Kolodziejczyk Dariusz. The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania (ENG)
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434 part two—chapter four
Likewise, no instruments of peace are known to have been issued by
Vladislaus IV, with one notable exception. Although the king obtained
several ‘ahdnames from the khans Djanibek Giray (1634), Inayet Giray
(1635), Bahadır Giray (1637 and 1640), and Islam III Giray (1646),
and, in addition, two ‘ahdnames from the qalga (1637 and 1640) and
one from the nureddin (1640), he only once responded with an analo-
gous instrument, namely in 1637. While sending a letter of agreement
(list przymierny) to Qalga Islam Giray, Vladislaus IV simultaneously
procrastinated his answer to the khan and even detained the latter’s
envoy. By keeping good relations with the qalga, the king tried to gain
time before he could decide whether to send gis to the khan or pre-
pare for a military confrontation. In fact, during the last years of his
reign, Vladislaus contemplated a full-scale invasion of the Crimea, to
be orchestrated by Warsaw and Moscow and subsidized by Venice.
It was the political and military catastrophe of the years 1648–1649
that prompted the Polish king to issue an instrument of peace addressed
to the Crimean khan, probably for the rst time since 1605. In August
1649, in a military camp near Zboriv, John Casimir, Vladislaus’ brother
and successor, issued a document that contained the peace conditions
negotiated between the Polish and Tatar plenipotentiaries. e king
engaged to resume the payment of the customary gis to the khan and
to restore the ancient liberties to the Cossacks on the condition that
the latter would return under his rule. On his part, Islam III Giray was
to withdraw his troops from the royal lands while causing “the least
possible damage.” As the Polish Vasas still claimed hereditary rights to
the Swedish throne, the royal document was dated “in the rst year of
our reign in Poland and the second year [of our reign] in Sweden.”
540
e pacication of 1649 was soon followed by a new outbreak of
hostilities, but the next Polish-Tatar pacication, negotiated in 1653 at
Žvanec’, and especially the Cossacks’ entry under the tsar’s patronage,
conrmed in Perejaslav in January 1654, paved the way to a lasting
rapprochement between Warsaw and Baghchasaray. In July 1654, arti-
cles of peace and military alliance were negotiated in Warsaw between
540
See Document 59; John Casimir claimed hereditary rights to the Swedish throne
from the death of his older brother Vladislaus, i.e., from May 1648. As to the Polish
throne, his reign began with his election in November 1648, and formally even later,
with his coronation in January 1649. e two ocial copies of the royal instrument,
preserved in the Crown Archives, do not contain the locatio and datatio, which are
extant in other copies. e original document, corroborated by the king and sent to
the khan, must have also contained the royal seal.
the polish and lithuanian instruments of peace 435
the khan’s envoy, Süleyman Agha, and the Polish dignitaries, and then
sworn by the king, the Senate members, and the Tatar envoy. en,
Süleyman Agha set out to the Crimea, accompanied by a Polish envoy,
Mariusz Jaskólski, who carried along a royal instrument of peace. e
instrument, issued and corroborated by the king, is today preserved
in a copy.
541
It contains the negotiated articles while the wording of
its introductory and nal sections is similar to the ones of the Pol-
ish instrument from 1649. e Polish-Crimean rapprochement was
not interrupted by the death of Islam III Giray in late June 1654. His
brother and successor, Mehmed IV Giray, accepted the royal instru-
ment brought by Jaskólski and conrmed the alliance with a formal
‘ahdname, issued in November 1654. Interestingly, in the khan’s ‘ahd-
name, the royal instrument brought by Jaskólski is referred to with the
same term as “your ‘ahdname” (‘ahdnameŋüz).
542
No more instruments of peace are known to have been issued by the
Polish kings aer 1654. Until the end of Mehmed IV Giray’s reign, both
sides regarded the pacication of 1654 as a sucent basis for politi-
cal and military cooperation. A new conict, arisen aer Mehmed IV
Giray’s deposal in 1666, was only temporarily appeased with an agree-
ment reached at Pidhajci in 1667. In the following months, the new
khan, Adil Giray, waited in vain for its ocial conrmation on the
part of the Polish king and Diet, but the Diet was broken and John
Casimir abdicated so neither the promised gis nor the expected royal
instrument were likely to come. Nevertheless, persuaded of Warsaw’s
peaceful intentions, the khan conrmed the peace with his oath and
solemn instrument, issued in April 1668.
543
Yet, in the years to come
Baghchasaray was permanently drawn into the orbit of the new Otto-
man northern policy, initiated by the Köprülü viziers and aimed to
extend the Porte’s inuence onto the Ukraine. e military conict
between Istanbul and Warsaw, which was to last with short breaks
until 1699, made a peace between Warsaw and Baghchasaray impos-
sible, although less formal contacts were maintained and the khans
oen acted as intermediaries between the sultan and the king.
Solemn instruments, conrming the peace with the Crimea on
behalf of the Polish-Lithuanian rulers, are thus very few. Today, only
541
See Document 61.
542
See Document 64.
543
See Document 69.
436 part two—chapter four
the texts from the years 1472, 1513 (two versions), 1516, 1535, 1598,
1601, 1605, 1637 (addressed to the qalga), 1649, and 1654 are pre-
served. In addition, the existence of a second, now lost, Latin version
of the instrument of 1516 is conrmed by other sources. e chrono-
logical dispersion and limited number of royal instruments, in fact
much more limited than the number of instruments issued by the
khans, make any conclusions dicult.
e instruments issued in Vilnius in 1513 (the one on behalf of
Lithuania), 1516, and 1535, today preserved in copies entered in the
Lithuanian Register books, were composed in Ruthenian and referred
to—similarly to the khans’ şartnames—as “letters of agreement”
(Ruth. lyst dokončalnyj), “agreements” (Ruth. dokončen’e/dokončane),
or simply “letters” (Ruth. lyst/lyst’). e instruments issued on behalf
of Poland in 1472 and 1513 were composed in Latin. e rst one,
issued in Cracow, is not referred to by any specic term, while the
second one, issued in Vilnius,
544
is referred to as “manifest letter”
(Lat. patentes literae). is Latin term was also known in the Crimean
chancery, perhaps adopted from the Polish instrument: Mengli Giray’s
instrument regarding Poland, drawn in 1514 in response to Sigismund’s
patentes literae from 1513, is referred to in its Italian version as a lectra
patente.
As to the four instruments, issued by Sigismund III and Vladislaus
IV in the years 1598, 1601, 1605, and 1637, they were composed in
Polish and referred to as “letters of agreement” (Pol. list przemierny/
list przemirny/list przymierny), with the term that also applied in con-
temporary Polish to the ‘ahdnames issued by the khans and by the
Ottoman sultans. Finally, the royal instruments of 1649 and 1654 are
not referred to with any specic terms whereas they refer to the treaty
between the king and the khan by the Polish loanword from Latin:
pakta (Lat. pacta).
544
During their travels in Lithuania, the Jagiellonian rulers were assisted by a num-
ber of Polish ocials, including the clerks of the Crown Chancery; therefore, there is
nothing unusual that a document, composed in Latin on behalf of the Polish Crown,
was issued in Vilnius. In analogy, a document referring to the negotiations with a
Crimean envoy, draed in Cracow in 1541, was composed in Ruthenian and recorded
in the Lithuanian Chancery books; cf. Document 29.
the polish and lithuanian instruments of peace 437
e oath formulas of the Polish-Lithuanian rulers and
plenipotentiaries and the written instruments of the plenipotentiaries
In the 15th and 16th centuries, the Jagiellonian rulers along with their
retinues took solemn oaths to observe the peace in the presence of
Crimean envoys, while the Lithuanian and Polish envoys, sent to the
Crimea, took similar oaths in the khan’s presence on their own behalf
and on behalf of their sovereigns. Yet, the texts of these oaths are not
extant. Apparently the chancery clerks in Vilnius and Cracow did not
see any reason to record the standard, familiar texts that were also in
common use in the diplomatic relations with other courts. We can
assume that the oaths were taken by the Gospel, Jesus, and sometimes
even Virgin Mary. It is evidenced by a letter of Khan Sa‘adet Giray,
who in 1527 mockingly reproached the Lithuanian Lords Councilors
that they had broken their word even though they had sworn to keep
peace “by the Gospel, Prophet Jesus, and his mother, Virgin Mary”
(što este prysjahaly na evanhelii y na proroka Ezusa y matki eho panny
Maryi, y to este ne zderžaly).
545
e only royal oath, preserved today in extenso, was taken in July
1654 by John Casimir. e king swore to observe the conditions of
peace, negotiated in Warsaw with the Crimean envoy, Süleyman
Agha. e oath ended with a standard formula: “So help me Lord
Jesus and his Holy Gospel!” (Tak mi Panie Jesu dopomóż i Ewangelia
jego święta!).
546
A similar oath was then pronounced “to Almighty God
upon the Holy Gospel of Lord Jesus” (Panu Bogu wszechmogącemu na
świętą Pana Jesussa Ewangelię) by the Senate members and other dig-
nitaries of the Commonwealth, present at the ceremony in the Royal
Castle.
547
In return, Süleyman Agha swore to observe the treaty on
behalf of the khan and was sent back to the Crimea, accompanied
by a Polish envoy Mariusz Jaskólski, who was provided with a royal
instrument of peace.
In result of the negotiations at Pidhajci in 1667, a single text was
agreed upon by the plenipotentiaries of the two sides and its text was
recorded in two fair copies in Polish. e Tatars corroborated their
copy with the seals of Qalga Qırım Giray and nine other Crimean
545
See RGADA, f. 389, no. 7, pp. 910.
546
See Document 62.
547
See Document 63; on this ceremony, see also n. 698 below, and on the pacica-
tion of 1654, cf. Part I.
438 part two—chapter four
dignitaries present in the camp, and gave it to their Polish partners.
ey also conrmed the agreement with an oath taken in the presence
of the Polish commander-in-chief, Hetman Jan Sobieski, who later
deposited its authenticated text in the Crown Archives in Warsaw (on
this procedure, see above). A mirror copy of the negotiated instrument,
corroborated by Sobieski and eight other Polish plenipotentiaries,
548
was given to the Tatars, but it is not extant. In addition, the Polish
negotiators took an oath in the presence of their Crimean partners.
We do not know whether the Tatars separately recorded the text of
the Polish oath and appended to the Polish instrument which they
took along to Baghchasaray, because the documents from the Crimean
archives are not extant. Nevertheless, the text of the Polish oath was
recorded by the Polish side, authenticated by Sobieski with his hand-
written signature, and sent to be kept in the Crown Archives. e text,
bearing Sobieski’s authentic signature, has been preserved in Warsaw.
Today it is the only extant instrument concerning the peace with the
Crimea, issued by the Polish-Lithuanian side, which can be regarded
as the original.
According to the preserved text, the Polish plenipotentiaries swore
“to God, One in the Holy Trinity, before the Holy Virgin and all
the saints” (Panu Bogu w Trójcy Świętej Jedynemu, przed Naświętszą
Panną i Wszystkiemi Świętemi) on behalf of the king and the Com-
monwealth, to observe the mutually agreed conditions, recorded in the
written instrument. eir oath contained two additional clauses that
were not entered in the instrument: the engagements not to enter a
permanent peace with Moscow without the khan’s knowledge, and not
to send troops to the Ukraine before the Polish-Lithuanian Diet con-
rmed the concluded agreement with Baghchasaray. e oath ended
with an invocation: “So help us God and His Holy Passion!” (Tak nam
Panie Boże dopomóż i Męka Jego Święta).
549
e few texts of the oaths, pronounced by the representatives of
Poland-Lithuania: the king (1654), the Senate members (1654), and the
commissioners empowered to conduct negotiations at Pidhajci (1667),
are today extant because their texts were recorded by the Polish side
and are preserved in the Polish archives. It is uncertain whether the
548
For their names, see Document 66, n. 1; they were the highest ocers present
in the camp, some of them Sobieski’s close condants.
549
See Document 68.
the polish and lithuanian instruments of peace 439
texts of the royal oaths, pronounced during the solemn audiences in
Vilnius, Cracow, and Warsaw, were given to the Crimean envoys, or
perhaps recorded by them out of their own initiative. Likewise, we
do not know whether the oaths of the Polish-Lithuanian envoys, pro-
nounced during their audiences with the khans, were recorded by the
Crimean chancery.
Ready formulas of the instruments to be issued by the Crimean khans
In the instructions to royal envoys dispatched to the Crimea, and
sometimes even in the texts of the royal instruments (e.g., the one
from 1598), one encounters typical stipulations that the contents of the
khan’s future instrument should mirror “word for word” the clauses
proposed and formulated by the royal chancery.
e practice, according to which foreign recipients draed the texts
of requested documents and asked the khans merely to accept them and
draw their instruments accordingly, is well evidenced by the Crimean-
Muscovian diplomatic exchange. In 1474, a Muscovian envoy, Ivan
Beklemišev, was sent to Mengli Giray with three draed versions (Rus.
sing. spisok) of a future instrument (jarlyk dokončal’nyj) that Ivan III
expected from the khan. According to his instruction, Beklemišev was
to request that the khan issue his instrument according to the dra (da
prositi jarlyka dokončal’nago po spisku), or rather to one of the dra’s
three versions. e rst version was the preferred one, but the envoy
was also authorized to accept an instrument that would be worded in
accordance with the second, or even the third version, the least favor-
able for Moscow. Simultaneously, he was ordered to reject any instru-
ment that would deviate from all the proposed versions.
550
In 1534, a Lithuanian envoy Anikij Hornostaj was provided with a
ready formula, according to which the khan was to issue his instru-
ment of peace. Sahib Giray promptly reciprocated with the embassy
of Devey Mirza, who arrived at Cracow, provided with the requested
instrument. In his letter to the king, the khan assured that his docu-
ment had been drawn in accordance with the copy submitted by the
royal side.
551
Yet, the royal chancery detected some deviations from its
550
See Pamjatniki diplomatičeskix snošenij, vol. 1, pp. 1–6; cf. Xoroškevič, Rus’ i
Krym, p. 126.
551
Cf. n. 229 in Part I.
440 part two—chapter four
original project and the khan’s instrument was not accepted.
552
None-
theless, having no intention to provoke the khan’s wrath, the Polish
dignitaries favorably received Devey Mirza in Cracow and then dis-
patched him to Vilnius, where he was received by the king. On his
way back to the Crimea, Devey was accompanied by a next Lithuanian
envoy, Vasyl’ Tyškevyč, who—like his predecessor—was provided with
a ready formula of the instrument expected from the khan, probably
identical with the formula given to Hornostaj in 1534.
e formula from 1535 was recorded in the Lithuanian Register
books and its text is preserved. Its wording reveals striking similari-
ties with the “donation yarlıq cum şartname” from 1517, sworn by
Bahadır Giray in Čerkasy in the presence of Olbracht Gasztołd. e
latter, promoted in 1522 to the post of the Lithuanian chancellor, well
remembered Bahadır’s instrument and regarded it as a model. Already
in 1532, the Lithuanian chancery headed by Gasztołd made the new
khan, Islam Giray, reconrm the contents of Bahadır’s yarlıq. In the
years 1534 and 1535, Vilnius apparently still regarded the document
from 1517 as a point of reference, although minor amendments were
conceivable. For itstance, the Lithuanian chancery added Ljubeč to
the list of towns to be “donated” to Lithuania, even though it had
never gured in the earlier yarlıqs. In fact, Ljubeč was the only strong-
hold of importance, recaptured from Muscovy in result of the war of
1507–1508, so its inclusion in the khan’s yarlıq was desirable for its
legitimizing eect. Vilnius was apparently not deterred by the fact that
the instrument, drawn on the initiative of the Lithuanian chancery,
presented King Sigismund as the beneciary of the khan’s “donation,”
obliged in return to deliver annual gis to the Crimea. e words of
the corroborating oath put in the khan’s mouth: “by God, [. . .] by
124,000 prophets, and by our righteous prophet, His Majesty Muham-
mad Mustafa,” makes one almost forget that the actual text was com-
posed in Vilnius, and not in Qırq Yer.
553
In 1571, a royal envoy Jurij Bykovskyj, sent by Sigismund Augustus
to the Crimea, was provided by the royal chancery with yet another
552
For the text of the royal explanation, communicating Devey Mirza the reasons
why the khan’s document was rejected, see n. 233 in Part I. Unfortunately, both the
royal formula and the khan’s instrument from 1534 are not preserved so we cannot
check the veracity of both sides’ claims.
553
See Document 27; the instruments from 1517, 1532, and 1535 are already com-
pared in Part I.
the polish and lithuanian instruments of peace 441
ready formula of the instrument, expected from Khan Devlet Giray.
Again in 1581, Andrzej Chorążyc, sent by Stephan Báthory to Mehmed
II Giray, was provided with a ready formula of the khan’s expected
instrument. Unfortunately, neither of these formulas is preserved.
In the rst case, we do not even know whether the khan issued the
desired instrument. In the second case, the khan reportedly issued the
requested instrument but probably did not send it.
554
e following ready formula, issued by the royal chancery and pre-
served, origins from 1619. It was drawn in the period of rising tensions
between Istanbul and Warsaw, aer Djanibek Giray had demanded
that Sigismund III should send him the overdue customary gis. e
khan was sure of the Ottoman support as he had recently returned
from the Persian front where he had been assisting the Ottoman
troops. Not discouraged, Sigismund III dispatched to Baghchasaray
Florian Oleszko, who had already performed a successful mission to
the Crimea in 1607. e political contents of the formula, given to
Oleszko in 1619, were similar to those of the royal instruments from
1601 and 1605, and to those of Ghazi II Giray’s instrument, suc-
cessfully negotiated by Oleszko in 1607. e formula’s text was duly
updated by entering the names of the new khan and his qalga, and by
enlarging the royal intitulatio that now also contained Černihiv and
Smolensk, whose recent conquest from Muscovy was conrmed by the
Truce of Deulino (Divilino) in January 1619. e proposed document
also contained the notorious clause in which the khan recognized the
Polish territorial claims to the Black Sea shore. A reader familiar with
the spirit of Counter-Reformation, introduced to Poland-Lithuania
during the reign of Sigismund III, might be surprized by the word-
ing of the instrument, prepared aer all in the Polish royal chancery,
according to which the khan was to swear “by the name of one God
and Prophet Muhammad.” Even the Arabic formula vallahi ve billahi
ve tallahi (“by God, with God, and through God!”) was correctly ren-
dered in the Polish text as wołłahi wo biłłahi wo ttałahi.
555
e royal
chancery clerk, who prepared the formula, tried so hard to comform
554
Cf. notes 303 and 316 in Part I; the expression “from the chancery of His Royal
Majesty” found in Bykovskyj’s instruction refers to the Lithuanian rather than Pol-
ish chancery as the royal instruction for the envoy was composed in Ruthenian and
is preserved in the Lithuanian Register books. Also the mission of Chorążyc (alias
Xoružyč) was probably prepared by the Lithuanian chancery as the envoy held the
post of Lithuanian scribe.
555
See Document 46.
442 part two—chapter four
to the Tatar linguistic custom, that in the text, composed aer all in
Polish, the starosta of Kamieniec is referred to as the bey of Kamieniec
(bek kamieniecki).
556
Yet, when Oleszko reached the Crimea in 1620, the Polish-Otto-
man war was already decided. Summoned to join the Ottoman troops,
the khan was in no mood for negotiations and the Polish envoy was
detained for almost two years.
Aer the war was terminated by the Treaty of Hotin (1621),
Oleszko was allowed to return home, and in 1622 another Polish
envoy, Krzysztof Krauzowski, was sent to Baghchasaray. Krauzowski
was again provided with the ready formula of an instrument expected
from the khan. It contained the same political clauses as the formula
given to Oleszko, as if nothing had changed since 1619.
557
No wonder
that Djanibek Giray ignored the royal request and did not issue the
expected instrument. Also Djanibek’s successor, Mehmed III Giray,
who ascended the throne during Krauzowski’s sojourn in the Crimea,
assured the envoy of his peaceful intentions but sent him back empty
handed.
To conclude, the royal chancery prepared no less than six ready
formulas of the instruments requested from the khans: in the years
1534, 1535, 1571, 1581, 1619, and 1622. Only three of these formulas
are extant today. In the years 1534 and 1581, the khans assured that
their instruments followed the royal formulas, but the royal side was
not satised. In the years 1535 and 1571, it is doubtful whether the
khans issued requested instruments at all. Finally, the royal embas-
sies of 1619 and 1622 both failed and no instruments were issued.
us, our evidence, drawn from the context of the Crimean relations
with Poland-Lithuania, does not support the opinion of Berežkov,
who stressed the passive character of the Crimean chancery and its
dependence on foreign models, and puts in question his assertion that
the khans’ instruments had been typically based on ready dras (Rus.
obrazcovye spiski) prepared in Moscow.
558
In the cases discussed above,
the khans modied or openly rejected the contents of the proposed
dras. Besides, a consent to follow a formula, submitted by the other
556
See Document 46, n. 16; in the following formula from 1622, the same title is
repeated in alternative spelling and pronunciation (beg kamieniecki), whereas the term
starosta is added in parantheses; see Document 47, n. bv.
557
See Document 47.
558
Cf. notes 19–20 above.
the polish and lithuanian instruments of peace 443
side, does not have to be seen as proof of weakness or undeveloped
chancery traditions. Even the Ottomans, who lacked neither strength
nor proper chancery traditions, are known to have issued instruments
shaped on models provided by foreign courts.
559
e inclusion of “ready formulas” into the present volume might
seem questionable since these formulas were not nal instruments of
peace but merely dras intended to serve in negotiations that were
rarely successful. Nevertheless, these dras reected the expectations
of the royal side as to how a khan’s proper instrument should look
like. Expecting the other side to consent to its proposal, the royal court
could not entirely depart from the tradition and compose a document,
whose form and contents would be entirely alien to its prospective
author. Rather, its wording was based on genuine instruments, issued
previously by the khans and stored in the royal archives, although
modied in order to serve the interests of the submitting partner.
559
Cf. the ‘ahdname of Selim I, issued in 1514 on the basis of a ready formula,
provided by a Polish embassy; Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations,
p. 115.