Woodward D. Lloyd George and the Generals
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should speak their whole minds and state exactly what they considered was
required to ensure complete co-operation and the best possible dispositions for
our forces.” Given his cue, Nivelle’s face turned red. His usual glibness abandoned
him and he “beat around the bush.” After thanking Haig for his previous
cooperation, he finally came to the point: “He did not anticipate any difficulties
between the Commanders-in-Chief, who were veritable brothers in arms. He
considered, however, that there must be certain rules which should not only guide
the relations of the Generals themselves, but should also be binding on their
successors if either of them disappeared.” The day’s session came to an end when
Lloyd George and Briand requested Nivelle to put in writing his thoughts on the
“rules” that should govern the relationship between the two Allied commanders
in chief.
64
The British delegation then took a stroll before dinner, with Lloyd George and
his generals going their separate ways. The distance between them was about to
widen in a different and explosive fashion. Returning from his walk, Lloyd George
met with Briand, Lyautey, and Nivelle. When Hankey was summoned to this
gathering, the prime minister handed him a typed page which had been prepared
a week earlier at Nivelle’s headquarters. “What do you think of it?”
65
the prime
minister wanted to know. The document, “Projet d’Organisation de 1’Unité de
Commandement sur le Front occidental,” represented unity of command with a
vengeance. Haig had been reduced to the status of an adjutant-general, with the
British commanders receiving their commands directly from French headquarters.
Only personnel and discipline remained in Haig’s province. The stunned Hankey
showed no emotion, but asked for time to study this extraordinary document.
Wully first learned of this proposal as he finished his dinner. His “face went
the colour of mahogany, his eyes became perfectly round, his eyebrows slanted
outwards like a forest of bayonets held at charge—in fact he showed every sign
of having a fit. ‘Get’ Aig,’ he bellowed to The Monument [Major C.C.Lucas,
Robertson’s s private secretary].”
66
Haig’s and Robertson’s rage was certainly justified and is explained by more
than their injured pride and their opposition to the laudable concept of a unified
command. The British army, which had made astonishing strides in its size and
fighting ability, was now arguably the cornerstone of the Entente. On the other
hand, the depleted French forces were becoming demoralized; and Haig had been
concerned for some time that the French, in an attempt to maintain their
ascendancy on the western front, might attempt to incorporate the British forces
into their own army. To their consternation and disbelief, the prime minister was
a willing accomplice in or even the instigator of such an “amalgam.”
67
Rather than
accept this humiliating arrangement, Haig and Robertson were prepared to resign.
The two generals were soon knocking on Lloyd George’s door. The prime
minister, who had worked himself into “an extra-ordinary frame of mind,” did not
flinch before their fury. When Haig suggested that his “Tommies” would refuse
to serve under a Frenchman, Lloyd George fired back: “Well, Field-Marshal, I
know the private soldier very well. He speaks very freely to me, and there are
THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE 137
people he criticises a good deal more strongly than Gen. Nivelle!”
68
He then played
his ace in the hole. The War Cabinet, he informed the shocked and incredulous
generals, was behind him.
But could Lloyd George really depend upon the Unionists to support the extreme
French proposal which called for the virtual abolition of Haig’s position as
commander in chief of the British army? It was one thing to place Haig under
Nivelle for the forthcoming operation; quite another matter to hand over the British
army lock, stock, and barrel to the French. That Lloyd George had gone too far is
indicated by Hankey, who told Haig that “Lloyd George had not received full
authority from the War Cabinet for acting as he was doing.”
69
After a restless night, Lloyd George was prepared to retreat—but not far. He
came to Calais expecting a “‘hard fight,’” but as he told Miss Stevenson before
departing for Calais, “‘I mean to have my way.’”
70
His rash acceptance of the
French position, however, placed his authority and prestige on the line with the
generals over a clearly flawed command arrangement.
Fortunately he was rescued from his predicament by a face-saving compromise
which all parties accepted after tense negotiations which shifted from room to
room. According to the new formula, Haig’s position was to be based on Milne’s
relationship to Sarrail, which had been established by the Rome conference. And
it was made clear that this arrangement would be terminated at the end of Nivelle’s
offensive. Also Haig retained the freedom to direct operations on his own front.
Relieved that the original French proposal had been dropped, Robertson and Haig,
with considerable misgiving, signed the new arrangement.
With his generals’ signatures on the Calais agreement, Lloyd George thought
that he had won a major victory over the high command: Haig, in whom he had
no confidence, had had his role considerably diminished in the approaching
offensive. In his haste to support Nivelle at Haig’s expense, however, Lloyd
George had been largely responsible for establishing a faulty system of supreme
command. It was unsound, if not dangerous, for Nivelle to command the French
army and at the same time exercise executive authority over the British forces.
Foch in 1918 and Eisenhower in 1944– 45 occupied a position above the national
armies involved, and were responsible to the Allied governments equally. With
Nivelle responsible only to the French government, national sentiment in Britain
was certain to be inflamed. During the following days, the Calais agreement was
a ticking bomb threatening to blow apart Lloyd George’s fragile ministry.
Returning to London, Lloyd George gained the War Cabinet’s acceptance of
the Calais agreement by telling the ministers that Haig’s relationship to Nivelle
had been little changed because the field marshal, on Kitchener’s instructions, had
subordinated his strategy to the French in the West since taking command. With
his signature on the agreement, Robertson at first held his tongue. But, upon
leaving the cabinet room, he wrote Haig: “He [Lloyd George] is an awful liar. His
story to the War Cabinet gave quite a wrong impression this morning.… I cannot
believe that a man such as he can for long remain head of any Government.”
71
138 LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS
Across the Channel, Haig’s irritation with Nivelle was rising. (Had he known
the French general’s involvement in the conspiracy against him, one wonders what
he would have done.) On the day that the Calais conference broke up, Nivelle sent
him a brusque letter demanding to know of his offensive preparations and
requesting the appointment of Sir Henry Wilson as head of the newly created
British mission at French general headquarters. Nivelle’s dictatorial tone and his
choice of Wilson made Haig’s blood boil, for the lanky Irishman was widely (and
incorrectly) considered by the British army to be more favorable to French than
British interests. “Briefly it is the type of letter which no gentleman could have
drafted, and it also is one which no C in C of this great British Army should receive
without protest,”
72
an offended Haig wrote in his diary.
Haig had more than Nivelle on his mind at this juncture. While at Calais, he
had received word that the German army was withdrawing many miles behind the
existing front to a new defensive position—the Hindenburg Line (or Siegfried
Stellung). The vastly improved German defenses and the additional reserve
divisions created by the shorter German line altered the strategical picture in the
West, and enabled Haig to question the advisability of Nivelle’s attack (“a blow
in the air”). Asserting that the Germans now had the initiative, he argued that his
first concern must be the threat of a German thrust against his forces between Lille
and the sea (the Ypres sector) to capture the Channel ports. If he committed his
reserves to Nivelle as demanded, he warned his government in a memorandum
on March 2, “the safety of the British Armies might be gravely endangered.”
73
Haig’s fear of a German attack, though mistaken, was probably genuine; but his
position was suspect because if Nivelle’s attack had to be abandoned, he would
regain full authority over his army, save it, or so he feared, from being broken up
and incorporated in the French army, and clear the way for his Flanders operation.
Whatever position he took, Haig could count on Robertson’s strong support.
After probing the mood of London, Robertson had decided to lead a mutiny against
the Calais agreement. The Army Council and Derby were solidly behind him, with
the secretary of state for war threatening resignation and complaining to Lloyd
George about his exclusion from the crucial February 24 meeting of the War
Cabinet.
74
The nationalistic passions aroused by Haig’s humiliation were certain
to bring many Unionists, especially Cecil, Long, Chamberlain, and Carson, into
the War Office’s camp.
75
And then there was the support of Buckingham Palace,
whose reaction to Haig’s warning that Calais might be the first step toward
incorporating the British army into the French corps bordered on hysteria. Lloyd
George’s motives, always suspect to George V, were given the worst possible
interpretation. Major Clive Wigram, the king’s equerry, told an incredulous
Rawlinson that “L.G.’s reason for wishing to do so [placing the British Army
under Nivelle] is based on his ultimate intention of breaking up the Monarchy and
introducing a republic with himself at the head and that he foresees the loyal
adherence of the Army to the Monarch is his chief obstacle—For this reason he
desires to weaken it by breaking it up and distributing it amongst the French
Armies.”
76
THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE 139
On March 2, Robertson prepared a memorandum for the eyes of the War Cabinet
making clear his opposition to Calais. He had only signed the agreement, he
argued, because constitutionally the War Cabinet’s position left him no other
alternative.
77
On that same day he wrote Haig, encouraging him to stand up to
Nivelle and assuring him of the Army Council’s support. “I am sure you will do
all you can to smooth things over; but on the other hand it is bad to lay up certain
trouble in the future, and if things seem really to have reached the breaking point
it may be best to have it all out now.”
78
The next day, with a discussion of his
memorandum about to take place in the War Cabinet, he fired off another letter
to the field marshal, suggesting that if Haig had any criticism of his new
relationship with Nivelle, he should put them before the War Cabinet
immediately.
79
Meanwhile Robertson waged a vigorous campaign to wean the civilians away
from the prime minister.
The rugged old man stumped up and down Ministers’ rooms, or glowering
at them from under his enormous eyebrows banged the table and repeated
again and again that Nivelle was answerable to the French Government
alone and that therefore the French and not the British Government was the
supreme authority over our army. Was that what was wanted? he growled,
baring his teeth in the alarming way he had: well, if so, tell the country.
80
The C.I.G.S. gained unwitting support from an unexpected quarter—the French.
Haig had passed on his memorandum of March 2 to Nivelle and enclosed a
covering letter to the French general questioning the details of his offensive. The
normally composed Nivelle was now in an anxious and cranky mood; to him
Haig’s attitude “appeared disobedient and his doubts almost sacrilegious.”
81
When
Nivelle forwarded Haig’s memorandum to his government, it in turn demanded,
on March 7, that the British government require Haig to comply with the Calais
agreement.
82
Meanwhile, Nivelle wrote Haig insisting that his attack “must not
be reduced by a single man, or gun.”
83
He also secretly got in touch with Lloyd
George and gave his opinion “that the situation cannot improve as long as Sir
Douglas Haig remains in command.” His choice for Haig’s successor was General
Sir Robert Gough, the young and dashing commander of the Fifth Army.
84
As the Calais agreement began to unravel, Lloyd George was faced with a
serious dilemma. Convinced that Haig’s appreciation of the situation created by
the German withdrawal was an attempt to destroy the decisions at Calais, his
combative instincts prompted him to fight back. He considered either firing Haig
or goading him to resign, although it was certain that Robertson’s and Derby’s
resignation would immediately follow. With the abrupt disappearance of Britain’s
military leadership, his ministry might disintegrate. On the verge of a momentous
decision he turned to the individual whose advice he valued most—Hankey.
Working late into the evening of March 7, Hankey prepared a paper that considered
the consequences of such a drastic development. In his memorandum, Hankey,
140 LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS
who had polled the members of the War Cabinet, pointed out that only Bonar Law,
more out of loyalty than conviction, would support the dismissal of Haig. He then
wrote:
12. Personally I believe that, if Haig resigned, the Government would very
likely be defeated, and that, even if they recalled him, they would be in
jeopardy, unless Haig was at once appointed to some other active command.
I do not under-rate the very strong case that would be made for the change,
but, even so, I believe that the result would be to cause elements to coalesce
which would never otherwise do so. The late Prime Minister would, I
believe, on this issue rally to him his old followers, and many waverers;
they would be joined, from sheer mischief, by the disunited Irish, by the
pacifists, and possibly by some Tories. Court and society influence, and all
elements within reach of the General Staff would be thrown into the scale
against the Government, and, whether the Government were defeated or not
they would be very seriously weakened. I have not the remotest idea how
an appeal to the country would result, but at the present time an election on
such a subject would not strengthen national unity.
13. On the political side, therefore, the arguments appear to me
overwhelmingly in favour of Haig’s retention. If, however, this is considered
impossible, it is of the first importance that he should not resign, but should
be recalled, and should, if possible, be given a high military command e.g.
at Salonica.
85
On the morning of March 8, the prime minister paced up and down the cabinet
room, hotly arguing with Hankey, who supported the retention of Haig. Lloyd
George then attended a meeting of the War Cabinet in which the ministers insisted
that another Anglo-French conference was necessary to resolve the differences
between Haig and Nivelle.
86
On the following day, incensed by French arrogance,
the War Cabinet went a step further. It instructed Lloyd George to demonstrate
the War Cabinet’s “full confidence” in Haig at the next Anglo-French
conference.
87
Lloyd George now had no choice but to beat a hasty retreat. Without the support
of the War Cabinet, he dared not remove Haig. He had to ask himself: Was this
the issue to break up his government and go to the country in a general election?
The mandate that had brought him to power had been total victory over Germany
—not support of the French against the leadership of the British army or
interference with the military’s conduct of the war. The Dardanelles Commission
report, published on the ninth, which by implication blamed the “amateur”
strategists for that disaster, would certainly not strengthen his position in any
quarrel with the army. Under the circumstances, he would almost certainly go
down in defeat. It is ironic that his opponents, fearing that a general election might
return him to power with all restraints removed, did not press him so hard as they
THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE 141
might have. Buckingham Palace urged Derby and Haig not to resign
88
; and there
were no attempts to arouse the volatile and bombastic press.
On the eve of the Anglo-French conference in London, Haig’s and Robertson’s
supporters kept up the pressure. Derby, in a memorandum which the prime
minister had requested, pointed out that Balfour, Carson, and members of the War
Cabinet, including Bonar Law, convinced of Haig’s good intentions, were furious
with the French attitude.
89
On the day the conference began, George V in an
acrimonious interview took the prime minister to task for being kept in the dark
about the Calais arrangement. After all, “as Head of the State and of the Army,
he had his responsibilities” and he “objected to being kept in ignorance of matters
affecting the welfare of the Army.” He bluntly informed Lloyd George that the
“whole Army” was certain to “strongly resent” being placed “under the command
of a foreign General.” If this state of affairs “were known in the Country it would
be equally condemned.” Lloyd George held his ground, asserting that “in the event
of any such public expression of feeling, he would go to the country and would
explain matters and very soon have the whole Country on his side.”
90
Despite these brave words, the prime minister was in full retreat. In a private
meeting with Nivelle and at the conference, he went out of his way to point out
that “Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig possessed the full confidence of the War
Cabinet, and was regarded with admiration in England.”
91
For once Lloyd George was in harmony with Robertson as they worked to take
some of the sting out of the Calais agreement. Prodded by Wully, Haig agreed to
accept Wilson as the head of the British mission at French general headquarters.
But, at the same time, it was made clear to Nivelle that Wilson, who was to report
directly to Haig rather than Robertson in London, was not to act as a British chief
of staff. In short, the function of his British mission was limited to liaison and was
not to be used by Nivelle to increase his control over the British army. Lloyd
George also took the lead in removing the threat of an amalgam of the two armies,
insisting that the British army should not be “mixed up with the French Army.”
92
Meanwhile, at the War Office, Haig and Nivelle, under Robertson’s watchful gaze,
succeeded in reaching an agreement on the offensive.
Robertson had reason to be pleased by the results of the Anglo-French
conference. To his great relief, he now apparently had Haig and Nivelle working
in unison; perhaps now the soldiers might get on with the war without division
between the commanders in chief giving the civilians another excuse to interfere
in military matters. Also, many of the most objectionable elements in the Calais
agreement, especially the tendency by the French to incorporate the British army
into their own, had been resolved to the advantage of the British. As for Lloyd
George, his continued commitment to Nivelle was disastrous. To be sure, he had
succeeded in stilling the intense passions aroused by Calais that threatened his
government without abandoning unity of command in the West. But his support
of Nivelle had cost him dearly and the damage was ultimately to be greater. His
devious methods deepened the high command’s distrust of him and he was about
to be tarred with Nivelle’s failure to rupture the German lines. In his discussion
142 LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS
with Hankey on March 8, the latter had urged him to force the French to reconsider
their strategy in light of the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line. In the
new situation, Hankey argued that Haig’s plan to attack in Flanders, where the
enemy “is bound, either to fight, or to surrender some objective of strategical or
political importance,”
93
offered a better chance of success. Lloyd George,
however, refused to reopen a discussion of Allied plans at the London conference,
and consequently increased his own responsibility for Nivelle’s unsuccessful
offensive. The War Cabinet, however, on March 14, did agree that Haig should
be allowed to prepare for his northern operation if the French failed to break
through.
94
With his reputation intimately linked to Nivelle’s success or failure, Lloyd
George’s anxiety mounted as the time for the French offensive approached. Each
day seemed to bring new complications. The German withdrawal to the
Hindenburg Line had undercut Nivelle’s tactical plan because of the shorter and
stouter German defensive position and the additional reserves freed from the
trenches. Meanwhile, inexcusable security lapses on the part of the French
destroyed any hope of surprising the Germans. Shopkeepers in Paris openly
discussed the date of the attack; and German raids on French trenches resulted in
the capture of documents which revealed the nature of the approaching offensive.
Just after the Anglo-French conference in London broke up an ill political wind
blew toward Nivelle’s headquarters from Paris. On March 15, the French minister
for war, General Lyautey, was shouted down when he attempted to speak to a
night session of the French Chamber. He responded by shouting “at the
gesticulating mob three words which the official stenographers did not take down,
very military words which described exactly what he thought of his audience.”
95
His subsequent resignation resulted in the collapse of Nivelle’s political support,
with Premier Briand resigning on the nineteenth. The new ministry under the
financier Ribot was hostile to Nivelle’s strategy because it threatened to deplete
further the war-weary French army. The driving force in the government was the
brilliant and iconoclastic minister for war, Paul Painlevé, who had boycotted
Briand’s government because of his opposition to Nivelle’s offensive. The
cautious and defensive-minded Philippe Pétain was his favorite general.
The new mood in Paris coincided with other events that radically transformed
the entire grand-strategic landscape that had existed when the plans for the spring
offensives had been made. In Petrograd, revolution swept the streets, with the tsar
abdicating on March 15. Although it was by no means certain that Russia would
fall out of the war, the situation was clouded with uncertainty. Meanwhile, the
United States was being daily pushed closer to a declaration of war by Berlin’s
reopening of unrestricted U-boat warfare in February. The German submarine
campaign was indeed a mixed blessing. It eventually brought America into the
war, but at the same time it put immense pressure on the already perilous shipping
position of the Allies. Elsewhere, the Italians were showing little fight and were
bombarding the British government with pleas for assistance to ward off a
combined AustroGerman attack which they anticipated. Other than America’s
THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE 143
inexorable slide toward war, the only encouraging news came from the periphery.
On March 11 Baghdad fell to General Sir Stanley Maude. Although of no real
strategic value, this success in Mesopotamia had significant political
consequences. Britain’s bargaining position at any peace conference was
strengthened and the allies were given something to boost their war-weary spirits.
Ironically, as the day of the British and French attacks neared, Lloyd George
found himself arguing against diverting forces away from the western front. First,
in early March, Bissolati showed up in London to lobby for Anglo-French troops
and guns being dispatched south of the Alps. Since Bissolati wanted these
reinforcements more for defensive rather than offensive purposes, it was easy for
Lloyd George to say no. He even found himself using the general staff s argument
that the approaching Allied offensive in the West would keep the Germans from
concentrating on Italy.
96
The Welshman took bitter pleasure in reminding the
Italians that their lack of support at Rome had placed him “in the position of
appearing to thrust an undesirable gift upon a reluctant recipient.”
97
Then, on the
very day the British launched their attack in April, Painlevé paid Lloyd George a
visit and advocated strategy which bore a strong resemblance to Lloyd George’s
earlier proposal. The French minister for war “appeared to desire” that four British
and four French divisions be sent to Italy.
98
However much Painlevé’s strategy
may have appealed to Lloyd George, it was too late for him to dismount from the
Nivelle horse he was riding. Painlevé was given no encouragement.
Another consideration for Lloyd George was the growing belief in London that
Austria-Hungary, after the death of Francis Joseph in late 1916, might be
persuaded to make a separate peace. In January, when the War Cabinet had
discussed detaching Austria-Hungary, Robertson had stressed the military
advantages. It “would eliminate 47 Austro-Hungarian divisions now on the
Eastern front, and set free 149 Russian divisions to deal with 78 German divisions
now on the Eastern front.”
99
The Russian Revolution in March made peace with
Vienna even more urgent. At Folkestone on April 11, in an atmosphere of great
secrecy, Ribot had shown Lloyd George a letter from Francis Joseph’s successor,
Emperor Charles, which suggested a compromise peace, but offered no
concessions to Italy.
100
Lloyd George immediately recognized the divisive nature
of this document: Italy would feel betrayed. Still, he apparently held the slim hope
that Italy might be bought off with concessions in Asia Minor. He also found
justification in this peace feeler for his desire to put pressure on Austria on the
Italian front if Nivelle’s attack miscarried.
As these crosscurrents tugged Lloyd George first this way, then that way, the
great spring offensive began. The British led off on April 9 to draw off the German
reserves. Haig’s first objective was Vimy Ridge, which was north of Arras.
Nivelle’s attack a week later in miserable weather fell far short of his objectives
and belied his last words to his troops: “L’heure venue! Confiance! Courage! Vive
la France!” Judged by the standards of previous general French assaults, the results
of Nivelle’s attack were generally impressive and his losses hardly unusual.
101
A
breakthrough, however, proved to be a mirage and the impact on French morale
144 LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS
was devastating. Meanwhile, Haig won a brilliant victory initially at Vimy Ridge
which surpassed anything achieved by British arms on the Somme in 1916. The
attempt to exploit the capture of Vimy Ridge with cavalry, however, was
characterized by considerable confusion and little success.
When it became obvious that Nivelle had not broken through, Lloyd George
was faced with a great dilemma. The French informed him that they wanted to
break off the offensive and wait for the recovery of Russia and for America, which
had come into the war on April 6, to send assistance. When Lloyd George sounded
out Haig about the military situation, however, the field marshal was horrified at
any suggestion that the Allies should stand on the defensive. “But I must say at
once,” he wrote in his diary, “that it would be the height of folly for the French to
stop now just when the Germans had committed the serious fault of retiring,
meaning to avoid a battle, but had been forced to fight against their will…. If
offensive operations are stopped in France, the enemy will be given time to recover
from the blows he received on the Somme[,] at Verdun, Arras, and now on the
Aisne.”
102
Lloyd George, humbled by Nivelle’s failure and Haig’s success, was in no
position to support the French over his generals, however much their views might
parallel his own. The chickens hatched by his support of Nivelle at Calais had
come home to roost. An immediate result of Nivelle’s failure was a demand by
Robertson that the Calais agreement be given a quick burial.
103
With Nivelle in
disgrace and the French government wobbling, there could be no argument against
restoring the complete independence of the British army.
Freed from the yoke of Calais, Haig was prepared for his army to assume the
major burden of defeating the German army. On April 19, Haig wrote Robertson
that “the results so far attained this year show that we have already reduced
considerably, by previous efforts, the enemy’s resisting power…. I consider that
the prospects of success this year are distinctly good…and that it would be unwise,
unsound and probably, in the long run, more costly in men and money to cease
offensive operations at an early date.”
104
Haig, of course, was not just thinking of
following up his Vimy Ridge success; his primary interest was the great blow he
wanted to deliver in Flanders later in the year.
But was Haig’s strategy the right one with support from Britain’s warweary
allies uncertain? It could be argued that the British army, the best and most reliable
Allied force in the field, would have to deliver massive blows against the German
army to keep the anti-German coalition from crumbling. But was it wise for Britain
to take on the Germans almost singlehandedly? As we will see there were no easy
answers to the profoundly complex questions facing the British government.
NOTES
1. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 1:620.
THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE 145
2. “Memorandum of Conversation between Mr. Lloyd George and certain Unionist
exMinisters, December 7, 1916,” Curzon MSS, Eur. F. 112/130.
3. Robertson to Lloyd George, December 8, 1916, Robertson MSS, 1/19/9. It is possible
that Robertson never sent this letter for there is not a copy in the Lloyd George MSS.
4. War Cabinet (l), December 9, 1916, CAB 23/1.
5. The reader should be aware of the revisionist contention that by 1916 Russia was
producing an adequate supply of war material. See Norman Stone, The Eastern
Front, 1914–1917 (1975), p. 13.
6. Memorandum by Hankey, December 8, 1916, CAB 42/19/2. This important
memorandum never became an officially numbered paper and was later filed
curiously and incorrectly with the Cabinet Papers for September 1916.
7. Hankey Diary, December 20, 1916, 1/1.
8. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 1:818.
9. Robertson to Lloyd George, December 12, 1916, Robertson MSS, I/33/12, and
memorandum by Robertson, December 29, 1916, W.O. 106/1511.
10. Robertson to Haig, December 24, 1916, Robertson MSS, I/22/97.
11. C.Delmé Radcliffe to Lloyd George, December 15 and 25, Lloyd George MSS, F/
56/1/1 and 3.
12. Brigadier-General E.L.Spears, Prelude to Victory (1939), p. 32.
13. Ibid., p. 42.
14. Haig to Lady Haig, December 20, 1916, Haig MSS, no. 146.
15. Haig, “Notes on relations with French C in C [Joffre and Nivelle], 1916–1917,” n.d.,
Haig MSS, no. 215 K.
16. Anglo-French Conference, December 26, 1917, CAB 28/2/I.C.-13 (a).
17. Ibid., December 27, 1916, CAB 28/2/I.C.-13 (b).
18. Ibid.
19. See War Cabinet (20), December 27, 1916, CAB 23/1.
20. Anglo-French Conference, December 28, 1916, CAB 28/2/I.C.-13 (d), and War
Cabinet (21), December 28, 1916, CAB 23/1.
21. Robertson to Haig, December 28, 1916, Robertson MSS, 1/22/100.
22. War Cabinet (23), December 30, 1916, CAB 23/1.
23. Cabinet Paper G 106 of January 1917, CAB 24/3.
24. Ibid.
25. Haig Diary, January 1,4–6, 1917, no. 110.
26. Esher Diary, January 4, 1917, 2/17.
27. Hankey Diary, January 4, 1917, 1/2, and Wilson Diary, January 4, 1917.
28. Hankey Diary, January 5, 1917, 1/2.
29. Ibid. and E. Capel Cure (a member of the staff of the British embassy in Rome) to
Lloyd George, n.d., Lloyd George MSS, F/56/1/16.
30. On the train to Rome, Lloyd George had “decided definitely” against circulating his
memorandum. Hankey Diary, January 5, 1917, 1/2.
31. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 1:854, and Allied Conference at Rome, January 5–7,
1917, CAB 28/2/I.C.-15 (b).
32. Robertson to Wigram, January 12, 1917, Robertson MSS, I/12/31.
33. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 1:858–59.
34. Robertson to Lloyd George, January 6, 1917, Lloyd George MSS, F/44/3/6.
35. War Cabinet (12 and 92), December 20 and March 9, 1917, CAB 23/1 and 2.
146 LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS