedonthisatthetime,itis

nowobviousthatNixonatheartobjectedtomydiscussinganyothersubjectin

MoscowexceptVietnam,andthatIstretchedwhateverauthorityIhadtoinclude

othersubjectstothelimit.

HewantedmetoforceamassiveshiftinSoviet

Vietnampolicybythethreatofbringingsummitpreparationstoanend.ThisI

judgedtobedangerous—andcertainlyimpossibleifIcutmystayshortashe

suggested.TherewasnodisagreementbetweenNixonandmeaboutthe

measuresthatwouldhavetobetakenagainstNorthVietnamifitdidnotstopits

offensive.IhadadvocatedtheB‐52attackontheHaiphongfuelstoragedepots

fourdaysbeforemydepartureforMoscow.IurgedaB‐52strikeontheThanh

HoaairfieldsouthofthetwentiethparallelwhileIwasinMoscow,togive

emphasistomywarnings.IwasatonewithNixonontheneedtoexpandour

bombingregularlynorthofthetwentiethparallelandtoresorttoablockade

eitheriftheNorthVietnameserefusedanotherprivatemeetingorifthemeeting

failed.



Astheissuedeve lopedinthecableexchangebetweenMoscowand

Washington,whereNixonandIapparentlydifferedwasontherelationshipof

thesedecisionstotheimpendingMoscowsummit.Nixonwantedtousethe

threatofcancelingthesummittoobtainSovietcooperationinVie tnam;Ijudged

itwisertoshifttherisksandtheonusforcancellationtotheSovietsandtouse

Moscow’seagernessforthesummitasadeviceforseparatingMoscowfrom

Hanoi.Itwasmaddeninglyfrustratingto watchthisdivergencedevelopbecause

wewerelockedintoacommunicationscycleandatime‐zonedifferencethatleft

Washingtonhoursbehindevents.ThusNixon’scommentsonmyreportsarrived

longaftertheday’smeetingshadtakenplaceandoftenwhileIwasalreadyinthe

nextsession.Thiswouldhavemadeithardformetocarryouthisinstructions

eveninthebestofcircumstances.Becausethetripwassecretwecouldnotuse

theEmbassycommunicationssystem;thePresidentwouldnothavebeen

comfortablewiththisanywaybecauseofhisdeterminationtokeepsummit

preparationsinWhiteHousechannelstopreventleaks.Wethereforeusedour

aircraftforcommunications.Ithadexcellentfacilities,andwehadtakentwo

membersoftheWhiteHouseCommunicationsAgencywithus.However,when

wehadamessage,theyhadtodrivetotheairportnearlyanhourawayand

transmitit.WhenamessagearrivedfromWashington,theprocedurewas

reversed.Sincewegenerallydidnotfinishourreportsuntillateatnight,they

arrivedinWashington—allowingtimeforthemtogettotheairportandbe

transmitted—afterthecloseofbusiness.Therewasanadditionaldelaycausedby

interferencewiththecommunications. [

Ipaidnoattentiontothisatthetime,ascribing

ittoatmosphericconditions.WhenIwasinMoscowin1973toarrangeacease‐fireforthe

MiddleEastwarandtimewasoftheessence,ithappenedagain—anditoccurredtomethatit

mightmorethancoincidence.

]Whateverthecause,onthisMoscowtripmyfirst

reportarrivedgarbledinWashingtonandhadtoberetransmitted—addingto

Nixon’sfrustrations.HisanxietymountedthatImightbeproceedingonacourse

hedidnotwish(oratleastnolongerwished)metofollow.



Evenhadcommunicationsworkedbetter,IdonotknowwhatIcouldhave

donewiththefeverishmessage sIreceived.AlHaiginmyofficewasmypointof

contactwithNixon,whowasensconcedinCampDavidwithhisfriendBebe

Rebozo—aconjunctionthatdidnotusuallymakeforthecalmestreflection.And

theSovietsneedlesslyaddedothercomplications.OurSALTnegotiatorGerard

SmithcabledfromHelsinkionApril21thathisoppositenumberVladimir

SemenovhadindicatedthattheSLBMissuewasunderintensereconsiderationin

Moscow.HedidnottellSmithmore,butthemerehintwasenoughtotriggeran

excitedSmithbackchanneltotheWhiteHouse,aRogersphonecalltothe

President,andaconclusionbyNixonthatthewilySovietsweretryingtodeprive

himofpersonalcreditforapotentialSALTagreement.WhatpossessedSemenov

againtoplayourtwochannelsagainsteachotherjustashehaddonetheyear

beforecanonlybeansweredfromSovietsources.ItseemedeitherSoviet

bureaucraticdisarrayoracalculatedefforttoexertpressure.Itisnotimpossible

thattheSovietsweretryingtoreinsureagainsttheveryinstructionsIwas

receiving.IfIbrokeoffthetalksinMoscowoverVietnam,itwouldbeonrecord

thatbeforetheeventtheyhadhintedofanewpositiononsubmarine‐launched

missiles.NotonlythesummitbutavirtuallysettledSALTagreementwouldhave

appearedtobehostagetoVietnam.Ifwehadabandonedboth,thedomestic

uproarfromthepress,academia,andCongressmighthavebeenuncontainable.



Smith’scableandRogers’sphonecallcompoundedNixon’snervousness

aboutmyMoscowtalksandreinforcedhissuspicionsaboutSovietmotives.He

wasnowconvincedthatitwasallanelaboratecollusionbyMoscowandHanoito

makeitmoredifficultforusto takestrongactiononVietnam,aswellasto

deprivehimofthecreditforwhatevermightbeachievedatthesummit.Onthis

theoryMoscowwasusingthesummitprospectsasleverageagainstustoprevent

ourbombingoftheNorth—anotunreasonableconjecture.Thehintsofflexibility

inSALTweredesigned,Nixonwroteme,asa“sweetenerforconcessionsbyuson

SouthVietnam”—thoughnonehadbeenaskedforormade.Nixonwasafraid that

IwouldagreeinMoscowtoendthebombingoftheNorth—whichwasneveron

theagendaand,interestinglyenough,wasneverevensuggestedbyBrezhnev.



Nixon’scabledinstructionsthroughoutmyMoscowtripwere,infact,highly

ambivalent.HewashoppingmadthatSemenov’shintstoSmithwoulddeprive

thePresidentialChannelofthecreditforaSALTagreement.Atthesametime,ifI

followedhissuggestionstosto newallBrezhnevonalltopicsexceptVietnam,this

wouldmakeithighlylikelythatwhateverSALToffersMoscowhadwouldsurface

intheregularchannelsinHelsinki,andthentheseofferswouldbeusedtoshow

whatopportunitieswehadmissedbyourintransigenceonVietnam.Inoneand

thesamecableIwastoldthatIshouldstallallsummitpreparations—andalso

thatIshouldgivestrongsupporttothetechnicaladvanceteameventhenvisiting

MoscowtoarrangethePresident’ssummitschedule.[Theadvanceteamwasheaded

bythePresident’sMilitaryAssistant.BrigadierGeneralBrentScowcroft,abrilliantofficerwho

laterbecamemydeputy.Scowcroftknewofmyvisit,havingarrangedtheaircraftforme.Bill

Hylandofmystaff,whoaccompaniedhim,hadtofendoffeagerKGBmenwhokeptaskingifhe

hadasecretmessagefromKissingerforBrezhnev.Hylandpolitelysaidno,knowingthatIwas

ontheothersideoftownandneedednosuchcircuitousprocedures.]Forforty‐eighthours

IwascastigatedbythePresidentfordiscussingsummitsubstance.ButthenNixon

readanewsreportthattheKremlinhaddowngradedhistripinprotocolrank

fromaStatevisittoanofficialworkingvisit,andIwasforthwithinstructedto

informGromykothatthiswasinadmissible.(Ididso.Thenewsreportturnedout

tobefalse.)



Leavingasidetheinternalcontradictionsinthemessages,thereemerged

fromalltheseheatedlong‐distanceexchangesadifferencethatwasfundamental.

Inmyviewoneoftheworstmistakesinanegotiationistoaskforsomethingthat

isclearlyunfulfillable.Howevertoughsuchademandsounds,itchangesthe

psychologicalbalanceinaperverseway.Sincetheothersidemaynotwishto

admitthelimitationsofitspowerorinfluence,itmayinventreasonsfor the

refusalthatsourtheentirerelationship.Andthepartythathasputforwardthe

proposalwillbefacedwitheitherbreakingoffthenegotiationor,ifitproceeds,

suggestingthatitsdemandsneednotbetakenseriously.Inmyviewthecourse

pressedonmefromWashingt onwouldsoonfaceuswithpreciselythisdilemma.

ItwasinconceivablethattheNorthVietnamesewouldagreetogiveupa

lifetime’sstruggleinthelessthanninety‐sixhoursscheduledformyvisitto

Moscow.EvenifpressedbyMoscow,Hanoiwouldwanttoplaytotheendits

currentoffensive,towhichitwasalreadyfullycommitted,toimproveits

bargainingposition.WhateverMoscowdecided,stoppingtheoffensiveand

turningitbackwasourresponsibility.If weslackenedourmilitaryeffort,we

wouldbeinahopelesspositioninthenegotiationsthatwouldinevitablyfollow.If

westeppedupourresponse,thebestformofSovietpressureonHanoiwouldbe

acquiescenceinouractions.



IfNixonhadwantedtoadoptastonewallingstrategyonthesummit,he

shouldnothaveletmegotoMoscow.Thatwasbestaccomplishedfrom

Washington.HesentmebecauseheknewthatifIdidnotgohewouldthenface

thesamedilemmaonhisowntrip.Logicallythat,too,wouldhavehadtobe

canceledunlessVietnamweresettled.IfNixonwentanyway,hewouldhave

appearedtobackdown—andwouldhavebeeninMoscowwithmostofthekey

SALTissuesunresolvedandundermuchgreaterpressurewhenresolvingthem

thanprovedtobethecase.Ontheotherhand,hadNixoncanceledhisowntrip,

themajormotiveforSovietrestraintonIndochinawouldhavedisappeared.We

wouldthenhavehadtopursueourVietnampolicyinthefaceofanall‐outSoviet

propagandaandpolitical assault,accusedathomeandabroadofriskingglobal

peaceintheillusorypursuitofamilitarysolution inSoutheastAsia.The

precedentoftheabortiveEisenhowersummitof1960,whichsohauntedNixon,

wouldhavebeenrepeatedafterall.



Paradoxically,therefore,theconditionforatoughpolicyinVietnamwasto

leavetheonusofanysummitcancellationonMoscowandtocomplicateSoviet

decisionstothemaximumbyholdingoutprospectsofmajorprogressinUS‐

Sovietrelations.Wewereinagoodpos itiontodoso.Brezhnevhadengagedhis

prestigebyofferingtoconduct thetalkswithmepersonally.Hewasnow

committedtothesuccessofthesummit;Sovietstonewallingcouldhavebeen

equallyaccomplishedbyGromykoorbyDobrynininWashington.



AsNixoninstructed,IdevotedmyfirstdayandahalfinMoscowto

beardingtheRussiansonVietnam.Hethenwantedmetocutoffthetalks,discuss

nothingelse,andcomehomeearly.IcabledmydisagreementandNixon

relented,butbythenIwasalreadylaunchedonthetalksonmyown.Becauseof

thelengthycommunicationslag,Ihadnochoice.



Tofollowmyinstructionsliterally,ifNixonhadinsistedonthem,would

havebeentothrowdownthegauntlettotheSovietleadershipinMoscowwitha

seriesofunfulfillabledemands—allthemorepointlesslywhenBrezhnevinhis

eagernesstogetNixontoMoscowwasacceptingourpositionsonSALTandthe

communiquéthatIhadpreviouslycommunicatedthroughDobrynin.Wewould

havehadasimultaneouscrisisinVietnamandinrelationswiththeSovietUnion.

Downthedrainwouldhavegoneourstrategyofcreatingatriangularrelationship

tostabilizetheglobalequilibriumandto fosteraVietnamsettlement,isolating

Hanoiandgivinghopetoourpublicthatwecould,amidthepassionsofthewar,

conductacreativeforeignpolicy.Vietnamwouldhaveconsumedoursubstance

afterall—thenightmarethatwe,andnotonlyourcritics,feared.Toabandonthe

entiredesignofourforeignpolicynowwouldinevitablybeinterpretedin

MoscowasafundamentalchangeofcourseforwhichHanoiwasonlyapretext.It

wouldbeviewedbytheSovietsasashifttotheChineseoption,with