Kolodziejczyk Dariusz. The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania (ENG)
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484 part two—chapter five
ulans and beys:
– Mamısh Ulan, the lieutenant (qaymaqam) of Qırq Yer
673
– Saqal Bey, the leader of the Crimean branch of the Qıyats
674
– Tevkel Bey, the leader of the Crimean Manghıts and the khan’s
brother-in-law
675
– Mamısh Bey, the leader of the Sedjevüts (Sedjeuts) and the khan’s
brother-in-law
– Agısh Bey, the qaraçı of the Shirins
– Devlet Bakhtı Bey, the qaraçı of the Barıns and the lieutenant of
Qarasu Bazar
676
– Merdan Bey, the qaraçı of the Arghıns
– Mahmud Bey, the qaraçı of the Qıpchaqs.
677
Apart from those mentioned by names, many more Tatar nobles and
courtiers participated in the oath ceremony. A year later, in 1508, a
Muscovian envoy Kostjantin Zabolockij resolved to remunerate each
individual, who had sworn to keep peace with Moscow, with one sable.
It soon turned out that he had no sables le and twenty dissatised
Tatars remained with empty hands.
678
673
Mamısh Ulan, son of Sarmak Ulan, gured prominently in the diplomatic
negotiations with Muscovy and Lithuania and headed embassies to these countries.
Syroečkovskij’s assumption that he belonged to the Qıpchaq clan has been challenged
by Beatrice Forbes Manz, who has considered him a “service beg” and not a member
of the clan aristocracy; see eadem, “e clans of the Crimean Khanate,” pp. 292–293.
Although it cannot be excluded that he belonged to the Qıpchaq clan, in the period
concerned, the post of the Qıpchaq qaraçı was occupied by Mahmud Bey (see below),
whose political inuence was nevertheless much weaker than that of Mamısh Ulan.
674
Saqal’s father (or perhaps more distant ancestor), Qıyat Mansur, was the founder
of the branch of the Qıyat clan that had le the Volga region aer 1380 and settled
in Lithuania and the Crimea.
675
Tevkel, son of Temir, was the Manghıt (i.e., Nogay) leader who had entered the
Crimean service in 1503, after the collapse of the Great Horde; his sister, Nur Sultan,
was Mengli Giray’s wife.
676
Devlet Bakhtı also gured prominently in the Crimean international policy and
led embassies to King Sigismund I (1512–1513) and to the Ottoman sultan Selim I
(1515).
677
e last two beys are not listed by names in the instrument proper but their
names can be found in the appended list that has been recorded in the Lithuanian
Register along with the şartname; the list also contains the names of Mehmed Giray,
Mamısh Ulan, Agısh Bey, and Devlet Bakhtı Bey, who are already mentioned in the
şartname; on the whereabouts of Merdan and Mahmud, who also swore an oath to
keep peace with Muscovy in 1508, cf. Document 9, n. 40.
678
Xoroškevič, Rus’ i Krym, p. 252.
the procedure of peacemaking 485
It is worth noting that both in 1507 and 1524 Muslim clergymen
were listed before the clan leaders. is was also the case in 1508, as we
learn from the list of the Crimean dignitaries who swore to keep peace
with Muscovy.
679
e head clergyman in 1508 was Hadji Baba Sheikh,
the mullah at the khan’s court, referred to in the Russian sources as
molna and bogomolec, regarded as pro-Muscovian and known for his
participation in the raids against Lithuania. One of his sons, Hadji
Mehmed Sheikh-zade, was then the mullah at the court of Prince
Mehmed Giray, and another, Qurtqa, gures among the clergymen
on the list from 1524. In the list from 1507, Baba Sheikh was pre-
ceded by two other Muslim hierarchs, but three years later Sigismund
asked him to mediate the peace, invoking his great inuence on the
khan. In the Polish sources, Baba Sheikh was then referred to as archi-
episcopus imperatoris.
680
We might assume that his prestige, already
high in the Crimean society, was further elevated due to the corre-
spondence with Sigismund, where the mullah was explicitly compared
with the archbishop of Gniezno, who in Poland crowned the king and
acted as interrex during the interregna. Unfortunately, the role of the
Muslim ulema and sheikhs in the Crimean society is still very much
underresearched.
Any textbook of the Crimean history underlines the political role
of the qaraçıs, the leaders of the most prominent Crimean clans, who
initially were the Shirins, Barıns, Arghıns, and Qıpchaqs. It was Agısh
Bey, listed above, who in 1508 boastfully disclosed the political aspira-
tions of the Shirins in his letter to the Muscovian ruler: “Are there not
two shas to a cart? e right sha is my lord the khan, and the le
sha am I, with my brothers and children.”
681
Nevertheless, already in
the instrument from 1507, the leaders of other clans: the Manghıts,
Sedjevüts, and even Qıyats, were listed along with the qaraçıs, or even
before. With the passing of time, the term qaraçı began to be used
in relation to the leaders of the Manghıts and Sedjevüts as well. Dev-
let Giray once referred to his “six qaraçıs:” the beys of the Shirins,
Manghıts, Barıns, Arghıns, Sedjevüts, and Qıpchaqs, as if the khan
were not aware that according to the Turco-Mongol tradition the
679
See Pamjatniki diplomatičeskix snošenij, vol. 2, p. 20.
680
Cf. n. 116 in Part I; on Hadji Baba Sheikh, cf. Document 9, n. 11.
681
Quoted aer Manz, “e Clans of the Crimean Khanate,” p. 282; the text recorded
in Russian can be found in Pamjatniki diplomatičeskix snošenij, vol. 2, p. 40.
486 part two—chapter five
number of qaraçıs should not exceed four.
682
e permanent advance
of the Manghıts and Sedjevüts, parallel with the decreasing role of the
Barıns and Qıpchaqs, is conrmed by Djanibek Giray’s ‘ahdname from
1632, which lists only the four qaraçıs: the Shirin, Manghıt, Arghın,
and Sedjevüt ones.
683
Nevertheless, the hierarchy was never entirely
stabilized. For instance, a Russian diplomatic report from 1681 refers
to the “ve noble Crimean clans” (Krymskie čestnye pjati rodov): the
Shirins, Sulesh-oghlu, Arghıns, Mansurs (i.e., Manghıts), and Külüks,
while it does not mention the Sedjevüts, Barıns, and Qıpchaqs.
684
While foreign envoys usually insisted that the oath should be taken
not merely by the khan, but by his retinue and the whole Crimean
nobility as well, the khans oen vehemently rejected the idea and
stressed their absolute authority over their subjects. In 1623, Mehmed
III Giray pointed to the Russian envoy that—unlike in the times of
his predecessor, Djanibek Giray—his courtiers were merely his slaves
(Rus. xolopy) and not his companions so there was no need for them
to take an oath.
685
Similarly, in 1654, Jaskólski demanded before his
audience, following his instruction, that—as the whole Common-
wealth had taken an oath—likewise it should be taken not merely by
the khan but by the whole Crimean nobility. He heard in reply from
the khan’s vizier, Sefer Ghazi Agha, that it was enough if the oath was
taken by Mehmed IV Giray and his senior councilors (aghas), because
the Crimean system of rule was the absolutum dominium and what-
ever the khan ordered, so it must be.
686
During the audience, it turned
out that even the aghas were not allowed to accompany the khan in
taking the oath, and the envoy’s protests were dashed by Mehmed
IV Giray’s retort: “like God is one on the earth, so I am the single
lord.” e vizier hastened with a lengthy explanation of the legal dif-
ferences between the two states: “In your country His Royal Majesty
cannot do anything unless authorized by the law, whereas when the
khan utters a word, on his order we are all ready to submit our necks
682
On the qaraçıs and their number, cf. notes 42–43 and 110 in Part I.
683
See Document 49.
684
Cf. n. 583 above.
685
See n. 395 in Part I.
686
[. . .] powiedział, że dość na tym będzie, kiedy chan sam z nami agami starszymi
przysięże, bo to u nas absolutum dominium. Co chan każe, to być musi; see AGAD,
Libri Legationum, no. 33, fol. 42a.
the procedure of peacemaking 487
to the sword.”
687
As the envoy was not satised, he was ensured that
the khan’s oath was taken on behalf of the aghas, too. When he still
insisted that at least the Shirin qaraçı should take an oath, Jaskólski
was told that the latter was absent from Baghchasaray but he might
meet him on his way home on the steppe beyond Perekop and there
bring him to the oath.
While reading the above dialogues, recorded in Jaskólski’s diary,
one cannot help thinking that, like his other Polish colleagues, he
slightly embellished the vizier’s words with what one would name
today “Orientalistic discourse” in order to li the self esteem of his
audience back home. e Polish-Lithuanian nobility was very proud of
the Commonwealth’s laws limiting the absolutum dominium, and this
Latin term put into the vizier’s mouth belonged to the Polish domes-
tic discourse rather than the Crimean one. It is also quite possible
that Sefer Ghazi, who knew well the Commonwealth’s political system,
consciously chose the wording that would be understandable for his
interlocutor. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the conict between
the throne and the nobles was unknown in the Crimea. For instance,
in 1681, the Russian request that the oath should be taken by the “ve
noble Crimean clans” was plainly rejected. e Russian envoys heard
that like their tsar ruled autocratically and bringing his subjects to the
oath would diminish his “monarchic honor” (gosudarskaja čest’), so
it would be untting to demand that the khan’s engagement be con-
rmed by his subjects.
688
Interestingly, it seems that a century earlier the insistence on the
khans’ autocratic prerogatives was less pronounced. Admitting the
limitations of the khan’s authority did not his prestige well, but their
invoking was sometimes convenient to excuse small Tatar raids that
were in fact beyond the khan’s control. In 1566, Devlet Giray declared
to the Muscovian envoy that he could only take an oath on his own
687
Po wykonanej tej przysiędze upominałem się, aby jako Rzeczpospolita nasza przy-
sięgła, żeby i agowie ich przysięgli. Na co tak odpowiedział: Nie potrzebna to. Jako Bóg
jeden jest na ziemi, tak i ja pan jeden. Po tych słowach wezyr: insza jest u was, a insza
u nas. U was nie może nic Król Jego Miłość nikomu bez prawa czynić, na co chan
niechaj jedno który bąknie, a potym wszyscy, byle chan rozkazał, szyje nasze położyć
gotowiśmy, je pod miecz dać. Po tym chan rzekł: Nie trzeba agom moim przysięgać,
bom ja już od nich przysiągł; see AGAD, Libri Legationum, no. 33, fol. 44b; cf. also
n. 480 in Part I.
688
See “Spisok s statejnago spiska [. . .] Vasil’ja Mixajlova syna Tjapkina, d’jaka
Nikity Zotova,” pp. 630–632.
488 part two—chapter five
behalf, but not on behalf of “the whole land” (šertovat’ vsej zemlej in
the wording of the Russian report), because many beys and mirzas,
along with Qalga Mehmed Giray, were overseas participating in the
Hungarian campaign of Sultan Suleyman.
689
e Crimean decentral-
ized political system at times even inuenced the Muscovian chancery
practice. Aleksandr Vinogradov notices the lasting importance of the
noble council (boyarskaja duma) in the Muscovian correspondence
with the Crimea, even during the “anti-boyar” centralizing reforms
of Ivan IV. e Russian scholar suggests that the elevated ceremonial
position of the duma merely mirrored the structure of the Crimean
diplomacy. As the Crimean solemn instruments, arriving at Moscow,
were corroborated not only in the khan’s name, but in the name of
the Crimean nobility, the tsar resolved that for ceremonial reasons the
boyars should also gure in diplomatic exchange, even if their political
role was in fact more limited than that of their Crimean peers.
690
While it is well known that the Ottoman and Russian autocratic
models inspired the Crimean khans in their centralizing eorts, it
seems equally natural that the Polish-Lithuanian republican model
inspired the Crimean nobles as it oen inspired the Russian ones.
Whether the Crimean decentralized system had, in turn, any inu-
ence on its neighboring states might be debatable; nevertheless, even
if we lack proof of conscious inspiration, we can at least admit the
possibility of osmosis.
691
Aer their nal audience with the khan, the foreign envoys typi-
cally paid visits to the qalga and the nureddin (the latter post existed
since 1581). During these audiences, the two Giray princes oen took
689
Vinogradov, Russko-krymskie otnošenija, vol. 1, p. 66. e Russian term vsja
zemlja (“the whole land”), also found in contemporary Russian chronicles, has been
convincingly identied with the Tatar noble assembly (qurultay); see Xudjakov, Očerki
po istorii Kazanskogo xanstva, pp. 191–196, and Donald Ostrowski, “Ruling class
structures of the Kazan Khanate,” in: e Turks, vol. 2, pp. 841–847, esp. p. 844 (both
aforementioned studies refer to the Kazan Khanate by their conclusions equally apply
to the Crimean Khanate).
690
Vinogradov, Russko-krymskie otnošenija, vol. 1, p. 81.
691
For some preliminary remarks regarding such osmosis between, on the one hand,
the centralized Habsburg and Ottoman political systems, and on the other, the decen-
tralized systems of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Crimean Khanate,
see Kołodziejczyk, “Turcja i Krym,” in: Rzeczpospolita-Europa: XVI–XVIII wiek. Próba
konfrontacji. [Studies in honor of Antoni Mączak.] Edited by M. Kopczyński and
W. Tygielski (Warsaw, 1999): 67–76.
the procedure of peacemaking 489
separate oaths to honor the newly established peace.
692
ey also sent
separate embassies with separate letters, conrming the contents of the
khan’s instrument and invoking their oaths. e idea that they could
also issue formal instruments of peace on their own, separately from
the khan’s instrument, was not alien to the contemporaries, although
it rarely materialized. By the 17th century, the elevated position of the
qalga and nureddin in the Khanate’s constitution was formalized by
their exclusive right, shared only with the khan, to use the tuġra, to be
conrmed in their post with solemn diplomas (berats) issued by Otto-
man sultans (probably except the nureddin), and to maintain direct
correspondence with the Russian tsars.
In 1515 Ivan Mamonov, the Muscovian envoy to the Crimea, was
instructed not to accept any separate şartname from Mehmed Giray’s
oldest son, Bahadır, should the latter propose to draw such an instru-
ment.
693
Moscow’s reluctance was apparently motivated by nancial
reasons, as in return for his document Bahadır would certainly expect
material benets, but the very possibility of such an initiative was tell-
ing, even more if we keep in mind that at that time Bahadır was not
even the qalga. He nevertheless perceived himself as the heir appar-
ent, even though the post of qalga had been unwillingly given by his
father not to him but to his uncle, Ahmed. In the light of Mamonov’s
instruction, we can better understand the fact that in 1517, Bahadır
issued his own instrument for Poland-Lithuania. In 1519, aer the riot
and death of his uncle, the Giray prince obtained the long awaited post
of qalga that formally conrmed his earlier aspirations.
A formal instrument of peace, issued by a Crimean qalga and referred
to as “oath-letter” (Ruth. lyst prysjažnyj), was sent to Sigismund I in
1527 by Islam Giray. Although issued during his short-term reconcile-
ment with Khan Sa‘adet Giray, it reected the ambitions of the qalga,
who believed that aer the tragic death of his father and his older
brother—Mehmed and Bahadır Girays—in 1523, the throne should
have belonged to him, and not to his uncle. Also a century later, the
qalga, Islam Giray, and even the nureddin, Qırım Giray, issued their
own instruments titled as ‘ahdnames in the years 1637 (qalga) and
692
Such was the case during the Russian embassy of 1680–1681; see “Spisok s state-
jnago spiska [. . .] Vasil’ja Mixajlova syna Tjapkina, d’jaka Nikity Zotova,” p. 641.
693
[. . .] a nečto carevič stanet davati Ivanu svoju opričnjuju šertnuju gramotu, i
Ivanu u careviča gramoty ego ne imati; Pamjatniki diplomatičeskix snošenij, vol. 2,
p. 215.
490 part two—chapter five
1640 (both qalga and nureddin), even though they were not in conict
with their older brother, Khan Bahadır Giray. Still, in the long run,
such cases were unusual. Typically, the qalga and nureddin conrmed
the peace with their oaths and separate embassies, but their letters
were not referred to as şart- or ‘ahdnames, whose issue was reserved
for the khan.
e study of the diplomatic relations between Baghchasaray and
Warsaw in the mid-seventeenth century fully conrms the rising role
of the Crimean viziers in the Khanate’s domestic and foreign policy.
In that period, two dignitaries competed for the khan’s favor and held
in succession the vizier’s post: Sefer Ghazi Agha and Subhan Ghazi
Agha. ey acted as the khan’s chief advisers, corresponded with for-
eign monarchs and chancellors, and led Tatar troops on campaigns.
eir role was somewhat similar to the role of the Polish chancellors
and hetmans, although the position of the latter vis-à-vis their ruler
was incomparably stronger.
e procedure of conrming a treaty at the royal court was paral-
lel to the one observed at the khan’s court. In 1527, Sa‘adet Giray
announced that his instrument would be delivered to the royal court
by his envoy Yankura (or Yanchura) and its contents should be read
in the royal presence by his scribe Djanaka.
694
e Crimean envoys
were usually expected to conrm the peace with an oath taken on their
own behalf and on behalf of the khan. eir oath was solemnly pro-
nounced in the presence of the king and his councilors. In the Moscow
Kremlin, a copy of the Koran was held so that the Tatar envoys could
take their oath upon their Holy Scripture and according to their own
religion (po svoej vere).
695
When a Crimean envoy took an oath in
Moscow, the Koran was placed on a stand of ca. 0.7 m. in height and
the kneeling envoy kept the index and middle nger of his right hand
on its top while pronouncing his oath. ereaer, he was expected
to kiss the Holy Scripture.
696
We can assume that the procedure was
not much dierent in the Crimean relations with Poland-Lithuania,
because the hosts usually insisted that the Tatar envoys should take
their oath according to their faith and custom as only that guaranteed
694
See Document 22.
695
[. . .] kuran tatarskoj, na čom privodjat tatar k šerti; see Opisi Carskogo arxiva
XVI veka i arxiva Posol’skogo prikaza 1614 goda, p. 42; cf. Keenan, “Muscovy and
Kazan,” pp. 552–553.
696
Juzefovič, Put’ posla, pp. 290–291.
the procedure of peacemaking 491
that the oath would be respected. It is thus possible that copies of
the Koran were also held in the royal castles in Vilnius, Cracow, and
Warsaw.
697
e king took his oath upon the Gospel in front of the Crimean
envoys, hence we must assume that a copy of the Gospel, and certainly
a crucix as well, were physically present during his oath. Casimir’s
instrument from 1472, issued in Cracow, invokes the presence of the
Crown dignitaries, headed by the archbishop of Gniezno, but it is not
clear whether they also pronounced the oath. In turn, Sigismund’s
instruments from 1513 and 1516, issued in Vilnius on behalf of Lith-
uania, invoke the presence of the Lithuanian dignitaries, headed by
the bishops of Samogitia and Vilnius, respectively (the bishop of Vil-
nius was absent in 1513), and state that they pronounced the oath
and appended their seals to the document. e instrument, issued in
Vilnius, in 1513, on behalf of the Polish Crown, invokes three Polish
dignitaries who appended their seals, but—like the instrument from
1472—it does not state whether they pronounced the oath. Sigismund’s
instrument from 1535, issued in Vilnius, again invokes the presence
of the Lithuanian dignitaries, headed by the bishop of Vilnius, but
for that time they did not append their seals and their oath is not
mentioned.
e scarce evidence, invoked above, might suggest a gradual shi
from the oath pronounced collectively towards the oath pronounced
solely by the king, rst in Poland and then in Lithuania, and the replace-
ment of oral engagements with written documents (in the instruments
of Sigismund III from 1598, 1601, and 1605 the oral pronouncement
of the oath by the king is not mentioned at all). Yet, such a conclusion
would be hasty. As late as 1654, the negotiations which took place in
Warsaw were crowned with the oaths pronounced on the one hand,
by the Tatar envoy, Süleyman Agha, and on the other, by King John
Casimir and the Commonwealth’s senators and ocials. On 20 July
1654, the Crimean envoy was introduced into the rone Chamber
697
A preserved inventory of the Crown archives in Cracow, composed in the
years 1681–1682, lists only extant documents but does not mention any attributes
that served for ocial ceremonies; see Inventarium omnium et singulorum privilegio-
rum, litterarum, diplomatum, scripturarum et monumentorum quaecunque in Archivo
Regni in Arce Cracoviensi continentur. Edited by E. Rykaczewski (Paris-Berlin-Poznań,
1862); for a cursory description of the Crimean documents then extant in the archives
(the oldest one issued by Mengli Giray), see ibidem, pp. 165–167 (entry: Litterae
Tartaricae).
492 part two—chapter five
in the Royal Castle, where the king was already waiting, seated on
the throne under the baldachin and surrounded by the members of the
Senate and the Lower Chamber (the ceremony took place during the
Diet that was held in Warsaw). e envoy took his oath rst, stand-
ing in the middle of the chamber with his hand raised “according to
the Tatar custom,” and then the king read aloud the text of his oath,
standing bareheaded. e royal oath was followed by the oath sworn
by the primate (i.e., the archbishop of Gniezno) and a number of other
dignitaries on behalf of the Senate, and by the marshal of the Diet on
behalf of the Lower Chamber (i.e., gentry). ey stressed that their
oaths would be void unless the khan conrmed the treaty with his own
oath taken in the presence of the royal envoy. Aer the ceremony, the
Crimean envoy kissed the royal hand and le.
698
e texts of the oaths,
pronounced by the king and the dignitaries, have been recorded and
are extant today.
Alas, we lack details on the procedure of oath taking in Poland-
Lithuania comparable to those regarding the oath of the Muscovian
rulers. e latter conrmed their oath with a solemn kiss of a cross
that was laid on the instrument of peace.
699
Interestingly, the Kremlin
ceremony was performed in the absence of Orthodox clergymen, who
oen condemned it as pagan. No wonder, if we keep in mind that
until the 16th century the Muscovian ruler was expected to spit on
the ground before he kissed the cross, apparently in order to chase
698
See Ludwik Kubala, Wojna moskiewska r. 1654–1655 (Warsaw, 1910), pp. 154–
155; also quoted in Augusiewicz, “Rokowania w sprawie przymierza polsko-
tatarskiego w roku 1654,” pp. 81–82; for the names of the leading dignitaries who
swore the oath, see the corroborating formula of Document 61. It is hard to guess
whether the fact that, unlike the Crimean envoys in Moscow, Süleyman Agha was
standing and not kneeling during his oath, reected the dierences in ceremonial,
the changing customs in the Crimean relations with both northern neighbors, or the
unusual circumstances of the Polish-Crimean alliance which prompted the royal court
to treat the Tatar envoy with special favors. Given that the king stood bareheaded, we
can assume that also the Crimean envoy was forced to remove his cap. According to
one later report, a Crimean envoy was forced to bare his head already at the entrance
to the royal audience room; see the account of the audience of Inayet-shah Mirza by
August II held in Warsaw on 7 April 1726; Bibl. Czart., ms. 207 (Teki Naruszewicza),
p. 173 (prowadzony na pokoje królewskie, gdzie w tym pokoju zdjęto mu zaraz przy
drzwiach czapkę, w którym Król Jego Miłość z przytomnym Senatem znajdował się).
Still, it is hard to establish whether the custom of removing one’s headgear, standard
in the European ceremonial but humiliating for a Muslim, was also observed in the
earlier centuries.
699
Typically, the cross was laid on two instruments, the one of the khan and the
one of the Muscovian ruler, touching directly the latter that was on the top.
the procedure of peacemaking 493
the demons, thus repeating the ancient ritual of perhaps pre-Christian
origin.
700
Paradoxically, it was the Crimean side that insisted on the
presence of Christian clergymen during the oath, apparently in the
belief that the tsar would then observe his pledge more sincerely. For
instance, in 1564, Devlet Giray warned Ivan IV that if the latter would
not kiss the cross in the presence of the Orthodox metropolitan, the
boyars, and the Crimean envoy (a sam pered mitropolitom i pered
bojary i pered moim goncom kresta ne poceluet), he would be respon-
sible for the renewal of hostilities.
701
e tsar duly responded in his
instrument, issued two months later, that he had conrmed its con-
tents by kissing the cross in the presence of Afanasij, the metropolitan
of the whole of Rus’, Pimin, the archbishop of Velikij Novgorod and
Pskov, his boyars, and the khan’s envoy.
702
Peacemaking procedures outside of the audience hall
In the standard procedure, described in the previous section, the
embassies traveled between the respective courts and the entire peace-
making procedure took place in the palaces of the two rulers. Yet,
negotiations could be initiated at the battleeld as well. In the early
modern period, not only the Crimean khans, but also the Polish kings
were still expected to perform as military commanders. Only the royal
presence on a campaign ensured that the nobles would respond to the
announced levy en masse. While some kings acted as commanders-
in-chief merely out of duty, the two last Vasas—Vladislaus IV and
John Casimir—regarded themselves as genuine kings-warriors, and
Jan Sobieski owed his election to the throne to his earlier military per-
formance. Two armed encounters between John Casimir and Islam III
Giray resulted in the treaties of Zborów and Żwaniec, negotiated in
military camps in 1649 and 1653.
700
Cf. Xoroškevič, Rus’ i Krym, p. 207; Juzefovič, Put’ posla, pp. 282–286.
701
See RGADA, f. 123, op. 1, no. 10, fol. 315a.
702
[. . .] celoval esmi krest na sej zapisi pered svoim otcom’ i bogomol’com Afa-
nasiem, mitropolitom vseja Rusii, i pered svoim bogomol’com, Velikogo Novogoroda
i Pskova arxiepiskopom Piminom, i pered vsemi svoimi bojary, i pered brata svoego
poslom [. . .]; see RGADA, f. 123, op. 1, no. 10, fol. 402a–402b; published in Pamjatniki
diplomatičeskix snošenij. . . . Edited by F. Laškov, p. 29; on the Crimean-Muscovian
pacication of 1564, see Vinogradov, Russko-krymskie otnošenija, vol. 2, pp. 24–34.