Riendeau A Roger E. Brief History of Canada

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A BRIEF HISTORY OF CANADA

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blocs from each section—Brown in Canada West and Cartier in Canada

East—with the master political strategist of the era, Macdonald, to form

a powerful governing force that had the capacity to end more than a

decade of sectional deadlock and to fulﬁ ll the ambitions of the Province

of Canada. The coalition government resolved to work toward achiev-

ing a federal union of all the British North American colonies and, if

this effort failed, to settle for a federation of the two Canadas with a

provision to include the West. The ﬁ rst course of action represented

the Conservative proposal made by Galt in 1858, while the alternative

embodied the plan devised by Brown and the Clear Grit Reformers in

1859.

At Brown’s insistence, the coalition agreed that the new federation in

whatever form it ultimately took would be governed on the basis of

representation by population. Despite long-standing and vigorous

objection, Cartier conceded the principle of representation primarily

because he believed that under federalism the French language and

religious and legal rights could be protected by a French-controlled

provincial government. In fact, Cartier won over those who might have

been tempted to support Dorion by arguing that federation would give

French Canadians their own government with the power to legislate

over matters that would ensure cultural survival and local develop-

ment. Although he did not express it in those precise terms, Cartier

appealed to notions of French Canada as a distinct society originally

embodied in the Quebec Act of 1774. Besides, Cartier realized that,

within a larger federation involving the Maritimes and the West, the

French-Canadian propensity to vote as a cultural bloc would be advan-

tageous in contrast to the diverse regional and political interests of the

English-speaking provinces.

For Macdonald and his English-speaking followers, the new federa-

tion ensured the unity of the St. Lawrence economy and opened up

prospects for its expansion. Macdonald’s Conservatives had been more

interested in a scheme encompassing union with the Maritimes and the

building of the vital Intercolonial Railway link, whereas Brown’s Liber-

als were more focused on western expansion. But recently, the Grand

Trunk Railway supporters had developed a more profound interest in

the prospects of British northwestern rather than American midwestern

expansion. In 1861 Edward Watkin, representing the major British

investors in the Grand Trunk, investigated the company’s “organized

mess” and reported that for the railway to pay off in the long run it

would have to be extended eastward and westward to become a trans-

continental line carrying trade from the Atlantic to the Paciﬁ c. Thus,

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the vision of Canada as an entrepôt of trade between Europe and the

interior of North America was replaced by an even more grandiose

dream of Canada as the commercial intermediary between Europe and

Asia (Creighton 1964).

To follow up on this recommendation, Watkin organized other

Grand Trunk investors to purchase a controlling interest in the Hud-

son’s Bay Company in 1863, with the intention of opening up its west-

ern lands so that construction of the railway linking Canada to the

Paciﬁ c could soon begin. However, a sectionally divided Canada

remained unwilling and indeed unable to meet the asking price to

acquire the Hudson’s Bay Company domain and to support the building

of a railway across the western plains and the Rocky Mountains. While

the formation of the Great Coalition of 1864 was a step in the right

direction, only a larger union of British North American colonies could

command sufﬁ cient credit in the international ﬁ nancial markets to

undertake such an ambitious scheme of transcontinental expansion.

The possibilities of a transcontinental railway network to link a

united British North America aroused the interest of the imperial

authority for defensive reasons. Opening the West to Canada and

building a Paciﬁ c railway connection to transport settlers and soldiers

might save the region from advancing American settlement. An inter-

colonial railway would help to alleviate the dangerous weakness

revealed during the so-called Trent Affair of 1861. In the early stages of

the American Civil War, the North suspected Britain of being sympa-

thetic to the South because it was a vital source of cotton for the British

textile industry. Anglo-American tension reached its height when a

Northern warship intercepted the British steamer Trent on the high seas

and forcibly removed two southern agents on their way to England to

generate more support for their cause. Indignant over this violation of

freedom of the seas and anticipating war, Britain dispatched more than

10,000 reinforcements to defend Canada in the event of an American

attack. The American government recognized the folly of ﬁ ghting with

the leading world power in the midst of its own Civil War and expedi-

tiously freed the envoys, thereby ending the military crisis. Neverthe-

less, when the British troops arrived, the St. Lawrence was already

frozen over, and the only railway link to Canada was on American soil

through Portland, Maine, via the old St. Lawrence and Atlantic line that

had been absorbed by the Grand Trunk. The need to undertake a win-

ter trek overland in sleighs through New Brunswick demonstrated the

strategic value of the proposed intercolonial railway and prompted the

British government to reconsider its commitment to colonial defense.

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A BRIEF HISTORY OF CANADA

172

Besides being a ﬁ nancial burden that the free traders wanted to

eliminate, colonial defense was a potential source of embarrassment if

ever Britain was to suffer defeat at the hands of the United States

because it could not adequately protect its North American interests.

Britain, therefore, began to exert strong pressure for a union of the Brit-

ish North American colonies so that they could assume more of the

burden of defending themselves against the United States. For this rea-

son, above all, the imperial authorities welcomed the formation of the

Great Coalition and its initiative to negotiate a union with the Maritime

colonies (Morton 1964).

Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island were already

planning a meeting to discuss the prospects of a Maritime union.

Accordingly, a delegation from the Province of Canada attended a

meeting at Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, in September 1864 to

propose a federal union of British North America. Sufﬁ cient progress

was made at the Charlottetown Conference to warrant postponement

of the Maritime union discussion until after another meeting with the

Canadians the following month at Quebec City. Over a period of

This 1883 painting by Robert Harris (1849–1919), Fathers of Confederation at the

Quebec Conference in October 1864, features the ﬁ rst prime minister, John A. Macdonald

(standing at the table with paper in hand); Georges-Étienne Cartier (seated immediately to

the right), who led Quebec into Confederation; George Brown (seated with legs crossed in the

foreground), the owner of the inﬂ uential Globe newspaper, who envisioned Confederation as

the key to western expansion; and Charles Tupper (standing in the foreground), who led Nova

Scotia into Confederation and would be a future prime minister.

(Library and Archives Canada

C-001855)

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slightly more than two weeks, the Quebec Conference proved to be

decisive in drawing up 72 resolutions that laid the foundation for a new

national constitution (Whitelaw 1967; Waite 1967).

The ﬁ rst principle of unity was federalism. The Maritime and

French-Canadian delegates insisted on a federal union so that their

respective identities would not be submerged. Mindful that the Civil

War in the United States was about to enter its fourth brutal year, the

Canadian and Maritime delegates agreed on a strong central govern-

ment to avoid the apparent mistakes of the United States Constitution

in giving the states too much power. In contrast, the new central gov-

ernment was granted residual powers—that is, all powers not speciﬁ -

cally assigned to the provinces. In addition, the power of disallowance

gave the central authority the right to reject provincial laws of which it

did not approve. The central government would consist of an elected

body based on representation by population and an appointed body

based on equal regional representation. The smaller Maritime Prov-

inces saw the appointed branch of government as a means of offsetting

their numerical weakness in the elected branch. Because it would

assume all existing provincial debts and the cost of building the inter-

colonial railway along with such major expenditures as administration

and defense, the central government was allowed unlimited taxing

powers, including the collection of direct and indirect taxes such as

customs and excise duties, which were among the main sources of rev-

enue at that time. The provinces were restricted to levying only direct

taxes but were to be compensated for the cost of education, roads, and

other local responsibilities with an annual subsidy from the central

government amounting to 80 cents per capita. The provinces could

raise additional revenue by selling their natural resources, such as pub-

lic lands, minerals, and waterpower.

The Canadian and Maritime delegates adjourned the Quebec Confer-

ence with the understanding that they would not risk subjecting the

draft constitution to popular approval. Instead, they decided to follow

the British procedure of ratiﬁ cation by provincial legislatures. In

essence, the aversion to direct democracy was based on the concern

that the people might not share the vision of their political leaders.

The Quebec Resolutions were debated in the Legislative Assembly of

the United Province of Canada in February 1865. Relatively little criti-

cism was expressed by members from the western section. In Canada

East, however, the Rouges led by Dorion strongly opposed the resolu-

tions, arguing that a true “confederation” was based on the supremacy

of local over central authority, that such a monumental scheme should

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A BRIEF HISTORY OF CANADA

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be subject to electoral approval, and that the proposed union was

merely “a Grand Trunk job.” The ﬁ nal vote taken in early March

appeared decisive: 91 in favor and 33 opposed. But the vote among the

French-Canadian members present was considerably closer: 27 in favor

and 21 opposed. Thus, French Canada embraced nationhood, but with

some serious reservations (Waite 1963; Bonenfant 1966).

Support for the Quebec Resolutions in the Atlantic Provinces was

even more precarious than it was in French Canada. Prince Edward

Island rejected Confederation outright because it did nothing to resolve

the long-standing absentee landlord issue; it left the tiny province with

little, if any, power in the central Parliament; and it offered a railway

link with Canada that was of little interest to the inhabitants. New-

foundland was completely indifferent to the idea of uniting with distant

Canada, since most of the island’s population and economic activity

were focused on the far eastern coast and therefore oriented toward

Britain. In Nova Scotia, Premier Charles Tupper’s attempts to gain sup-

port for Confederation were countered by Joseph Howe, who argued

that the province would be more likely to keep its identity and to enjoy

more prosperity by remaining within a great empire than by joining a

dubious experiment in nationhood. Not only did Tupper avoid Howe’s

challenge to call an election on the issue, he did not even dare to bring

the Quebec Resolutions to a vote in the provincial legislature. Indeed,

Confederation could have proceeded without the support of any of

these three provinces, although the involvement of Nova Scotia was

considered more highly desirable.

Without the support of New Brunswick, however, the Confederation

scheme embodied in the Quebec Resolutions would have disintegrated,

principally because a railway connection to an ice-free winter port had

to pass through the province whether the terminal was Halifax or Saint

John. Premier Leonard Tilley succumbed to pressure to call an election

on the issue of Confederation. His opponent, A. J. Smith, pointed out

that New Brunswick’s trade ﬂ owed in a north-south rather than an east-

west direction, particularly since the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854. There-

fore, he proposed a provincial railway that linked up with Maine as a

more viable alternative to the intercolonial railway. In the election cam-

paign of March 1865, the pro-Confederation forces under Tilley were

soundly defeated, thereby leaving the plan for nationhood in serious

jeopardy.

At this critical juncture, the renewal of the American threat proved

to be a convenient factor in turning the tide in favor of Confederation.

The end of the American Civil War in the spring of 1865 raised concern

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that the victorious Union army, then the largest in the world, would be

free to turn its aggression toward Canada as a measure of retaliation

against Britain. In fact, some of its discharged soldiers were recruited

John A. Macdonald

Speaks in the Canadian

Legislature about the Need

for a Federal Union of

British North America

he . . . only means of solution for our difﬁ culties was the junction

of the provinces either in a Federal or a Legislative union. Now, as

regards the comparative advantages of a Legislative and a Federal union,

I have never hesitated to state my own opinions. I have again and again

stated in the House, that, if practicable, I thought a Legislative union would

be preferable. (Hear, hear.) I have always contended that if we could agree

to have one government and one parliament, legislating for the whole of

these peoples, it would be the best, the cheapest, the most vigorous, and

the strongest system of government we could adopt. (Hear, hear.) But, on

looking at the subject in the Conference, and discussing the matter as we

did, most unreservedly, and with a desire to arrive at a satisfactory conclu-

sion, we found that such a system was impracticable. In the ﬁ rst place, it

would not meet the assent of the people of Lower Canada, because they

felt that in their peculiar position—being in a minority, with a different lan-

guage, nationality and religion from the majority,—in case of a junction with

the other provinces, their institutions and their laws might be assailed, and

their ancestral associations, on which they prided themselves, attacked and

prejudiced; it was found that any proposition which involved the absorption

of the individuality of Lower Canada—if I may use the expression—would

not be received with favor by her people. We found too, that though their

people speak the same language and enjoy the same system of law as the

people of Upper Canada, a system founded on the common law of England,

there was as great a disinclination on the part of the various Maritime

Provinces to lose their individuality, as separate political organizations, as

we observed in the case of Lower Canada herself. (Hear, hear.) Therefore,

we were forced to the conclusion that we must either abandon the idea

of Union altogether, or devise a system of union in which the separate

provincial organizations would be in some degree preserved. . . .

Source: Waite 1963, 40–41.

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A BRIEF HISTORY OF CANADA

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by the Fenian Brotherhood, a fanatical republican Irish group dedicated

to capturing the British North American colonies and using them as

ransom to negotiate with the British government for the liberation of

George-Etienne Cartier

Speaks about his Preference

for a British North

American Rather than

a Canadian Federation

and his Vision of a New

“Political Nationality”

. . . representation by population, though unsuited for application as a

governing principle as between the two provinces, would not involve

the same objection if other partners were drawn in by a federation. In a

struggle between two—one a weak, and the other a strong party—the

weaker could not but be overcome; but if three parties were con-

cerned, the stronger would not have the same advantage; as when it

was seen by the third that there was too much strength on one side,

the third would club with the weaker combatant to resist the big ﬁ ghter.

(Cheers and laughter.). . . .

The question for us to ask ourselves was this: Shall we be content

to remain separate—shall we be content to maintain a mere pro-

vincial existence, when, by combining together, we could become a

great nation? . . . Now, when we were united together, if union were

attained, we would form a political nationality with which neither the

national origin, nor the religion of any individual, would interfere. It

was lamented by some that we had this diversity of races, and hopes

were expressed that this distinctive feature would cease. . . . We could

not do away with the distinctions of race. We could not legislate for

the disappearance of the French Canadians from American soil, but

British and French Canadians alike could appreciate and understand

their position relative to each other. They were placed like great

families beside each other, and their contact produced a healthy spirit

of emulation. It was a beneﬁ t rather than otherwise that we had a

diversity of races. . . .

Source: Waite 1963, 40–41, 49.

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Ireland. Although the Fenian raids of New Brunswick in April 1866

and of the Niagara frontier of Canada West less than two months later

featured only sporadic ﬁ ghting, they intensiﬁ ed fears of an American

THE ROAD TO CONFEDERATION

George Brown (Who Formed

the Great Coalition with

Macdonald and Cartier)

Explains his Support for

Confederation

r. Speaker, I go heartily for the union, because it will throw down

the barriers of trade and give us the control of a market of four

millions of people. (Hear, hear.) What one thing has contributed so

much to the wondrous material progress of the United States as the

free passage of their products from one State to another? What has

tended so much to the rapid advance of all branches of their industry,

as the vast extent of their home market, creating an unlimited demand

for all the commodities of daily use, and stimulating the energy and

ingenuity of producers? . . . But here, sir, is a proposal which is to add,

in one day, near a million of souls to our population—to add valuable

territories to our domain, and secure to us all the advantages of a large

and proﬁ table commerce, now existing. And because some of us would

have liked certain of the little details otherwise arranged, we are to

hesitate in accepting this alliance! (Hear, hear.). . . .

Sir, the future destiny of these great provinces may be affected by the

decision we are about to give to an extent which at this moment we

may be unable to estimate—but assuredly the welfare for many years of

four millions of people hangs on our decision. (Hear, hear.) Shall we then

rise equal to the occasion?—shall we approach this discussion with-

out partisanship, and free from every personal feeling but the earnest

resolution to discharge conscientiously the duty which an over-ruling

Providence has placed upon us? Sir, it may be that some among us will

live to see the day when, as the result of this measure, a great and pow-

erful people may have grown up in these lands—when the boundless

forests all around us shall have given way to smiling ﬁ elds and thriving

towns—and when one united government, under the British ﬂ ag, shall

extend from shore to shore.

Source: Waite 1963, 63, 68–69, 78–79.

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invasion that were already fueled by the revival of annexationist senti-

ment directed toward Canada and the British Northwest. In December

1865 the United States Congress had further undermined relations with

British North America by legislating the end of the Reciprocity Treaty,

to become effective March 1866.

The Fenian threat, coupled with the collapse of Premier Smith’s rail-

way link with Maine in the wake of the demise of reciprocity, gave New

Brunswick Governor Arthur Gordon the opportunity to maneuver the

anti-Confederation administration out of ofﬁ ce. In the subsequent elec-

tion campaign, Tilley beneﬁ ted from the generous ﬁ nancial support of

the Canadian government and the Grand Trunk Railway to sweep back

into power. He then successfully engineered the Quebec Resolutions

through the provincial legislature in time to join his Canadian col-

leagues at the London Conference to ﬁ nalize the Confederation agree-

ment in December 1866. Tilley’s victory also enabled Tupper to get

support from the Nova Scotia legislature to send delegates to the Lon-

don conference.

At the London Conference, the Quebec Resolutions were only slightly

modiﬁ ed to include protection for existing separate school rights;

increased provincial subsidies; the designation of the union as a “con-

federation” rather than a “federation”; the renaming of Canada East and

Canada West as Quebec and Ontario, respectively; and changing the

name of the new nation from the Kingdom of Canada to the Dominion

of Canada. Even while the terms of Confederation were being ﬁ nalized

in London, Joseph Howe appealed to British ofﬁ cials in London to reject

the union on the grounds that it was being forced against the popular

will (Beck 1965). The British government ignored him, and the British

North America Act passed through Parliament without much notice in

March 1867. Indeed, Howe’s Nova Scotia delegates commented bitterly

on the limited attention devoted to the act in the House of Commons

compared to the vigor with which the members participated in the

debate on a new dog tax immediately afterward. On July 1, 1867, the

colonial age of British North America came to an end, and the provinces

of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, and Ontario ofﬁ cially united

to form a new nation known as the Dominion of Canada.

Confederation was effectively a marriage of economic and political

convenience between partners who had little desire to live together but

could not afford to live apart. The reluctance with which the British

North American colonies entered into their national partnership fore-

shadowed the persistence of the regional and cultural discontent that

would characterize Canada’s development in the last third of the 19th

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century and throughout the 20th century. Despite the precarious foun-

dation of unity, Canada would manage not only to survive as an inde-

pendent nation in the shadow of a mighty southern neighbor but also

to fulﬁ ll the transcontinental ambitions expressed in its motto, adopted

from Psalm 72: A Mari Usque Ad Mare—“From Sea to Sea.”

THE ROAD TO CONFEDERATION