Kolodziejczyk Dariusz. The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania (ENG)

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464 part two—chapter five

take place in Kamieniec!

613

No wonder that also the other side returned

to its earlier stand. e instrument of Mehmed III Giray, issued in

1624, contained an idealized picture of the past peace and amity, when

the kings Sigismund I and Sigismund Augustus “used to send custom-

ary treasures or gis, partly in cash, partly in beautiful textiles [. . .], as

far as to the Crimea, to our prosperous seat in Baghchasaray, having

loaded them on their own carts. And those traveling with the gis,

the great envoy, merchants, and other people in his retinue, were not

harmed in any way nor were their property or goods damaged.” e

khan reminded the addressee, Sigismund III, that earlier, he had also

sent gis to Ghazi II Giray, having loaded them on the royal carts and

brought as far as Djankerman [i.e., Očakiv], from where the message

of their arrival had been sent across the Dnieper. e document did

not openly state that the old route should be reinvigorated, but this

was implied by its referring to the idealized past and its expressed

hope that the king should send the customary gis like his ancestors

had done.

614

While Djanibek Giray’s instruments from 1632 and 1634 referred

to the gis but contained no reference to the place of their delivery,

Inayet Giray’s instrument from 1635 repeated the clause from 1624 that

invoked the old good times of Sigismund I and Sigismund Augustus,

when the royal gis loaded on royal carts had reached Baghchasaray,

and the more recent times of Sigismund III and Ghazi II Giray, when

the royal carts loaded with gis had reached as far as Djankerman. By

recalling that “from this side men were sent to fetch all these [goods

from Djankerman] to Baghchasaray,” Inayet tacitly admitted that he

would accept the latter option. Yet, he still refused to accept the route

through Moldavia and Budjak, which is hardly surprising if we have

in mind his strained relations with the Nogays, who inhabited Budjak

and could easily lay their hands on the gis.

e request that the royal gis should be transported on Polish carts

as far as Djankerman was repeated in the rst instrument of Bahadır

Giray, issued in 1637. Yet, in the following years the issue was again

covered with silence. Curiously, the Polish instrument of the Treaty of

Zborów (1649) stipulates that the gis should be delivered in Kamie-

niec, but this clause is absent from the Tatar version. Finally, during

613

See Document 47.

614

See Document 48.

the procedure of peacemaking 465

the negotiations that led to the military alliance of 1654, both sides

agreed that the gis would be transferred in Kamieniec. e provision

was formally entered both in the royal instrument and in Mehmed

IV Giray’s ‘ahdname brought to Warsaw by Mariusz Jaskólski.

615

e

envoy himself traveled from Baghchasaray to Warsaw overland,

through Perekop, Očakiv, and Jassy, which was probably the standard

route in this period, when the Polish Ukraine had to be bypassed as it

was controlled by the insurgent Cossacks.

616

It seems that by that time the transport of gis had been nally

separated from purely diplomatic missions, which enabled the envoys

to travel faster. An envoy or courier could cover the distance between

Baghchasaray and Warsaw in three weeks,

617

though most embassies,

and especially solemn embassies, traveled much longer. For instance,

the great embassy of Bahadır Giray, dispatched probably in late August

1640, arrived at Warsaw on 29 November.

618

In 1601, Piaseczyński

departed from Warsaw on 15 April and arrived at Baghchasaray on

14 June, although one must keep in mind that he spent almost two

weeks in Lublin and Zamość waiting for additional instructions from

Chancellor Zamoyski. On the return way, he departed from Közlev

on 4 October and arrived at Vilnius on 29 November. An experienced

Tatar envoy, Dedesh Agha, who traveled numerous times between

the khan and the king in the mid-17th century, needed similar time

to cover this distance. In 1666, he le Baghchasaray in late June and

arrived at Warsaw in early August.

619

Considering that the distance from Baghchasaray to Warsaw, Vil-

nius, and Moscow was comparable, the time of travel was similar as

well. For instance, in 1564 a Russian courier accompanied by his Tatar

colleague traveled from Baghchasaray to Moscow six weeks.

620

In the

late 15th and early 16th centuries, an average time needed by Mus-

615

See Documents 59, 60, 61, and 64.

616

Augusiewicz, “Dwa poselstwa Mariusza Stanisława Jaskólskiego na Krym w 1654

roku,” p. 60.

617

Cf. Baranowski, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie w latach 1632–1648, p. 42; Skorupa,

Stosunki polsko-tatarskie, p. 147.

618

Baranowski, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie w latach 1632–1648, p. 117.

619

For Piaseczyński, see Pułaski, “Trzy poselstwa Piaseczyńskiego,” pp. 248–250

and 472–478; for Dedesh Agha, cf. n. 496 in Part I.

620

ey departed from Baghchasaray on 6 January and arrived at Moscow on 17

February; see Vinogradov, Russko-krymskie otnošenija, vol. 2, pp. 31–32.

466 part two—chapter five

covian envoys to reach the khan’s court was two months.

621

Also the

Russian envoys who negotiated the Treaty of Baghchasaray (1681) trav-

eled two months from Moscow to the Crimea. eir return trip lasted

much longer due to the quarantine imposed by the Russian authorities

on the news of a plague in the Crimea. Nevertheless, the report from

their embassy reached Moscow within less than three months.

622

As concerns the Crimean embassies, they were usually much larger

than the ones sent by the kings and tsars. Moreover, not only the

khans, but also the qalgas, nureddins, and other Crimean dignitaries

used to send separate embassies, or at least their envoys joined the

embassies sent by the khans.

e khans’ solemn instruments of peace were usually entrusted to

great envoys, referred to in Turkish as uluġ elçi or uluġ elçi başı.

623

1640, when the qalga and nureddin issued their own ‘ahdnames that

were brought to Poland by separate envoys, these envoys were also

referred to as “great envoys.” In other cases, the qalga and nureddin

would rather refer to their envoys in more modest terms, typically as

“couriers” (çapqun or çapqun elçimiz).

624

e term çapqun also referred the the khan’s emissaries, who pre-

ceded the great envoys and announced their arrival, or who individu-

ally performed less prestigious missions. An unusual event occurred in

1635, when Inayet Giray sent to Poland his ‘ahdname through Ghazi

621

Syroečkovskij, “Puti i uslovija snošenij Moskvy s Krymom na rubeže XVI veka,”

p. 207.

622

e envoys departed from Moscow on 18 August and arrived at their quarters

assigned on the Alma river (near Baghchasaray) on 25 October 1680; their return

trip began on 9 March 1681, but they were detained in Borisov Gorodok, where

their detailed embassy report was composed in June; nevertheless, their rst sum-

mary report reached Moscow already in May (all dates according to the Old Style);

see “Spisok s statejnago spiska [. . .] Vasil’ja Mixajlova syna Tjapkina, d’jaka Nikity

Zotova,” pp. 569–578 and 644–658.

623

e latter term appears in Djanibek Giray’s instruments from 1632 and 1634;

according to Inalcık, these terms were used alternatively; cf. idem, “Power Relation-

ships between Russia, the Crimea, and the Ottoman Empire as Reected in Titula-

ture,” pp. 410–411.

624

Cf. Document 51, n. 1; Inalcık proposes to translate the term çapqun as “envoy,”

reserving the English term “courier” for ulaqs; yet, in consequence there remains no

English equivalent for elçi (Inalcık proposes the term “diplomatic agent” but it sounds

awkward); cf. ibidem, pp. 410–411. In his book written in German, Matuz renders the

term çapqun as iegender [Gesandter], but again its English equivalent “ying [envoy]”

sounds awkward; cf. idem, Krimtatarische Urkunden im Reichsarchiv zu Kopenhagen,

pp. 53–55. In Polish contemporary translations (and probably in Ruthenian and Rus-

sian as well; cf. Document 23, n. 10), the term çapqun was commonly rendered as

goniec, i.e., “courier,” and it is thus translated in the present volume.

the procedure of peacemaking 467

Agha, referred to as “great courier” (Pol. wielki goniec, equivalent to

Tur. uluġ çapqun). e document announced the imminent arrival of

the khan’s great envoy, Rüstem Agha, who was empowered to discuss

any remaining matters. One might ask why the khan did not wait with

entrusting his solemn instrument to the great envoy? Perhaps the deci-

sion to send it through a courier was caused by an unexpected delay

of Rüstem Agha’s departure? Unfortunately, we do not know whether

Rüstem Agha was also provided with an instrument of peace because

the documents from his embassy are not preserved.

e great envoy, sent by the khan, was accompanied by the tet and

the bahşı. e term tet was already known in the times of the Golden

Horde and initially referred to an extraordinary envoy. In the 16th and

17th century, it referred to the khan’s courtier or a young member of

Tatar nobility, who was second in rank among the embassy members.

e term bahşı, also of ancient origin, referred to a secretary and in

the 16th century was gradually replaced by its Arabic equivalent: katib.

Nevertheless, both terms remained in use at least until the 1630s and

can still be found in the instruments of Djanibek Giray.

625

In the 17th century, the Crimean embassies sent to the Habsburg

imperial court numbered from seven to twenty-three horsemen, and

as a rule the number of horses exceeded the number of riders almost

twice.

626

In analogy, the Crimean embassy to Denmark in 1682 num-

bered thirteen men and twenty-four horses.

627

e Crimean embas-

sies to Lithuania and Poland, especially in the earlier period, had been

much more numerous. In early modern Eastern Europe, the living

expenses of foreign envoys were customarily covered by the hosting

party. Moreover, Tatar envoys expected to receive royal gis for them-

selves and their patrons. No wonder that the Polish-Lithuanian rulers

tried to limit the number and size of the Tatar embassies. In the royal

instrument from 1535, Sigismund promised to send each year the cus-

tomary gi to the khan but simultaneously added a new clause provid-

ing that “our brother, Sahib Giray Khan, should not send us his great

envoys, because due to the long road a great detriment is caused to

our treasury by providing his envoys with allowance and horses. Only

when he needs to notify us about some matter or news, he should

625

On the terms tet and bahşı, cf. Document 20, n. 27, and Document 35, n. 21.

626

Ivanics, “Posol’stva krymskix tatar pri Venskom dvore v 1598–1682 gg.,” p. 233.

627

Matuz, Krimtatarische Urkunden im Reichsarchiv zu Kopenhagen, p. 50.

468 part two—chapter five

send us a courier in the company of one, or at most two men [Ruth.

honca samohodruha, a nabolšyj samotretja]. And if he sends us his

great envoy, then we are not obliged to give him any allowance from

our proper funds, but solely deduce it from the gi that we are to give

to the khan.” is clause was also entered in the ready formula of the

khan’s instrument, prepared by the Lithuanian chancery.

628

Sigismund’s request was ignored as far as it concerned the khan’s

proper envoys, but at least Sahib Giray promised to limit the number

of Crimean notables entitled to send their own envoys to Vilnius and

Cracow; his instrument from 1539 specically provided that apart from

the khan, only his wives, daughters, and daughters-in-law, the qalga

and other Giray princes, the four qaraçıs, and two prominent mirzas

from the retinue of each qaraçı (i.e., eight mirzas altogether) could

send individual envoys to the king (and—as it was tacitly assumed—

count on royal presents).

629

e issue was again raised in 1541. During the negotiations in Cra-

cow, the Tatar envoy engaged that his lord would limit the number

of couriers sent to the king, and the retinue of each Tatar courier

should not exceed two men. e royal side no longer tried to prevent

the khan from sending great envoys, but it requested that the retinue

of each great envoy should not exceed twenty-ve men. e allow-

ance of embassy members would be le at the king’s discretion, and if

their number exceeded the one agreed upon, the allowance would be

deduced from the annual gi to be sent to the khan.

630

Sahib Giray was visibly irritated by these requests, especially as the

royal side still did not recognize the right of his family members and

the highest Tatar dignitaries to send separate envoys. In his follow-

ing instrument from 1542, the khan reiterated the right of his sons

and other Giray princes to send embassies to the king. Further on,

he retorically asked: “as regards the qaraçıs, they have each 20,000 or

628

See Documents 26–27. To shed some light on how much of a burden it was

for the inhabitants of royal domains to host Tatar envoys, it is worth quoting two

royal orders regarding the inhabitants of Čerkasy and Kaniv: in 1539, the townsmen

were obliged to provide food and shelter while the starosta was ordered to supply

the envoys with honey, and in 1552 the townsmen were ordered to provide transport

service and accomodation, and supply Tatar envoys, “whenever they come,” with hay,

bread, meat, and honey from the castle; see Čerkas, Ukrajina v polityčnyx vidnosynax,

p. 50.

629

See Document 28.

630

See Document 29, articles 10–11.

the procedure of peacemaking 469

30,000 servants and they used to send envoys and couriers; should we

now reduce their number [i.e., the number of their envoys]? ey used

to send envoys in the times of our ancestors and fathers, we cannot

reduce their number. As you have the Lithuanian and Polish lords

at your side, so they are their peers at our side.” In consolation, he

assured the king that there was no need to receive and feed envoys

sent by other Tatar individuals who were not authorized by the khan

to send embassies: “you should send them back with empty hands so

that they should not come again.”

631

e instrument of the new khan, Devlet Giray, issued in 1552, reit-

erated that the right to send embassies to the king was restricted to the

khan, his wives, the qalga and other Giray princes, three qaraçıs and

two mirzas, but nobody else.

632

Devlet Giray’s following instrument,

issued in 1560, touched upon another issue that had caused contro-

versies in the earlier correspondence between the two courts. As the

embassies were joined by numerous merchants, who hoped for tax

exemptions usually granted to envoys, the treasuries of both rulers

suered substantial losses. erefore, the khan declared that his trad-

ing subjects, be they Muslims, Latin Christians, Armenians, or Jews,

633

should not join embassies and couriers, and if they did so, they should

pay the ordinary tolls.

e eort to limit the number and size of Tatar embassies was

resumed by the royal side in the years 1619 and 1622, when the pro-

posed formulas of the khan’s instruments contained a clause limiting

these embassies to twelve horsemen, to be sent each year to Kamieniec

(but not further) in order to collect the gis. In addition, the khan

and the qalga would be entitled to send couriers to the royal court

under the provision that their retinues would not exceed ve horse-

men.

634

As we know, the proposals were rejected and the issue did not

reappear in the following agreements. Nevertheless, the seventeenth-

century Crimean embassies to the royal court seem to have contained

less participants than the earlier ones. In the years when the relations

631

See Document 31.

632

See Document 32.

633

Referred to as “the Turks, Franks, Armenians, or Jews” (Turczi, Frasy, Ormyanie,

Żydowye); see Document 33; curiously, Orthodox Christians are not listed although

Greek merchants played a large role in the Khanate’s economy.

634

See Documents 46–47; these couriers are referred to in the Polish text as posłańcy,

and probably should be identied with the Tatar çapquns, whereas the envoys are

referred to as posłowie and should be identied with the Tatar elçis.

470 part two—chapter five

were strained, the Tatars knew that they could not count on the royal

largesse, whereas in the years of alliance the gis’ transfer took place

in Kamieniec, and additional small presents were brought to Bagh-

chasaray by the Polish envoys.

635

As the Muscovian court faced similar problems in regard to Tatar

embassies, it also tried to nd similar solutions. e Treaty of Bagh-

chasaray (1681) provided that only the khan, the qalga, and the

nureddin were entitled to send embassies to Moscow, ranked either

as envoys (elçi), no more than ve persons whose escort should not

exceed twenty men, or as couriers (çapqun; rendered in Russian as

gonec), no more then three persons (apparently representing the

khan, the qalga, and the nureddin) whose escort should not exceed

twelve men.

636

e standard peacemaking procedure and the diplomatic ceremonial

While studying the Crimean documents and diplomatic ceremo-

nial, one oen encounters forms that seem anachronous, redundant,

or meaningless, like corroborating a document with the seal of the

former khan who was long dead (1514), reissuing a document of

the khan’s predecessor without even changing its heading (1532),

repeated ctitious granting of lands which in fact belonged neither

to the sender not to the addressee (until 1560), and, most typically,

invoking the ancient friendship that had supposedly reigned in the

times of the two rulers’ predecessors. Yet, we must keep in mind that

the term “ancient” had usually positive connotations in early modern

societies, so invoking “ancient” documents and obeying “ancient” cus-

toms was both expected and valued, notwithstanding the fact that the

term “ancient” sometimes veiled new political contents.

637

Even today,

635

To give just one example: in 1654 Mariusz Jaskólski brought numerous presents

to various Crimean dignitaries, including the wife of the powerful Crimean vizier,

Sefer Ghazi Agha. e Polish envoy recorded in his diary that the presents had been

delivered in secret so that the vizier’s wife should not be the subject of jealousy of the

khan’s wives (aby invidiey u chańskich żon nie miała); see AGAD, Libri Legationum,

no. 33, fol. 43a.

636

Materialy dlja istorii Krymskago xanstva, pp. 652–653; for the Russian transla-

tion, see Pamjatniki diplomatičeskix snošenij. . . . Edited by F. Laškov, p. 177.

637

Cf. the illuminating remarks by Mixail Krom on the Russian/Ruthenian term

starina/staryna (“antiquity”), which to the contemporaries embodied the idealized

past law, order, and good life of their ancestors; knowing the expectations of their

the procedure of peacemaking 471

protocol and ceremonial, rooted in a distant and “anachronous” past,

still matter in diplomacy.

638

Although the focus is on the procedures and ceremonial reign-

ing in the diplomatic exchange between the Crimean Khanate and

Poland-Lithuania, numerous analogies from the Crimean-Muscovian

relations, provided by the immensely rich archival material le by the

Muscovian bureaucracy, allow one to draw parallels and supplement

knowledge by valuable details. e diplomatic ceremonial at the khan’s

court is described in many reports le by the Muscovian envoys sent

to the Crimea, while the proceedings held in Moscow between the

Tatar and Russian negotiators have been recorded by the Muscovian

chancery clerks.

From the ocial Crimean point of view, it was the indel for-

eign ruler who was to initiate the diplomatic exchange and petition

for the khan’s instrument (especially a yarlıq), oering in return the

timely payment of tribute. Nevertheless, pragmatic considerations

oen caused that it was the khan who initiated the correspondence,

for instance by notifying of his accession or by asking about the for-

eign ruler’s health and reminding about the ancient friendship. In the

times of Ivan IV, the Muscovian diplomacy openly tried to reverse

the procedure and demanded that the rst move should be made by

the khan, who would send his great embassy and implore for peace

while the tsar would generously grant his request, but in 1577, fac-

ing a new campaign against Poland-Lithuania, Moscow had to give

up due to the exigency to secure its southern border.

639

In fact, with

frequent envoys and couriers traveling to and fro between the courts

concerned, it was quite easy to claim that the peace negotiations had

been initiated by the other side.

640

subjects, the Lithuanian and Muscovian rulers oen proclaimed that they would fol-

low the ancient custom and would not introduce any novelties; idem, Mež Rus’ju i

Litvoj, pp. 38–39 and 169.

638

Cf. the remarks of Roosen in idem, “Early Modern Diplomatic Ceremonial:

A Systems Approach,” p. 456.

639

Cf. Filjuškin, “Proekty russko-krymskogo voennogo sojuza,” p. 325.

640

To provide an exotic analogy, in 1606 the Japanese lord of Tsushima, whose

commercial interests suered due to the strained Japanese-Korean relations, sent to

Seoul a letter purportedly drawn by the shogun because he knew that neither the sho-

gun nor the Korean court would initiate the diplomatic exchange, as such move would

imply admitting the other’s superiority; the forgery enabled the Korean king to send a

“response embassy” (thus ocially termed) in the following year and the diplomatic

472 part two—chapter five

A description of a standard peacemaking procedure is contained

in a letter from 1532, sent by Sigismund I to Sa‘adet Giray, in which

the king proposed the khan to enter a new treaty and conrm it with

the exchange of solemn oaths and instruments: “if you take an oath to

[keep friendship with] us, along with your beys and ulans, in the pres-

ence of our envoy, and if you send us your letter of agreement through

our aforementioned envoy, and you [also] send us your great envoy,

in whose presence we can, too, take an oath to you, our brother, that

we should be your good brother and friend, in conrmation of that

we will send you our letter of agreement through your aforementioned

envoy.”

641

e above description did not mention the fact that also the envoys

were expected to take oaths on behalf of their lords during their sol-

emn audiences at foreign courts. Muscovian envoys to the Crimea

were specically instructed that they should take their oath only if the

khan was present in person.

642

e procedure could be even further complicated if an instrument,

issued by one ruler and brought by his envoy to a foreign court, was

rejected by the addressee. For instance, in the years 1535, 1585, and

1601 the instruments issued by the khans were rejected by the royal

side and sent back for corrections.

643

In order to evade such events and

the resulting delays in peacemaking procedures, the royal chancery

tried to make sure in advance that the khan’s instrument will assume

the desired form; therefore, Lithuanian and Polish envoys were some-

times provided with ready formulas of the instruments requested from

the khans; yet, such measures were rarely eective as the Crimean side

was unwilling to passively accept the contents and wording of the pro-

posed versions.

Another way to hasten the negotiations and evade the risk of their

disruption, practiced by the royal chancery, was providing the envoys

relations were formally reestablished; see Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern

Japan. Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu, pp. 31–32.

641

[. . .] ty by [. . .] pered tym našym poslom prysjahu nam učynyl [s] knjazy y ulany

svoymy [. . .], y dokončan’e svoe na to nam čerez toho našoho posla k nam pryslal,

a svoeho posla velykoho k nam poslal, pered kotorym poslom tvoym my takže tobe,

bratu našomu, prysjahu učynyl [by], yž maem tobe dobrym bratem y pryjatelem byty,

y dokončan’e našo čerez toho ž tvoeho posla na to k tobe pošlem; see Lietuvos Metrika.

Knyga Nr. 15, p. 184.

642

See Vinogradov, Russko-krymskie otnošenija, vol. 2, p. 213.

643

See notes 233, 321, and 347 in Part I.

the procedure of peacemaking 473

with two alternative versions of the royal instrument of peace, both

corroborated with authentic seals; the rst version was more favorable

for the royal side while the second one contained more concessions.

e envoys, furnished with both versions, were authorized to present

the second one only in the utmost necessity. Of course, the envoy was

strictly ordered not to reveal that he had two royal instruments, and

the instrument that was not given was to be instantly destroyed. For

instance, in 1598, Nikodem Kossakowski was given one royal instru-

ment that did not mention the Cossack issue, and another one, equally

corroborated with the royal seal, in which Sigismund III unwillingly

engaged that he would restrain the Cossacks from raiding the Crimean

lands.

644

From a letter of Sahib Giray addressed to Sigismund I in 1534, we

learn that the practice of issuing multiple versions of one instrument

was also known in the Crimea, although its rationale was somewhat dif-

ferent. e khan openly admitted that he had provided his envoy with

two instruments of peace, suggesting that the king should choose the

document of his liking, and send the other one back to the Crimea.

645

e striking frankness of the above letter can be tentatively explained

by the khan’s priorities: what mattered to him was the timely delivery

of the royal gis and—with this priority in mind—Sahib Giray was

ready to adjust the form of his document in accordance with the royal

desire, certainly within certain limits.

Perhaps the most extended procedure in the history of the Crimean-

Lithuanian-Polish relations can be observed in the years 1513–1522.

In September 1513, aer the unexpected death of Prince Djalaleddin,

the Crimean honorary hostage who had been dispatched to Vilnius

in 1512, Sigismund reassured Mengli Giray of his friendship by issu-

ing two instruments, one in Ruthenian on behalf of Lithuania and

another in Latin on behalf of Poland, and by conrming their contents

with his oath taken in the presence of the Crimean envoys. Having

received the royal instruments, Mengli Giray issued a “donation yarlıq

cum şartname” and conrmed his engagements with an oath, taken in

the presence of four royal envoys then present at his court: Stanisław

644

See Skorupa, “Poselstwo na Krym Nikodema Kossakowskiego,” p. 33. In 1533,

the royal envoy dispatched to Istanbul was also secretly provided with two alterna-

tive versions of the royal instrument; cf. Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic

Relations, p. 71.

645

Cf. n. 230 in Part I.