Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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urgedNixonto waituntilMondayandtogivemeforty‐eighthourstodevelop

someplanforsustai nedoperations.InadditionIknewthatGeneralAbramswas

opposed:AsusualhewantedtothrowallB‐52sintothegroundbattleinthe

South.Howspecificallytoreactwasprimarilyatacticalquestion.ButNixon,Haig,

andIwereallagreedthatamajormilitarymovewascalledforandthatwewould

decideonitsnaturewithinforty‐eighthours.



WhatconcernedNixonmostwastheimminentMoscowsummit.Haunted

bythememoryofEisenhower’sexperiencein1960,hewasdeterminedthatany

cancellationorpostponementshouldcomeathisinitiative.Myviewwasthatwe

hadnochoice;wewouldhavetorunwhateverriskwasnecessary.IfLeDucTho

wasrightandthecollapsewasathand,wewouldnotbeabletogotoMoscow

anyway.WecouldnotfraternizewithSovietleaderswhileSoviet‐madetanks

wererollingthroughthestreetsofSouthVietnamesecitiesandwhenSovietarms

hadbeenuseddecisivelyagainstourinterestsforthesecondtimeinsixmonths.I

hadsoughttogiveHanoieveryopportunityforcompromiseandtheSovietsthe

maximumincentivetodissociatefromHanoi.Thatstrategywouldnowhavetobe

puttothetest.WewouldhavetobreakthebackofHanoi’soffensive,to

reestablishthepsychologicalequilibriuminIndochina.Whethertopreemptthe

expectedcancellationorleavethedecisiontotheSovietsseemedtomeamatter

forNixon’spoliticaljudgment.



HewasadamantthatacancellationbyMoscowwouldbehumiliatingfor

himandpoliticallydisastrous;ifithadtobe,wemustcancelthesummit 

ourselves.Heorderedpreparationofasetofsevereretaliatorymilitarymeasures

againsttheNorthVietnamese;sinceItoldhimthatthesecouldwellcausethe

Sovietstocancel,heinstructedmetoplanontheassumptionthathewould

preemptMoscow.Hewouldaddressthenationearlythefollowingweekto

explainwhatevermilitarymoveshefinallydecidedon,andannouncehis

cancellationofthesummit.SALTwouldgoforward,however;itcouldbesignedin

alow‐keywayatalowerlevel.AndsothefatefulSequoiameetingended.



OurfirstmovewastowarntheSovietleadersthatgravedecisionswere

impending.OnMay3aPresidentiallett er,draftedbySonnenfeldt,Lord,andme,

wassenttoBrezhnevinforminghimofmyfruitlessmeetingwithLeDucTho.It

seemedtous,thelettertoldBrezhnev,thatHanoiwasattemptingtoforceusto

accepttermstantamounttosurrender.Wewouldnotpermitthis.Afterour

experienceattheParismeeting,wewouldcommunicatenofurtherproposals;in

thelightofHanoi’sconducttherewasnoreasontobelievetheywouldhaveany

positiveeffect.Theletterspokeof“decisions”aboutto bemade.Itimpliedthat

theSovietUnionwasatleastpartlyresponsible.ItaskedcoldlyforBrezhnev’s

“assessmentofthesituation”onanurgentbasis.



TherestofMay3wasspentinpreparingthemilitaryplans.Theyincluded

variouslevelsofairattacksNorthofthetwentiethparallel.Nixonwentoverthe

optionswithmelateatnightintheLincolnSittingRoomwithout,however,

makinganydecisions.Haldemansatinonsomeofthesemeetings.Hehadno

viewsonthemilitaryoperations,buthestronglyopposedourcancellationofthe

summit,andsaidso.Hesawnobenefitintakingtheinitiative;itwould,onthe

contrary,damagethePresidentbymak inghimappearimpulsive. Nixonsuggested

thatHaldemanandIsolicitJohnConnally’sviews. 



WecalledonConnallyattheTreasuryDepartmentaroundnoonon

Thursday,May4.TheofficeoftheSecretaryoftheTreasuryisfreeofthe

Mussolini‐stylevastnessoftheCabinetofficesbuiltintheThirties,likeInterioror

CommerceorJustice.Nordoesithavethatatmosphereofanoversized

boardroomofaprovincialcorporationwhichhasbeentheSecretaryofState’slot

since1947.Itiselegantandyetofhumanproportions,situatedwhereAndrew

Jacksonsettledthecontroversyaboutitslocationbypointingwithhiswalking

stick,therebyforevercuttingofftheviewtoCapitolHillfromtheWhiteHouse

andundoingL’Enfant’smeticulousartistryinlayingoutWashington’sstreets.



HaldemanandIsatonasofa,Connallyonaneasychairfacingus.Hiseyes

werenarrowed,squinting,aswashishabitwhenhewasgauginghischallenge.

WeexplainedthatthePresidentwasdeterminedtoresumebombinginthe

Hanoi‐Haiphongarea,beginningwithathree‐dayB‐52strike,andhaddecidedto

preemptMoscow’sprobablereactionbycancelingthesummit.Haldemansaid

thathedisagreedwiththelatter.ConnallyresoundinglysecondedHaldeman.He

wouldhearnothingofcancellation;itwouldgainusnothingdomestically.Either

waywewouldbechargedwithjeopardizingEast‐Westrelations;ifwetookthe

initiativetheaccusationofrashnesswouldbeaddedtotheusualbar rageof

criticisms.Weshoulddowhatwethoughtwasnecessaryandleavethedilemma

totheSoviets,whosearmshadmadeitallpossible.Anyway,Connallydidnot

thinkitaforegoneconclusionthattheSovietswouldcancel.



AssoonasConnallyhadspokenIknewhewasright.ForamonthIhad

beenpursuingastrategyofseekingSovietacquiescenceinourmilitarymovesby

enhancingtheprospectofasuccessfulsummit;afternursingmatterstothispoint

itmadenosensetorefuseeventotesttheefficacyofwhatwehadlaboredso

hardover.IhadgonealongwithNixon’spreliminarydecisionindeferencetohis

superiorknowledgeofthedomesticpoliticalconsequences.ButwhentheCabinet

officergenerallybelievedtohavethebestpoliticalbrainintheAdministration

consideredcancellationadomesticliability,IguiltilyrealizedthatontheSequoiaI

hadfallenintothatcardinalsinofPresidentialAssistants:permittingoneselftobe

seducedbyargumentsbecausetheycomportedwithPresidentialpreference.My

dutywastospeakunambiguouslytothosesubjectsforwhichIhadresponsibility.

Clearly,Ihadnotmadetheforeignpolicycaseagainstcancellationonthe

Sequoia.Infact,theprincipalpurposeofmyMoscowtriphadbeentoshiftthe

onusofcancellatio nto theSovietsandtomakeitasdifficultforthemtodoitas

possible.Connally’sstrongstandgavemeanopportunitytorectifymymistake.



Connally’ssecondcontributionwastostressthatwhileweshouldnot

cancelthesummit,wealsoshouldnotrefrainfromdoingwhatwethought

necessaryoutoffearoftheSoviets’doingso.Whatevermeasureswetookhadto

bedecisive.ChallengingtheSovietUnionwas,infact,saferifweshowedno

hesitation.Theprincipalissue,hesaid,wassimplywhatwouldbethemost

effectivemilitaryresponse.Thattooclearedtheair.Toomuchgovernmental

discussionfocusesonmarginalissues.Buttheanswerscannotbebetterthanthe

questionsasked.Themostvitalcontributionthatadviserscanmakeistodefine

thecentralissue.Connallyhaddonethat.



ItoldConnallythatweneededamilitarystepthatwouldatonceshock

HanoisufficientlytochangethecourseofeventsinVietnamandbesustainablein

termsofAmericanpublicopinion.Athree‐dayB‐52attackonHanoiandHaiphong

wouldgivetheshockbutwouldbetoobrief.Inthelongertermitmightbe

negatedbythepublicoutragethatitwouldproba blygenerateathome;itwould

beagodsendforourcritics.(ItalsohadtocontendwiththereluctanceofGeneral

Abrams,who,eventhoughhisairforceshadbeenaugmentedfarabovehis

recommendations,stillinsistedthatheneededallhisassetsforthecrucialbattle

inSouthVietnam.)Mypreferre dstrategywastheplanfirstdevelopedbymystaff

in1969andresubmittedbyHaigonApril6:theblockadeofNorthVietnam,tobe

accomplishedbymining.



IfavoredablockadebecauseitwouldforceHanoitoconserveitssupplies

andthusslowdownitsoffensiveatleastuntilreliablenewoverlandrouteshad

beenestablishedthroughChina.SincemostofthesupplieswouldbeSoviet,this

wouldnotbeaneasyassignment.Ipreferredminingbecauseaftertheinitial

decisionitwasautomatic;itdidnotrequiretherepeatedconfrontationsofa

blockadeenforcedbyinterceptingships.Eventhoughthebruntofstoppingthe

offensivewouldstillhavetobebornebytheforces inSouthVietnam,once

enemysuppliesintheSouthwereexhausted,theminingwouldcreatestrong

pressuresfornegotiations.Iagreedwiththeneces sityofbombingNorthofthe

twentiethparallel,includingHanoiandHaiphong,especiallyconcentratingon

roadandraillinkstoChinabywhichHanoiwouldtrytocircumventtheblockade.

Butitshouldbecarriedoutsteadilybyfighter‐bombersandnotdramaticallybyB‐

52s.



AssoonasIfinishedwithConnally,IplacedtheseargumentsbeforeNixon

intheOvalOffice.Nixon’sreadyacceptancedemonstratedhowreluctant,despite

allthebravado,hadbeenhis“decision”tocancelthesummit.Hescheduleda

meetingfor3:00p.m.;he,Haig,Haldeman,andIweretobethesoleparticipants.

InthemeantimeIaskedAdmiralMoorerabouttheJointChiefs’viewofthe

miningoptionandwhenitcouldbeimplemented.Moorerwasenthusiastic,

havingrepeatedlyrecommendeditintheSixties;hehadalsoparticipatedinthe

DuckHookplanningin1969andhadbeenconsultedbyHaigonthesubjectin

earlyApril.HethoughtthattheminingcouldbecarriedoutasearlyasMay9,

Indochinatime,ortheeveningofMay8inWashington.



WhenwemetinNixon’shideawayintheExecutiveOfficeBuildingatthe

appointedhour,thePresidentwasingoodform,calmandanalytical.The only

symptomofhisexcitementwasthatinsteadofslo uchinginaneasychairwithhis

feetonasetteeasusual,hewaspacingupanddown,gesticulatingwithapipeon

whichhewasoccasionallypuffing,somethingIhadneverpreviouslyseenhim

do—yetonemorefrommychief’sinexhaustiblestoreofsurprises.Ononelevel

hewasplayingMacArthur.Onanotherhewassteelinghimselfforadecisionon

whichhispoliticalfuturewoulddepend.Playactingaside,hewascrispand

decisive,hisquestionsthoughtfulandtothepoint.Whywasminingpreferable to

ablockade,hewantedtoknow.Irepliedthatitschiefadvantagewasthatit

requiredonlyonedecision;afterthemineshadbeenseeded,thatwasthat,until

theyturnedthemselvesoff,usuallyafterfourmonths.Ablockade,incontrast,

wouldproducedailyconfrontationswiththeSoviets.Everytimeashipwas

stoppedwewouldseearepetitionofthedramaoftheCubanmissilecrisis;our

challengeandtheSovietreactiontoitwouldhavetobeactedoutoverandover

again,probablyontelevision.Thedangerofsomesliporofapretextforserious

incidentwouldbetoogreat.



Interestinglyenough,Nixondidnotagainmentioncancelingthesummit.

WhetherpersuadedbyConnally’sargumentorbyhisownlongstandingyearning

tocompleteEisenhower’splantovisitMoscow,heproceededwithamuch

strongermilitaryresponsethananypreviouslyconsideredandyetwaswillingto

puttheburdenofabandoningthesummitontheSoviets.Nixonthenandthere

decidedupontheminingofNorthVietnameseports.Hewouldspeaktothe

nationonMondayevening,May8,orassoonthereafterastheminingcouldbe

implemented.HewouldconvenetheNationalSecurityCouncilonMonday

morningtogivehisadvisersanopportunitytoexpresstheiropinions.Thesummit

wouldthenbeuptotheSoviets.



ItwasoneofthefinesthoursofNixon’sPresidency.Hecouldhavetaken

theadviceofhiscommanderinthefield,supportedbyhisSecretaryofDefense,

andconcentratedonthebattleinSouthVietnam.Thatwouldhaveprobablyseen

himthroughtheelectionwithoutadebaclebutwouldhavefacedhimattheend 

oftheyearwithsubstantiallythesameproblemandnoprospectofanegotiated

end.Hecouldhavetemporized,whichiswhatmostleadersdo,andthenblamed

thecollapseofSouthVietnamoneventsrunningoutofcontrol.Hecouldhave

concentratedonthesummitandusedittoobscurethefailureofhisVietnam

policy.Nixondidnoneofthese.Inanelectionyear,heriskedhispoliticalfuture

onacoursemostofhisCabinetcolleaguesquestioned.Hewaswillingtoabandon

thesummitbecausehewouldnotgotoMoscowinthemidstofadefeatimposed

bySovietarms.AndhehadinsistedonanhonorablewithdrawalfromVietnam

becausehewasconvincedthatthestabilityofthepost‐Vietnamworldwould

dependonit.Hewasrightonallcounts.



Wenolongersoughttohidethatmajordecisionswereimminent;theless

surprisingtheywere,thelesslikelythatMoscowwouldreactbyaspasm.OnMay

4,oneoftheregularplenarysessionstookplaceinParis;theyhadbeenresumed

onlytheweekbefore.Atitsend,AmbassadorPorter,asinstructed,refusedto

scheduleanothermeeting,byreasonof“lackofprogressineveryavailable

channel.”OnMay5Hanoiviolatedthesecrecypledgeonwhichithaditself

insistedanddisclosed thatLeDucThoandIhadmetonMay2.Itdidnot

characterizethemeetingorrevealthatIhadrefusedanotherdate.Instead,it

floatedrumorsthatIhadagreedtoacoalitiongovernment.Suchcrudeduplicity

couldbeexplained,ifatall,onlyasanattemptatpsychologicalwarfare,tocreate

animpressionthatwouldcompoundthedemoralizationofSaigon.Theploywas

tootransparentandcynical.Itactuallyplayedintoourhandsbyenablingusto

useHanoi’sint ransigenceattheMay2meetingtoexplaintheactionsthatwould

nowbeinevitable.WeadvisedThieutoignoreHanoi;wewereoncourseand

wouldnotbedeflected.Hewasfreetodenytherumorsofacoalition

governmentinanymannerhesawfit.



MystaffandIboretheburdenoftheplanningnormallyconductedbythe

WashingtonSpecialActionsGroup.WeinformedtherelevantCabinetofficers,

buttoavoidleaksthePresidentwantednointeragencyactivitybeforetheNSC

meetingscheduledforMay8.Iobtainedtheviewsoftheprincipalsseparately.

Moorerwasenthusiastic.Hewasplanningatfullspeed.Theminingcouldbegin

theeveningofMay8,Washingtontime.Lairdwasopposed.Hethoughtthebattle

wouldbedecidedinSouthVietnam;thebattlefieldimpactofminingwouldcome

toolatetoaffecttheoffensive.(Iagreed,butIwasconcernedwithHanoi’s

actionsaftertheoffensive.)HealsothoughttheNorthVietnamesewouldbeable

toreplaceseabornesupplieswithoverlandroutes.RogerswasinEurope;hewas

askedtoreturnfortheNSCmeetingonMay8.Iexpectedthathisassociates

wouldnotfavorthePresident’sdecision.Helmswasunambiguouslyopposed.The

analyticalsideoftheCIA,neverthegroupofwild‐eyedColdWarriorsthatmedia

andCongressionalinvestigatorslatersuggested,generallyreflectedthemost

liberalschoolofthoughtinthegovernment.Theyhadlongsincegivenupon

Vietnam;theytendedtobelievethatnothingcouldwork.Ataminimumthey

knewthattheycouldsuffergreatdamagebymakinghopefulpredictionsthat

turnedouttobewrong;theyranfewrisksinmakingpessimisticforecasts.They

nowprovidedtheanalyticalrationaleforwhatLairdhadsuggested.Hanoi,they

said,wouldbeabletoreplaceitsseaimportsbyoverlandroutes,usingaportin

SouthChinatiedintotheNorthVietnameserailsystemortransportingalltheway

overlandthroughChina.



ForallmyrespectandaffectionforHelms,Ithought thisnonsense.Our

estimatewasthatHanoireceived2.1milliontonsofsuppliesthroughHaiphong

harbor,includingallitsoil.Railwaysnowcarriedonly300,000tons,orone‐

seventhoftheHaiphongtotal.Toshifttheremainingsix‐sevenths,evenif

feasible,wouldrequiretime,and,aboveall,politicaldecisionsbytheSovietUnion

andChina.HavingseentheChinesedistrustoftheSoviets,Ididnotthinkthat

eithertheChineseseaportsorrailsystemwouldbeautomaticallyavailableto

Moscow.Nordiditseemtomequitesosimpletoshiftanelaborateseaborne

logisticalsystembasedonOdessa,Murmansk,andVladivostok torailtransport

acrossanunfriendlycountry.Toshipoilthousandsofmilesoverlandwithout

pipelineswouldbea formidableundertaking.Atbestitwouldtakemonths,while

Hanoi’ssupplieswoulddwindlewitheverypas sing day.Wewentonwithour

planning.



OnMay5Istresse dagaintoDobryninthatgravedecisions wereintrain.I

toldDobryninthatthePresidentwasnotangry;hewaspreparingouractions

coldlyanddeliberately.WewerenolongeraskingMoscowtodoanything. We

wouldlookafterourownneeds.WeaskedofMoscowonlyunderstandingof

whathadbroughtustothispoint.



OnMay6IdidmybesttoavoidthemistakeoftheLaosoperation,of

attemptingamajorblowwithinsufficie ntforces.Tomakesurethatourcommand 

inSaigonwasundernomisapprehensionaboutthePresident’sdetermination,I

sentabackchanneltoAmbassadorBunker:



Toputitinthebluntestterms,wearenotinterestedinhalf‐measures;wewantto

demonstratetoHanoithatwereallymeanbusinessandwewanttostrikeinafashionthat

maximizestheirdifficultiesinsortingoutwhattheirprioritiesshouldbeinrespondingtothese

retaliatoryactions.



ThereshouldbenoquestionineitheryourorGeneralAbrams’mindthatwewantto

devotethenecessaryassetstothisaction.Ifinyourjudgmenttheassetsrequiredfor

operationsintheNorthleadyoutoconcludethatmoreairisneededtomeettacticalexigencies

intheSouth,thenthatairshouldbepromptlyrequestedandwewillgetittoyou.



AbramsrespondedthroughBunkerthathisforcesweresufficient—making

himuniqueamongAmericanmilitaryleaders,whosereadinesstorequest

additionalforces,ifonlyasanalibishouldfailurefollowtheirrefusal,isusually

insatiable.OfcourseAbramshadrecentlybeentherecipientofmassiveand

unexpectedPresidentiallargesse.Hehadreceivedwithoutanyrequest,and

againstconsiderableoppositionfromtheciviliansideofthePentagon,fifty‐six

moreB‐52s,threemoreaircraftcarriers,and129moreF‐4Phantomjets.

Seventy‐twoadditionalPhantomswereontheway.Bunkeraddedhisown

personalappreciationforthePresident’scourage.



MyconversationwithDobrynintriggeredarapidreplyfromBrezhnevto

thePresident’sletterofMay3.OntheafternoonofSaturday,May6,Dobrynin

deliveredaletterdistinguishedbyitsnearirrelevancetotherealsituation.In

defianceofallevidence,Brezhnevinsistedthatour“pessimism”aboutmy

meetingwithLeDucThowas“unjustified.”OnthebasisofKatushev’svisitto

HanoihecouldassureusthatNorthVietnamwasreadytoseekapolitical

settlement;ofcourse,headdedoffhandedly,thisrequiredacoalition

government.InotherwordswecouldhavepeacebyacceptingHanoi’sterms;for

thisinsightBrezhnevwasnotneeded.Brezhnevtactlesslymentionedthe

PentagonPapersamongthereasonsthatHanoiallegedlyhadtomistrustthe

actionsandintentionsoftheUnitedStates—agaffehardlylikelytoelicitacalm

reactionfromNixon.Brezhnevcautionedusagainstattemptingtoexertmilitary

pressureonHanoi,hintingdarklythatthiscould“entailseriousconsequences”for

peaceandforSoviet‐Americanrelations.Brezhnevurgedthatweshow“restraint”

andnotmissthe“opportunities”forsettlingthewarbynegotiation.Buthemade

clearthatMoscowwouldnotinvolveitselfinthediplomacy.Theissuewouldhave

tobesettledbetweenWashingtonandHanoi.



Brezhnev’sletterservedonlytoreinforceourdetermination.He

threatenednospecificresponses;thedangertopeaceheforesawwasstated

hypotheticallyandasarising“evenirrespectiveofourwishes.”Inanyevent,the

UnitedStatescouldnotdelaybecauseofvagueSovietpredictions andelliptical

threats.Wedidnotanswertheletteruntilwehadalreadyacted.



Tomakesurethatwehadconsideredallthepossibilities,Imetwithmy

staffexpertsthatsameSaturdayafternoonofMay6:AlHaig,mydeputy;Hal

Sonnenfeldt,mySovietexpert;JohnHoldridgeandJohnNegroponte,specialists

onAsiaandVietnam;RichardT.Kennedy;WinstonLord;andCommander

JonathanHowe.InadditionIinvitedGeorgeC.Carver,theprincipalCIAexperton

Vietnam.Itwasavariedassembly:ForeignServiceOfficers,militaryofficers,aCIA

representative,andseveralcivilianexperts.Buttheyheldvaryingviewsonthe

Vietnamwarandwereanoutspokengroup.Wedebatedtheimplicatio nsofthe

President’sdecision.Sonnenfeldt,theSovietexpert,thoughttheSovietswould

cancelthesummit.Holdridge,theChinaexpert,expectedthatPekingwould

freezeallitsrelationswithusexceptthelesssignificantpeople‐to‐people

contacts.NegropontearguedthatthefavorableimpactonmoraleinSouth

Vietnamwouldbedramatic.CarverrepeatedtheCIAanalysisthatoverland

supplylineswouldbeabletosubstituteforseaimports.



Isummeduptheargumentsforandagainsttheoperation.Thearguments

infavorwerethattheNorthVietnamese alreadyfacedsevereconstraintsand

nowwouldhavetoconfrontnewpressuresontheirlimitedmanpowerand

resources.TheminingwouldshakeHanoi’sfaiththattimewasonitsside.It

wouldstrengthenmoraleinSouthVietnam.Itwouldgiveusanadditional

bargainingcounterforthereturnofourprisoners.Itmightaccelerate

negotiations.Itwouldrestorethepsychologicalbalance withtheSovietsandthus

mightmakeasummitpossible.Thenegativeargumentswerethatthefurther

investmentofAmericanprestigewouldexacerbatethegravityofourdefeatifthe

SouthVietnamesecollapseddespiteourbestefforts.Cancellationofthesummit

andofalltheripeningagreements,includingSALT,wasconceivable.Relations

withPekingwouldcool.Therewouldbeanotherdomesticupheaval,whichin

turncouldencourageHanoi’sintransigence.



AftermysummaryIaskedeachparticipantforhisrecommendation.

WinstonLordopposedouraction;hethoughtthepotentialgainsnot

commensuratewiththecosts.Theconsensusoftherestwastoproceed.There

wasagreementalsothatifitweredoneitshouldbedone“thoroughly”;wewere

goingtopaythedomesticpriceanywayandthereforewemightaswellsucceed.



InVietnam,meantime,alullhadsettledoverthebattlefronts.AnLoc

remainedsurrounded;theNorthVietnamesewerestillmovingupsuppliesforthe

attackonHuéandKontum.Thisreinforcedourdeterminationtoactto 

strengthenSaigon’smoralebeforethestormbrokeagain.



SundaywasspentinpreparingfortheNSCmeeting.Incontrastwiththe

Cambodianoperationtwoyearsearlier,themoodwasonenotofincipient

hysteriabutofresigneddetermination.IacknowledgedtoWinstonLordthatall

wehadpatientlyputtogetheroverthreeyearsmightgodownthedrainina 

twenty‐minutespeech.Butwehadnochoice.SeeingthePresidenttoasting

BrezhnevwhilewewerebeingdefeatedbySovietarmsinVietnamwouldnotbe

understoodbyAmericanswhosesonshadriskedorgiventheirlivesthere.It

wouldbebettertostandfirm,gainrespect,andpickupthepieceslater.Lordand

IspentthebeautifulspringdayatCampDavidworkingwiththePresidentonthe

speechheproposedtodeliverthenextevening.Theimminenceofatelevision

appearancehaditsusualelectriceffectonNixon.Whileeverypublicappearance

madehimnervous,oncehehadleapedthepsychologicalhurdletowarddecision

themomentumofpreparationtookover.Thoughtechnicallythedecisionto

proceedwasnottobemadeuntiltheNSCmeetingthenextmorning,every

succeedingspeechdraftmadeitsoutcomemorecertain.



TheNSCmetnextday,Monday, May8,intheunrealatmospherethat

Nixon’sproceduresgenerated.Allpresentknew thathehadalmostcertainly

arrivedathisfinaldecision.Theythereforehadmuchlessinterestinconsidering

theissuesthaninpositioningthemselvesforthecertainpublicuproar.Nixon,

withhisbacktothewall,wasathisbest:direct,tothepoint,withnoneofthe

evasionsthatoftencharacterizedhisstylewhenfacingopposition.Heledoffthe

meetingwithalongmonologueemphasizinghisdeterminationnottoletSouth

Vietnamfall.Hewasconvincedthat“therewillbenosummit”—whichevercourse

wetook.Ifwetookstrongaction,thiswould“jeopardize”thesummit;ifwedid

nothingandVietnamwascollapsing,hecouldnotgoanyway.



AdmiralMoorerpresentedtheminingplanandthecampaigntointerdict

railroads.Helmspresentedanintelligenceappraisal. TheCIA’sconsidered

assessmentwasthatMoscow“wouldalmostcertainlymovetocancelthe

summit”andperhapsbringpressuretobearonBerlin;Chinawould“probably”

providedirectsupporttoHanoianalogousto the90,000supporttroopsithad

sentduringthepre‐1968Americanbombing;theoverlandrouteswould

effectivelyreplacethesearoute.Helmsconcludedwiththenoncommittal

predictionthatHanoiwouldwaitfortheoutcomeofthemilitarytestbefore

decidingitscourse.(Whilenotveryilluminating,itturnedouttobethesingle

correctpredictionintheassessment.)Lairdarguedthatthemostcriticalsupplies

cameinbyrailandinanycasetheNorthVietnamesehadfourtofivemonthsof

stocksinreserve.HeexpressedconfidencethattheSouthVietnamese“canmake

it.Huémaygobutitwillnotbeasbadas1968.”Hisconclusionwasthatthe