Riendeau A Roger E. Brief History of Canada

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A BRIEF HISTORY OF CANADA

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isolated settlements. Communications were also improved by the pop-

ularization of the telephone, originally invented in 1875 by Alexander

Graham Bell, a Canadian. The greatest communications invention of

the era, however, was the radio, which became the most popular enter-

tainment medium. In 1920 Montreal radio station XWA (later CFCF)

relayed the ﬁ rst scheduled broadcast in North America. The radio also

accelerated the rise in popularity of spectator sports, highlighted by the

ﬁ rst broadcast of Hockey Night in Canada by Foster Hewitt in 1923.

Despite these pioneer efforts, more than three-quarters of the radio

programs to which Canadians were listening by the end of the decade

originated from the more powerful American border stations. This pro-

gramming, along with the rising American ﬁ lm industry, was beginning

to exert a pervasive inﬂ uence on Canadian culture. In effect, while the

hearts of Canadians were still closely tied to the British Empire, their

minds were increasingly being Americanized.

The changing orientation of Canadian life mirrored the new direction

of the Canadian economy. Unlike wheat, which moved from west to east

for shipment to the British market, the new extractive staples, including

minerals, pulpwood, and hydroelectric power, traveled more along

north-to-south lines, since their main markets were in the United States.

While Britain remained the chief market for the older products of farm-

ing and the forest, the new staple exports helped to make the United

States Canada’s leading trading partner by the early 1920s. Furthermore,

whereas the expansion and settlement of the western agrarian frontier

and its integration into a transcontinental and transatlantic economic

framework had been directed almost exclusively by the federal govern-

ment, the development of the northern resource frontier and its integra-

tion into a “continental” economy was largely driven by provincial

governments. In effect, the “new continentalism” was further shifting the

balance of power and responsibility from the federal to the provincial

governments. The lack of a new national economic strategy, the rise of

provincial power, and the uneven distribution of prosperity among

regions contributed to the outburst of discontent directed toward the

federal government and the two traditional political parties.

Renewed Regional Protest and New Political Challengers

Postwar political unrest was complicated by conﬂ icting demands and

expectations that divided city from country and east from west. In the

cities, industrial workers who had generally cooperated with govern-

ment and business during the war responded to postwar inﬂ ation by

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staging a series of strikes in 1918 and 1919 to support their demands

for better wages, working conditions, and job security. Buoyed by the

doubling of union membership during the war, the labor movement, in

typical Canadian fashion, remained divided over the most effective

strategy for overcoming the power of big business. While the more

conservative trade unions, which were dominant in eastern Canada,

preferred strategic labor action to bolster collective bargaining rights,

the industrial unions, which were stronger in the West, were adopting

a more radical political course. Labor organizers from the Prairie

Provinces and British Columbia, inspired by the supposed triumph of

the working class over ruling capitalist oppression in the Russian

Revolution of 1917, met in Calgary in March 1919 to form a branch of

One Big Union (OBU), an offspring of the radical American-based

International Workers of the World (IWW). Advocating the formation

of a socialist state, which they believed would be more responsive to

the needs of the working class, the delegates at the Calgary convention

called for a general strike to take place simultaneously in many western

cities and ultimately to spread across Canada. Their reasoning was that

government and industry would inevitably be forced to capitulate when

confronted with a complete withdrawal of the services of labor. Two

months after the Calgary convention, the theory was put to the test in

Winnipeg (Bercuson 2003).

Metalworkers’ and builders’ unions in Winnipeg launched a strike

that was supported by other unionized workers including police ofﬁ -

cers, ﬁ reﬁ ghters, telephone and telegraph operators, and delivery per-

sonnel, virtually closing down the city. The predominantly British-born

union leaders called for a total general strike and created a committee

to regulate the activities of more than 30,000 strikers and to maintain

essential services in the city. Comparing this strike committee with its

apparent dictatorial powers to the Bolsheviks who had staged the Rus-

sian Revolution in 1917, Winnipeg business and political leaders coun-

tered by forming the Citizens’ Committee of One Thousand to maintain

public utilities during the strike. Despite the outbreak of sympathy

strikes across the country, the six-week confrontation at Winnipeg was

actually losing momentum and workers were drifting back to their jobs

when Arthur Meighen, minister of justice and soon-to-be prime minis-

ter, ordered the Royal North-West Mounted Police to arrest the strike

leaders. A few days later, the workers organized a protest demonstra-

tion in downtown Winnipeg during which violence erupted between

police and strikers, resulting in one death and one serious injury. The

infamous Bloody Saturday ended with the dispersal of workers and the

THE CONFIRMATION OF NATIONHOOD

A BRIEF HISTORY OF CANADA

252

establishment of military control of the city. The strike committee soon

called off the strike without having achieved any of its goals.

In retrospect, the Winnipeg General Strike was hardly the Communist-

inspired conspiracy to usurp Canadian democracy that government and

business leaders feared, although the tendency of strike leaders to utter

the idealistic rhetoric of the Russian Revolution without understanding or

appreciating its autocratic outcomes distorted public perceptions of the

nature of the labor movement. In fact, the Winnipeg General Strike was a

major setback for the labor movement, as union membership declined by

one-third to a low of a quarter-million by the mid-1920s. Throughout the

decade, business sought to limit trade union effectiveness through wage

cuts, industrial consolidation, and improved technology and managerial

methods. In retaliation, workers staged a series of strikes, most of which

ended in violence and total failure. Moreover, organized labor remained

divided between the conservative Trades and Labor Congress (TLC),

which favored craft unions, and the All-Canadian Congress of Labour

(ACCL), created in 1927 to promote industrial unionism. Labor, how-

ever, did make some inroads in Canadian politics as J. S. Woodsworth,

one of the arrested leaders of the Winnipeg General Strike, was elected to

the federal parliament in 1921, while three other arrested leaders were

elected to the Manitoba legislature even though they were serving prison

sentences at the time.

In addition to labor strife, the postwar period also featured renewed

agrarian unrest. Long-standing dissatisfaction with high tariffs, freight

rates, and interest rates on bank loans and mortgages led farmers in

both eastern and western Canada to conclude that Liberal and Conser-

vative government policies were too biased in favor of the interests of

big business, particularly manufacturers and ﬁ nancial institutions.

Inﬂ uenced by the earlier Grange and Populist movements in the United

States, Canadian farmers resorted to political organization on a national

and a provincial basis in order to secure adequate government repre-

sentation of agricultural interests (Morton 1967; MacPherson 1979).

In 1918 the Canadian Council of Agriculture, the national associa-

tion of farmers organized eight years earlier, adopted a political pro-

gram called the New National Policy, which included the following

demands: tariff reduction, particularly on manufactured goods; higher

taxes on proﬁ ts and incomes rather than on land; public ownership of

utilities in the realms of transportation and power; continuation of

cooperative marketing strategies as embodied in the wartime Wheat

Board; political reforms to enhance democracy, notably abolition of the

Senate and direct legislation through such methods as the initiative and

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referendum; and social reforms like old-age pensions and mothers’

allowances. Encouraged by the victory of the United Farmers of Ontario

under the leadership of E. C. Drury in the provincial election of 1919,

the Canadian Council of Agriculture launched the National Progressive

Party in the following year. With Manitoba farmer Thomas A. Crerar as

its leader and the New National Policy as its political platform, the Pro-

gressives became the most successful third party in the nation’s history

by winning 65 seats in rural Ontario and the Prairie Provinces in the

federal election of 1921. By comparison, the incumbent Conservatives,

led by Arthur Meighen, who had succeeded Borden in the previous

year, were reduced to 50 seats, mostly in Ontario. Laurier’s successor

as Liberal leader, William Lyon Mackenzie King, grandson and name-

sake of the notorious leader of the Upper Canada Rebellion of 1837,

formed a minority government by taking 116 out of 235 seats. The

Liberals swept all 65 seats in Quebec, as Meighen suffered the wrath of

French-Canadian voters for his role as author of the conscription bill

four years earlier (Graham 1968).

The electoral success of the Progressive Party, bolstered by the vic-

tories of the United Farmers of Alberta and the United Farmers of

Manitoba in the provincial elections of 1921 and 1922, respectively,

marked the pinnacle of agrarian political strength in Canada. But the

challenge of preserving rural values and agricultural interests in an

increasingly urban and industrial age would prove to be daunting. The

United Farmers of Ontario were out of power by 1923, while the Pro-

gressive Party was bitterly divided from the outset over how most effec-

tively to exert its newly won inﬂ uence in the House of Commons. The

moderate Manitoba wing of the party headed by Crerar believed that

the Progressives should support the minority Liberal government in

return for its pledge to make signiﬁ cant concessions to farmers. King

convinced Crerar that, in their policy positions regarding tariffs, taxa-

tion, and social reform, Progressives were merely “Liberals in a hurry.”

The radical Alberta wing of the Progressive Party headed by Henry

Wise Wood was opposed to engaging in party politics and advocated

group government whereby farmers would cooperate with other inter-

est groups to achieve mutual goals. As a result of this division in the

ranks, the Progressives declined to serve as the Ofﬁ cial Opposition,

Crerar resigned as leader in 1922 to be replaced by Robert Forke, and

the so-called “ginger group” led by Wise Wood had seceded from the

party by 1924.

The fragmented Progressives could only manage to retain 24 seats in

the federal election of 1925, while the Conservatives mounted a come-

THE CONFIRMATION OF NATIONHOOD

A BRIEF HISTORY OF CANADA

254

back and emerged with a plurality of 116 seats versus 101 for the Liber-

als. Since no party could command a majority of the 245 seats in the

House of Commons, King asserted his constitutional right to continue

to govern provided that he could retain the support of the Progressives.

By lowering tariffs and introducing an old-age pensions scheme (which

the Senate eventually rejected), King was able to keep the Progressives

on the Liberal side for six months. But the postponement of the prom-

ised return of natural resources to the Prairie Provinces alienated the

Progressives, and a customs scandal relating to liquor smuggling in the

United States where Prohibition was in force resulted in a crisis of con-

ﬁ dence in the Liberal administration. To avoid losing a decisive vote in

the House of Commons, King exercised his constitutional right to ask

Governor-General Julian Bying to dissolve Parliament and to call a new

election. Bying responded by asserting his constitutional right to deny

King’s request and called upon Conservative leader Arthur Meighen to

form a government. Unable to secure sufﬁ cient Progressive support, the

Meighen administration was defeated by a motion of nonconﬁ dence

within three days to earn the distinction as the shortest government in

national history.

The King-Bying constitutional crisis became a major issue in the

federal election of 1926. To deﬂ ect attention away from the customs

scandal, King took advantage of the prevailing interest in national

autonomy, accusing the governor-general of attempting to perpetuate

colonialism by refusing to take the advice of his elected representatives

and charging Meighen with jeopardizing responsible government by

taking power unconstitutionally. Regardless of the merits of his argu-

ment, King succeeded in leading the Liberals to a majority victory

mostly at the expense of the disintegrating Progressives, who were

reduced to nine parliamentary seats. Although Progressivism ceased to

be a force in national politics as many of its moderates were absorbed

into the Liberal Party, the agrarian movement remained active in west-

ern provincial politics, particularly in Alberta, where the United Farm-

ers remained in power until 1935. Despite its short-lived national

prominence, the Progressive Party deserves credit for pressuring the

federal government into ﬁ nally transferring control of natural resources

to the three Prairie Provinces in 1930, thereby bringing down the cur-

tain on the original National Policy.

While the Progressives were serving as the voice of agrarian protest

in the West, the Maritime Rights movement was expressing that

region’s relative economic decline and its consequent disillusionment

with the Confederation (Forbes 1983). When Nova Scotia and New

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Brunswick entered Confederation in 1867, they were assigned nearly

one-ﬁ fth of the seats in the House of Commons. But by 1925, the par-

liamentary representation of the three Maritime Provinces, including

Prince Edward Island, was reduced to one-eighth, largely as a result of

regional depopulation. Workers and manufacturers had left for central

Canada and the United States in search of better economic opportuni-

ties. Besides a chronic lack of natural resources, the region suffered

from postwar economic change: the wartime boom at the ports of

Halifax and Saint John had subsided, the decline of shipbuilding and

railway construction reduced the demand for iron and steel, the con-

version to hydroelectric power and oil limited the market for Cape

Breton coal, lower tariffs no longer offered sufﬁ cient protection to

Maritime industry, and the price of ﬁ sh was steadily dropping as

advances in refrigeration made meat a dietary staple.

The inﬂ uential entrepreneurs and professionals who led the Mari-

time Rights movement encouraged the regional electorate to vote over-

whelmingly against the governing party in the federal elections of 1921

and 1925. In particular, this amorphous movement demanded increased

annual subsidies for the Maritime Provinces and greater tariff protec-

tion to revive the region’s steel and coal industries. When the Liberals

returned to power in 1926, King attempted to defuse the Maritime

rights movement by establishing a royal commission under the direc-

tion of Sir Arthur Rae Duncan to investigate regional grievances. In its

report in 1927, the Duncan Commission typically recommended

increased federal subsidies for the Maritime Provinces and their strug-

gling industries. The federal government did raise provincial subsidies,

but any hope that it would undertake initiatives to promote regional

development were dashed by the onset of the Great Depression.

The Achievement of National Autonomy

While national unity was being severely tested on the home front,

Canada’s distinguished performance on the battleﬁ elds of Europe dur-

ing World War I was enhancing its stature within the world community

of self-governing states (Preston 1970). Canada entered the war clearly

subordinate to the British government, which felt no obligation to con-

sult its dominions about war strategy or even to keep them informed

on developments in international relations. But as Britain became more

reliant on military support from its self-governing colonies, it became

increasingly difﬁ cult to ignore their demands for a greater voice in

imperial affairs. For this reason, the British military command aban-

THE CONFIRMATION OF NATIONHOOD

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256

doned its original plan to absorb Canadian recruits and agreed to the

formation of a distinct Canadian Corps. But the Canadian Corps

remained under British command, which meant that the Canadian gov-

ernment had no share in the decisions relating to its deployment.

Borden continued to press for “fuller information” and “consultation

respecting general policy in war operations,” but Canadian-born

Colonial Secretary Bonar Law was “not able to see any way in which

this could be practically done.” The acute and urgent recruitment crisis

that led to the decision to impose conscription in 1917 gave the British

government a will to ﬁ nd a way.

To persuade them to intensify their war effort, the Dominion prime

ministers were invited to join the British cabinet to form an Imperial

War Cabinet that would be responsible for the general direction of war

strategy and foreign policy. Furthermore, the Imperial War Confer-

ence, meeting simultaneously with the Imperial War Cabinet in 1917,

passed Resolution XI recognizing the equality of the Dominions with

one another and with Britain “as autonomous nations of an Imperial

Commonwealth.” About the same time, the Canadian Corps, following

its success at Vimy Ridge, was placed under the command of General

Arthur Currie, the ﬁ rst Canadian commander of the armed forces.

Thus, Canada emerged from World War I with an ability to exert con-

trol over its armed forces and to exercise genuine inﬂ uence in relevant

matters of imperial foreign policy.

Canada’s evolution from colony to nation was further advanced by

the postwar peace settlement (Eayrs 1964; Stacey 1977, 1981). The

British government embarked upon the peacemaking process on the

assumption that the allied great powers would play the major role,

while the smaller states and the Dominions would be consulted only on

matters directly affecting them. However, Borden insisted that Canada’s

signiﬁ cant contribution to the Allied war effort entitled it to separate

representation at the peace conference in Versailles in 1919. Ultimately,

the Dominions won the right to sign the Treaty of Versailles, and Bor-

den also secured the right of the Canadian Parliament to approve the

treaty prior to imperial ratiﬁ cation. In the continuing battle for inde-

pendent national status, Canada won a seat on the new League of

Nations and the International Labour Organization, despite the Ameri-

can objection that admission of the Dominions was advantageous to

Britain. Yet Canada was adamant in its objection to a system of collec-

tive security proposed in Article X of the League of Nations Covenant,

which bound member nations to come to each other’s aid in the event

of foreign aggression against them. Although unsuccessful in modifying

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or eliminating the provision, which U.S. president Woodrow Wilson

regarded as the cornerstone of the league, Canada clearly articulated an

isolationist suspicion of European entanglements that would become

the basis for North American foreign policy for the next two decades.

To reduce the possibility of being dragged into another European

war, Canada continued to seek even greater autonomy within the Brit-

ish Empire during the 1920s. After greatly advancing the cause of

Canadian autonomy over the previous nine years, Borden retired in

1920 and his successor, Meighen, maintained the same interest in the

development of a common imperial foreign policy based on mutual and

continuous consultation between Britain and the Dominions as free

and equal partners of the Commonwealth.

When he came to power in 1921, Prime Minister King adopted a

cautious approach to foreign policy in order to maintain national unity.

He was keenly aware of the divisive effects of Canada’s involvement in

international affairs and the damage done to his political party before

Growing autonomy in world affairs is reﬂ ected in the Canadian delegation at the League

of Nations (left to right): O. D. Skelton, Philippe Roy, Raoul Dandurand, Prime Minister W. L.

Mackenzie King, Charles Dunning, W. A. Riddell. Mackenzie King (1874–1950) served as prime

minister for more than 22 years, the longest tenure in the British Empire.

(Library and Archives

Canada C-009055)

THE CONFIRMATION OF NATIONHOOD

A BRIEF HISTORY OF CANADA

258

and during World War I. Consequently, he did not share the faith that

Borden and Meighen had in the prospects that Canada could exert suf-

ﬁ cient control over its foreign policy within a common imperial frame-

work. Wishing to maintain the imperial tie but suspicious that Britain

wanted only to use its self-governing colonies to enhance its own

power, King was determined to free Canada from the last traces of colo-

nial restraint and to complete its evolution toward full national status.

The difﬁ culty of shaping a common imperial foreign policy became

apparent during the Chanak crisis of 1922. When British troops sta-

tioned in Chanak, Turkey, to guard the neutral zone between the

Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea came under siege by Turkish

nationalists, the imperial government appealed to the Dominions for

reinforcements. King was upset that Canada had not been appropriately

consulted about events in Turkey until they reached the crisis stage,

and he remained unconvinced that becoming involved in this distant

conﬂ ict was in Canada’s interest. To the imperial request, he replied

that “only Parliament could decide,” and unfortunately for Britain, or

perhaps fortunately for Canada, the House of Commons was not in ses-

sion. By contrast, Opposition leader Meighen insisted that Canada

should have responded: “Ready, aye, ready we stand by you.” The crisis

was soon resolved by the Treaty of Lausanne, which prompted King to

declare that, because it had not been a party to this agreement, Canada

would not be bound by it. In effect, Canada had succeeded in avoiding

foreign entanglements and in discrediting the notion of a common

imperial foreign policy.

The demise of imperial unity in diplomatic affairs was completed by

the signing of the Halibut Treaty of 1923, an agreement between Can-

ada and the United States relating to ﬁ shing rights on the Paciﬁ c coast.

While negotiations were conducted entirely by Canadian minister of

marines and ﬁ sheries Ernest Lapointe, the British ambassador in Wash-

ington expected to sign the treaty in keeping with imperial tradition.

But the Canadian government insisted that Lapointe alone should sign

the treaty, a decision the British government did not dispute. For the

ﬁ rst time, Canada had assumed responsibility for concluding a formal

treaty with a foreign power on its own behalf. The Imperial Conference

later that year formally abandoned the idea of a common imperial for-

eign policy and afﬁ rmed the right of the Dominions to conclude treaties

with foreign states. Canada’s power to control its international relations

would be conﬁ rmed in 1927 when Vincent Massey took up residence

in Washington as the ﬁ rst Canadian-appointed foreign minister, and

the United States reciprocated by opening a legation in Ottawa. Other

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The Statute of

Westminster, 1931

AN ACT to give effect to certain resolutions passed by Imperial

Conferences held in the years 1926 and 1930. [2 George V. Chapter 4]

11th December, 1931

WHEREAS the delegates to His Majesty’s Governments in the

United Kingdom, the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of

Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, the Union of South Africa,

the Irish Free State and Newfoundland, at Imperial Conferences

holden at Westminster in the years of our Lord nineteen hundred

and twenty-six and nineteen hundred and thirty did concur in making

the declarations and resolutions set forth in the Reports of the said

Conferences:

And whereas it is meet and proper to set out by way of preamble

to this Act that, inasmuch as the Crown is the symbol of the free

association of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations,

and as they are united by a common allegiance to the Crown. . . .

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ENACTED by the King’s Most

Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords

Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament

assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows: — . . .

2. 1. The Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, shall not apply to any

law made after the commencement of this Act by the Parliament of

a Dominion. 2. No law and no provision of any law made after the

commencement of this Act by the Parliament of a Dominion shall

be void or inoperative on the ground that it is repugnant to the

law of England, or to the provisions of any existing or future Act

of Parliament of the United Kingdom . . . and the powers of the

Parliament of a Dominion shall include the power to repeal or amend

any such Act, order, rule or regulation in so far as the same is part

of the law of the Dominion.

3. It is hereby declared and enacted that the Parliament of a Dominion

has full power to make laws having extra-territorial operation.

4. No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the

commencement of this Act shall extend or be deemed to extend, to

a Dominion as part of the law of that Dominion, unless it is expressly

declared in that Act that that Dominion has requested, and con-

sented to, the enactment thereof. . . .

THE CONFIRMATION OF NATIONHOOD