Kolodziejczyk Dariusz. The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania (ENG)
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE PROCEDURE OF PEACEMAKING
Equal or unequal? e character of Crimean relations
with the northern neighbors
Having studied the Crimean-Muscovian relations in the times of
Ivan III and Mengli Giray, Robert Croskey observes that while the
Muscovian grand duke was in fact the dominant partner, he formally
accepted his inferior position and acknowledged the Crimean khan’s
claim to the heritage of the Golden Horde, including his right to col-
lect tribute from Muscovian rulers and to send them yarlıqs, formally
unilateral instruments addressed by a sovereign to a subject. While
addressing the khan, Ivan III shaped his letters as humble petitions
referred to with the term čelobit’e (Rus. “[a deep bow culminated
with] a strike of the forehead [against the ground]”) instead of the
less demeaning term poklon (Rus. “a bow”). Croskey explains this pre-
tended humility by the substantial benets of the Crimean military
alliance that facilitated Muscovian expansion in other directions, most
notably at the cost of Lithuania, and notices that in his relations with
other states Ivan III assumed a much less humble pose.
560
As late as in 1575, Ivan III’s grandson, Ivan IV the Terrible, ostensi-
bly abdicated his throne to a Genghisid princeling, who resided in Mos-
cow under his tutelage and had been baptised as Simeon Bekbulatovič.
e tsar temporarily le Moscow and adopted a humble name Ivanec
Vasil’ev, until he formally returned to power a year later. Historians
will argue forever about the hidden motives of this political masquer-
ade. What matters here is the fact that playing with Genghisid pup-
pet princes had a long tradition in the steppe and was mastered by
the Muscovian rulers, who knew how to use the prestige of the once
560
Robert Croskey, “e Diplomatic Forms of Ivan III’s Relationship with the
Crimean Khan,” Slavic Review. American Quarterly of Soviet and East European Stud-
ies 43 (1984): 257–269; for similar conclusions, cf. Juzefovič, Put’ posla, pp. 23–31.
the procedure of peacemaking 445
powerful dynasty to promote their aims in both foreign and domestic
policy.
561
If even the Muscovian rulers had pragmatic reasons to invoke their
past subordination to the Genghisid dynasty in their current relations
with the Crimean khans, no wonder that the latter ones invoked their
Genghisid roots even more eagerly. As late as 1672, Selim Giray tried to
impress the Habsburg emperor by recalling the name of the Genghisid
dynasty in expectation that it should bring the desired eect.
562
e nature of the Crimean relations with both its northern neigh-
bors: Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania, discloses numerous analogies.
e khans, at least ocially, regarded both northern rulers as their
tributaries, who were expected to send tribute on time and to apply for
solemn yarlıqs, conrming their possessions. With the passing of time,
the rulers concerned began to perceive their relations with the khans
in an entirely dierent light and refer to the goods and cash, which
they continued to dispatch to the Crimea, as freely donated gis or,
even better, as an equivalent for the Tatar military assistance, thus pre-
senting the khan and his subjects as paid auxiliaries. Yet, when endan-
gered with an imminent Tatar invasion or in urgent need of Tatar
military assistance, the same rulers would return in their vocabulary to
the more humble phraseology from the times when the Mongol domi-
nance of Eastern Europe was unquestionable. At times, the humili-
ating issue of tribute (in such cases termed exactly with this name)
was raised in Polish-Lithuanian and Russian internal discourse by the
authors who aimed to incite their countrymen to ght the trouble-
some steppe neighbors and perhaps even evict them from Europe.
Much of the scholarly misunderstandings origin from the fact that
the same goods and cash money, sent to the khans by their northern
neighbors, were dierently termed by dierent participants and wit-
nesses in dierent languages and times, and the meaning of the terms
561
Omeljan Pritsak, “Moscow, the Golden Horde, and the Kazan Khanate from a
Polycultural Point of View,” Slavic Review 26 (1967): 577–583. A view that Muscovy
won the steppe not by challenging its rules but by comforming to them is also per-
suasively voiced by Edward Keenan in his article published in the same volume; see
idem, “Muscovy and Kazan: Some Introductory Remarks on the Patterns of Steppe
Diplomacy,” Slavic Review 26 (1967): 548–558.
562
[. . .] essendo il nostro regio costume di honorar quelli che professano antica amici-
tia e fratellanza verso questa nostra augusta Casa Ginghisiana [. . .] et sapendo che Voi
sete delli ben aettionati alla Casa Ginghisiana [. . .]; for the khan’s letter, dated in July
1672 and preserved in Italian tranlation, see Vienna, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv,
Türkei I, 144, f. 69 (January–March 1673), fol. 61a–62a.
446 part two—chapter five
used varied from gis and stipends given at free will to customary
payments to obligatory tribute. Quite expectably, the senders favored
the former terms while the receivers the latter ones, and in the Mus-
lim chronicles and internal correspondence one even encounters such
terms as harac or cizya (i.e., Ar. haradj and djizya).
563
Departing from the fact that in Russian sources the payments to the
Crimea were typically referred to as pominki (Rus. “gis” or “souve-
nirs”), Anna Xoroškevič takes pains to prove that Moscow did not send
a tribute to the Crimea except for the short period between 1670 and
1685 (formally abolished in 1700). She nevertheless admits that such
a tribute, referred to as vyxod (lit. “exit,” apparently a Russian calque
from Ar. haradj) had been earlier sent to the Golden Horde and, by
extention, to the Great Horde, for the last time in 1502. According
to Xoroškevič, when the Muscovian rulers sent gis to the Crimean
Tatars, they did it out of their free will and in return expected military
service.
564
e weakness of the above arguments can be demonstrated
even without referring to Oriental sources
565
by invoking three points:
rstly, the term vyxod was at times still used in reference to the sums
dispatched to the Crimea, for instance in the will of Ivan III;
566
secondly,
by acknowledging Mengli Giray as the legitimate successor of Sheikh
Ahmed aer the latter’s catastrophe in 1502, Ivan III tacitly agreed to
extend the character of his earlier relations with the Great Horde onto
the Crimean Khanate, even though he certainly tried to obtain the
Crimean military assistance in return for his payments;
567
and thirdly,
Xoroškevič does not suciently explain why Russia, if it had not indeed
paid tribute in the 16th century, should have agreed to such humil-
iating conditions in 1670, when it was incomparably stronger. Her
563
Cf. n. 190 in Part I.
564
Xoroškevič, Rus’ i Krym, pp. 225–258.
565
is was nonetheless done by Inalcık, who demonstrated that in the seventeenth-
century Crimean-Muscovian correspondence prior to the year 1670 such terms were
commonly used as uluġ hazine (“great treasure”) and vėrgü (“tax,” lit. “something
given”); see idem, “Power Relationships between Russia, the Crimea, and the Otto-
man Empire as Reected in Titulature,” pp. 394–398 (an appendix entitled: “Notes
on tribute paid to the Tatars”). In the Crimean seventeenth-century sources, the same
terms refer to the “gis” obtained from the Polish kings, whereas these Polish “gis”
to the khan are commonly regarded in historiography—also by Xoroškevič—as a form
of tribute.
566
Cf. Croskey, “e Diplomatic Forms of Ivan III’s Relationship with the Crimean
Khan,” p. 267.
567
Cf. Vinogradov, Russko-krymskie otnošenija, vol. 1, pp. 60 and 123, n. 21.
the procedure of peacemaking 447
argument that the tribute was paid only from le-bank Ukraine,
recently acquired from Poland, because the Polish kings had paid it
previously, does not make sense because many more lands, in fact
amounting to one third of the Lithuanian territory of that time, and
previously “donated” to Vilnius with the yarlıqs of Hadji and Mengli
Girays, had been acquired by Muscovy in the years 1492–1514, so
the need of a “compensation” for the khan would be no less feasible
in 1514 than in 1670. e argument that in 1670 Moscow needed to
appease the khan because it feared an Ottoman invasion is not per-
suasive either: a large scale Ottoman invasion of the Russian held le-
bank Ukraine was unthinkable before the prior conquest of the Polish
held right-bank Ukraine, which did not occur until 1672. e Russian
negotiators who agreed to pay tribute to the khan in 1670 could not
predict the results of the campaign, which was resolved in the fall of
1671 and eected a year later.
568
Xoroškevič seems to suggest that while the Muscovian rulers
proudly defended their prestige, the Polish-Lithuanian rulers willingly
maintained tributary relations with the Crimea. Yet, such a statement
stands in a curious contradiction with Usmanov’s thesis that the khans
regarded the kings as their equals and the Muscovian grand dukes as
their vassals.
569
As a matter of fact, since the 16th century, court pam-
phletists and diplomats in both Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy had
done their best to assure the domestic as well as foreign (especially
Western) audience that it was the other ruler who was the khan’s trib-
utary while the author’s patron bravely defended Europe from indel
Asiatic barbarians. At the same time, in their direct correspondence
with the khans, both Polish-Lithuanian and Muscovian rulers depicted
their Christian rival as the common eternal enemy and expressed their
loyalty and friendship towards the Tatars. e khans played the same
game and assured the correspondents of their predilection towards
568
For the arguments of Xoroškevič regarding the tsar’s decision taken in 1670, see
eadem, Rus’ i Krym, pp. 238–239.
569
Cf. esp. Xoroškevič, Rus’ i Krym, p. 231 and Usmanov, Žalovannye akty Džučieva
ulusa XIV–XVI vv., p. 198. To be sure, the Muscovian (as well as Polish-Lithuanian)
rulers not once tried to abolish the practice which they surely perceived as humiliat-
ing; for instance, in 1578 the Muscovian envoys to the Crimea were instructed to
deliver gis in exactly the same value as the gis that they were to receive, but under
no circumstances were their gis to exceed the value of those received; hence, a clear
dierence was seen between the accepted practice of gi exchange and the tributary
relations; see Filjuškin, “Proekty russko-krymskogo voennogo sojuza,” p. 329.
448 part two—chapter five
the “old trusted friendship,” even though—as they usually hastened
to add—the rival had recently proposed to augment his tribute. A t-
ting illustration of such (un)diplomatic language is contained in the
instrument of Sa‘adet Giray, sent to Sigismund I in 1527, in which
the khan bemoaned the spoiling of the ancient amity that enabled “the
Muscovian duke Ivan, the slave [Ruth. xolop] of your [ancestors] and
our ancestors, and also our and your enemy, the son of a serf [Ruth.
smerd] by descent, unworthy to remain in brotherhood and friendship
with us,” to enter the alliance with the Crimea, in whose course “not-
withstanding his being a serf, [he nevertheless] fullled his word and
oath, and [. . .] never delayed [the delivery of ] his tting gis.”
570
Perhaps instead of nally resolving the question whether the kings
and the tsars were the tributaries of the Crimean khans, it is better
to point—in perfectly postmodernistic fashion—to various real and
pragmatic functions of the dispatched “gis” or “tribute.” For the
senders, it was a tool, sometimes cheaper than maintaining troops
and fortresses, intended to fend o Tatar slavers and prevent devasta-
tions that would be caused by their raids; even better if these raids
could be directed against a rival Christian neighbor.
571
For the khan,
frequent arrivals of foreign embassies along with gis from foreign
rulers certainly helped to built his domestic prestige. By distributing
the obtained goods among his loyal family members and clients, the
khan could strengthen his position in domestic politics. In times of
drought, the obtained means could relieve his subjects from a famine,
again strengthening his position as a good ruler and patron. Under-
standing these internal mechanisms, we may better understand the
unabashed insistence of the khans, displayed in their letters to the
northern courts, on the timely delivery of gis, and the detailed lists of
expected items and prospective beneciaries, including their women-
folk and domestic servants, which were attached to these letters.
572
To
570
See Document 22.
571
Zbigniew Wójcik concluded that the cost of the Crimean alliance, in result of
which Tatar auxiliaries fought in the years 1654–1666 against the Commonwealth’s
Muscovian and Swedish enemies, had been surprisingly low if compared with the
expenditures of the Polish-Lithuanian treasury on maintaining its own regular army;
the average yearly cost of the Crimean alliance, including the cost of the “gis,”
amounted in these years to 200,000 złotys or 67,000 thalers; see idem, “Some problems
of Polish-Tatar relations in the seventeenth century,” pp. 101–102.
572
For one such list (deer) from 1635, drawn on the order of Inayet Giray and sent
to Moscow, see Materialy dlja istorii Krymskago xanstva, pp. 137–147; many more
the procedure of peacemaking 449
their contemporary addressees (as well as a modern reader), such petty
claims might appear as not betting a monarch, but foreign opinion
was less crucial for maintaining the khan’s position and throne than
the domestic one, and the latter heavily depended on the khan’s eec-
tiveness in bargaining the delivery of the gis (or tribute) due from the
real and imaginary vassals.
573
While the tribute issue at least formally assigned both northern
rulers the role of the Crimean tributaries, another factor constantly
weakened the khans’ position in their external relations. Scholars oen
attribute the gradual loss of Crimean sovereignty to the institution
of hostages, introduced on Ottoman demand, according to which a
number of Giray princes constantly resided at the Porte; such hos-
tages guaranteed the khan’s obedience and could at any time will-
ingly replace a “troublesome” ruler. It should not be forgotten that
an analogous institution functioned in Muscovy in the form of the
puppet Khanate of Kasimov on the Oka river, ruled by members of
various branches of the Genghisid dynasty, who remained under the
Russian patronage, and existing until the 17th century; signicantly,
in the years 1486–1512 the throne in Kasimov was held by Mengli
Giray’s refugee brother, the former Crimean khan Nur Devlet, and his
sons. Less than a century later, aer the violent deposal and murder
of Mehmed II Giray, instigated by the Porte in 1584, his three sons
found refuge in Russia; the oen deplored servility of the new khan,
Islam II Giray, displayed towards Istanbul, was largely conditioned by
his constant fear of the return of the runaway princes. Hence, when
in the 18th century, Catherine II interfered in the Crimean politics by
supporting her protégé, Shahin Giray, in fact there was nothing new
in her politics that simply followed the old patterns.
lists of this type, both in the original and translations, can be found in the Russian
and Polish archives.
573
On the visualization of power aimed for domestic audience, cf. William Roosen,
“Early Modern Diplomatic Ceremonial: A Systems Approach,” e Journal of Modern
History 52 (1980): 452–476, esp. pp. 472–475. e domestic factor is also invoked by
Ronald Toby in his generally positive assessment of the early modern Japanese diplo-
macy; according to the author, a selective seclusion helped the Tokugawa shoguns
to consolidate their reign and gain internal prestige by presenting the subjects with
a desirable image of the outside world that accepted Japan’s status as the universal
empire; the question whether this image was shared abroad was irrelevant as long as
foreigners were eectively kept out of Japan; see idem, State and Diplomacy in Early
Modern Japan. Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu (Stanford, 1991),
pp. 201–203.
450 part two—chapter five
If measured against the hordes of Genghisids residing in the Ottoman
Empire and Russia, the number of Genghisids, who found themselves
in Lithuania or Poland, with or against their will, was rather unimpres-
sive. Yet, the early prestige of Vilnius in the Crimean eyes was earned
by the assistance once extended by Vytautas to Tokhtamısh and his
sons, then to Ulug Muhammed, and nally to Hadji Giray, who had
all been granted temporary refuge in Lithuania. Casimir earned no less
gratitude from the side of Mengli Giray by imprisoning his main rival,
Seyyid Ahmed (Tokhtamısh’s grandson), in 1454. Aer the Lithuanian-
Crimean relations had deteriorated in the late 15th century, nothing
contributed more to their appeasement than the decision of Vilnius to
detain its former ally, Sheikh Ahmed, aer he came to seek asylum in
1503. While the unlucky khan spent in the Lithuanian “golden cage”
almost twenty-ve years, the peace with the Crimea could be restored.
In 1512, Mengli Giray consented to an unprecedented move and sent
his grandson, Djalaleddin, to Sigismund as a guarantee of peace. e
young prince died in Vilnius in the following year and the sending
of another Giray prince, although negotiated, never materialized, but
this very move put in question the tributary character of the relations
between Qırq Yer and Vilnius: would a suzerain send his grandson as
a hostage to a vassal?
In the later decades and centuries, dissident Giray princes not once
found shelter in Poland-Lithuania or invoked its help. In the 1520s
and 1530s, Vilnius tacitly supported Islam Giray, who repeatedly
rioted against his uncle, Sa‘adet Giray. In 1581 two rebel Giray princes,
chased by Khan Mehmed II Giray (the same who was murdered three
years later and whose sons found refuge in Russia), arrived in Poland
and were forced to take a loyalty oath by the Polish dignitaries. One
of them, Selamet Giray, would later ascend the throne and invoke this
oath in his instrument issued in 1609. In the 1620s, the Polish court
maintained secret contacts with the brothers, Mehmed III and Sha-
hin Girays, when they opposed the Ottoman protégé, Djanibek Giray,
although Warsaw was careful not to openly provoke the Porte. e
sojourn in Poland of the future khan Islam III Giray in the years 1629–
1634 had a dierent character as he was taken prisoner and did not
display any wish to be manipulated against the ruling khan. Neverthe-
less, his detainment was also used to soen Baghchasaray and the talks
regarding his release played a prominent role in the mutual relations.
No matter how splendid was the Genghisid tradition and still formi-
dable the Tatar cavalry in the East European theatre of war, the mere
the procedure of peacemaking 451
comparison of the population and territory of, on the one hand, the
Crimean Khanate, and on the other, Poland-Lithuania or Muscovy
(and later the Russian Empire), made equal relations questionable.
Apparently aware of this, with a rising frequency the khans invoked
the Ottoman might that stood behind their back. Yet, by doing so
they put in question their own prestige that they deserved as “free
sovereigns.”
574
is “schizophrenic” situation transpires from the
direct Ottoman-Polish correspondence already in the rst half of the
16th century. In 1531, Suleyman the Magnicent notied the Polish
court that the Poles did not need to negotiate separately with Sa‘adet
Giray, since the khan was not a sovereign ruler, owing his position to
the sultan and obliged to obey him. Accordingly, the Ottoman ‘ahd-
name sent to Poland in 1533 referred to the sultan’s request addressed
to the new khan, Sahib Giray, who was asked to maintain friendship
with Sigismund on the condition that the latter did not assist the
khan’s rioting relatives (a clear allusion to Islam Giray). Yet, when
the Polish court was still unsatised and asked the powerful Otto-
man vizier, Ibrahim Pasha, to strongly order the khan to keep peace,
the vizier’s letter, written in July 1533, contained a Pythian answer.
Although admitting that Sahib Giray was like a son to Suleyman and
owed his throne to the sultan, Ibrahim yet stressed that the khan was
a sovereign ruler of another country (müstaqil selatin ‘ıdadından olub
başqa memlekete vali ve hakimdır) and it was not tting to include him
in a Polish-Ottoman treaty.
575
Nevertheless, he promised to write to
the khan, expecting that the latter would behave in a friendly manner
towards the king.
On his part, in the instrument sent to Sigismund in 1539 Sahib
Giray declined any responsibility for the raids eected from the ter-
ritories controlled by the Ottoman sultan, but he engaged that if such
individuals came to his lands, he would punish them as “His Imperial
Majesty [i.e., the Ottoman sultan] will not reproach us for [punish-
ing] them.”
576
A closer Ottoman-Crimean cooperation, or even shared
sovereignty on the Black Sea steppe, is already witnessed by the instru-
ment of Sahib’s successor, Devlet Giray, issued in 1552. In regard to
574
On this expression, see n. 310 above.
575
e aforementioned Polish-Ottoman correspondence from the years 1531–1533
is already quoted in Part I; for the sources of the quotations, see notes 218, 220, and
221 there.
576
Dla tych Cesarz Jego Miłość nam nic nie uczyni; see Document 28.
452 part two—chapter five
the same issue, namely the raids eected from the Ottoman territories,
the khan assured the king that: “I have the authority to restrain them
[. . .]; as His Majesty, the Turkish emperor, allowed me to keep a tight
rein on these cossacks and restrain them from such acts, even if I pun-
ish them for their transgressions, then His Majesty, the Emperor will
not reproach me for this.”
577
References to the Ottoman sultans would
then appear with a rising frequency in the khans’ correspondence with
their northern neighbors, although neither side wished to resign from
maintaining direct diplomatic contacts, even if such contacts were at
times discouraged by the Porte. To be sure, also Warsaw and Mos-
cow knew how to intimidate Baghchasaray with a warning to directly
address Istanbul and to exert pressure on “unruly” khans by invoking
the possible wrath of the Porte.
Envoys: recrutation and status
Perhaps a reasonable method of measuring the relative status and
importance of two states in each other’s eyes is to compare the rank
of their diplomats sent to the other party and the status enjoyed by
these diplomats in their own societies. For instance, among the Polish-
Lithuanian envoys sent in solemn embassies to Rome, Paris, Istanbul,
or Moscow one recognizes the members of the most prominent fami-
lies, who occupied senatorial posts and sometimes, typically aer the
accomplishment of their missions, advanced to the most prominent
oces in the Commonwealth. e retinues of these envoys, especially
in the 17th century, could reach several hundred horsemen. In the
Polish-Lithuanian relations with the Porte, the Crimea, and Muscovy,
a more complicated diplomatic hierarchy was devised than in the rela-
tions with Western courts. While an envoy sent to a West European
court was simply referred to as nuncius or orator, diplomats sent to the
sultans, khans, and tsars were divided into “great” and “small” envoys,
the latter also known as “light” or “swi” envoys, or referred to by
the Latin term internuncius.
578
is hierarchy, apparently developed
577
[. . .] bo ja mam yx moc ot toho povstehaty [. . .]; bo Cesar Eho Mylost’ ture-
ckyj pryzvolyl, aby tyx kozakov vo stjažlyvosty mel, a ot toho yx povstehal, bo xotja
byx za vystup yx y karal, tohdy my Cesar Eho Mylost’ ny slova za to ne reknet’; see
Docu ment 32.
578
Cf. Zbigniew Wójcik (ed.), Polska służba dyplomatyczna XVI–XVIII wieku
(Warsaw, 1966), pp. 45, 104, and 173.
the procedure of peacemaking 453
under Oriental inuence, was nevertheless misleading: a “great envoy”
sent to the Crimea might have stood lower in social hierarchy than an
ordinary nuncius sent to Rome or Vienna.
In comparison to the envoys sent to the major European courts,
those sent to the Crimea were usually of lower status, except for the
two early Lithuanian embassies: the mission of Prince Ivan Hlyns’kyj
in 1480 and the great embassy of Jurij Zenovevyč, the future governor
of Smolensk and court marshal, accompanied by Jakub Ivašencovyč,
the governor of Mazyr, in 1507. More typically, the Lithuanian envoys
to the khans were recruited from among the courtiers and secretar-
ies of the Grand Ducal Chancery, of noble, but rather modest origin,
although some of them could attain a higher status aer numerous
years of service, like Vasyl’ Tyškevyč, the envoy to the khan in 1535,
who died as the palatine of Podlachia [Podlasie]. Some of these envoys
became genuine specialists of the countries to which they traveled,
like Anikij Hornostaj, sent to the Crimea in 1520, 1522, 1534, and
1541. Perhaps the most intellectually prominent among the Lithu-
anian envoys was Venclav Mykolaevyč, sent to the Crimea in 1542.
His treatise De Moribus Tartarorum, published in Basle in 1615 under
the pen name Michalon Lituanus, provided valuable information on
the Crimea and its inhabitants, although it also contained—like most
travel literature—hidden allusions regarding the social life and juris-
diction in the author’s homeland.
e Polish envoys, sent to the khans from Cracow and then Warsaw,
were likewise typically recruited from among the royal courtiers and
secretaries, to mention only Marcin Broniowski, Ławryn Piaseczyński,
or Florian Oleszko. Broniowski, who traveled ve times to the Crimea
between the years 1578 and 1592, published his famous treatise Tar-
tariae descriptio, in 1595, in Cologne. It became the standard source
of knowledge on the Crimea in Europe, used by scholars until today.
Piaseczyński’s equally rich report from his three embassies performed
in the years 1601–1603 was less fortunate and remained in manuscript
until 1911, when its large excerpts were published by Kazimierz Pułaski.
Alas, even today it is rarely used except for the Polish historians.
Usually descending from less auent noble families, the royal sec-
retaries are sometimes regarded today by historians as the core of
professional bureaucracy, if one can speak at all about professional
bureaucracy in early modern Poland-Lithuania. Unlike the magnates
sent in great embassies to major European courts, for whom these
embassies were but steps in further career, the secretaries oen turned