Kojeve Alexandre. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit

A Notp

or, Eternttg,

Tlma,

otd ttu

Corcept

Therefore,

the Aristotelian

System explains

Man's

biological

existence

but

not

his

truly

human-i.e.,

historical---existence.

And

we

see

this

even better

by

turning

to the

anthropological

level-

that

is, by

posing

the

problem of.

freedom.

To

be

sure,

Aristotle

talks

about freedom.

But evervone

talls

about

freedom.

EvenSpinoza!

But if it is

nor to

be

a

word-game,

if the

true

notion

of

freedom

(made

explicit

in

the Hegeliaricon-

ception,

T

i! ir

formulated

in

the

pbenomenology)

iJsought,

it

must

be

admitted

that it is

not

compatible

with

Aiistotle's

S!*em.

As a maner

of

fact,

wg know

that ihis

System

excludes,

by

defini-

tion, a creartae

God.

(By

definirion,

for

Eterniry

in

Time

,igrrifi"r,

etemhy

of

the

World, refiir-n,

end, eternal

return.)

Now,-where

gher3-s

no

place

for

God's

creative

acrion,

there

is still

less

place

for

Man's

creative

action:

Man

undergoes

History,

but

does not

create it;

therefore

he is

not

free

in

Tiire.

on this"point,

Arisrotle

does

not

go beyond

Plato.

But

his

System

is

still

iess

acceptable

than

the

Platonic

system,

for

it

exciudes

even

the

transc;tdent

free

act.

In fact,

since

Eternity

is

in

Time,

and

the

eternar

concepr

is,related

tg

E1e1ni1y

iz

Time,

all

possibility

of

going

outside

of

Time

is

excluded.

One is

outside

of

Ti*"

o"ty

Uyi

being ;z

Time.

A temporal

existence

that

one

could

choose

outside

of rlme

would.

be

conceptually

unknoasable,

because

it would

not be

etemal

in

Tirne, whereas

rhe

Concepr

can

be

to rn

Eternity

in

Time.

In short:

to

the extent

that

Man

changesj

he

does

not know;

end

not

knowing,

he

is not

free

(by

definitiin);

and

to

the

e*teni

that

he

knotts,

he

does

not

change

and

hence

is'not

free

either,

in

the

usual

sense

of

the word.

Indeed,

for

Aristotle

as for

plato,

one

can

have

an

absolute

_K1o1teag.e.of

Man

"$y

!y

relating

Man

to

Eternicy.

The indi-

vidual

soul

is

too

small

io

be

knowi,

pl"to

says

in

tie

Repubric:

to know

it,

one

must see

it

enlarged-that

is,

one

must

"ona.*_plate the

City.

Now

for

Aristotli,

plaro's

erernal

Srate is

but

a

utopia;

in

actual

fact,

all

States

sooner

or later

change

and

perishf

hence

rhere

is

no

absolute

poriticar

Knowredge

rerat"ing

, L"i

ii

the.posible-forms

of

the State.

But,

happily,

tirr.

is

a ilosed

cycle

in

the

transformation

of

States,

which

i eiemally

repeated.

it'";;_

fore

this

cycle

can

be understood

concepruatty;

ia

by

speakine

of iq

one

can

grasp

the

difierent

stares

and

tvtan trimsJtrirtt""gi

115

INTiODUCTION

TO

TBE

NEADING

OF EIGAL

con:epts:

Jo _br

sure.

But if

all

this is

rrue, History

has nothing

to do

with

what is

called

"Histol'y" todal;

and in this

Hisrori,

Men

is anything

but

free.

Jherefgrg,

by replacing

g€omerry

with

biology,

the

Aristotelian

variant

of

the

Platonic

System

explains

Man as

animel, but

does

not

explain

him

as historical

and

fiee individual;

it docs not

ev€n

explain

him-as

Plato

did-as

fallen

Angel.

-

Alongpr{"

the

great

philosophies

there have

alwayn

boen

more

or

less

barbaric

or

barbarized

theories.

The

platonic-Aristotelian

no-

tion

of the

Concept has

also

been

barbarized:

either by

a vulgar

and

abzurd

denial,

or by

a

distoned

ecceprance.

The

aulgm

denial

conststs

in

sapng

that the

Concept,

far

from

L:-g

:.Tn"l,

is

iust

as rempora[

es any

other

thing existing

in

Time.

It is

our

possibility

IV, of

which

I shall

not speak, since

it

logs lyay-with

the

very

idea of

e tnue

or

genuine

Knowledge.

It is

Skepticism

or

Relativism,

which Plato

dinounced

under

t-he

name-

of

"Sophistic";

which

Kant

criticized,

calling

it

.,Empiri-

cisrn"l

and

which

Husserl

quite recently

denounced

oncr

tio""

under

the name

of

"\chologism." Let us speak

no further

about

it.

Let

us rather

say

a few

words

about

the

distorted

ilcceptance,

which

is

no

less absurd,

although

les

oboiously

absurd.

people

who

hold

this

view

conrinue

ro

sey that

the

Concept is etemal.

pry

while

being

eternal, it

is

in Time;

which

meens,

they say,

that

it is

is in

Time-i.e.,

to

the temporaL

(Not

to

Time,-but

t9

the rernporal-i.e.,

ro

whar

is

tn

Tirie.) And being

temporal,

it is

Time,

existing-in

Time-bef ore

the

temporal

properly so-called.

It

is the

well-known

notion

of

the

a

priori

or

the

"innate idea"

that

precedes

experience.

-

Thls

"apriorism"

(called

"Dogmadsm"

by

Kant)

is

what

the

famous

6rst

sentence

of the

Introduction

to'the

Critiryte of Pure

Reryon

is direcred

against:

there is

no doubt,

Kant says

(more

or

fess),

thal experience-i.e.,

the

temporal

realiry-always

precedes

h

-ri-g

the

concept

that

appears

in time

as my

Knowledge. And

indeed

there

can

be no

possible

doubt on

this subject.-Vulgar

npl9fu

begins

from

a

supposed

fact

and

ends

in

a

truly

un-

tenable

conception:

on the

gnoseological

level rs well

as

on

the

anthropological

level

(where

the

notorious

"free

will" is

discussed),

116

A

Note on Eternltg,

Time, atd

tle

Corcqt

One need only

develop

this Apriorism

somewhat in

order to

come

either to

SJ<eptichm

or Relativism,

or

to Kant; or,

finally,

ro rhe

renrrn

to

Plato

and

Aristotle.

{ag

likc

every

philosopher worthy

of

the name,

knows

full

well

that

the

Concept

can neither

be

defned

as

temporal,

nor

be

the

remporal

(which,

by

the way,

emounti

to

the

same

:ling)i

for

him,

asJor Plato

and

Aristotle,'the

Concept s

eternal.

Now bejlg

eternal

and

not

Eternity,

the

Concept must

be related

to

something,

arnd,

reloted

in

the strict

sense of

the

term-that

is,

r9lat1{

to

something

other

than

itself.

But,

seeing

the

difficulties

that

Plato and

Aristotle

encounrered

by relating

ihe .tern"l

con-

cept

to

Eterniry,

Kant had

the

unheard-of

audacity

to relate

it

to

Time

(and

not,

of

course,

to

the

temporal-i.e.i

to

what is iz

Time).

The whole

Kantian

conception

is

summed

up

in

this cerebrated

sentence:

"without intuition

the

concept

is empty;

without

the

concept

intuition

is

blind."

But

before

speaking

of

this

Kantian

formula,

I

want

to

mendon

in

a

few

words

anorher

solution

to

the

problem,

namely,

Spinoza's.

.

Ar

I_

have

already

said,

Spinoza's

system

is

the

perfect incarna-

tion

of

the

absurd. (And

that

is

whv,

when

one

tii"s to

,,realize,,

his

thought,

as we.s:ry,

one

experiences

the

same

feeling

of

dizzi_

ness

as

when

one

is

faced

with

a

paradox

of formal

lJgic

or

set

theory.)

,

Noy,

a

particularly

curious

thtng:

absolute

ertor

or

absurdity

tt,

"11

must.be,-jusr

as

"circular', as

the

truth.

Thus,

Spinoza;s

(and

Parmenides')

absolute

Knowledge

mu$

be

symbolizia

Uy

"

closed

circle

(withour,a

cenrral

polnt,

of coors.;,

Figure

'rz.

l{::$

if.Sgiy3a

says

that

the

Concept

is

Eternity,

wherel

i.g;i

says

that

it

is

Time,

they

have

this

much

in

common,

the

conce"ot

is

not

a

relaionship.

(Oi,

if

you

like,

it

is in

relation

orrly

to

;r*ffll

Being

and

(conceptual)

Thought

are

one

and

the

same

thine.

Parmerudes

said.

Thought

(or

the

Concept)

is the

attribute

Jf

Substance,

which

is

noi

difierent

from

its

'aruibute,

Spi"o-

,"yr.

Therefore,

in

both

cases-rhat

is,

in

parmenides_dpirioz"

,ri'i,

Hegel-rhere

is

no "reflecrion',

on

Being.

In

both

cases,

Being

itself

is

what

reflects

on itself

in

and

th.o"ugh,

or_beffer

i.;:;

r17

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE

READINC

OF HECEL

Concept.

Absolute

Knowledge

thar

reflects

the totality of

Being,

.theSfore,_p

just

as

closed

in itself,

iust

as

',circuler,"

as

Being itsJf

in

its totality:

there is

nothing

ootiide

of

the Knowledge,

ai rhere

is

nothing

outside

of

Being.

But

there is

an essential

-difierence:

Parmenides-Spinoza's

Concept-Being

is

Eternity,

whereas Hegel's

Concept-Being

is Time.

Consequenily,

Spinozist absolute

Knowl-

1dge,

too,

must De

Eternity.

That

is to

iay that it musr

exclude

Time.

In other words:

there

is no

need

of

'Time

ro

realize

it; the

Ethics

must

be

thought,

written,

and read

,'in

a trice."

And that

is

the

thing's

absurdiry.

[Plotinus,

however,

acceprs

this conse-

quence.]

This

absurdity

was

already

denounced

by Plato in his

par-

menides.If

Being

is

truly

one

(or

more

exactly,

the One)-i.e.,

if

it excludes

diversity,

all

diversiry-and

therifore

all

change-

i.e.,

if it is

Eternity

th* annuls

Time-if,

I say, Being

is the One,

a

men

could

not

speak

of

it,

Plato

remarls.

Indeed, Discourse

would

have

to be

iust

es one

^s

the

Being that it reveals,

and

there-

fore

could

not

go beyond

the single

wird

"one." And

even

that.

.

. . For

Time is

srill

the

crucial

qu€srion. Discourse

must

be

intemporal:

now, if

he has

not

the

time, man cannot

even

pro-

nounce

a

single

word.

If

Being is

one, or,

what

amounts to- the

same

thing,

if the

Concept is

Ererniry,

"absolure

Knowledge,'

reduces

for

Man

to absolute

silence.rr

I say: for

Man.

That is,

for the

speaking

being that

lives in Time

and

needs

time in

order

to

live and

to

speak

(i.e.,

in order

to

think

by

means

of the

Concept).

Now,

as we

have seen,

the

Concept

as

sacb is

not

(or

at least

does not

seem to

be) necessarily

attachid

to

Time.

The universe

of

Concepts or of

Ideas can

be'conceived

of

as a universe

of Diseourse:

esi

en eternal

Discourse, in

which

all

the elements

coexist.

fThis

is

what Plotinus

says.] And as a

mafter of

fact, there

are

(it

seems) nontempor^l

relations,

between

Concepts:

all Euclid's

rheorems,

for example, exist

simulraneously

within

the

entirery

of his

axioms.

[And

Plotinus insists on this

fact.]

Hence

there

would

be

a nontemporil

Dscourse.r2

The

idea

of

theSpinozist

System,

then,

is

not abiurd:

quite simply, it is the

idea

of absolute

Knowledge.

Whar

is

absurd

is that

tliir System

is

11

Plato

ecceps

this:

the One

is inefiable,

12

Just

as

there are nontemporal

movernents,

as Descartes

corrrcdy rremarks.

A Note

on Eten&g,

Time, ord tlw

Corrcept

"Abrclute

Knowledge"

(Spinoza

and Hegel)

"Monotheistic

Theolog/'

"Polytheistic

Theologtr/'

(Aristotle)

0''?'?Br'

Ot*,:ii'

ffure16

/A

l l

-

\'Th*togy'

t\ )

(Prato)

\

\6

"Acosmism,,

\l

(spinoJa)

figore 17

,'-\

-\,,Hyporh.ricalrheotos/,

\-/

(Kan

Iigutt 15

"Skepticism

and Criticism"

(KanD

r19

INTRODUCTION

TO

TIIE

READINC

OF EEGTL

suppoTd

to have

been fabricated

by a,

man, who

in

actual

fact

needed

time

in

order

to

fabricate

it.

[Accordingly,

in

plotinus,

this

system

belongs

to

the

eternal

Intelligence.]

6i eke, again:

the

System

can

exist

outside

of

Time;

but,

starting

from

-temporal

existence,

there is

no access

to this

System.

(The

Spinozist

Sy:stem

is

Hegel's

Logik,

for which

there

would

not

and iould noi be

a

Phenmnmology

that

"leads"

to it;

or

else,

it

is

Descartes'

System,

to

which

one

could

not

find ecces

through

a, Discouise on

Method.)

The Ethics

is

made in

accordance

with

a

method of which

an

eccount

cannot

be

given in human

language.

For

the

Ethics

ex-

plains everything,

except

the possibiliqr

foi

e man living

in time

to

write ir.

And if

the Phenomenology

explains

why

the

Loglk

lppears

at

a certain

momenr

of

history

and

not at another,

the

Ethics

proves

the

imposibility

of

its own

eppearance

et

any

mo-

ment

of time

whatsoever.

In short,

the

Ethics could have

been

written,

if

it

is tru.e,

only

by God

himself;

and,

let

us

rake care

to

note-by

a

nonincarnated

God.

Therefore,

the

difference

berween

Spinoza

and

Hegel can be

formulated

in

the

following

wey:

Hegel-becomes

God by thinking

or

writing

the

Logik;

or,

if

you

like,

it is

by becoming

God

that

he

writes

or

thinks it.

Spinoza,

on

the

othei

hand,

must

&e

God

from

all eternity in

order

to be able

to write

or think

hs

Ethics.

Now, if

a

being thrt

becomes

God in time

can be

called

"God"

only

provided that it uses

this

tenn

as a

metaphor

(a

correct meta-

phor,

by

the way),

the being

that has always

been

God is God

in

the

proper and

strict

sense of

the word.

Therefore,

to

be a

Spinozist is

actually

to replace

God

the

Father

(who

has no

Son,

incidentally)

by

Spinoza,

while

maintaining the

notion of

divine

transcendence

in

all its rigor;

it is

to

say that

Spinoza is the

uan-

scendent

God who

speals,

to be sure,

to human

beings,

but who

speaks

to

them

as eternal

Gad.

And

this,

obviously,

is the

height of

absurdity:

to take

Spinoza seriously

is acrually

to

be--or m be-

come-mad.

Spinoza, like

Hegel,

identifies

Man

(that

is to say, the Wise

Man) and

God. It seems,

then, that in both

cases it could be said

indifferently

either

that there

is nothing

other than

God,

or

thar

there

is nothing

other

than

Man. Now in

point

of

fact,

the

two

asertions

are nor

identical,

and

if

the

first is

accepted

by

Spinoza,

L20

A

Note on Etm*tg,

Time,

atd

tle Corrz,ept

only

the second

expresses

Hegel's

thought. And

that

is what

Hegel

means

by

sayrng

that Spinoza's

System is not a

pen-rheism,

but an

a-cosmism:

it is

the

Universe or

the totaliry of

Being

reduced

to

God alone,

but

to a God

without

World and without

men. And

to

say

this is to

say

that

everything that is

change,

becoming,

time,

does

not

exist for

Science.

For if

the Ethics is, in fact,

concerned

with

these

thingp,

how

or

why

they eppear

in it is not known.

With

the use

of our

symbolic

circles,

then,

the difference

between

Hegel's

and

Spinoza's

Systems can

be represented

in the

following

manner:

Let

us start

with

the

theistic

System.

In

its

pure

form,

it is

Plato's

System.

But in

general it symbolizes

posibiliry II

(see

Figure

r3).

For Arisrotle,

several

small

circles

must

be-inscribed

in the

large

circle

to

symbolize

the relation

of Eterniry

and

Time

(Figurg

r4); but

these

circles ought

to have

6tted together; in

the

end,

there

would again

be

the

Plaronic

symbol with

only one

small

circle. (That

is to

sey:

all truly

coherent

theism is

a mono-

theism.)

As

for

Kant, the

same

symbol

can

serve; but

the

small

circle

must

be

drawn

with

a dotted

line,

to show that

Kant's

theology

has,

for

him,

only

the

value

of an

,.as

if"

(Figure

r5). In

tfto.r,.

the

s)'mbol

of

the

theistic

System

is

valid for eiery

S1'srem

that defines

the

Concept *

tn etirnal

entity in

relation't

o

,ome-

thing

otber

than itsef,

no

matter

whether

this other thing

is

Eternity

in

Time

or

oumide

of

Time, or

Time itself.

But lei

us

return

to

-Spinoza.

Starting

with

the

theistic system,

Hegel

does

away

with

the

small

circle

(reduced

beforehand,

by

his

prede-

cessors,

to

a single

point):

see

Figure

16.

Spinoza, on

the-other

hand,

does-away

with

the large

ciicle,

see

Figure

17.

.

H"l":

ttre

lyrr_rb9l

is

the

Jame

in

both .aies,

"

homogeneous

closed

circle.

And

this

is

important.

For

we

see

that it is

sifhcient

:o {:iy

that

the

Concept

s

a

relation

with

smnetbing

other

thrn

itself in

order

to

ser

up

the ideal

of

absolute*rhat

i!,

circulm-

Knovledge.

And

indeed,

if

the

Concept is

realitS

an

bolated

concepr_can

be established

as

true

by

adequa-

tion

to

this

autonomous

riality.

In

this

case

there erc

pirtial

ficts,

or

even

partial

trurhs.

But

if

the

concept is

revealed

Being

itself,

it

can

be established

es

rrue only

througti

itserf.

The

proof

iiself

no

l9nge1

differs

from

that

which

has

to-be

proved.

Ana

tnis

means

that

the

truth

is

a

"Sysrem,"

as

Hegel

says.

The

word

,.system"

t2r

INTNODUCTION

TO

TgE

NEAD!NC

OF IIECEL

is

not found

in.spinoza.

But the

thing

itself

is

there.

setting

aside

P.armenides,

Spinoza

is

the

only

phitosopher

who

understoJd

that

the

principle

of all

or nothing-is-valid

fbr

Knowledge:

either

one

knows

eaerything,

or else

oie

knoa:s

nothing;

for-one

sees

that

oye

tntly

knows

something

only by

seeing

that one

knows

eeer!-

thing.

And

that is

why

ihe snrdy

of

Spinoza is

so

instructive,

despite.the

abnrdity

of'his

point

oi

view.'spinoze

sets up

the ideai

of.

total,.ot

"systemadc,t' oi

"circular,"

Knowledge.

However,

bis

ly*"-

is

imposible

in

Time.

And

Hegel's

whJe effort

consists

in.creating

1

Spinozist

System

which

Jan

be

written

by

e man

["jp_il

a,

bistorical

World.

And

that is

why,

while admitting

with

Spino"a

that

the

Concept is

not a relation,

Hegel

identifiei

f

n-* with-Ererniry,

but

with

Time.

(On

this

subJect

see the

Preface

to

the

Pbenommology,

pp.

ryft..)

We shall

see later

what

this means.

For

the moment,

I want

to

underline

once

more

that the

symbols

of both

sysrems

are

identical.

They

differ

only

in their

souice

(which

is

noi seen

in

the

drew-

ing):

doin-g

away

with

the

small

or

the large circle.

And

again,

this

indeed

corresponds

to

the

realiry.

It is

understandable

th'"t

"

temporal

Knowledge

could

finally

embrace the totality

of

becom-

ing.

But

it

is not

understandable

that

rn

etemal

Knowledge

could

absorb

e,verything

that is

in Time:

for the

simple

."r.oi

that

it

would

absorb

us ourselves.

It

would

be the

absolute

Knowledge

of

Beanrsstsein,

which

would

have

completely

absorb ed

Selbit-

bewusstsein.

And

this, obviously,

is absurd.

.I.shall

sto_p

here.

To

know

what

the

identification

of

the

Concrept

with

Eterniry

means,

one

must read

the

whole

Etbics.

Let

us

proceed,

or rerunn,

to

Kant.

Kant agrees

with

Plato

and

Aristotle

(in

opposition

to

par-

menides-Spinoza

and

Hegel)

that

the Concept ts-

in eternal

enutlr

in

relotion

with

something

other

than itself.

However,

he reletes

this

eternal

Concept not

to Eterniry,

but

to Time.

.

We can

sey,

moreover,

that Kant

defines

the

Concept

u a

rela-

aaa-precisely

because

he sees

the

impossibility of

Spiriozism

(iust

as

Plato had

done to

avoid

the

impossibiliry

of Eleat[isrn).

perhaps

he

did not

read

Spinoza.

But

in

rhe

"Transcendental

Deduction

bf

the

Categories"

and in

the

"schematismus" he

says why

the

122

A Ntu

on

Et6&V, Tlne,

alnd, llu Corcopt

Spinozist

conception of

Knowledge is

imposible: it

is

impossible,

beceuse for

us-that is,

for 1nx1-"'yffiout intuition

the concept

is empry."

The

Parmenidean-Spinozist

(and

Hegelian)

Concept,

which

is

not in relation

with

a Being othn

than itself, but which li

Being

rey-eafing

itself

to imelf-this

Parmenidean-Spinozist

Concept is

called

the

"transcendental

I" or the tanscendentale

Syntbes{s il*

Appercepion

in

Kant.

"Transcendental" in

Kant

means: that

which makes experiencc

posible.

Now,

experience

is

essentially temporal,

nd

everytbing

that is

temporal

belongs

to the

domain

of experience.

"Tran-

scendental,"

therefore,

meens:

that which

makeJ

the temporel

as

f-.p-41ossible.

Kant

says

thar the

transcendenral

entiry

is

"before"

Time

or

"outside of"

Time.

Hence

the uanscendenial

is

"et€mal"

or,

as

Kant

himself

seys,

d

prioriithis

is

to

say

that it

pre-

cedes

"the

temporal

taken

as temporal.,'

To say

itrat

there is

epistEmE,

absolute

Knowledge,

trullrue

ruth, is

io s"y

that there

are

universally

and

necesarily

valld

concepts-that

is,

concepts

that on

the one

hand

are

valid

at taery

miment

of

time, and bn

the other

htnd,

ercfu.de

Time

from

themselves

(that

is,

can

never

be

modifcd);

rherefore,

ir is

to say

that

rhere

are a

priori,

or

transcendental,

or etemal,

concep$.

Now,

the

eternal

Concept

(like

every

eternal

entity)

is

not

3telnal

iT

Td-9y

itself.

k ii eternal

by

iis

coming

from'Eternity,

by its

orig-in.-Now,

the origin

of

the

eternal

ConJepr

is

the

.,tran_

scendental

I"

or

the

"transcendental

Synthesis."

ihis

I or

this

Synthesis,

rherefore,

is

not

etemal;

it

is

Eterniqy.

Therefore,

Kant's

transcendental

self-consciousness

is

parmenides'

subsrance

con-

*jy".d

of

as_spiritual

subject-that

is,

God.

It is

the

real

Eternity,

which

reveals

itself

to itself

in

and

by

the

concept. It

is the

,oor!.

of

all

Being

revealed

by

the

Concept,

and

the

ioor""

of

all

con_

ceptual

reaehtion

of Being;

ir

is

rhi eternal

source

of

all

remporal

Being.

Howevcr,

Kant

says,

we

men

can

sey

of the

"transcendental

I"

that

it

is

and

that

it

is one;

but

that

is

ail we can

say

of

it.

In other

words,

Kant

accepts

the

platonic

cridque

of

parrnenides:

if

the

Concep_t.rj

Et:TolI,

then

absolute

Knowiedge

reduces

to

the single

word

"Ey" or

"6rr"

and

there

is no

possibl"birrourrr. (MoreovZr,

r23

ININODUCTION

TO TEE

NEADTNG

O!

E!C!L

strictly

qpeaking,

one

qrnnor

even

sny of

the

"uenscendental

I"

that it

is

and

that

it s one.

For,

as we shall

soon

see,

the

cate-

gories

of

Being

and

Quantity

cannor

be applied

in

this

case. There-

fore,

the

most

that

can be

said is

that

ii'is

,,something',

and

not

No.thingTgl;

but

one

-Tryol

say

that

it is a,

thing

havi-ng

such

or

such.qualities;

_n9w,

this

Being, of

which on"

c"n

onl/say

that

i-t

is,

is

a Serz

whictr,

as Heg;el

will

say,

does not

difier

from

lilichtr,

from

Nothingness.)

The

Parmenidean-Spinozist

System

is

therefore

imposible,

Kant

says.

The esential

self-conscious

uniry of

Eterniry

has

twelve

aspe€ts,

which

are

the twelve

famous

categories-concepts.

These

twelve-

Tp."F

o{

Eternity

are obviously

eiernal;

they',,precede"

everything

that is

in

Time,

they are

.'before"

Time;

hence

they

are valid

et

every

moment

of

Time, and, since

they

exclude

Tirn;,

chey

cannot

be

modi6ed;

they are t

prioi.

Now,

Parmenides'

and

Spinoza's

error

(or

illusion)

consisted

in

this:

they

believed

rhat

the eternal

which

contes

from

Eternity reaeals

this eterniry

by

determining

it-that

ir,

by

qualifying

it.

For

Parmenidei

and

Spinoza,

the

concepts-categories

are artributes

of

the

One which

is,

and can

be attibuted

to

it.

Now

for Kant, none of

this

holds

true.r8

None

of

this

holds true,

because

it is imposible.

And

at

the

end

of

$

16

of

the second

edition

of the

Critique of

Pue ReasonKrnt

explains

why.

A

determination

of

Eterniry

by

the

eternal concepw-categories

yould

be

posible

only by

an

(Jnderstanding

(Versrazd)

"through

the Sef-Consciousnes

of

which," he says,

"the

whole

Manifild

(das

Mannigfalrige)

would

be

given at

the

same time"l

or else,

again:

by an

Understanding

zuch that

the

obiects

of irs

representa-

tions exist

through

the

sole

fact of the existence

of these

representa-

tions themselves;

in

other

words-by

r

diaine

(or

"archerypal")

Understanding.

For in

point of fact,

the being

which,

by thinking

of itself

,

thinlcs

of e,uerytbing

that can be

thought,

and

which

creltes

the objects

thought

by the

sole

act

of thinking

of them,

is

God.

Hence

Spinoza

was

right

to give the name

"God"

ro

Parmenides'

tv-6v

which coincides

with the

Concept that

reveals

rs

For

Plotinus, they

crnnot be

rtoibuted to the

One. But they can

be

attributed

to

thc

Onc-which-is,

which

for

him

is

the *cond Hypostasis:

Intelligrnce or the

iateUigible

Cosmos.

r24

Kojeve Alexandre. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit

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