Kolodziejczyk Dariusz. The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania (ENG)
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454 part two—chapter five
into career diplomats, sent several times to the same courts and gain-
ing rich expertise from visited countries.
579
Hence, paradoxically, the
lower status of the Crimean Khanate in the Polish court’s diplomatic
hierarchy resulted in the fact that the missions to Baghchasaray were
performed by more experienced envoys.
e analysis of the social status of the Muscovian envoys sent to
the Crimea is certainly beyond the scope of the present study, but it is
worth to quote a telling example, already invoked by Croskey: in 1492,
Ivan III instructed his envoy to the Crimea that he should publicly
address the previously sent Muscovian envoy (Kostjantin Zabolockij),
whom he was about to meet at the khan’s court, as a boyar. Croskey
observed that the instruction would have been unnecessary if Zabo-
lockij had been a boyar indeed.
580
In spite of the hosts’ expectations,
581
Moscow sent to the Crimea nobles, but not boyars.
582
Like in the Polish-
Lithuanian case, the predilection towards lower ranked envoys was
paradoxically benecial for the professionalization of the diplomatic
corps as those chosen to go were usually experienced and oen spe-
cialized in diplomatic missions to a given country. e professional-
ization of the Muscovian diplomacy was strengthened by the role of
d’jaks, chancery clerks who participated in the missions and ranked
second aer the envoys.
If compared with the Lithuanian, Polish, and Muscovian envoys,
sent to the khans, the Crimean envoys dispatched to the neighboring
579
Cf. ibidem, pp. 142–143, 179–180, and 364–366.
580
Croskey, “e Diplomatic Forms of Ivan III’s Relationship with the Crimean
Khan,” p. 263; on the practice of temporary bestowing of the badge of boyars onto the
Muscovian envoys sent to the Crimea, see also Xoroškevič, Rus’ i Krym, p. 198.
581
In 1680, Murad Giray invited Vasilij Šeremetev, the unlucky commander of the
Russian army who had spent already 20 years in the Tatar captivity, to join the nego-
tiations with the newly arrived Russian embassy, evidently aware that Šeremetev’s
boyarly status was higher than that of the envoys; nevertheless, Šeremetev was not
empowered to conduct the negotiations and even refused to sit down in the presence
of his sovereign’s ocial representatives; see “Spisok s statejnago spiska [. . .] Vasil’ja
Mixajlova syna Tjapkina, d’jaka Nikity Zotova,” p. 599.
582
In this aspect, the Russian rulers and aristocrats were unusually united: the for-
mer did not want to jeopardize their prestige by sending high-ranked envoys, who
might have been deliberately humiliated by the khan or detained as hostages, while the
latter were anything but enthusiastic about going in missions to the Crimea; in 1535,
in a rare case when Moscow decided to send an aristocrate, Prince Aleksandr Strigin-
Obolenskij to Qalga Islam Giray, who promised to overthrow Khan Sahib Giray and
terminate the Tatar-Lithuanian alliance, Obolenskij plainly refused to go, giving as an
excuse the fact that Islam’s envoy, who was to arrive at Moscow, was of lower rank
than he was; see Juzefovič, Put’ posla, p. 35.
the procedure of peacemaking 455
courts seemed to have enjoyed a relatively higher status. Sev-
eral envoys, sent to the northern capitals in the late 15th and early
16th centuries, descended from the most prominent Crimean clan of
the Shirins, to mention Devletek, the son of Eminek and the future
Shirin qaraçı sent in 1475 to Moscow, Bashıbek, Devletek’s son sent
in 1515 to Cracow, Evliya, Bashıbek’s brother sent in 1520 to Poland-
Lithuania and detained as honorary hostage, Djan Giray, Evliya’s
nephew who replaced his uncle and was detained in Lithuania until
1526, and nally Ma‘qul, Djan Giray’s brother sent in great embassy
to Sigismund in 1531.
Ma‘qul’s embassy coincided with the failed Shirin conspiracy
against Khan Sa‘adet Giray, headed by Bakhtıyar, the father of Ma‘qul
and Djan Giray, and Evliya, Bakhtıyar’s brother and a former envoy.
Staying at Sigismund’s court, Ma‘qul escaped the fate of his father,
uncle and other relatives, massacred by the khan, but the latter noti-
ed Sigismund that the Shirin lost his diplomatic status. In 1532, the
Crimean throne was ascended by Islam Giray, Sa‘adet’s long-term rival,
who requested for Ma‘qul’s release and aimed to restore the Shirins’
position. Unfortunately for the Shirins, the Porte did not acknowledge
Islam Giray on the throne and installed Sahib Giray instead. e new
khan did his best to diminish the inuence of the powerful clan and
in the following period the Shirins no longer performed embassies to
Poland-Lithuania.
In 1512, when Mengli Giray agreed to send his grandson to Vilnius
as an honorary hostage, the dynasty prestige required that the young
prince be accompanied by trusted and eminent personages. Apart
from two Italians in the khan’s service (see below), this task was con-
ferred to Devlet Bakhtı, the qaraçı of the Barın clan and the lieutenant
(qaymaqam) of Qarasu Bazar. is was the only occurrence that an
acting qaraçı performed an embassy to Poland-Lithuania. Aer Prince
Djalaleddin’s premature death, in 1513 Devlet Bakhtı returned to the
Crimea along with Sigismund’s instrument of peace.
e Shirins and Barıns along with the Arghıns and Qıpchaqs tra-
ditionally formed the four most prominent clans among the Crimean
nobility. Yet, their position was challenged by the Nogay newcomers
from the Volga known as the Manghıts or Mansurs. In the 15th cen-
tury, the Manghıt leader Temir had been the beglerbeg (a post remi-
niscent of the grand vizier) in the Great Horde, while his daughter,
Nur Sultan, had married Ibrahim, the khan of Kazan, and aer the
latter’s death became the wife of Mengli Giray. Temir’s son, Tevkel,
456 part two—chapter five
inherited his father’s position in the Great Horde, but aer its col-
lapse entered the Crimean service and founded the powerful clan that
became a new factor in the Crimean domestic politics. When Sahib
Giray ascended the throne in 1532, Tevkel’s sons, Baki and Devey,
were his most powerful supporters against his rival and pretender,
Islam Giray, who enjoyed the support of the Shirins. In consequence,
the new khan consciously promoted the Manghıts to the position once
enjoyed by the Shirins. It is in the above context that we should regard
the appointment of Tevkel’s younger son, Devey, as the envoy to Vil-
nius in 1534. In 1537, the former envoy assisted his older brother Baki
in the assassination of Islam Giray. Although at rst it secured them
Sahib Giray’s gratitude, Baki’s unruliness soon drew a disaster and in
1541 he was executed. Devey was more lucky and survived, to be pro-
moted in 1563 to the post of qaraçı by the new khan, Devlet Giray. He
ended his adventurous life in the Muscovian captivity somewhere aer
1576. In the following period, the rising tensions between the khans
and their Nogay subjects and—on the other hand—Kantemir’s activity
in Budjak, especially resented in Warsaw, made the appointment of a
Manghıt to an embassy to Poland rather unlikely.
Among other prominent clans, whose members acted as envoys
to Poland-Lithuania, one should mention the Külüks, whom a Rus-
sian embassy report from 1681 listed among the ve most promi-
nent Crimean families along with the Shirins, Manghıts, Arghıns, and
Sulesh-oghlu.
583
Unlike the great clans, whose leaders aspired to the
posts of qaraçıs, the Külüks and their chief rivals, the Sulesh-oghlu,
owed their rise to the service at the khan’s court and formed an inter-
mediate group between the Crimean aristocracy and the service beys.
In the second half of the 16th century, the Külük leader, Dervish Bey,
headed the “Polish-Lithuanian faction” at the khan’s court (perhaps he
should also be identied with the envoy to Poland in 1552). His son,
Sefer Ghazi Bey, was sent in embassies to Sigismund III in 1604 and
1609. He then actively participated in the Polish-Crimean negotiations
during Oleszko’s fateful mission to Baghchasaray in 1619. In 1624, he
was again sent to Poland and died at a sea accident on his return.
584
e next leader of the Külük clan, Ibrahim Bey, headed the Crimean
embassy to Cracow in 1633.
583
Cf. Document 49, n. 7. It is curious that the report did not list such traditionally
prominent clans as the Barıns, Qıpchaqs, and Sedjevüts. Mentioning the Sulesh-oghlu
in a Russian report can be explained by the prominent role of this clan in mediating
the relations between Baghchasaray and Moscow.
584
Cf. Document 41, notes 2 and 5, and n. 399 in Part I.
the procedure of peacemaking 457
A second group of Crimean diplomats consisted of men who owed
their position to their merits and loyalty to the khan rather than
clan aliations and were typically referred to as the members of
the inner (içki) service, i.e., the khan’s courtiers. Worth mentioning
in this context is such personage as Tevkel Ulan, whose title (ulan)
might have referred to his Genghisid origin, but who rather owed his
position to Mengli Giray’s trust and was sent in embassy to Lithu-
ania in 1506 (interestingly, his two brothers then lived in Lithuania).
585
A century later, the leading “expert in the Polish-Lithuanian aairs”
in Baghchasaray seemed to have been Djan Ahmed Chelebi, whose
title (chelebi) referred to his belonging to the educated class.
586
He was
sent in embassies to Poland-Lithuania in 1595 (directly from Ţuţora),
1597, 1601, and 1602, and his expertise was needed not only abroad.
During Piaseczyński’s sojourn in the Crimea, in August 1601, the khan
put Djan Ahmed Chelebi and a scribe named Hüseyin in charge of
draing the treaty, negotiated with the Polish envoy. According to
Piaseczyński’s report, they spent together two days working on the
text in the envoy’s residence in Süyrü Tash (Sujurtasz) near Bagh-
chasaray, while the Tatars did not refuse to try the Polish vodka (pod-
pili gorzałką). Apart from his numerous embassies to Sigismund III,
Djan Ahmed Chelebi traveled with missions to Moscow. In 1602, he
delivered Ghazi II Giray’s şartname and witnessed the oath taken by
Tsar Boris Godunov. His following mission in 1604 was less successful
as it coincided with the beginning of the Time of Troubles.
587
e position of Dedesh Agha, who indefatigably traveled between
Baghchasaray and Warsaw in the 1650s and 1660s, was even stron-
ger. He was not only a diplomat, but also a military commander. In
1663, he headed—along with two Giray princes—the Crimean aux-
iliary troops in John Casimir’s campaign against Muscovy. When in
1666 Adil Giray—an “upstart” Choban Giray despised by the Crimean
elite—ascended the throne, although suspicious towards his predeces-
sor’s advisers, he had yet to reckon with Dedesh’s expertise. Hence,
the diplomat was again sent to Warsaw with the task of prolonging
the peace on behalf of his new lord. In 1680, when a Russian embassy
585
Cf. Document 7, n. 2. On the term ulan, see n. 348 above.
586
In the Crimean context, it commonly referred to bureaucrats who did not
descend from the Tatar nobility, but nevertheless were granted efs (timars) by the
khan; chelebis stood lower in hierarchy than aghas; cf. Matuz, Krimtatarische Urkun-
den im Reichsarchiv zu Kopenhagen, p. 7.
587
See Pułaski, “Trzy poselstwa Piaseczyńskiego,” p. 365; for Djan Ahmed Chelebi’s
biography, cf. Document 36, n. 2.
458 part two—chapter five
arrived at Baghchasaray, Dedesh was still prominent, listed among the
closest advisers (bližnie ljudi) of Khan Murad Giray and ranked sec-
ond aer the Crimean vizier, Ahmed Agha.
588
A special sub-category among the second group of Crimean dip-
lomats consisted of the Italians in the khan’s service. One of them,
already mentioned several times, was Augustino de Garibaldis, a Gen-
ovese from Caa who traveled repeatedly between Mengli Giray and
Sigismund I and largely contributed to their reconciliation. In 1514,
he composed in his native language—partly with his own hand—the
Crimean instrument of peace issued on behalf of the khan. e years
in the khan’s service earned him the Tatar title of bey, but he did
not sever his relations with the Genovese diaspora in the West and
his brothers are known to have lived in Spain. e curriculum of the
second Italian, Vicenzo de Guidulphis, was perhaps even more pic-
turesque as he was the son of the Genovese ruler of Matrega and of
a Circassian princess. In 1512, he was chosen along with the Barın
qaraçı and yet another Italian, Giovanni Baptista de San Nicolo, to
accompany the Giray prince to Vilnius.
589
To be sure, these were
not the only Italians who traveled at that time as Crimean envoys to
Poland-Lithuania. A century later, one of the most active Crimean dip-
lomats was Gianantonio Spinola, also of mixed Genovese-Circassian
origin, whose surname disclosed his descent from the once auent
merchant family in Caa. In the years 1589–1622, he traveled seven
times to Poland-Lithuania, and in addition to Sweden and Austria.
Fully assimilated in the Tatar society, he used an alternative form of
his rst name—Djan Anton—and perhaps did not even know Italian,
certainly not the written language.
590
One might wonder what criteria,
if not the language uency, predestined him for diplomatic service:
religion?,
591
or perhaps simply his loyalty to the khan? e predilection
of early modern rulers towards all kinds of “strangers,” who did not
588
“Spisok s statejnago spiska [. . .] Vasil’ja Mixajlova syna Tjapkina, d’jaka Nikity
Zotova,” p. 589.
589
On Vicenzo de Guidulphis and Augustino de Garibaldis, see also Document 16,
notes 10 and 18.
590
Cf. Document 45, n. 8.
591
e Italians in the khan’s service probably preserved their religion longer
than their language; also many Circassians in the khan’s service were Christians;
Piaseczyński reported in 1602 that he was led for the audience with Ghazi II Giray by
two Circassian Christians, Biytemir and Kantemir, while none of the khan’s Muslim
courtiers was in his escort, “as this was the custom” (przyszli po mnie od cara dwaj
Petyhorcy: Bij Timir a Kan Timir, chrześcijanie, abym szedł do cara [. . .]; a z dworzan
the procedure of peacemaking 459
descent from local nobilities and were therefore more dependent and
more loyal, was certainly not only the Crimean speciality.
e size, logistics, and the routes traveled by the embassies
As the Lithuanian and Polish envoys to the Crimea usually did not
speak the Tatar language,
592
the embassies were joined by interpret-
ers. e Lithuanian diplomacy relied in this aspect on the Tatars, who
had settled in the Grand Duchy in the 14th century and later. e
exemplary role of Ibrahim Tymirčyn, who assisted the great embassy
of Jurij Zenovevyč and Jakub Ivašencovyč in 1507, traveled with indi-
vidual missions to the Great Horde and the Crimea, and founded the
entire clan of Tatar interpreters, has already been mentioned.
593
Aer
1569, when the relations with the Crimea became the speciality of the
Polish chancery, the monopoly of Lithuanian Tatars was challenged
by the Armenians whose ancestors had settled in Red Ruthenia (i.e.,
Galicia) and Podolia in the middle ages and whose everyday language
was Kipchak Turkic, not much dierent from Tatar.
594
At times, the
interpreters also served as couriers or even performed individual mis-
sions. For instance, in 1623, when the Polish court was scandalized
by the long detainment of the previous envoy, it consciously lowered
the level of diplomatic exchange and conded the following mission
to a Tatar interpreter, Suliman Rubaj.
595
During the years 1658–1659,
when the Polish-Tatar relations were especially intensive in result of
the military alliance, an Armenian interpreter Zachariasz Piotrowicz
traveled as many as eight times between the two sides.
596
e Crown
hetmans, who were authorized to maintain diplomatic communication
with the Crimea, also sent in missions trusted and experienced ocers,
who spoke a mixture of Ruthenian, Tatar and Polish that served as a
jego muzułmanów, jako był obyczaj, żaden mnie nie prowadził); see Pułaski, “Trzy
poselstwa Piaseczyńskiego,” p. 757.
592
Among the rare exceptions one may name Stefan Narajowski, sent to the khan
in 1634, or Krzysztof Dzierżek, sent in 1639; the latter belonged to the family whose
several members served as Ottoman Turkish translators at the Polish chancery.
593
Cf. n. 61 above.
594
Actually, it had been acquired by the members of the Armenian diaspora in the
Crimea from their Tatar neighbors.
595
Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie, pp. 245 and 253.
596
Wójcik, “Some problems of Polish-Tatar relations in the seventeenth century,”
p. 95.
460 part two—chapter five
vernacular on the steppe frontier.
597
Yet, solemn documents, published
in this volume, were not entrusted to interpreters or couriers, but to
regular envoys.
Unlike the great embassies sent to the major European courts,
the embassies sent to the Crimea rarely exceeded a dozen members,
although they were oen accompanied by merchants, who expected
greater travel security and hoped for tax exemptions. On the way
home, the embassy could be joined by former captives and slaves,
redeemed by their relatives or released by the khan in a gesture of
goodwill. Logistical problems arose when a royal embassy transported
the annual royal gis (or tribute). For instance, in July 1563 the Mus-
covian envoys in the Crimea witnessed the arrival of the “Lithuanian
treasure” (litovskoj kazny), loaded on thirty-six carts.
598
e security of travel was a major problem, since the route led
through the steppe, frequented by Ukrainian Cossacks as well as Nogay
and Tatar vagabonds, whose obedience towards any ruler was at best
questionable. Until the mid-sixteenth century, envoys and merchants
still used the medieval via Tartarica that had once connected Central
Europe with the Italian Black Sea colonies of Caa and Tana. Mengli
Giray’s instrument from 1507 provided that the fort of Islamkerman,
recently built on his order on the le shore of the Dnieper at the river
crossing named Tavan’ (< Tat. Toġan keçidi), should be a meeting place,
where Lithuanian envoys would come on boats and deliver the yearly
payments, which were formally assigned for the fort’s maintenance. In
return, the envoys would collect previously kidnapped Lithuanian cap-
tives as well as Tatar culprits, found guilty of raiding Lithuania, who
were to be arrested by the khan and delivered in order to be punished.
If such culprits escaped the khan’s justice, their wives and children
would be delivered in their stead as hostages.
599
A Lithuanian report
from 1542 conrmed that the ancient border ran through Tavan’ and
ferry incomes from the Dnieper crossing had been traditionally shared
between the Lithuanian and Crimean rulers.
600
Yet, in 1560 a new clause was entered in the instrument of Devlet
Giray, providing that: “when an envoy of our brother is sent from Kiev
597
Also Jan Sobieski, the hetman and future king, is believed to have known some
Turkish.
598
See Filjuškin, “Proekty russko-krymskogo voennogo sojuza,” p. 314.
599
See Document 9.
600
See n. 266 in Part I.
the procedure of peacemaking 461
to us, he is not to carry the gis from [your] treasury [further] than
[. . .] Perekop; [. . .] and we should order to collect from him the trea-
sures and gis.”
601
e vaguely formulated novelty meant that from
then on the royal side was responsible for the security of envoys and
gis not only within the Lithuanian borders, but also on the route
between Tavan’ and Perekop (i.e., Ferahkerman) that led through the
Khanate’s territory. e change was evidently related to the demolish-
ment of Islamkerman by Dmytro Vyšnevec’kyj in 1556 and the rising
activity of the Dnieper Cossacks, at least nominally the royal subjects,
which made the travel through the steppe even more dangerous than
before.
While the khan tried to push the responsibility onto the royal side,
the latter was no more willing to take the burden. In 1571, a royal
envoy tried, in vain, to persuade the khan that Tatar agents should
collect the gis in Kiev or Braclav and transport them further through
the steppe on their own risk.
602
e mention of Braclav suggests that
already at that time the route leading along the Boh river to Očakiv
(i.e., Djankerman), which ran more to the west than the ancient route
through Kiev, was gaining in popularity. is was probably the route
traveled by Marcin Broniowski, sent ve times to the Crimea between
1578 and 1592.
603
anks to a shortcut towards the Black Sea, the route
bypassed the main area of Cossack activity on the lower Dnieper and
the embassy could nd shelter in Očakiv, garrisoned by the Ottoman
troops. Nevertheless, Broniowski later admitted that even on the Black
Sea shore, travelers had been afraid not only to camp overnight, but
even feed their horses.
604
Further envoys traveled the route that was even more to the west
and ran through Moldavia. Kossakowski’s travel to Suceava was con-
ditioned by the fact that the khan was then in Hungary, participat-
ing in the Ottoman-Habsburg war. Consequently, the instruments
exchanged between the king and the khan in 1598–1599 provided that
the royal gis should be delivered in Akkerman, the Ottoman port at
the mouth of the Dniester through which the Tatars passed each year
601
See Document 33.
602
See n. 303 in Part I.
603
In his description of the Crimea, Broniowski did not provide his own itinerary;
nevertheless, he described the route from Braclav to Očakiv and mentioned that the
travel took six to seven days; see Martini Broniovii [. . .] Tartariae descriptio, pp. 1–2.
604
Ibidem, p. 3.
462 part two—chapter five
while heading for Hungary.
605
Yet, the royal side found the new route
more convenient even when its embassy was dispatched to the Crimea.
Ławryn Piaseczyński, who traveled to Baghchasaray in the years 1601–
1602, always took the route leading through Jassy to Akkerman and
then crossed the sea on rented Ottoman galleys or commercial ships
to Közlev (Tur. Gözleve), the only large port in the Crimean Khanate.
Even in distant Akkerman, the fear of the Cossacks was so great that
the Ottoman garrison was constantly on alert and Piaseczyński’s galley
was once unpacked before departure on the mere gossip of the Cos-
sacks’ approaching.
606
Aer Piaseczyński had departed to the Crimea,
the royal gis began to be slowly amassed in Kamieniec with the inten-
tion to release them aer the embassy’s successful completion. In the
royal instrument, sent through Piaseczyński in 1601, a void place was
le, in which the place of the gis’ delivery was to be entered, while
the envoy was instructed to persuade the khan that Kamieniec was the
optimal choice.
607
In desire to evade the additional costs of transport
and fearing robbery in Moldavia and Budjak, the Polish side preferred
to be relieved from the responsibility already on its own territory.
Ghazi II Giray was unsatised with both the delay of the gis’ deliv-
ery and the route through which they were transported. His instru-
ment given to Piaseczyński provided that: “as your envoys used to
bring us gis taking the customary old route across the Dnieper and
through the eld [i.e., steppe],
608
also now [the gis] should be sent to
us in the same manner as they used to in the times of our ancestors.”
Nonetheless, the khan agreed that the gis already amassed in Kamie-
niec could be transported through Moldavia in order to be delivered
as soon as possible.
609
It took another seventeen months until the royal
gis were nally brought from Kamieniec to Jassy and entrusted to the
khan’s representative in the Moldavian capital, in January 1603.
605
See Documents 36–37.
606
Pułaski, “Trzy poselstwa Piaseczyńskiego,” pp. 358–359, 472, 648–655, 762.
Közlev’s rapid development under Ghazi II Giray’s reign is further conrmed by the
establishment of the khan’s mint; see Hajvoronskyj, Poveliteli dvux materikov, vol. 1,
p. 324.
607
Cf. the empty places deliberately le in Document 39; for the royal instruction
to the envoy, see Pułaski, “Trzy poselstwa Piaseczyńskiego,” p. 245.
608
e Polish term pole (“eld”) or dzikie pola (“wild elds”) referred to the barely
inhabited steppe area extending to the north from the Black Sea.
609
See Document 40.
the procedure of peacemaking 463
e demand to transport the royal gis along the ancient steppe
route was reiterated in Ghazi II Giray’s successive instrument from
1604, although the request from 1560 that the gis should be trans-
ported as far as Perekop was no longer repeated. e royal envoys were
only expected to deliver the gis “to the hither side of the Dnieper.”
610
For the following two decades the two sides still could not agree on
the place where the transfer of gis should occur. e ready formula
of the khan’s instrument, prepared by the royal chancery in 1619,
contained a specic provision that the khan should send each year
his envoys to Kamieniec, where they were to collect the royal gis
and transport them to Akkerman and further to the Crimea on Tatar
horses and carts. e embassy’s size was not to exceed twelve horse-
men and the starosta of Kamieniec was to provide for their accomo-
dation, food, and fodder, but their stay in the Polish fortress was not
to exceed two weeks, and if they wished to remain any longer, they
would have to provide for themselves.
611
Yet, the khan refused to issue
the proposed instrument and the Tatars soon joined the Ottomans in
their war against Poland-Lithuania.
During the peace negotiations at Hotin in 1621, a compromise was
at last reached. It was agreed that the transfer of the gis for the khan
should occur in the Moldavian capital of Jassy. e Polish instrument
of the Treaty of Hotin provided that:
Henceforth, the Commonwealth will provide the usual yearly pay [Pol.
żołd] for the Tatar khan, and send it to Jassy, to the Moldavian hospodar
of the time. Aer notication from the Moldavian hospodar, the khan
should send his agents to Jassy in order to collect [the pay].
612
Yet, when in 1622 Krzysztof Krauzowski was sent to the Crimea in
order to formally conrm the peace, he was again provided with a
ready formula of the khan’s requested instrument, which repeated the
stipulation of the earlier formula from 1619 that the transfer should
610
“As from the ancient times eir Royal Majesties, the ancestors of our brother,
His Royal Majesty, were obliged to send us gis through their envoys and deliver them
to the hither side of the Dnieper, and they have done so accordingly until the present
time, also hereaer His Royal Majesty should send us gis through his envoy, each
year, in the same manner;” see Document 41.
611
See Document 46.
612
Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, pp. 378 and 380; this clause
is missing in the Turkish instrument of the treaty, but it is entered in the formal Otto-
man ‘ahdname, issued by Sultan Mustafa in 1623; see ibidem, pp. 391 and 398.