Kojeve Alexandre. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit

ANote oa Etenftv, Tlmc, ard tho

Concept

"Pessimistic

Skepticism"

or

"Relativism"

"Mpticismr

figurc1

?

I

Egurc2

O

FigurrS

,^.

i \

"optimistic

Skepticism',

ft

t

or"Critici$m"

\-/

Figure

10

"Absolute

Knowledge"

(Hegel)

105

INTRODUCTTON

TO

THE

NEADINC

OT

HEGEL

this Knowledge-that

is, outside

of Man

who

exists in

the

World

and outside

of

the

World

that

implies

existing

(i.e.,

ternporal)

Man.

This

-"cenrral

point"

(which-necessarily-appears

once

the

concept is

interpreted

as t relationship

with

so*"ihing

other

thtn

the

concept-that

is, once

the element

of

transcendelnce

is

inuo-

duced

into

Knowledge)

has

been

called

God.

Funhennore,

we

have

seen

that

this

tleistic

schema

has

no specificafly

christian

asp_ect,

since

we derived

it

from

the

platonic-

conception.t

.

Let-us

say,

then,

that the

"central

point" is

God. lVe

can

do so

since

for

Plato

the tv

dvo06v,

symboliied

by

this

point, is also

dctis.

But

the name

makes

no

difference.

Let us

""ther

see what

the

thing

means.

And

to

this

end, let

us

transform

the

drawing,

that

is

to say,

make

it

more

precise.

.

First,

let us

simplify.

The

Concepr can

be repeated

in

time.

But

its

repetition

does not

change

it,

nor

does it change

its relation

to

Eternity;-

in

a word,

it changes

nothing.

Hence

i.

""r,

do

away

with

all

the

radii

of

the

circle,

except

f6r one (Figure

5).

(Except

for one,

for

the

fact

of

the

Concept;,

pr.r.n""

i"

ii-" ;" of

c"pit'"t

imporcance;

now,

the point

on the

circumference

symbohzes

fuinmt

knowledge

which

is

accomplished

in

Time).

Anh

now let

us see

what

is

symbolized

by

this

radius.

The

radius

symbolizes

the relation

between

the eternal

Concept

and

Eternity

or

the

eternal

Entity.

Therefore

this reration

too'is

nontemporal

or eternal.

Nevenheiess,

ir

is

clearlv

a. relation

in the

strict

sense-i.e.,

a

relation

between

two

differinr

things.

There-

fore the

radius

has,

if

you

will, ectension (in

Space,

sirrie there is

no

Time

in it).

Therefore

we did

well

to symbolize

it by

a line

(a

dotted

line,

to

distinguish

it

from

the

solid

temporal

line).

However,

the

relation

in

quesrion

is undeniably

double'(Figure

6).

Indeed,

on

the

one

hand

the

(eternal)

Concept

situated in Time-

i.e., the

Word-rises

up

through

itsmeaning

to

the entiry revealed

b.y

thtg

meaning;.and

on

the other

hand,

this

entiry descends

through

the

meaning

toward

the

Word,

which

it thui

crearcs as

Word

out

of

its

phonetic,

sound-giving,

changing

reality.

Without

s

Generally

speeking,

it is

the

schema

of il

mono-theistic

knowledge-that

is,

of all

Knowledge

that recognizes

a

transcendenee,

and

only one

transcendeni

entiry.

And one

can say

that

every

philosophy

recognizes

a transcendence:

except the

acosmimt

of

Parmenides-spinoze

(possibility

I), and the atbeimt

of

Hegel

(possibility

III).

ro6

A

Note on Etemttg, Time, and tfu

Corcept

the Word, Eterniry would

not

be

represented in

Time,

end

con-

sequently it would

not be

accessible to

Man. And

without Eternity,

the Word would

have no

meaning

and

would

not raise

Man above

Time

and

change;

there would be no

mttb for Man.

(Or,

taking

, concept

as en example

of

the

Concept: the anrd

"Dog"

reveals

the essence

of

the dog, and

without this word

this

esence would

not be revealed

to men;

but

the essence

of

the dog is what realizes

the

meaning

of

the word;

the

dog is what

allows man to develop

the

,uord

"Dog"

into

a

judgment,

saying:

"the

dog is

an

animal

with

four feet,

covered

with hair, etc.")

Generally speaking, there

is a movement

from

the word

to the thing, and

a

rerurn from the

thing to

the

word. And

it

is

only

this double relation

that consti-

tutes

the trath

or the revelation

of reality,

that

is

ro

sey, the

Con-

cept in

the

proper

sense. And on

the orher hand,

this double rela-

tion exhausts

the truth

or the

Concept: the

(erernal)

Concept

is

to Eternity,

and

Eternity reveals

itself exclusively

through

the

Concept.

Hence,

even

though they

are

in

Time, they

nonetheles

have

no

relations

with

Time and the temporal.

There-

fore

the

double, or

better,

circular,

relation

of the

(eternal)

Con-

cept

and

Eterniry

cuts tbrougb

the temporal

circle.

Change as

change

remains

inaccessible

to

the

Concept. In

other

words,

ihere

is no

truth

in

the temporal,

either before

or after the

Concept.

ThloySh

the

Concepc

one

can

rise

from

the temporal

to Ererniry;

and

then one

can fall back

to the

temporal.

But

ifter the fall

one

is

exactly

what

one

was

before.

[n order

to live

in

the

Concept-

that is,

in

the

truth-it

is necessary

to live

oatside

of

Time

in

the

eternal

circle.In

other

words,

the Lternal circle

of absolute

knowl-

edge,

even though

it

is

in Time,

has no

relation

to Time;

and

the

entirety

of

Knowledgeis

absolute

only

to the extent

that it

implies

an eternal

circle

which

is related

only

to

Eterniry. And

that is

w]ry

we

must

represent

the Platonic

conception

of

aLsolute

Knowl-

edge-in

the

manner

indicated

by

Figure

f.

In

other

words,

again

we

find

the schema

of

theo-logical

Knowledge. (The

circle with

a

point

in

the

center was

bur

a simple

graphical

variant

of this

schema.)

Thus

we see

rhat

the

difference

between

the

rheological

System

and.the

atheistic

legelian

System

is to be

traced

back

to the

very

beginning

point.

Speaking

in metaphysical

terms,

we

can

say

rhat

a theistic

System

properly

so-callid-that

is, a

frankly

transcen-

107

INTRODUCTION

TO

TITE

READINC

OF

HECEL

denmlisr

and

mono-theistic,system-results

as

soon

as the

Concept

(i.e.,

absolute

Knowledge)

is

defned

es en eterndl

entity

that

^is

Eternity,

Eterniry

being

outside

of

Time.

Let us

see

what

this

means

foi

the

temporal

World

of

phe_

nomena.

understanding

of

this world

(and

o]

Man who

rives

in it)

is.

symbolizea

by tl9

large

circle.

So, let us

rake away

the

small

circle

of

the eternal

concept

(Figure

g).

Then,

two

intirpretations

are

posible.-

FTRST,

one can

say

that

the

arc

has

fixed, iefinitive,

impassable

limits (Figure

9).-Thus

we

find

the schema

of the

Knowledge

thac

I have

called

,,m1ntical,'in

the

broad

sense

of the

word.

Taking

God

away

from

i

given theological

System,

rhen,

can

lead

in

the

end to_a

mystical

System, in

wf,ich

one can

speak

of

everything

except

God,'who

is

issentially

inefiable.

And if one

is

radical,

one

will

say

that it

cannor

euetr b" said

of

God

that

he is

God;

the

most

that

can be

said is

that

he is

ineffable.

And

the

ineffable

Being

can reveal

itself

through

whatever

you like:

lho"S-

h_

"ecstasy,"

through

music,

and

so on;

but

noi

through

Speech.a

But

wjth regard

to

the other

things-i.e.,

the

temporal

entities-

eaerything

can

be said.

In

other

woids,

the Knowledge

that relates

to

them can,

in

principle,

be

total,

definitive;

since

Time

is

limited,

it

and

its content

can

be

erbaasted

bv

Discourse.

However. in

t"flg

eaerything

that

can

be

said

about the

temporal

lworidty

and

human)

reality,

one

aftains

its

timit-that

is,

thi

limit of what

is

beyond.

But

the

establishment

of

the

presence

of

the

beyond

proves

that one

cannot

be

content

with

Discottrse,

even

total.-One

sees

that one

is

obliged

to go

beyond

Discourse

through t ilence-

"mysticalrt'

"ecstaticr"

"algorithmig"

"sonofousr" or otherwise.

sEcoND,

one

can

say that

after

the

small

circle that

srrm-

bolizes

the eternal

Concept has

been taken

away,

the arc of'the

large

circle

is

without

limits

(its

rwo

"farrhest" points

being on the

small

circle

that

has

been

removed):

Figure

A. In this C"se, we

have

the

schema

of

skeptical

or

relative

Knowledge-i.e.,

rhe

schema

of

the

absence of

true

Knowledge

in

the strict-sense

of

the

term.

Knowledge

is

is,

to change. Bur

since

rln

Plato

the

"mysticd"

tendency

is

very clear:

the

2v

&yo06v

is.teveded"

in

and by

t silent

contempletion.

ro8

ANap on

Eternitg,

Time,

atd tlv Corcept

Time

is now

without limits,

change

never stops. Hence there

is

no

eternal or

definitive

Knowledge: there is

no epist?mE,

there

is only

dora. But in another way, even in

this case,

one can sey

that

the

circle is closed.

Then the ideal of

Hegelian absolute Knowledge-

that is,

circular

Knowledge-is set up

(cf.

Figure

rr). But this

ideal forever remains an ideal:

the circle of

real

Knowledge

is

never actually closed

(Figure

ro).

It

is

the

optimistic

form

of

skepticism. It is the skepticism

of the

eternal

"why,"

of humaniry

"that

always

learns,"

that ceaselessly

marches

on

like an

individual

man

toward

an

end

that it

will

never attain. And the truth rcmains

It[fx1ft"-xgcording

to

the definition

of

the

Devil

in

"Le

Puits

de

Sainte Claire." It

is also the "eternal

task"

(easige

Aufgabe) of

Kantian Criticism. In the two variants of

skeptical

knowledge,

then,

philosophy

as a road that

actually leads to Wisdom

is

obviously impossible.

InverselR through

the

introduction

of

the

eternal

Concept-

i.e., discursive tuth-into

a

given

"mysdcal"

or

"skeptical"

Sys-

tem,

e

theo-loeical

System

is

always obtained,

even if

the

term

God

does

not explicirly

enter into it.

For in

this

case

the truth

would

necessarily reveal

a

Being situated outside

of

Time-that

is, outside

of

the World

and

Man.

Well then,

once

more,

what

does

the theological

(not

the

mysti-

cal or skeptical)

Sysrem mean

for understanding

of the temporal

World?

In

principle,

everything

can

be

said

about the World and Man.

Knowledge that relates

to them is

total. However, in

itself, Knowl-

edge relating

to Time

and the temporal

remains relative:

it is

a

doxa.

Only

by

relating

it in its

entirery

to

ercrnnl

Knowledge

related to

Eterniry

can one

say something

defniiae about

the

temporal.

LET

us

coNsrDER THE

woRLD.

In

theological

language

(in

the

narrow

sense

of

the

term) one must

say thet

events in

the

World,

as well

as

the

World

itself,

are

contingent:

hence

there

is no

absolute

Kno,utledge

relating

to

them.

But if,

pn

impossible,

Gad's designs

and

His

creative will

were known,

there

could

be a

true Science

of

the

World.

Speaking

in

symbolic

theological

terrns,

one

can-sey

that

there

is

Science relating

ro

the World only to

the

extent that

this

World

implies geometrical

elements.

Indeed,

Kant

109

INTRODUCTION

TO

TIIE

NEADTNC

OF

trBGEL

showed

us

that

if algorithm

is to

be transformed

into

Discornse,

it

must

be related

either

to

Time

or to

Space.

Here, since

its

being

Time

is excluded

by definirion,

it can

be related

only

t6

Space

(which,

in

this

conception,

is a

Space outside

of

Time).

And indeed,

one

can

speak

of

geometry:

,,the

circle',

b also

t

anrd

that has.a-.me-a1ing

(and

one

cxn

sdy what

it

is), as

opposed

to a

nonspatialized

integral,

for

example,

which

can

be

expressed

only

by

an

algorithm.

Therefore,

the-theological

System

can fabricate

a, retl-geomety,

that

is

to

say, a, geornetrical

physics, and

nothing

else.

Now,

this

physics can

tell

us that

the eanh

is round,

bw

lt

qrnnot

tell us

why it

atrracm

heavy

objects

(because

the

force

of

att-rection,

like every

force,

is

not

only'a

spatial, but

also an

essen-

tially

temporal

phenomenon);

and consCquenrly,

it

cirnnor

say

what

the

eefth

is

* Eartb-t

planet

on which

trees grow and

man

lives.

As FoR

rvreN

himself,

the

case is

the same

for him.

There is

true

Science

concerning

him

only

to rhe

extenr

rhat he is

relared

to

Eternity

.

I

cen

proae

the

exisrence of

God: it

is an

eternal

rruth.

But I.cannot

prove my existence

on

the same

grounds, unless

I

conceive-

of

myself

es

en

eternal

idea in

God.

As for me

in

my

temporal-or

worldly

existence,

I can know

nothing.

Moreovei,

absolute

Knowledge

is

precisell what

makes

tn abs-olute

Knowledge

relating

to

the temporal

imposible.

Let us

take

Christian

theology

as an example.

Wtrat truly

matters

for

rhe

Chrisdan is

to

know

wherher

he is

saved

or damned in

consequence

of his_

worldly

or temporal

existence.

Now,

the analysis

of th"

eternal

concept

that

reveals

God shows

that this

cannot be

known,

that

this

c:ln

never be

known.

If the

Christian

does

not

want

ro be

"mystical,"

-

that

is,

to renounce

Discourse

completely,

he

must

necesarily

be

skeptical

with respect

to his temporal

existence.

Do

what he

will,

he

will

not

be certain

chat he is-acting

well.5

In short, in

the theological

Sysrem

there is

an absolute

Knowl-

edge

in

and through

Beususstsein,

but

there is

no absolute

Knowl-

edge

through

and in

Se/Dsr-bewusstsein.

.

Finally,

we

can

presenr

the

theological

Sysrem in

its anthropo-

Iogical

aspect

by explaining

the

significance in

it of

the

idea-

of

*#J..

the

Christian edmits

that

God's decision

is

in

conformity

with

humen

lro

A Note on Eternity, Time, atd

the

Corwept

human

freedom

(that

is to

sey, the idea of

Man

himself, since man

without freedom

is but

an

animal).

We do

not

need

to define

freedom here.0

We all

have

"an

idea of

what it is,"

as

we

say; even

if we do

not

know

how to define

freedom.

And the

"idea"

that

we have of it is

sufFcient

to enable

us to say

this:

The

free

act is situated,

so

ro

spea,k,

outside

of

the

line of

tem-

poral evolution.

The hic et nunc,

represented by a

point

on this

line, is determined,

fired,

defined

by

the

past

which,

through

it,

determines

the future as

well.

The bic et

nanc

of

the

free act, on

the other

hand, is unexplainable,

on the basis

of

its

past;

it is not

fixed

or determined

by it.

Even

while existing

in

space-time,

the

being

endowed

with freedom

must be

able to detach

itself from

the hic et

nunc,

to

rise

aboae

it, to

take up

a

position

in relation

to

it.

But the free

act is related

to

the

hic et

nanc:

it

is effected in

given determined

conditions.

That is

ro say: the content of

the

hic

et rrunc

must be

preserved, while

being'detacbed

from the bic

et

nunc.

Now,

that

which

preserves the content

of a perceprion

whife

deraching

it

from

the hic

et

nunc of

sensation is

precisely

the

Concept

or

the Word that

has

a meaning.

(Thrs

table is bound

to

the

hic et nunc;

but

the meaning

of

the uords

"rhis

table"

exists

everywhere

and always).

And

that is

why everyone

agrees

that

only

a

speaking

being can

be

free.?

As

for

Plato,

who believes

that virtue

can

be taught, and

taught

through

dialectic-i.e.,

through

Discourse--obviouJy

the

free ict,

for

him,

has

the

same nature

as the

act of

conceptual undersrand-

ing:

for him,

they

are

but

two

complemenrary

asp""tr of

one and

tne

same

ttung.

Now,

for

Plato

the

Concept is

()

etemal,

and

(z)

itis related

t9

Eteyity,

which

(3)

is

outside

of Time.

The application of

this

definition

of the

Concept

ro

the

free

act leads

io

the

following

results:

-

Just

as

the

Concept

is

not related

to the

temporal

reality

in which

doxa

reigrx,

so

the free

acr,

too, is

impossible

\n tbis r""li.y.

In

and

oln

poinr

of fact,

either

this word

hes

no

meaning,

or else it

is the Negatfuitlt

of which

Hegel

speaks,

and which

a Dcscartes

end

a Kant

had in view without

speaking

of

it

erlplicidy.

Bur no

mafter,

?

Hegel, it

is true,

reverses

this assenion

and says

that only

a

free

being

cen

speak; but he

too maintains

the

close

connection

between

language

end

freJdom.

l1l

INTNODUCTION

TO

THE

READTNG Otr

IIEGEL

by

the free

act, man

relares

himself

to

something that is

situated

outside

of

Time.

That is,

as Plato

says in

his

well-known

mwh:

the soul cbooses

im

destiny

before its'birth.

There is choice,hince

freedom.

But

this

choice

is

made outside of

temporal existence,

which

existence

is

absolutely determined

in its

evolution.

In

his

myth

Plato adopts

the

idea

of

..t.*prychosis:

the

choice

can

be

repeated,

and

the

choices

differ

among themselves. But in

truth,

this

hypothesis

does

nor

fir

in

well with the entirery of

the

Platonic

system,

in

which the

nontemporal admits

of no variations.

Accordingly,

fairly

soon one

comes to the

(gnostic

and

Christian)

conception

of

e unique

choice,

fixed by

the

rclation

bctween

the

extra-temporal

Eternity

(or

God)

and the free agent.

It

is the idea

of the

Angel

who

decides

once

and

for

all, and outside of

time

properly so-called,

for

or

against

God, and

becomes

a

"virtuous"

Angel

or a forever

"fallen" Angel or Devil.8

Generally

speaking,

this

whole

conception

does not manage

to

gxplain

temporal

exisrence

xs sach)

that

is,

as History.

Historyhere

is always

a comedy,

and

not

a tragedy: the

tragic is before or

after,

and in

eny

case

outside

of,

temporal life;

this life itself realizes

e

program

fixed

beforehand

and therefore,

taken in

itself,

has nefuher

any

meaning

nor any

value.

In

conclusion,

then,

this can

be said: every system of

theo-

logical

absolute

Knowledge

sees in

the

Concept

zn

eternal

entity,

which

is related

to

Eternity.

And inversely, tbh conception

of the

Concept

necessarily

leads

in

the

end, once developed,

to a theo-

logical

Knowledge.

If, as

in Plato, Eterniry

is

situated outide of

Time,

the

System

is

rigorously

mono-theistic and

radically

tran-

scmdmtalist:

the being

of

God is essentidlly different

from

the

being

of him

who

speaks

of

God; and

this

divine Being

is

abso-

lutely

one

and

unique,

that

is

ro say, it

is eternally identical to

itself

or it

excludes

all change.

In relation

to the

natural

World, this System

gives

a

purely

s

This

conception

dso

comes

to light in

the dogma

of

original

sin:

in

Adam,

man,

in

his entirery,

freely

decides

once

and

for all. Here the

act is in time;

but

it is not

it is related

to

dre

eternal commendment

of God, this

God

being

oatside

of

time, As

for the

freedom

of

man

properly

so-called-ir

is

the

smmbling

block

of

all theology,

and

panicularly

of Chtistian

theology.

Even if

divine elecdon

is

a cooperation

with man

(which

in

itself is

quite

"heretical"),

human

ac$

are

iudged

dl at once

by

God, so ther freedom remains

a unique

act, situated

outside

of

time

and related

to

Eternity.

Lt2

A

Note or

Etemity, Time,

atd tlw Cottcept

geontettical

theory,

which

can at

most operare

with

the

notion

of

purely incorporeal

"movement"

(as

Descartes

does),

but not with

the notion

of

force:

this

System admits kinematics

or

phoronomy,

but excludes

dynamics.

Consequendy, it

does not

explain biologicil

phenomena,

in

which

Time is

consfituent.

And in

lehtion

to the

human

World,

this

System

at

best

explains "angelic"

existence,

but

deprives historical

life,

that is,

Man's

temporal existence,

of

any

meaning and

value.

SEVENTH

LECTURE

I

have

discussed

ar

some length

the Platonic

concepdon,

which

corresponds

to

possibility

II,

t,

a.

Let

us

now

move

on

to Arisrotle-that

is,

to

posibiliry

II,

r,

D.

Aristotle

saw

Plato's

dificulties.

And

at

the

same

dme

he made

e

greet

S:o":t

Just

like

Plato,

Aristotle

defines the

Concept as

eternal.

That is,

he

defnes

it

as a relation

to

something else.

hnd

this

something

else for

him,

as

for

plato,

is

not Time

bit

Eternitv.

(EpistanE

exists

only

in

the cosmos

in

which

there are

ideas-i.e.,

eternal

enrities,

having

Eterniry

as

their

topos.)

But

Aristotle

saw

what

Plato

seems

not

to have

seen;

namely,

that

Eterniry

is

not

outtide

of

Time,

but

in

Time.

Ar

the

very

least,

there

i,

,orn.-

thing

eternal

in

Time.

In fact,

Plato

reasoned

as

follows:

All

real

dogs

change;

the

gonc:pt

"dog,"

on the

other

hand,

remains

identicalio

itselfithere-

fore

it

mu$

be related

to

an Eterniry

siruated

outside

of

real

dogs-

that

s,

outside

of

Tim_e.

(This

Etirnity

is

the

,,idea,,

of

dog,"and

co1sequently,

in

the

final

analysis,

thi

Idea of

ideas.)

To

-whicn

Aristotle

answered:

to

be suri,

the

concept

,,dog"

is retated

to

Eterniry;.but

Eternirysubsists

in

Time;

f6r

if re-al

dogs

change,

rbe

real.dog-+hat

p,

the

species,,dog,'-6o",

"ot "t""g".

Si;""

the

qpecies

is etemal,

even

though

it

is

lhced

inTime,

it ii possible

to

relate

the

concept

to

Erernity

iniime.

Therefore

theie

is

an

1r3

IIE READTNC

OT EEGEL

absolute Knowledge

relating

to the

temporal World, to

the extent

that this World

implies

Eternity.

In

other

words, Plato

forgot

that

in Heracleitus'

river

there are

perrnanent eddies. Fint

of all, they

ere the animals

and

the plants.

The

eternal

or immutable

axis of

the

"eddies"

is the relas

or

the

entelechy;

and this

same entelechy

is what

appears, in

relation

ro

the Concept,

as

the Idea

of the

"eddy."

But there are also

planetsn and

finally rhe Cosmos.

Hence

Aristotle says:

Time itself is

eternal.

It is circular,o

but

the

circle

is

gone around

agein and again,

erernally.ro

Therefore the Cosmos

has the

same

stmctrue as does

the

animal. The Aristotelian

System

thus

gives an explanation of

life

and a biological conception of the

World.

Theologically

speaking,

the conception

that relates the eternal

Concept to

Eternity inTime

equals Polytheivn.

To be sure, Aris-

rctle

is too far removed

from

the totemic mentality

to

esseft that

animals and

plants

ere

gods. But when

he says

that

the

planets

are

gods,

he maintains

a

greater agreemenr with his

qystem than does

Plato

u'ith

his.

But, all thingp

considered,

the

difierence

is not very

important:

mono- or

poly-theism-in

both

cases

u/e are dealing

with

a

tbeo-logpcal

knowledge.

The cosmic revolution

is

eternally

repeated;

and it is solely

because

there

'ts

tn

etemal

repetition

thar

there is an absolute

Knowledge relating

to

the

Cosmos.

Now,

it is

one and

the same

Eternity

that manifests itself

in and

through

the

eternal

return

of

Time.

In

other

words, there is a supreme

god,

the God

properly

so-called,

who

maintains the

Cosmos

in irs

iden-

tiry and thus

makes

conceptual

Knowledge possible.

And, while

manifesting

itself through

the course of

Time, this divine Eterniry

differs essentially

from

everything

thar is

iz

Time. At most, man

can speak of

himself

roo, taken

as species, when

he spealcs

of

God.

[t

remains

nonetheles

true

that the difference's essential berween

him,

taken as historical

individual,

and the

erernal

God

of

whom

he

speals.

Once more,

then,

as

in

Plato,

it is an

absolute Knowledge

of. Bewusstsein,

arnd,

not of

Selbst-Bewu.sstsein.

(For

the

species

has no

Selbst-Beuusstsein,

no Selbst or

Self; at the most, it says

ttwertt

but

not

ttl.tt)

e

As in Hcgel.

ro

Wherers

io

Hegel thc circuit is mlde

only once.

rr4

Kojeve Alexandre. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit

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