Kolodziejczyk Dariusz. The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania (ENG)

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494 part two—chapter five

When the king was absent, the Polish army was commanded by

the Crown grand hetman, the commander-in-chief of regular troops

permanently located in the southeastern provinces, precisely because

these provinces were constantly endangered by Tatar raids. e auton-

omous position of the Crown hetmans in the diplomatic relations with

Baghchasaray developed in the times of Jan Zamoyski, whose role in

the negotiations at Ţuţora (1595) was frequently invoked in the cor-

respondence between Sigismund III and Ghazi II Giray. Later on, the

hetmans were ocially authorized to correspond with the khans and

even maintained residents at the khan’s court.

703

Especially inuential

and competent in regard to the Crimean matters were: in the rst half

of the 17th century—Stanisław Koniecpolski, and in the second half—

the future king Jan Sobieski. e intermediary role of Koniecpolski in

the peace negotiations between Baghchasaray and Warsaw is openly

invoked in Djanibek Giray’s instruments from 1632 and 1634. Sobieski

negotiated and corroborated the Treaty of Podhajce (1667), which was

nevertheless subject to future conrmation by the king and the Com-

monwealth, embodied by the Diet.

e institution of rozmen (Rus. “exchange”), introduced in the

Crimean-Muscovian relations, was unknown in the Crimean relations

with Poland-Lithuania. Baghchasaray and Moscow agreed that their

envoys sent to the other court would depart simultaneously and meet

at the border, rst while heading for the other court, and then on their

way back. Hence, the safety and timely return of the tsar’s embassy

hosted by the khan was secured by the fact that at the same time the

khan’s embassy was hosted by the tsar, and vice versa. In the 16th

century, the exchange took place near Putivl’, then, since the late 16th

century near Livny, and in the 17th century on the Uraeva river near

Valujki.

704

During their sojourn in the hosting state, the envoys were

escorted by a prominent dignitary who was oen authorized to start

703

Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie, p. 183. For a study entirely devoted to the

grand hetmans’ prerogatives in foreign policy, see Wacław Zarzycki, Dyplomacja het-

manów w dawnej Polsce (Warsaw-Poznań, 1976).

704

See Juzefovič, Put’ posla, p. 35; Berežkov, Krymskie šertnye gramoty, pp. 18–19;

Sanin, Otnošenija Rossii i Ukrainy s Krymskim xanstvom v seredine XVII veka, pp.

91–93, 97, 185. According to the Treaty of Baghchasaray (1681), the meeting place

was moved to Perevoločnaja in the Ukraine, but already in 1683 the two sides agreed

that it was too far to the west from the usual route and resolved to restore the rozmen

at Valujki; see RGADA, f. 123, op. 2, no. 67; published in Pamjatniki diplomatičeskix

snošenij. . . . Edited by F. Laškov, pp. 195–197.

the procedure of peacemaking 495

preliminary negotiations. In the Crimean Khanate, this task was usu-

ally performed by the leader of the Sulesh-oghlu clan. Negotiations

initiated on the border sometimes resulted in preliminary instruments,

corroborated by the present ocials. Nevertheless, such instruments

were later subject to conrmation by the two rulers.

705

e only document in the present volume, which with some reser-

vations can be described as resulting from border negotiations, is the

instrument of Bahadır Giray, given to Olbracht Gasztołd in Čerkasy

in 1517.

705

For such instruments, issued in 1682 and 1683 at Perevoločnaja and cor-

roborated by Veli-shah Bey from the Sulesh-oghlu clan, see notes 223–224 above.

Invoking analogous agreements reached at Valujki in the mid-seventeenth century,

Sanin bitterly observes that in the ensuing negotiations the khans rarely respected the

engagements made by their subjects while the latter oen made unrealistic promises

in expectation for the tsar’s gis; cf. idem, Otnošenija Rossii i Ukrainy s Krymskim

xanstvom v seredine XVII veka, p. 97.

CHAPTER SIX

THE POLITICAL ISSUES TYPICALLY PRESENT IN

THE INSTRUMENTS OF PEACE EXCHANGED BETWEEN

POLAND-LITHUANIA AND THE CRIMEA

Apart from standard declarations to maintain peace and amity, con-

tained in the instruments exchanged between the khans and the kings,

one encounters a number of clauses typically entered in these instru-

ments, namely:

A. “donation” of lands to Lithuania

B. “common friends and common enemies” clause

C. specic provision to jointly attack Muscovy

D. engagement not to commit harm to the other ruler’s domains and

subjects

E. mutual release of captives and prisoners and restoration of cap-

tured goods

F. security of trade

G. regular sending of gis (or tribute) to the khan and presents to his

retinue members

H. engagement not to mistreat or detain the envoys of the other side

A. “Donation” of lands to Lithuania

e “donation” of lands to Lithuania, repeated in the Crimean yarlıqs

until 1560, had a great ceremonial value for the khans as it depicted

their relations with the Jagiellonian rulers as ones between benefactors

and recipients. For the latter, the value of this clause was political:

rstly, by “granting” these lands to Vilnius the khans tacitly engaged

not to raid them; secondly, the clause potentially served as the basis for

an anti-Muscovian alliance because the khans used to “donate” to Vil-

nius such contested areas and towns as Černihiv, Novhorod-Sivers’kyj,

Smolensk, and even Pskov, Velikij Novgorod, and the Duchy of Rjazan’,

all claimed or already controlled by Moscow. Admittedly, this political

potential was weakened by the fact that the khans oen “donated” the

same lands alternatively to Vilnius and Moscow.

the political issues in the instruments of peace 497

year

(document no.)

A. B. C. D. E. F. G. (value and terms used) H.

ca. 1462 (1) x – – – – – – –

1467 (2) – – – – – x – –

ca. 1473 (4) x – – – – – – –

1480 (5) – x – – – – – –

1480 (6) – x – x – – – –

1506–1507 (7) – x x x – – – –

1507 (8) x – – – – – – –

1507 (9) x

706

x x x x – x (4,500 orins)

707

–

1513 (10, 11) x

708

x x x – x x (15,000 orins; upomynky)

709

–

1513 (12) x x x x – x x (pomynky)–

1514 (14) x x x x – x x (vpomynky)–

1514 (15, 16) – x – x – x x (15,000 orins; no term

used)

–

1516 (17) x

710

x x x – x x (15,000 orins; upomynky)–

1517 (18) x x x x – x – –

1520 (19) x x x x – x x (15,000 orins;

vpomynok)

1520 (20) – x – x – x x (15,000 orins; bölek)

711

1527 (22) – x x x – – x (pomynky)x

1532 (24) x x x x – x x (vpomynky)

712

–

1535 (26) – x x x x x x (260 pieces of cloth;

713

pomynky)

–

1539 (28) x x x x x x x (15,000 orins; upominki)x

1541 (29) x x x x x x x (15,000 orins; pomynok)–

1542 (31) x – x x x x x (15,000 orins;

714

upominki)x

1552 (32) x x x x x x x (15,000 orins;

715

upomynky)x

1560 (33) x x x x x x x (upominki)

716

706

Referred to but not specied.

707

Described as the yearly subsidy that should compensate the costs incurred by the

maintenance of the fort of Islamkerman, allegedly constructed by the khan in order to

prevent his subjects from raiding Lithuania.

708

Referred to but not specied.

709

No term is used in the instrument in Latin.

710

Referred to but not specied.

711

On this Turkic term referring to a gi, cf. Document 20, n. 32. In the contempo-

rary Ruthenian translation it is referred to as vpomynok (cf. Document 20, Appendix).

712

Mentioned as the factor that persuaded the khan to allow the royal merchants

to trade in his domains, but not specied in a separate clause.

713

Worth in the Crimea ca. 8580 orins; for the calculation, cf. n. 235 in Part I.

714

And in addition “three sets of nine gis;” on the symbolic value of “nine gis,”

cf. Document 31, n. 15.

715

And in addition “three sets of nine gis;” cf. n. 714 above.

716

e document introduced two categories of gis: the ordinary annual gis

(upominki roczne) that were treated as a kind of tribute and the extraordinary gis, to

498 part two—chapter six

year

(document no.)

A. B. C. D. E. F. G. (value and terms used) H.

1592 (34) – x x x x x x (bölek hazinesi plus tiyiş)

717

1592 (35) – x x x – – x (bölek hazinesi plus tiyiş)

718

–

1598 (36) – x x x – x x (upominki)–

1599 (37) – x x x – x x (upominki)–

1601 (39) – x x x – x x (upominki)–

1601 (40) – x – x – x x (upominki)–

1604 (41) – x – x – x x (upominki)–

1605 (42) – x x x – x x (upominki)–

1607 (43) – x x x – x x (consueta dona)–

1609 (44) – x x x – x x (zwykłe upominki)–

1611 (45) – x – – – – x (upominki)–

1624 (48) – x – x x

719

xx (skarb/upominki plus

podarki)

720

1632 (49) – x – x x

721

–x (uluġ hazine plus tiyişler and

bölekler)

722

Table (cont.)

be sent by the royal treasury in compensation for the Tatar military assistance against

Muscovy; the latter were referred to as “the gis of Mehmed Giray and of Bahadır

Sultan” (upominki machmetgireiowskie, i bohartirsołdanowskie) in analogy to the

gis once received from Sigismund I by Khan Mehmed Giray and his son and qalga,

Bahadır Sultan; now, they were to be sent to Khan Devlet Giray and his own son and

qalga, Mehmed Giray (the future khan Mehmed II Giray); cf. Document 33, n. 30.

717

In the document, the term bölek hazinesi (on the term bölek, see n. 711 above;

hazine means literally “treasure”) refers to the customary gi for the khan while the

term tiyiş to the presents for his retinue (on the term tiyiş, cf. Document 34, n. 16);

in addition, the king was to send each year sixty pieces of cloth for the qalga, Feth

Giray. If the khan was to assist the king against Muscovy, he was to receive an extra

allowance.

718

In addition, the king was to send each year sixty pieces of cloth for the qalga,

Feth Giray. If the khan was to assist the king against Muscovy, he was to receive an

extra allowance of 5,000 orins.

719

Only in reference to the goods stolen from envoys and merchants.

720

In the document, the term skarb (“treasure;” apparently a Polish translation of

the Turkish term hazine) is identied with upominki and refers to the yearly pay-

ment (in cash and kind) to the khan. e term podarki refers to the gis or presents

sent to the khan’s retinue. In fact, the dierence between the terms upominki and

podarki in Polish is negligible, like the dierence between “gis” and “presents” in

English; nevertheless, in the translation upominki are rendered as “gis” and podarki

as “presents.”

721

e instrument stipulated that the king was to release the khan’s stepbrother,

Islam Giray Sultan (the future khan Islam III Giray).

722

e term uluġ hazine (translated as “great treasure”) refers to the yearly pay-

ment to the khan, while the plural terms tiyişler and bölekler to the presents and gis

delivered to his retinue.

the political issues in the instruments of peace 499

year

(document no.)

A. B. C. D. E. F. G. (value and terms used) H.

1634 (50) – x – x – x x (uluġ hazine or vėrgü)x

1635 (51) – x – x – x

723

x (zwyczajne upominki)x

1637 (52–54) – x – x x

724

xx (upominki zwyczajne/wedle

zwyczaju)

1640 (55, 56) – x – x x – x (30,000 orins, hazine or

bölek)

725

–

1640 (57) – x – x – x x (hazine plus hedaya)x

1646 (58) – – – x – x

726

x (hedaya or vėrgü, also

pişkeşler)

727

–

1649 (59) – x – x – – x (zwyczajne upominki)–

1649 (60) – x – x – – x (vėrgü or pişkeş)–

1654 (61) – x x x – – x (upominki zwyczajne)–

1654 (64) – x x x – – x (pişkeş plus hedaya)–

1667 (66) – x – x x – x (upominki)–

1668 (69) – x – x x – – –

1672 (70) – – – x – – x (upominki)

728

–

1742 (71) – – – – – x – x

723

In fact, the security of merchants and envoys is only invoked in the narratio, in

the idealized description of the past peace that should be restored.

724

Only in reference to the goods stolen from envoys and merchants.

725

In addition, the king was to send presents and gis, referred to as hedaya and

vėrgüler, arranged in sets of nine objects; cf. n. 714 above.

726

In fact, the security of merchants is only invoked in the narratio, in the idealized

description of the past peace that should be restored.

727

On the term pişkeş, explained in the Redhouse dictionary as a “gi brought to a

superior,” cf. Document 50, n. 23.

728

e khan accepted the Polish proposal to supplement the annual quota by a

thousand of golden orins and in return promised to restrain his subjects from raid-

ing Poland-Lithuania.

Table (cont.)

B. “Common friends and common enemies” clause

e engagement to be “a friend of the other ruler’s friend and an

enemy of the latter’s enemy” could likewise form the basis for military

cooperation, but more commonly served as the standard ceremonial

formula which was also used in the Ottoman chancery.

500 part two—chapter six

C. Specic provision to jointly attack Muscovy

As the “common friends and common enemies” clause was too vague,

when a common military action was indeed planned against Muscovy,

it was reected by a specic provision. e clause typically stipulated

that the khan should help the king to recapture the Lithuanian lands

lost to the Muscovian ruler. In return, the future incomes from these

domains were to be shared between the king and the khan or the latter

was to obtain extra subsidies from the royal treasury. Characteristi-

cally, the clause disappeared in the rst half of the 17th century, when

the relations between Warsaw and Baghchasaray were oen tense, but

reappeared in 1654, when the two courts renewed the anti-Muscovian

alliance.

D. Engagement not to commit harm to the other ruler’s domains

and subjects

A standard formula contained the khan’s engagement to restrain his

subjects from raiding the royal domains and sometimes also his prom-

ise to punish the culprits. On his part, the king resigned from any

claims regarding the past raids. e documents, published in the pres-

ent volume, also reveal the rising importance of the Cossack issue.

While keeping in mind the devastating eects of the Tatar and Nogay

raids on the economy and everyday life of their Slavic neighbors, one

should not forget that with time, the Cossack activity became equally

harmful to the Crimean subjects.

e appearance of the Cossack issue is reected by the speed with

which the old Turkic term kazak/qazaq has evolved to denote the

Slavic subjects of the Polish-Lithuanian and Muscovian rulers, dwell-

ing on the lower Dnieper and Don rivers. Originally, the term referred

to free vagabonds of Turkic origin. In 1514, Mengli Giray engaged that

the royal merchants, who would travel through the Black Sea steppe

in order to extract salt near Kačybej, would not experience any harm

from the side of the khan’s cossacks (ot kazakov našyx).

729

To be sure,

729

See Document 14. Admittedly, the earliest known references to the cossacks who

were Lithuanian subjects origin from the years 1492–1493; cf. Hruševs’kyj, Istorija

Ukrajiny-Rusy, vol. 7, pp. 82–83, Čerkas, Ukrajina v polityčnyx vidnosynax, p. 229.

Still, in this early period the term primarily referred to Turkic vagabonds.

the political issues in the instruments of peace 501

these Tatar cossacks were hardly controllable and the Crimean instru-

ment from 1517 listed them along with the khan’s “unruly subjects”

(ot našyx ljudej lyxyx y ot kazakov . . .).

730

A handy denition of this

social group is provided by a document from 1528, recorded in the

Lithuanian Register, which described the cossacks as loose Tatars

who did not have their own dependents (to tatare kozaky, što ljudej

ne majut’ ).

731

e royal instrument from 1535 already distinguished

three categories: the cossacks unrelated to the khan, probably of Slavic

or mixed Turko-Slavic origin,

732

“the khan’s cossacks,” and nally “the

Akkerman cossacks” (kozaky belohorodskyi) who lived under the Otto-

man rule. e instrument of Devlet Giray, issued in 1552, clearly dif-

ferentiated between the khan’s cossacks, who were to be restrained

from raiding the royal domains, and the royal cossacks, referred to

as “your cossacks” (kozakov vašyx).

733

Finally, Devlet Giray’s instru-

ment from 1560 referred to “your or Muscovian cossacks,” evidently

in reference to the activity of Dmytro Vyšnevec’kyj, the famous Cos-

sack leader who shied his loyalty between Vilnius and Moscow.

734

us, depending on the context, the same term could refer to Turkic

nomads, being the Crimean or Ottoman subjects, or even to the dis-

tant Kazakhs who at times invaded the Nogay pasturelands on the

Volga,

735

but also to the Dnieper and Don Cossacks (the last term is

capitalized in the standard English usage) who were mostly, though

not exclusively, of Slavic origin and recruited from among the Pol-

ish-Lithuanian and Muscovian subjects. In Ghazi II Giray’s instru-

ment from 1592, the latter were labeled as “the Christian cossacks

who dwelled on the Dnieper river and who were thieves and robbers”

(Özü suyında olan qrıstyannıng hırsuz harami qazaqları) and clearly

distinguished from “the Tatar cossacks” (Tatar qazaqları). e khan

demanded that the king should restrain his subjects and expel them

from the Dnieper so that they could not raid the Crimean territory.

736

In the years to come, this demand would be repeated like a mantra in

730

See Document 18.

731

Lietuvos Metrika. Knyga Nr. 523 (1528). Viešųjų reikalų knyga 1. Edited by

A. Baliulis and A. Dubonis (Vilnius, 2006), p. 94.

732

Admittedly, this fragment is unclear; cf. Document 26, n. 3.

733

Document 32.

734

Document 33.

735

Cf. n. 189 in Part I.

736

Document 34.

502 part two—chapter six

the subsequent Crimean instruments and letters, but the kings were

unable, and sometimes unwilling, to fulll it.

E. Mutual release of captives and prisoners and restoration

of captured goods

e provision to release captives and restore stolen goods was entered

relatively rarely. Apparently both sides acknowledged that it was

hardly practicable. A khan who would try to deprive his warriors of

the booty would risk his throne. Besides, by the time when the instru-

ments were exchanged most of the captives had been probably sold to

the Ottoman domains. Also the royal control over the Ukrainian Cos-

sacks, who lived from raiding the Muslim territories, was very weak

and an order to release the Tatar captives would be probably ignored.

Only the most prominent captives could hope to return home, either

redeemed or released in political gesture.

F. Security of trade

A common stereotype depicts the Tatars as concerned solely with gis

and booty and thus obliterates the fact that it was the conscious com-

mercial policy of the Genghisids which enabled the rst direct trade

contacts between medieval Europe and China. In fact, the instruments

exchanged between the Crimean khans and the Polish-Lithuanian

rulers typically contained the clause that not only assured safe trade

within the khan’s domains, but also safe transit to Ottoman Caa. e

royal subjects were also allowed to extract salt from the salines near

Kačybej (today’s Odessa) and bring it to Kiev, Luc’k, and other royal

towns, initially for free, and later against payment. A clause entered in

1513 stipulated that the royal merchants, either from Poland, Lithu-

ania, or Germany (yz ljadskoe zemly, y lytovskoe, y z nemeckoe) should

be able to come and go without suering any oppression, on the pro-

vision that they paid the ancient customary toll (tamġa).

737

It is hard

to resolve whether the reference to Germany reected the fact that

737

See Document 12; the identication of the Ruthenian term myto with the Turkic

term tamġa is possible on the basis of Document 20, which is preserved in the Khwar-

ezmian Turkic original and in a contemporary Ruthenian copy.

the political issues in the instruments of peace 503

many royal merchants, not only from Royal Prussia (e.g., Danzig and

orn) but also from such major towns as Cracow (Germ. Krakau) or

L’viv (Germ. Lemberg), were Germans, or resulted from geographical

ignorance at the khan’s court. Actually, such geographical ignorance

could be perpetuated by those concerned: a merchant from Breslau,

Nuremberg, or Lübeck might have preferred to pass as a Polish sub-

ject in order to benet from the clause extended onto the royal mer-

chants, just like the Western ships used to come to the Ottoman ports

under the French ag in order to benet from the Ottoman-French

capitulations. e clause from 1513 was repeated in 1520 and, like the

former one, regarded the royal merchants “from the Grand Duchy

of Lithuania, the Polish Crown, and Germany” (Lytovskoho Velykoho

Kneženja, y Korony Pol’skoe, y Nemec’ ). It contained the additional

provision reducing the tamġa from seven percent to only three per-

cent ad valorem and exempting the royal merchants from any other

fees. e fees for the transported salt and other products were to be

paid to the amins, i.e., the khan’s intendants, responsible for their

collection.

738

e mutual agreements also regarded the khan’s subjects who trav-

eled with the purpose of trade to the royal lands, although in 1560 Dev-

let Giray promised that his merchants, be they Turks [i.e., Muslims],

Franks [i.e., Latin Christians], Armenians, or Jews, should not join

embassies and couriers in the hope to benet from tax exemptions.

739

In the long run, neither the written warranties of safety nor the

reductions of fees could save the medieval via Tartarica that had once

connected Central Europe with Caa (cf. Chapter 5 above). e road

through the steppe became too dangerous due to the activity of the

Cossacks, Nogays, and other loose vagrants who escaped the control

of either Baghchasaray or Vilnius/Cracow. Yet, the trade continued,

mostly through Moldavia, Budjak, and the Black Sea ports of Akker-

man and Közlev, and the seventeenth-century instruments of peace,

exchanged between the khans and the kings, contained the standard

clause that secured the safety of trade, although formulated more

738

See Document 19.

739

See Document 33; the document is preserved only in a Polish translation. e

omission of Orthodox Christians, who would be referred to as Greeks in the khan’s

instrument, was probably accidental although it might have reected the fact that they

were less active in the Crimean trade with Poland-Lithuania than in the Black Sea

trade and the Crimean domestic trade.