Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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GROMYKO:MaybetheanswershouldbegivenonlyattheSummit.

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BREZHNEV:No,Dr.KissingerhastoleaveMoscowwithclearanswerstoallhis

questions.BecauseyoumightwanttotellthePresidentthisstory.Hewillwanttoknowthe

ending.Ifyoudon’tknowit,hewillwonderwhatyouweretalkingabouthere.

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KISSINGER:Frommyexperiencewithbureaucracies,theyprobablydidboth.

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Ineverdidreceivetheanswer.



Brezhnevwas,inshort,notonlyheadoftheCentralCommitteeofthe

CommunistPartyoftheSovietUnionbutquintessentiallyRussian.Hewasa

mixtureofcrudenessandwarmth;atthesametimebrutalandengaging,cunning

anddisarming.WhileheboastedofSovietstrength,one hadthesensethathe

wasnotreallyallthatsureofit.Havinggrownupinabackwardsocietynearly

overrunbyNaziinvasion,hemightknowthestatisticsofrelativepowerbut

seemedtofeelinhisbonesthevulnerabilityofhissystem.Itismynightmarethat

hissuccessors,bredinmoretranquiltimesandaccustomedtomodern

technologyandmilitarystrength,mightbefreerofself‐doubt;withnosuch

inferioritycomplex,theymaybelievetheirownboastsand,withamilitary

establishmentnowcoveringtheglobe,mayprovefarmoredangerous.



EqualityseemedtomeanagreatdealtoBrezhnev.Itwouldbe

inconceivablethatChineseleaderswouldaskforit—ifonlybecauseintheMiddle

Kingdomtraditionitwasagreatconcessiongrantedtotheforeigner.ToBrezhnev

itwascentral.Inthefirstfifteenminutesofourmeetinghecomplained about

Nixon’simpromptutoastinShanghaitotheeffectthattheUnitedStatesand

Chinaheldthefutureoftheworldintheirhands.Brezhnevthoughtthis

downgradedtheSovietUnion,tosaytheleast.Heexpressedhispleasurewhenin

mybriefopeningremarksIstatedtheobvious:thatwewereapproachingthe

summitinaspiritofequalityandreciprocity.Whatamoresecureleadermight

haveregardedasclichéorcondescension,hetreatedasawelcomesignofour

seriousness.(Evenifhismotivewasflattery,itwasanoddchoiceofobject;

flatterycanbeeffectiveonlyifitisgracedwithsomeplausibility.)



Brezhnevledanationthatafternearlysixtyyearsofhorribleexertionsstill

laggedbehindWest ernEuropeintechnologyandstandardofliving.He seemedin

aweofAmericantechnology;hebackedoffinacrisiswheneverweconfronted

himunambiguouslywithAmericanpower.TheSovietUnionhadacquireda

tremendousmilitarypotential; itwasasuperpower;ithadtobetakenseriously.

Butitcouldnotavoidthereality—perhapseventhepremonition—thatthe

Communistsystemisincompatiblewiththehumanspirit,thatamoderneconomy

cannotberunefficientlybytotalplanning,thatmancannotflourishwithout

freedom.Thestatethatsoughttoabolishthecontradictionsofthecapitalist

systememergedwithacontradictionatonceconsolingtousandmenacing:It

couldnotpossibly flourishwithitsexistingstructurebecauseitstifledallcreativity

inasoullessbureaucracy.Butitssingle‐mindedconcentrationontheonethingit

didwell,theaccumulationofrawmilitarypower,gaveitthemeanstodisturb

everyequilibriumandtheincentivetose ekforeignsuccess,evenasitscoregrew

moreandmorehollow.Itthusfaceduswiththegravedangerthatitsleadersat

somepointmightseektoescapetheirhistoricalperplexitiesbyusingthe

weaponstheyhadsoimplacablyaccumulatedoverthedecades.



Brezhnevwastheincarnationofthisambivalence.Underhisstewardship

theSovietUnionhadundertakenacolossalmilitarybuildup.Itsoriginmaywell

havebeenBrezhnev’sneedtokeepthemilitaryestablishmentonhissideinthe

struggletooverthrowKhrushchev,asmuchasawell‐thought‐outdesignfor

worlddomination.Intimetheoriginalmotivewouldgrowirrelevant.The

accumulatingmilitarymeanswouldcreatetheirownopportunitiesandan

inherentthreattotheglobalbalanceofpower.Ontheotherhand,themassive

devotionofscarceresourcestomilitaryhardwarewouldalsoinhibitthe

modernizationofSovietsociety.Brezhnevsoughtto escapethedilemmaby

relaxingtensionssothathecouldacquireWesterntechnologywithoutchanging

hisdomesticstructureorimpairinghismilitarybuilduporreducingSovietglobal

pressures.Hewasallthemoretemptedtodothisbecausegeopoliticallythe

SovietUnion,despiteitsseemingpower,wasinanuncomfortableposition.With

ouropeningtoPekingthetimewouldbenotfaroffwhenallthemajorpower

centers—theUnitedStates,WesternEurope,China,andJapan—wouldbeonone

sideandtheSovietUnionontheother.Brezhnevwasamaninahurrycaught

betweentwochallenges:HewantedtocalmthethreatfromRussia’sWestern

pastsothathecoulddealwithitsChinesefuture.Detentewashiswayofseeking

this.TheChinesewerenotwrongwhentheysawitasapotentialperilto

themselves.Ourchallengewaswhetherbybringingourpowertobearwiselywe

couldinduceagenuinereductionoftensions,genuineinthesensethatitreduced

thedangerstoEurope withoutmagnifyingthemenacetoAsia.

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Wewillneverknowwhetherarealrelaxationwaspossibleintheperiod

immediatelyafter1972.NodoubtBrezhnevjustifieddetentetohiscolleaguesas

awaytobeguiletheWest.Andthatwassurelyoneofitsdangers.ButIalso

believethatpartofBrezhnevsincerelysought,ifnotpeaceintheWesternsense,

thensurceasefromthedangerandrisksandstrugglesofalifetime.Ireadanovel

once,basedonthepropositionthateachhumanbeinghasafiniteamountof

qualitieslikecourageandenduranceandwisdom,andthatlifeconsistsof

expendingtheseever‐dwindlingresources.Somethinglikethatseemedtohave

happenedtoBrezhnev.WhenImethimhehadgonethroughtheStalinpurgesof

theThirties(indeed,hisfirstbigjumpuptheladde rtookplacethen),theSecond

WorldWar,anewwaveofpurges,thepowerstrugglefollowingthedeathof

Stalin,andtheintriguethatledtotheoverthrowofKhrushchevandcatapulted

Brezhnevtothetop.Heseemedatonceexuberantandspent,eagertoprevail

butatminimumrisk.Hehadhadenoughexcitementforonelifetime.Hespoke

often,andonoccasionmovingly,aboutthesufferingandtraumaoftheSecond

WorldWar.

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Noneofthis,ofcourse,changedtherealitiesofSovietpower,whichhewas

augmentingenergetically.Andthiswouldhavetobebalancedbyourstrength,

whateverBrezhnev’sintentionsorprofessions.Detentecouldneverreplacea

balanceofpower;itwouldbetheresultofequilibrium,notasubstituteforit.And

Ithereforeconsistentlyspurredthestrengtheningofourowndefenses.Maybe

Brezhnev’sperformancewasalltheater,thoughIbelieveoutsidersexaggerate

busyleaders’capacityforsustaineddissimulation.Ithoughthewasgenuineinhis

desireforarespiteforhiscountry.WhatIwasunsureofwasthepricehewould

bewillingtopayforit.Washepreparedforanendtotheconstantprobingfor

openingsandthetestingofeveryequilibrium?Washereadytobeginatrue

periodofcoexistence?Orwasitallatacticalmaneuvertoweakenourvigilance

beforethenextroundofpressureswouldbeexertedwithgrowingpower?



Ourstrategyofdetentealwaysdependedonafirmapplicationof

psychologicalandphysicalrestraintsanddeterminedresistancetochallenges.We

hadshownthisinJordan,Cien fuegos,India‐Pakistan,andshortlywouldshowitin

Vietnam;wesoughttoshowitlaterinAngola.Inlateryears,thecollapseofour

executiveauthorityasaresultofWatergate,theerosionoftheleadership

structureevenintheCongress,theisolationismbornofthefrustrationsof

Vietnam,andanemergingpatternofgeopoliticalabdicationconspiredtoprevent

theestablishmentofthebalanceofincentivesandpenaltiesthatmighthave

preemptedseveralcrisesandinthelongrungivenusa genuineperiodof

restraint.Instead,weendedupachievingtheworstofallresults:constant

pinpricksoftheSovietbear(denialofMFNstatus,forexample),butnotcoupled

withareadinessonourparttoruntherisksthatalonecouldproduceSoviet

caution(inAngola,forexample).Intheabsenceofanequilibrium,withoutthe

provisionofincentivesandpenalties,theinherentdynamicsoftheSovietsystem

againtempteditintoexpansio nafewyearsafterthe1972summit.And

Brezhnev’sfailinghealthmayhaveenabledmoreenergetichandstodesigna

consciouschallengetotheWestinthelatterpartofthe1970s.Now,noteven

Brezhnevwilleverknowhowmuchhemighthav ebeenpreparedtopayin

restraintforagenuinepeaceimmediatelyafter1972,hadwemaintainedthe

rightbalancebetweenfirmnessandconciliation.

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<<Contents>>

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ConversationswithBrezhnevandGromyko



henheopenedourmeetingonApril21,Brezhnevspokefromnotes—a

departurefromwhatwehadlearnedofhispracticeinearlyencounters

withforeignleaderswhenhewasdependentuponreadingpreparedstatements.

Brezhneveffusivelyexpressedhiscommitmenttothesuccessoftheforthcoming

summit.Therewouldbeagreements,heinsisted.“Wehavenowishtobring

aboutaquarrelinthe[summit]meeting.Thatissomethingwecouldeasilydoby

stayinginWashingtonandMoscow.”HereferredonlytangentiallytoVietnam.In

uncharacteristicallydelicatereferencetotheB‐52bombingofHanoiand

Haiphongfourdaysbeforemyarrival,heobserved:“Unfortunately itsohappens

thateventsintherecentperiod—shortlybeforethisprivatemeetingbetween

us—dampenedtheatmospheresomewhat.”Itwasnotmuchofastatementof

supportforanallyevennowbeingbombedonadailybasis.Andeventhiswas

immediatelyqualifiedbyareassurance:“Iamnotsayingthiswillreducethe

prospectsforourmeeting.”ThenextdayBrezhnevsaidthathecontrolledneither

ourpeaceproposalsnorourbombers,offeringnosuggestionsforthefo rmerand

utteringnothreatwithrespecttothelatter.Hisprioritywasclearlythesummit

andUS‐Sovietrelations,notVietnam.



Allofthefirstday,however,wastobedevotedtothewar.Ratherthan

beginwithultimatums,IexpressedonbehalfofthePresidentourcommitmentto

asuccessfulsummit.Wewantedtoimprovenotonlytheatmospherebutalsothe

substanceofEast‐Westrelationships.Thiswastosetthestageforanexposition

ofNorthVietnameseduplicity andofourdeterminationtobringmatterstoa

headinVietnam.IsaidbluntlythatHanoi’soffensivethreatenedthesummit.I

wentsofarastoadvancethestartlingthesisthattheSovietshadaninterestin

preventingaNorthVietnamesevictory;I doubtedthatthePresidentcouldcome

toMoscowifwesufferedadefeat.Eveniftheoutcomewerestillindoubtby

then,theAmericanpeoplewouldbeawarethatitwasSovietequipmentwhich

hadmadeHanoi’soffensivepossible;hencethePresident’sfreedomofaction

wouldbeseverelylimited:“ImustinallhonestytelltheGeneralSecretarythatif

developmentscontinueunchecked,eitherwewilltakeactionswhichwillthreaten

thesummitor,ifthesummitshouldtakeplace,wewilllosethefreedomofaction

toachievetheobjectivewhichwedescribed.”Iinsistedthattherehadtobea

privatemeetingwithLeDucThobeforeMay6andthatitwouldhavetobe

conclusive:“Wearenotinterestedintalks.Weareinterestedinresults.IlikeMr.

LeDucTho.Heisamostimpressiveman,butthereasonIwanttoseehimisnot

forthepleasureofhiscompany,buttohavesomeconcreteresults.”



Brezhnev’sresponsewasmildintheextreme.Hedidnotdisputemy

characterizationoftheNorthVietnamese.Hedidnotanswermythinlyveiled

threats.HereadinsteadanotefromHanoirefusingtosendanemissarytomeet

meinMoscow.Heproudlyshowedmethecable,whichIwasofcourseunableto

read,todemonstratethathealonewaslistedonthedistribution.(Ifthiswas

genuine,heclearlyexpandeditscirculationonthespot.)TheNorthVietnamese

werenowinsistingonresumptionoftheplenarysessionsonApril27tobe

followedbyasecretmeetingonMay6.Theyaddedtwominorconcessions,

however:LeDucThowouldleaveHanoiassoonaswehadacceptedaplenary

session,andwecouldproposeanearlierdateprovidedwegaveLeDucThoa

weektoreachParis.(HeusuallytraveledviaPekingandMoscow,stoppingfor

consultationsineach“fraternal”capital.)TheNorthVietnamese,whotrustedno

one,noteventheirprincipalsupporter,forty‐eighthoursearlierhadsentus

directlytheveryproposalBrezhnevreadtome.Theyfeltnoneedtoremindus,

however,oftheirlongstandingrefusaltomeetmeinMoscow.



AswasalreadyclearbeforeIwenttoMoscow,whatwasneededtohavea

privatemeetingwassomeformulatopreserveeveryone’sface.Forthiswedid

notneedSovietassistance.WhatwehadtoaccomplishinMoscowwastoconvey

ourdeterminationtobringmatterstoa head;toestimateourhost’slikely

responseifweproceededunilaterally;andtoengagetheKremlininamanner

mostlikelytobringhometoHanoiitsincreasingisolation.ItoldBrezhnev

ominously:“Sowehavetworequirements.Thefirstisthatthemeetingcannot

takeplaceonMay6;first,becauseIamoccupiedonthatday,andsecondly,

becausethatistoolate,asItoldyourAmbassador.May2isthelatestdateIcan

attendandonwhichprivatetalksstillmakesense.”Iwarnedthatatthenext

meetingLeDucThohadtochangehisnegotiatinghabits.Wewouldnolonger

holdstillforarecitalofultimatumsinwhichHanoi’sdemandsweretreatedasthe

solerevealedtruth:“Ifthisprocessismaintainedwewillactunilaterallyat

whateverrisktowhateverrelationship.”



ItwasameasureofBrezhnev’scommitmenttothesummitthathelistened

totheseprovocativeremarkswithoutdemur.OnlytheChinese,hesaid,opposed

thesummit:“Youshouldbearinmindthatpowerfulforcesintheworldareoutto

blockthesummitmeeting.ItcertainlywouldbequiteabiggifttotheChineseif

themeetingdidnotcomeoff.ItwouldonlyhelpChina.”Thisstatement

convincedmethatBrezhnevwouldgotogreatlengthstoavoidcancelingthe

summit.AndnothingcouldrevealbettertheSovietfixationwithChinathan

Brezhnev’sapparentassumptionthatsomethingthathelpedChinawouldby

definitionbeanathematous.The“Chinesemenace”hadbecomesecondnature;

itsupplieditsownjustificationevenwhencitedtoanAmericanwho,nottwo

monthspreviously,haddraftedacommuniquéinPekingwhosecondemnationof

hegemonywasclearlyaimedatSovietexpansionism.Thisobsessionalso

accountedforthecompulsivemannerinwhichtheSovietleaderskeptraising

China,oscillatingbetweenseeminguneasinessandtheunshakableconviction

thatsoonerorlater—iftheyonlykeptatitlongenough—wewouldjointhemina

condominiumtostiflewhattheyconsideredtheoverwhelmingthreatfromthe

East.



Ididnotimmediatelyputforwardaformulaforbreakingtheprocedural

deadlockwithHanoi.NordidIsubmitoursubstantiveproposalforthe

negotiationsbecauseIthoughtIhadreachedthelimitofwhatthetrafficwould

bearinthatmeeting.AndsincethehourwasgettinglateIdidnotwanttoend

thesessionbyputtingforthtermsthatmightberejectedandthusgiveBrezhnev

anighttothink upreasonsfordoingso.



Brezhnevendedthefive‐hourmeetingbysuggestingwebothreflectonour

exchangesand“reachresults”sothathewouldnotbecriticizedbytheCentral

CommitteeorIbythePresident.IrepliedthatIranagreaterriskofbeingscolded

bythePresidentthanhebytheCentralCommittee.Hedidnotknowhowtruthful

Iwas.



Thenextday,April22,involvedanotherfive‐hoursession.Ibeganby

presentingacompromiseproposalto breakthedeadlockoverthesequenceof

plenaryandprivatemeetingswiththeNorthVietnamese:Wewouldattenda

plenarysessiononApril27,providedHanoiagreedinadvanceofittoaprivate

meetingonMay2.Ipointedoutominouslythatthiswasthelastpracticabledate

beforewehadtoma ke“otherdecisions”;resultsthereforehadtobeachievedat

thatmeeting.Togiveemphasistothenotverysubtlewarning,Isaidthatwe

wouldnotbombintheHanoiorHaiphongareapendingthemeeting.Brezhnev

hailedmyproposalas“constructive.”AsfarasIwasconcerned,itsmajorutility

wastomaketheSovietsshareresponsibilit yforthemeeting’soutcomeandto

puttheonusonHanoiforitsfailure.



IthereforealsodescribedthesubstantiveproposalthatIwouldmaketoLe

DucThoonMay2.ItwastheproposalIhadoutlinedinmystrategy

memorandumforthePresident,whohadapproveditonApril19:withdrawalof

thoseNorthVietnameseunitsthathadenteredSouthVietnamsinceMarch29,

respectfortheDMZ,immediateexchangeofprisonerswhohadbeenheldfor

morethanfouryears,andaseriousefforttonegotiateasettlementwithinan

agreedtimeperiod.InreturntheUnitedStateswouldhaltthebombing ofNorth

VietnamandwithdrawtheairandnavalforceswehadintroducedsinceMarch

29.



Thisproposalhasbeenthesubjectofsomefiction.Oneaccount claimsthat

itwasa“concessionofenormousmagnitude”whichleftBrezhnev“astonished,”a 

“veritablediplomaticbomb.”“thefirstmajorturningpointintheVietnam

negotiations.”

EvenapartfrommyimpressionthatBrezhnevwasnotallthat

familiarwiththedetailsoftheVietnamnegotiations,theaccountispure

nonsense.Therewaslessto myproposalthanmettheeye.Itwastougherthan

thestandardUSpositioninthatitaddedtheratherambitiousdemandthatthe

NorthVietnameseunitswhichhadinvadedintheMarchoffensiveshould

withdrawunilaterally.Thisdemandwasathrowaway;noonehasdevisedaway

toaccomplishatthebargainingtablewhathasnotbeenachievedonthe

battlefield.ThedemandcouldbediscardedwhenHanoiwasreadyforserious

negotiation;itwastobequietlydroppedinNixon’sMay8speech.The

importanceofmyApriltripwasnotthesubstantiveproposalbutthefactthatthe

USSRengageditselfintheprocessinamannerthatworkedtoouradvantage.



Brezhnevrespondedtomysomewhatinsolentproposalinan

extraordinarilyconciliatorymanner.Hemumbledsomethingaboutthedifficulty

ofwithdrawingNorthVietnamesedivisionsinthemidstofanoffensive.“Justby

listeningbyear”—assuringmehedidnotwantto“raiseanyconditions”—he

wonderedifwecould“perhaps”excludethatprovision.WhatwouldIthinkofa

cease‐firealongexistinglineswithallunitsstaying inplace?Isaidthatthree

weeksearlierwewouldhavejumpedatsuchanopportunity.NowthatHanoihad

putitsentirearmyintotheSouth,itwouldnolongerdo:



ButnowwehaveasituationwhereNorthVietnamhasviolatedtheunderstandingwe

hadwiththemin1968.Youknowverywellinthisroomthattherewasanunderstandingto

respecttheDemilitarizedZone.Therefore,itisimperative,ifwearetostopthebombing,that

theywithdrawthedivisionsthatcrossedtheDMZ,andthathenceforththeDMZberespected.



IhadmydoubtswhetherHanoiwouldyetacceptacease‐fireinplace—a

proposalthathadbeenonthetablesinceMay31,1971.IfHanoiwereinterested,

wewouldsurelyhearaboutitonMay2.Thatwouldbethetimetomakethe

decision;itwasnotanissuetobesettledinMoscow.Andmy Soviethostswerein 

nomoodtodebateVietnamproposa ls.Brezhnevwasobviouslyeagertogetonto

otherbusiness.HethereforeagreedtosubmitourproposalstoHanoi.And,in

fact,theheadoftheSovietCentralCommitteesectiondealing withforeign

Communistparties,KonstantinKatushev,leftonaspecialplaneforHanoishortly

afterward.Moscowwasnowengaged. Nationsdonotgenerallytransmitoffers

withwhoserejectiontheyintendtoassociatethemselves.Brezhnev’slow‐key

treatmentofVietnam,hisrefusaltoseektosoftenourthreatsorcontestour

toughdemands,wasfurtherindicationthatwecouldgoquit esomedistance

beforetheSovietswouldjeopardizethesummit.Thiswascrucialintelligencefor

thecrisisthatwouldbeahead, eitheriftheNorthVietnameserefusedtheMay2

meetingorifitfailed.



Atthispoint,Imadeacrucialdecision.IagreedtoputVietnamtotheside

andproceedwithsummitpreparations.Thankstoacommunicationssnarltobe

discussedbelow,Ihadnotreceivedcontraryinstructions.Ihadlittledoubtfrom

theambiguouscableexchangewithNixonwhileIwasontheplanethathewas

nervousaboutmydiscussinganysubjectbutVietnam.Thenightbefore,Ihad

receivedaninstructionwhichIimmediatelyappealed—tocutshortthetalksand

returnhomependingaSovietdecisiontobringtheIndochinawartoaconclusion.

IjudgedthistobedangerousandunwiseandIthereforewenttothelimitsofmy

discretionaryauthorityandproceededtotherestoftheagenda.Brezhnevhad

heldstillforadayandahalfofmenacingstatementsdirectedagainstaSovietally

obviouslybecausehewantedtomakeprogresstowardasummit.IfInowleft

Moscowwithoutevengivinghimachancetomakewhateverproposalshehad

clearlyprepared,hewasboundtoconsideritanaffront,aputdowninfrontofhis

associates,afundamentalreversalofcourse,andadeliberateefforttoforcea

showdownnotoverVietnambutoverUS‐Sovietrelationsingeneral.Ithoughtthe

logicalopponentforaconfrontationwasHanoi.Moscowshouldbemaneuvered

intothepositionwhereitwouldhavetomakethechoiceaboutproceedingwith

thesummit;weshouldnotpreemptitbyforcingthedecisionuponit.Forthese

andotherreasonswhichIwilldiscussmorefullybelow,IdecidedtoletBrezhnev

presenthisproposalsonthemajorissuesforthesummit.Ifwewanteda 

showdown,thePresidentcouldalwaysrejectthem;itwasamuchbettercourse

thantorefuseeventolistentoSovietoffersinMoscowandtoseektofacedown

BrezhnevdemonstrativelyinfullviewofhisPolitburo.



OneofBrezhnev’smoststrikingcharacteristics,asofalmostallSoviet

negotiators,washisanxietyto getmatterswrappeduponcehehaddecidedona

breakthrough.Hecouldhaggleandstallformonths,evenyears.Butoncehisown

cumbersomemachineryhaddisgorgedadesign,hisdomesticstandingseemedto

dependonhisabilit y togetitimplementedrapidly.



Brezhnevhadcomepreparedwithmajorproposals.Theywentmostofthe

waytowardourpositionsonthetwoprincipaloutsta ndingissues,SALTandthe

communiqué.HebeganwithanewproposalonABMs.Arguingthathewantedto

show“howtheSovietsidesolvesproblemsinaconstructivespirit,”he

abandonedthecomplicatedformulasofthepreviousSovietposition,which

amountedtothreeABMsitesfortheSovietstotwoforus.Hisnewplan

permittedeachsidetoprotectitscapitalandoneICBMsite.Brezhnevnotedthat

giventheSovietpatternofdeployment,thiswould meanthattheSovietswere

protectingonlyhalfthenumberofmissilesthatwewere.Exceptforthelast

wrinkle,thishappenedtobeexactlythepositio nofMelLaird.Ihadmydoubts

thatwewouldevergetthefundsforamissiledefenseofWashington.Itherefore

preferredeachsidetohavetherighttoselectwhatevertwolocationsitchose.In

ourcasethesecondsitewouldhavebeenthemissilefieldatMalmstromwhere

constructionhadalreadystarted(thefirstbeingatGrandForks).Buthavingcome

thisfar,thenegotiationwouldsurelynotdeadlockontherelativelyminor

differencenowremainingbetweenthetwosides’ABMformulas—especiallysince

thePentagonseemedtopreferBrezhnev’sformula.



Ididnotrespondtotheproposal,however,becauseIcouldseethat

Brezhnevhadanotherpaperthathewaseagertoputforward.Firsttherewas

somebyplay,whichIreprintheretoconveysomeoftheatmosphere:



KISSINGER:Mr.GeneralSecretary,letmesaythisisaconstructiveapproach.Iwill

reservecommentuntilIhearwhatyousayaboutsubmarines.



BREZHNEV:Nothing.



KISSINGER:Nothing?



BREZHNEV:Bepatient.WhatcanIsayaboutthem?Theytravelunderwater,wecan’t

seethem.They’resilent‐



GROMYKO:[inEnglish]Puzzle,puzzle!



KISSINGER:Youdohavesomethingonsubmarines?



GROMYKO:Youcan’treaditbeforeSukhodrev![ViktorSukhodrevwasthebrilliant

Sovietinterpreter.IwasfrequentlycriticizedforrelyingonSovietinterpreters.Thiswasas

nonsensicalachargeasintheChinesecase.Infact,threemembersofmystaffknewRussian

(Sonnenfeldt,Hyland,andRodman);severalonBrezhnev’ssideofthetableknewEnglish

(Gromyko,Dobrynin,andAleksandrov).IfSukhodreveverhaddifficultywithawordorphrase,

achorusofvoiceschimedintohelphim.Asidefromthis,itwasnevercleartomehowthe