Kolodziejczyk Dariusz. The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania (ENG)

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504 part two—chapter six

vaguely than in the early sixteenth-century documents. e ultimate

triumph of the Budjak route over the ancient via Tartarica is evi-

denced by the last Polish-Crimean treaty instrument from 1742. Its

second article, regarding the merchants and trade, is formulated as if

the commercial center of the Khanate were not the Crimean Peninsula

but Budjak. Selamet II Giray assured that the royal merchants “who

come to Budjak and [other] regions of the hither side [i.e., the Crimean

Khanate], should not be asked [to give] anything above the custom-

ary taxes” (Bucaq taraarına ve beri semtlere gelenlerden mu‘tad olan

vėrgülerinden ziyade şey taleb olunmamaq).

740

G. Regular sending of gis (or tribute) to the khan and presents

to his retinue members

e issue of gis or tribute has been already discussed in Chapter 5,

where we have also proposed to focus on their function rather than

stick to the terms used. It is worth noting that while the royal side con-

sequently referred to its annual payments as “gis” (Ruth. pomynky;

Pol. upominki), also the khans, at least in their formal instruments sent

to Poland-Lithuania, typically used such terms as bölek, hedaya, pişkeş,

which all referred to gis (although pişkeş referred to a gi brought to

a superior), or the neutral term hazine (“treasure”). At times, one also

encounters the term vėrgü (“tax,” lit. “something given”), but never the

term harac, which was used in reference to the royal payments only

in the correspondence between the khans and the Ottoman sultans.

741

Halil Inalcık observes that such terms as hedaya, vėrgü, and especially

pişkeş had features of a tribute but did not entail actual submission and

dependence for the “tributary” state.

742

On the other hand, it is worth

remembering that also in the humiliating Polish-Ottoman treaty of

1672 the Ottoman negotiators mercifully replaced the term harac with

pişkeş, while there is no doubt in historiography that the Polish king

then formally became an Ottoman tributary.

743

740

See Document 71.

741

Cf. n. 190 in Part I.

742

Inalcık, “Power Relationships between Russia, the Crimea, and the Ottoman

Empire as Reected in Titulature,” p. 395.

743

Cf. Document 50, n. 23.

the political issues in the instruments of peace 505

Sending the annual payments to the Tatars was not a novelty for

the Lithuanian rulers, but in their relations with the Crimean Khan-

ate the issue had not been formally regulated until the 16th century.

Hadji Giray was apparently still too weak to demand a tribute from

Vilnius, and the Crimean-Lithuanian hostilities in the initial decades

of Mengli Giray’s reign prevented a formal treaty that could invoke

nancial obligations. Negotiations regarding a mutual reconcilement

on the condition of annual payments to the khan were initiated in

the years 1499–1500, but ended in failure. Finally, an agreement was

reached in the years 1506–1507, when Vilnius engaged to pay yearly

4,500 orins, formally as the subsidy towards the maintenance of the

Crimean border fort of Islamkerman. In the following negotiations,

in 1509, Sigismund proposed to augment this sum to 6,000 orins.

Finally, in 1510, both sides agreed to the annual sum of 15,000 orins,

to be paid in two installments: by Pentecost and by St. Martin’s Day

(11 November). e rst payment was eected for the year 1512

(although with delay) and the above conditions were reiterated in

the subsequent instruments of peace, until in 1520, Mehmed Giray

demanded that the whole annual sum should be paid in one install-

ment, by Pentecost. An internal arrangement between Vilnius and

Cracow stipulated that half of the annual sum would be paid by Lithu-

ania, and the other half by Poland.

Protting from the internal turmoil in the Crimea that followed the

death of Mehmed Giray in 1523, Sigismund suspended the gis. In

the following decade they were sent rarely if at all and their value

was sharply diminished. In 1535, during the negotiations with the new

khan, Sahib Giray, Sigismund proposed to renew his annual gis, but

in a reduced value and only in English cloth. e royal instrument

stipulated that these gis would be sent in one annual installment,

by 30 June. Sahib Giray resented all the three novelties: the reduction

of value, the complete replacement of cash with cloth, and the post-

ponement of the rst installment. His instrument of 1539 stipulated

that the gis should amount to 15,000 orins, of which 13,000 should

be in English cloth and 2,000 in golden coins, and they should be

delivered by St. George’s Day (23 April). e negotiations in Cracow,

conducted in 1541, brought a compromise: the gis were to be entirely

in English cloth, but their value was to amount to 15,000 orins, to be

delivered in two installments: by St. John’s Day (24 June) and by All

Saints’ Day (1 November). Yet, in his instrument of 1542 Sahib Giray

again demanded that 2,000 orins should be paid in cash (i.e., golden

506 part two—chapter six

coins) and the standard gi should be supplemented by extra presents.

e above conditions were repeated in the instrument of Devlet Giray,

issued in 1552, which also stipulated that the gis should be sent each

year by 1 November. In his following instrument, issued in 1560, the

khan moved the deadline to Christmas.

In the times of Ghazi II Giray and Sigismund III, the value of gis

continued to amount to 15,000 golden orins and the typical deadline

was November or, more precisely, St. Demetrius’ Day (5 November),

known in the Turkish world as the day of Kasım (ruz-i Qasım) and

regarded as the beginning of winter.

744

Admittedly, this deadline was

rarely met. In the following decades, the gis were typically not deliv-

ered at all due to the frequent hostilities and Tatar raids. In a rare

moment of detente, in 1640, Bahadır Giray requested that the gis

should be doubled to 30,000 orins: 15,000 in cash and 15,000 in cloth

and furs. Perhaps the longest period when the gis were sent regularly

coincided with the “long alliance” between Warsaw and Baghchasaray

in the years 1654–1666. Yet, even in that period, delays were common,

although in theory the gis were to be sent by St. John’s Day.

745

that time, the means for the Tatar gis had been provided mainly by

the Polish Crown treasury while the Lithuanian nancial participation

had become marginal.

746

Finally, in June 1682, one year before the gis

were ultimately discontinued due to the outbreak of a new war, their

yearly value amounted to 40,000 kara guruş, i.e., Reichsthalers.

747

H. Engagement not to mistreat or detain the envoys of the other side

is matter has been already discussed above in Chapter 5. It is worth

stressing that the immunity of foreign envoys was repeatedly invoked

744

Cf. Document 36, n. 9 and Document 43, n. 11.

745

Wójcik, “Some problems of Polish-Tatar relations in the seventeenth century,”

p. 100.

746

Cf. n. 304 in Part I.

747

Bibl. Czart., ms. 179 (Teki Naruszewicza), pp. 207–212, esp. p. 209 (a letter of

Murad Giray to John III Sobieski, dated on 25 Djumada I 1093 A.H., in which the

khan reminds the king that the total value of annual gis should amount to forty

thousand kara guruş: la somme de quarante mille karagrouse, qui nous revient pour

le tribut d’une année entière; the letter is preserved in a French translation prepared

by a Crown translator, Antoni Crutta, in 1780). In the Ottoman Empire, the imperial

thalers were referred to as kara guruş (lit. “black thalers”) because they contained less

pure silver than the Spanish reals.

the political issues in the instruments of peace 507

in the instruments of peace exchanged between the kings and the

khans. To be sure, this immunity was not always respected and at

times openly violated. Nevertheless, at least at face value, the inclusion

of this clause set a standard for diplomatic relations not much dier-

ent from the one observed in other early modern states.

Regulation of border problems

One issue to be expected in instruments of peace exchanged between

two neighboring states would be the demarcation of the common

border. Yet, no formal demarcation was ever eected between the

Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania, even though demarcations

were eected several times between Poland-Lithuania and the Otto-

man Empire.

748

Mengli Giray’s instrument from 1507 regarded the Dnieper crossing

named Tavan’ as the meeting place, where Lithuanian envoys were to

deliver the royal gis and in return collect the Lithuanian subjects,

released from the Tatar captivity.

749

A Lithuanian report from 1542

maintained that since the times of Semen Olelkovyč (the autonomous

prince of Kiev who reigned in the years 1454–1470) the border had

run between Tavan’ and the upper Donec while the ferry incomes

from the Dnieper crossing at Tavan’ had been equally shared between

the two rulers.

750

Aer the Cossacks had destroyed the Crimean fort

of Islamkerman (built at the Tavan’ crossing on the le shore of the

Dnieper) in 1556, the meeting place was moved further to the south-

east, to the Tatar fort of Ferahkerman (Perekop, also known as Or)

built in the Crimean isthmus. is transfer was conrmed by Devlet

Giray’s instrument from 1560.

Yet, the aforementioned stipulations did not imply that the khans

had no claims to the steppe territories extending beyond Tavan’ and

Perekop, which served as Tatar and Nogay pasturages. In reaction to

the Lithuanian protests against his subjects who had grazed their herds

on the rivers Boh and Synja voda (Synjuxa), Sahib Giray retorted in

748

On these demarcations, undertaken in 1542 but failed, and then eected success-

fully in 1633, 1680, and 1703, see Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations,

pp. 57–67.

749

Cf. Document 9.

750

Cf. n. 266 in Part I.

508 part two—chapter six

1548, in his letter to the king: “this land is neither yours nor mine, but

God’s; whoever is stronger, will keep it.”

751

e Tatar ambivalent attitude towards the idea of territorial border

is best reected in Bahadır Giray’s instrument from 1640, in which

the khan reproached the king: “your [. . .] Cossacks came many times

[raiding] our subjects wandering on the outer side of Or [i.e., Per-

ekop], situated on our border moat, [. . .] and captured a lot of prop-

erty [i.e., cattle] and many captives” (serhad cerlerimizde Ordın tışqarı

çevire-turġan ėlimizge [. . .] qazaġıŋuz niçe kerre kelüb köb mal ve niçe

tusnaq aldılar).

752

Although the khan’s subjects were wandering on the

outer side of the border moat (emphasis mine-DK), it is evident that

the khan regarded these territories as his.

e claim to the northern pasturages, situated between the Dnieper

and the Boh, is most explicitly expressed in the instrument of 1649,

issued by Islam III Giray: “as on the northern side of the Dnieper,

on the [rivers] Ingul, Ingulec’, and Chubartıl [Velykaja Vis’] there

are pasturages and grasslands belonging to the Crimea, when ani-

mals arrive [from the Crimea], while they graze, neither you, nor

your commanders should interfere” (ve Öziniŋ canib-i şimalinde İngil

ve Ungul ve Çubartılda Qırım vilayetiniŋ çera-gah ve otlaqları olup

hayvanatları gelüp otladıqlarında tarafıŋızdan ve ümeraŋuzdan müda-

hale ėtmeyeceklerine).

753

Further complications resulted from the Ottoman-Crimean shared

sovereignty over the Black Sea steppe.

754

Since the late 15th century,

the Ottomans garrisoned Azaq (Azov) and Akkerman, and since the

Moldavian campaign of 1538, also Bender (Tighina) and Očakiv.

e last fort, initially constructed by Mengli Giray and known to the

751

Cf. n. 268 in Part I.

752

See Document 55.

753

e Ingul is a le tributary of the Boh, the Ingulec’ is a right tributary of the

Dnieper, and the Velykaja Vis’ (Tur. Chubartıl) is a le tributary of the Synjuxa (Pol.

Sine Wody), which in turn is a le tributary of the Boh; on the identication of the

three rivers, proposed by Abrahamowicz on the basis of the Crimean chronicle by

Hadji Mehmed Senai; cf. Document 60, n. 7.

754

It is worth remembering that elements of shared sovereignty also existed in

the Crimea proper; for instance, the khan exerted judicial authority over the Tatar

inhabitants of Caa; moreover, the Ottoman subjects from the Mangup district of

the Ottoman province of Caa used to settle their conicts at the judicial court in

Baghchasaray apparently because the travel time was shorter than to any Ottoman

court; see Natalia Królikowska, “Law and Division of Power in the Crimean Khanate.

A Study on the Reign of Murad Giray (1678–1683),” pp. 214–219.

the political issues in the instruments of peace 509

Tatars as Djankerman (lit. “the new town”), assumed the new Turkish

name (Özü qal‘esi, lit. “the Dnieper fortress”) and became the center

of a new Ottoman province. It was situated at the mouth of the Boh

near the remains of Dašov, the ancient Lithuanian fort founded by

Vytautas. e Ottoman acquisition of the territory between the lower

Dniester and the lower Boh was probably the immediate reason for the

fact that the donation yarlıq, granted by Sahib Giray to Sigismund in

1539, no longer listed Majak, Kačybej, and Dašov, which had been tra-

ditionally “granted” to Lithuania in the previous documents. In 1539,

Sahib Giray also explained that he could not prevent the inhabitants

of Akkerman, Očakiv, and Azov from raiding the royal lands because

they were Ottoman subjects.

755

Yet, it soon turned out that the Ottomans were unable to con-

trol their northern steppe territories without the Tatar cooperation. In

1552 the new khan, Devlet Giray, proudly informed the king that he

was authorized by the “Turkish emperor” to “keep a tight reign” on

the inhabitants of these lands.

756

In the following years, the Ottomans

garrisoned the main strongholds but the authority over the northern

Black Sea steppe, extending from the Kuban to the mouth of the Dan-

ube, was ceded to the khan. In Budjak, the khan’s authority over the

local Tatars, Nogays, and even Christians was exerted by his deputy

titled yalı agha (“the agha of the seashore”), who resided in Hanqıshla

(lit. “the khan’s winter quarters”) near Ottoman Akkerman.

In the years 1598–1622, in a somewhat delayed reaction, the Polish

diplomacy insisted on obtaining the khan’s recognition of its territo-

rial claims reaching the Black Sea shore, notwithstanding the Tatar

protests that they could not make such concession without the sultan’s

authorization. In 1599 and 1607, the Polish eorts were crowned with

apparent successes and the respective clauses were entered in Ghazi

II Giray’s instruments. Yet, it does not seem that the khan treated

such promises seriously and was ready to resign from the traditional

Tatar and Nogay pasturages. Even more curiously, the same clause

reappeared in Mehmed III Giray’s instrument from 1624, though

admittedly it was issued at the time when the khan desperately needed

Polish support against a possible Ottoman intervention. e issue was

dropped altogether in 1633, when the Polish and Ottoman commis-

755

See Document 28.

756

See Document 32.

510 part two—chapter six

sioners demarcated a common boundary passing slightly to the south

from the rivers Jahorlyk and Kodyma, quite distant from the Black

Sea shore.

According to the Polish-Russian treaty of 1686, the king ceded to

the tsar the sovereignty over the Zaporozhian Cossacks and thus the

Commonwealth was deprived of its ancient border with the Crimean

Khanate, which ran along the lower Dnieper. Nonetheless, in 1699 the

Commonwealth recovered its southeastern provinces, lost to the Porte

in 1672, and regained its former border with the territories between

the lower Dniester and the lower Boh, which remained under the joint

Ottoman-Crimean sovereignty. In 1703, the boundary from 1633 was

formally restored (with minor changes) in result of a new demarca-

tion. Although it was eected by the Polish and Ottoman commission-

ers in the absence of the khan’s representatives, its instruments, drawn

in Latin and Ottoman Turkish, contained references to the khan’s sub-

jects, who inhabited the lands situated on the southern, Ottoman side

of the border.

757

With a strengthening control over the steppe exerted from St. Peters-

burg, Istanbul, and Baghchasaray, one of the last safe havens for all

sorts of irregulars and marauders developed on the lower Boh, at

the conjunction of the Polish, Russian, Crimean, and Ottoman bor-

ders. Not accidentally, the only typical “border clause,” found in the

Crimean instrument of 1742, referred to this area. e document’s

h article stipulated that as the border area along the lower Boh had

become the shelter for “plundering brigands from among the Zaporo-

zhian Cossacks” as well as “some Nogay mirzas,” it should be patrolled

and settled in order to protect the peaceful subjects of the king and the

khan from further depredations.

758

By tracing the changes in terminology encountered in the corre-

spondence between the khans and the kings, we can observe the evolu-

tion of the Slavic term ukrayna/ukraina, which had initially denoted

any “borderland,” but with time assumed its modern primary mean-

ing, namely “the Ukraine”—a land to the north of the Black Sea,

757

See Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, pp. 627, 632, 637. e

fragment, found in both the Ottoman and Polish instruments, refers to a settlement

on the border river Jahorlyk, inhabited by the khan’s subjects. In the second half of the

18th century, a similar settlement named Balta developed on the border river Kodyma,

opposite the Polish town of Józefgród.

758

See Document 71.

the political issues in the instruments of peace 511

whose name was later adopted by a modern nation and state. When

in 1507 Mengli Giray declared that he had donated ruskaja vkrayna to

Sigismund, we may safely assume that the term still had a vague general

connotation and should be translated as “the Ruthenian borderland.”

is conclusion can be conrmed by a quotation from Sigismund’s let-

ter from 1514, in which the king deplored the Muscovian raids of his

“borderland towns” (ukraynnyx horodov) Polack and Vicebsk, in fact

situated far to the north in today’s Belarus.

759

Yet, when in 1552 Devlet

Giray promised not to raid or bring harm obejum pan’stvam, Ljac-

komu y Velykomu Knjazstvu Lytovskomu, abo na ukrayne, we might

assume that the last term already denoted the Ukraine and the frag-

ment should be translated: “to the two states: Poland and the Grand

Duchy of Lithuania, or to the Ukraine.”

760

Likewise, the reference to

the cossacks z ukrainnych zamków, found in the instrument from 1560,

should be rather translated “from the Ukrainian castles,” although an

alternative translation: “from the borderland castles” appears correct

as well.

761

e term kozacy (“cossacks”), found in the above citation,

reects a parallel development, already described above, from a com-

mon to a proper name.

Other issues

In addition to the typical clauses that gured in the instruments

exchanged between the khans and the kings, other issues were treated

only in certain periods and the fact of their recording reected their

relevance at a given time. As long as the Girays’ claim to the Golden

Horde’s heritage was vulnerable, the khans aimed to secure that their

rivals would not receive support from Vilnius and Cracow. In 1480,

Mengli Giray asked Casimir to hand him over the subjects of his for-

mer rival, Seyyid Ahmed, the grandson of Tokhtamısh. In the years

1506–1527, the personage of Sheikh Ahmed, the former khan of the

Great Horde, kept over twenty years in Lithuanian custody, gured

prominently in the negotiations between Qırq Yer and Vilnius. At

rst, Mengli Giray tried to persuade Sigismund to execute his archrival

but had to satisfy himself with the promise that the latter would not

759

Pułaski, Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną, p. 441.

760

Cf. Document 32, n. 22.

761

Cf. Document 33, n. 31.

512 part two—chapter six

be released (he was eventually released in 1527) and that his followers

would be settled in Lithuania far from the Crimean borders. Mengli’s

unprecedented consent to send his grandson as a hostage to Vilnius

(in 1512) was aimed to assure Sigismund of the khan’s goodwill and to

dissuade the king from using Sheikh Ahmed against the Crimea.

A century later, during the Crimean “time of troubles,” in 1632,

Djanibek Giray demanded that the royal side should not grant refuge

to his enemy, the former qalga Shahin Giray. e prolonged conict

within the Giray family enabled Kantemir, the powerful Nogay com-

mander, to build an independent base of power in Budjak and challenge

the khan’s rule. erefore, when in 1634 Djanibek Giray consented

to the old Polish request and promised to remove his subjects from

Budjak, his decision not only aimed to please the Poles but was in

fact intended against Kantemir. e Tatar-Nogay conict continued

during the reign of the new khan, Inayet Giray, and culminated with

the open confrontation of 1637, which resulted in the execution of

both contenders: Kantemir and Inayet Giray, by the Ottomans. Aer

the new khan, Bahadır Giray, executed a number of Nogay leaders

in 1639, Budjak lost much of its political importance, although the

Nogays continued to dwell in the northern Black Sea steppes.

e ambitions of Warsaw and Baghchasaray to share the patronage

over Moldavia, and at times even Wallachia, with Istanbul, are reected

in the instruments exchanged in the years 1598–1609, which invoked

the agreement reached in 1595, at Ţuţora, between Khan Ghazi II Giray

and Hetman Jan Zamoyski. Aer the war of 1620–1621, Baghchasaray

changed its ocial position and in the instruments from 1624, 1635,

and 1637 the khans defended the status of Moldavia and Wallachia

as the Ottoman tributaries against any Polish claims. Nevertheless,

the idea of a triple Ottoman-Crimean-Polish patronage over Molda-

via, Wallachia, and even Transylvania, returned in the negotiations of

1654. Not by accident, the Crimean envoy Süleyman Agha, who con-

cluded the preliminary peace in Warsaw and accompanied the Polish

envoy, Mariusz Jaskólski, to Baghchasaray, was then immediately sent

to Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania, to notify their rulers of the

newly concluded alliance between the khan and the king.

762

e Ukrainian Cossacks, typically regarded as a nuissance and

blamed for disrupting the peace in the correspondence between

762

See Jaskólski’s diary in AGAD, Libri Legationum, no. 33, fol. 45a.

the political issues in the instruments of peace 513

Warsaw and Baghchasaray, are treated more favorably in the Crimean

instruments issued in the years 1649, 1654, and 1667–1668. All these

instruments were issued in similar circumstances, when the khans

deserted their Cossack allies and resolved to reconcile with Warsaw.

Apparently in desire to maintain the equilibrium and not let the

Commonwealth recover its full control over the Ukraine, perhaps

also tormented by bad conscience and—more likely—accusations of

the pro-Cossack faction in the Crimea, the khans acted as mediators

and obliged King John Casimir to forgive the Cossacks and reconrm

their ancient privileges, if only the latter expressed their wish to return

under the royal hand.

e instrument from 1742, which stands alone as the only eigh-

teenth-century document in the present volume, no longer contains

the traditional clauses regarding the Tatar raids and the royal gis,

because these issues were regulated by the Karlowitz Treaty, corrobo-

rated by the Ottoman sultan also on behalf of the khan. In its rst

article, Selamet II Giray’s instrument invokes the Karlowitz Treaty and

stipulates that its provisions should be observed. In addition, the khan

rearmed the security of the royal merchants, envoys, and even Chris-

tian missionaries who would arrive into his domains. e document

also aimed to settle a number of minor disputes that had arisen during

the recently nished Russo-Ottoman war (1736–1739), in which the

Commonwealth had not participated, but its territory had been used

by both belligerents.

In sum, the political contents of the instruments, published in the

present volume, disclose a large spectrum of issues and surprisingly

broad horizons, extending from Scandinavia to Persia and from Hun-

gary to Siberia.