Woodward D. Lloyd George and the Generals
Подождите немного. Документ загружается.
Wilson was abruptly called to London, he objected to being put in Robertson’s
shoes. Instead, he suggested that more power be given to Versailles to reduce
Robertson “from the position of a master to that of a servant.”
104
If anything, Wilson’s hurried trip to London made Lloyd George more anxious
than ever to have him at his side. The two men talked for hours about future British
military policy, with Wilson telling the prime minister what he wanted to hear.
He was not given a “Western” lecture or badgered about drafts. Instead, the
articulate Irishman, who agreed with his defensive policy in the West, mesmerized
him with talk of his war game at Versailles. Lloyd George’s suggestion that
Germany would concentrate on expanding her influence in the East in 1918 rather
than attack in the West was not greeted with grunts of dismay as would have been
the case with Wully. To the contrary, Wilson treated him as an equal in the
formulation of military policy and thought his contributions “valuable.”
105
To make certain that collusion between Allenby and the general staff would not
undermine a great British campaign against Turkey, which Lloyd George
confidently expected Wilson to shepherd through the permanent military
representatives at Versailles, the prime minister and Amery pondered placing
Smuts, who would report direct to the War Cabinet instead of to the War Office,
“Ugly” Wilson (fourth from left in front row) and the British section of the Supreme
War Council at Versailles in January 1918.
THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL AND BRITISH MILITARY PLANS FOR 1918 237
in charge of all naval and military operations against Turkey. “With Wilson at
Versailles & the East delegated to Smuts,” Amery wrote Lloyd George, “I don’t
think the old gang can give too much trouble— if they do you can deal with
them.”
106
Smuts, who had a high opinion of his own generalship, readily agreed to this
scheme and on January 15, he and Amery left London for Versailles. Smuts was
Wilson’s second important guest from London within the week for Robertson had
earlier paid him a visit to lobby against a campaign against Turkey. Wilson was
taken aback and cool toward the appointment of Smuts as commander-in-chief
and high commissioner to Palestine, Mesopotamia, Armenia, the Caucasus, and
the eastern Mediterranean. “Whew! Whew! Whew!” he wrote in his diary. But
his enthusiasm for eastern operations seemed to match Lloyd George’s. “The
Boches,” he told Smuts, “could not get a decision agst. us, that we could not get
one agst. him in the West & thereupon we ought to try to knock out the Turk.”
107
During the next few days, the British staff was instrumental in getting the
permanent military representatives to accept, on January 21, the following
suggestion in their proposals for the 1918 campaign (Joint Note 12):
To inflict such a crushing series of defeats upon the Turkish Armies as would
lead to the final collapse of Turkey and her elimination from the war would
not only have the most far-reaching results upon the general military
situation, but might also if not too long deferred, be in time to enable the
Allies to get into direct touch with, and give effective help to, such elements
of resistance to German domination as may still exist in Roumania and
Southern Russia.
108
The force of this suggestion, however, was weakened by the condition insisted
upon by the French that no British forces in the West would be withdrawn to assist
the offensive against Turkey.
Robertson naturally protested this decision, arguing that Allenby did not believe
that he had sufficient forces to achieve the objectives assigned to him by Versailles.
Who was in the best position to advise the War Cabinet, Robertson wanted to
know, Versailles or Allenby and the British War Office?
109
Demonstrating its
contempt for the general staff, the War Cabinet’s response was to send Smuts to
Egypt.
110
As the War Cabinet’s “deputy on mission,” he was expected to impose
the War Cabinet’s will on the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
As the meeting of the Supreme War Council approached to consider the
campaign plans for 1918, Lloyd George contemplated drastic action to put British
strategy and tactics in different hands. One cannot help shaking one’s head in
wonderment at the prime minister’s ingenuity and audacity as he intensified his
efforts against the army leadership. To ease the protector of Robertson and Haig
out of the War Office, Lloyd George proposed to Derby that he go to Paris as the
British ambassador.
111
As the genial aristocrat pondered and then rejected this
offer, Lloyd George considered sending Robertson halfway around the world to
238 LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS
India as commander in chief of the British forces there.
112
What better fate for the
apostle of the “Western” school of thought than exile in the East. As for Haig,
Lloyd George hoped to replace him if a better soldier could be found.
113
On
January 18, he turned to Smuts at lunch and said, “I wish you would go out to the
Western front & go right round in order to find out who are the rising men, & to
see the new defences they are making to meet the forthcoming German offensive.”
If a replacement for Haig could not be discovered, Lloyd George wanted to send
Hankey to general headquarters as chief of staff to watch over him.
114
At noon on the twenty-first, with rumors rife in journalistic circles and the
lobbies of Parliament that Haig’s demise was imminent,
115
Smuts and Hankey left
London for the western front. Their next five days were to be filled with danger
and tension as they surveyed the leadership of the British Expeditionary Force and
inspected its defenses. Wearing steel helmets and gas masks, they climbed in and
out of trenches in the battle zones of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Armies as dogfights
took place overhead and an occasional German shell came their way. Every step
of the way they talked with officers of the British army, who treated them with
remarkable civility, given the suspicious nature of their tour.
On the evening of the twenty-first they had dinner with Haig at general
headquarters. To his surprise, Hankey discovered much “peace talk” in the nerve
center of the British army. Haig, who, it would appear, was shaken by the refusal
of his government to furnish him with the men he demanded and the intense French
pressure on him to extend his line, told Smuts and Hankey that
so far the British Empire had got most out of this war, certainly a good deal
more than even Germany, and he doubted whether we would gain more by
continuing the war for another twelve months. At the end of that period we
would be much more exhausted and our industrial and financial recovery
would be more difficult, and America would get a great pull over us. There
were besides the dangers from the collapse of Italy or France or both…. He
doubted whether America would be a really serious factor even in 1919 from
her present rate of progress.
116
Although Haig had two or three offensive plans up his sleeve, he displayed none
of his old enthusiasm. Hankey wrote Lloyd George on the twenty-second: “No-
one now talks of the offensive, nor thinks that anything can be done in that line.
The Americans they believe will not be of much use for the offensive before 1920.”
Lloyd George was surely pleased to learn from Hankey in this same letter that
“most people here feel doubtful whether the Germans will really attack in force,
but everyone is preparing to meet the attack if it comes.”
117
As Lloyd George plotted against the army leadership, the general staff prepared
a counterattack. Its willing tool was Repington, who was widely considered the
nations’s most authoritative military correspondent. When his employer
Northcliffe, in Repington’s view, “tied himself to L.G.’s chariot wheels,”
118
he
began negotiations with Gwynne in early December to join his paper. On the eve
THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL AND BRITISH MILITARY PLANS FOR 1918 239
of the public announcement that he was transferring his pen to the War Office’s
organ, the Morning Post, he wrote Gwynne on January 19 that the general staff
was urging him “to begin by exposing the man-power muddle…to do through you
about the men and what I did through the Times about the shells.”
119
Repington
encountered no difficulty in acquiring the evidence he needed because the general
staff gave him the adjutant general’s top-secret tables on manpower.
120
As
Repington busied himself writing an article that was certain, as he put it, to “raise
cain,” Northcliffe raised some of his own. On January 21, Lovat Fraser of the
Daily Mail, which called itself “The Soldiers’ Friend,” under the heading “Things
Hidden,” lashed out at “the ridiculous ‘theory of attrition’” and accused the general
staff of squandering Britain’s manpower by pursuing “the strategy of the Stone
Age” in the West. Since this press attack occurred on the very day that Hankey
and Smuts departed for general headquarters to seek a successor for Haig, one can
be forgiven the suspicion that the prime minister was behind it all. Quite the
reverse, however, seems to have been the case. The last thing Lloyd George wanted
was any suggestion that he was at the beck and call of Northcliffe, who inspired
hatred in many quarters because of his often clumsy and megalomanical attempts
to manipulate public opinion. The army rallied to Haig; during his tour of the front
Smuts discovered that Lovat Fraser’s virulent assault was “greatly pre-occupying
the minds of nearly all the officers whom I met.”
121
There was outrage in
Parliament and the Unionist War Committee on January 24 passed a resolution
supporting Haig and Robertson and demanding that the government condemn the
press campaign being waged in Northcliffe’s papers against the generals. Even
before this reaction, Lloyd George had urged Northcliffe to cease his attacks. “I
could have taken him out and shot him,” the Welshman told Lord Stamfordham,
who quickly perceived that the prime minister’s anger was provoked, not from
any disagreement with the criticisms, but because he now dared not shake up the
army’s leadership.
122
Another restraint on Lloyd George was that, alas, Smuts and
Hankey were unable to uncover another Marlborough or Wellington. The only
capable replacement for Haig they could find, it seems, was General Claud Jacob,
who commanded the II Corps.
123
His elevation from relative obscurity was hardly
worth the political price that Lloyd George would have to pay, especially after
Northcliffe butted in.
On January 24, Repington exploded his bomb in a piece addressed to the British
public that accused the War Cabinet of “procrastination” and “cowardice” in
tackling the manpower question.
124
By providing the army with only 100,000
category “A” recruits in 1918, he charged in his first article for the Morning Post,
Lloyd George and his colleagues were betraying the army. “The one question,”
he wrote, “which concerns most deeply every man, woman, and child in the United
Kingdom is whether Sir Douglas Haig’s armies will not be sufficiently reinforced
to enable them to compete with the enemy on fair terms, and my opinion is that
they will not be.”
Lloyd George was indignant when he picked up his copy of the Morning Post.
Where but from the War Office could Repington have gotten his facts and figures?
240 LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS
Only three days earlier he had taken Robertson and Derby to task for the sudden
and startling increase in German strength reported in the most recent summary of
military intelligence, charging the military authorities with an attempt to “create
panic” and attempting to show that the War Office was playing a conjuring trick
with some of its estimates.
125
Now he correctly suspected that the general staff
was taking its case to the public through Repington. In high dudgeon he wrote
Derby:
As you are aware, the General Staff have altered their figures of enemy
numbers from time to time, and a most serious change in their view on this
subject has been effected within the last two or three days. But clearly
Colonel Repington has been supplied with the very latest General Staff
intelligence as to enemy numbers and also as to our reserves, but he
publishes these figures without any of the qualifications contained in the
Staff report. This is a gross breach of Army Regulations, and if someone in
the General Staff Department continues to supply secret intelligence to the
press with whatever object I must, after submitting the facts to His Majesty,
take the House of Commons into my confidence and take stern action.
126
When Derby was slow in replying, Lloyd George wrote with ever more heat. “If
an ordinary soldier had been the offender he would have been shot without any
compunction; and you will forgive me for saying that I think it is the duty of the
Secretary of State to search out the culprit ruthlessly and deal with him.”
127
When
Derby finally responded on the twenty-ninth, he attempted to exonerate any
member of the general staff of complicity with Repington, arguing that
Clemenceau and other French authorities, with whom Repington kept in close
touch, were a more likely source for his information.
128
Repington’s s article did not create as great a stir in the press as might be thought,
but it served as a prelude to another of his press attacks which threatened to bring
down Lloyd George’s government. His subject this time concerned the granting
of executive authority over a proposed Allied general reserve to an executive war
board at Versailles chaired by Foch.
NOTES
1. Milner to Wilson, November 3, 1917, Milner MSS, dep. 354.
2. Amery, “The Turning Point of the War,” October 31, 1917, and Maurice, “An
Answer to the ‘Turning Point of the War,’” November 11, 1917, Milner MSS, dep.
354.
3. See Amery to Smuts, October 15, 1917, Smuts MSS, 680, and Milner to Wilson,
November 3, 1917, Milner MSS, dep. 354.
4. Hankey Diary, November 4, 1917, 1/4.
5. Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen, 1:216.
6. Robertson to Haig, November 4, 1917, Haig MSS, no. 119.
THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL AND BRITISH MILITARY PLANS FOR 1918 241
7. Allied Conference, November 7, 1917, CAB/2/I.C.-30 (c), and Lloyd George, War
Memoirs, 2:1441.
8. These are Liddell Hart’s calculations. Although Liddell Hart, an apostle of the
indirect approach to warfare, is hardly without bias in his treatment of World War
I, his estimates seem more fair-minded than the “cooked” estimates of casualties
propagated by Edmonds. See ‘The Basic Truths of Passchendaele,” p. 438.
9. Maxse, “Sir William Robertson,” National Review 70 (September 1917), pp. 41–52.
10. Morning Post, September 5 and October 23, 1917. For Lloyd George’s reaction to
Gwynne’s leading articles, see Wilson Diary, October 5 and 16, 1917. Articles by
the “Old Soldier” in the Morning Post were thought by some to be the work of
Robertson. In conversation with Rawlinson, Gwynne would neither deny nor admit
that the “Old Soldier,” who obviously was as inside figure, was Robertson. There is
some evidence to suggest that Esher may have been the author of these “Western”
pieces. See Rawlinson Diary, November 17, 1917, 1/9, and Gwynne to Esher, July
4 and 19, 1917, Esher MSS, 5/52.
11. For proof that Sutherland was Lloyd George’s chief contact with the London press,
see F.Guest to Lloyd George, February 26, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/21/2/13.
12. Daily Chronicle, November 1–2, 1917, and Observer, November 4, 1917.
13. Morning Post, November 6, 1917.
14. Star, November 5, 1917, and Daily News, November 6, 1917.
15. Entry of November 6, 1917, A Diary by Frances Stevenson, p. 165.
16. Wilson Diary, October 31, 1917, Haig Diary, November 4, 1917, no. 119, and
Hankey Diary, November 4, 1917, 1/4.
17. Times (London), November 13, 1917.
18. Daily News, November 14, 1917, Nation, November 17, 1917, Star, November 15,
1917, and Spectator, November 17, 1917.
19. Esher Diary, November 10, 1917, 2/20.
20. Haig to Robertson and Robertson to Haig, November 12 and 15, 1917, Robertson
MSS, I/23/65–66.
21. Hankey Diary, November 15, 1917, 1/4, and Repington, First World War, 1914–
1918, 2:131.
22. Army Council (236), November 12, 1917, W.O. 163/22.
23. Robertson to Derby, November 15, 1917, Robertson MSS, 1/20/11.
24. War Cabinet (276), November 16, 1917, CAB 23/4.
25. Curzon to Lloyd George, November 18, 1917, Lloyd George MSS, F/11/8/18.
26. Derby to Lloyd George, November 18, 1917, Lloyd George MSS, F/14/4/77; how
rattled Lloyd George and his supporters were at this moment is indicated by a letter
Amery wrote the prime minister which made the astonishing claim that the Supreme
War Council’s “object is to make things easier for our strategists, to give Robertson
& Haig more, and not less free play.” Amery to Lloyd George, November 18, 1917,
Lloyd George MSS, F/2/1/6.
27. Lloyd George to Derby, November 26, 1917, Lloyd George MSS, F/14/4/80.
28. Wilson Diary, November 22, 1917.
29. Repington, First World War, 1914–1918, 2:138.
30. H.C.Deb., 5th series, vol. 99 (November 19, 1917).
31. Robertson to Haig, November 22, 1917, Robertson MSS, I/23/67.
32. Robertson to Milne, November 23, 1917, Robertson MSS, I/34/36.
242 LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS
33. Haig’s minutes on a memorandum, “Cavalry Operations November 20–26th, 1917,”
prepared for his eyes only. Haig MSS, no. 119.
34. See War Cabinet (279–80 and 282), November 21–22 and 26, 1917, CAB 23/4.
35. Ibid. (281), November 23, 1917, CAB 23/4.
36. Robertson, “Future Military Policy,” November 19, 1917, Robertson MSS, I/17/5.
37. Charteris, At G.H.Q., p. 273.
38. Wilson Diary, November 27, 1917.
39. “Talk with Edmonds,” September 23, 1929, Liddell Hart MSS, 11/1929/15.
40. Wilson Diary, December 3, 1917.
41. Supreme War Council, December 1, 1917, CAB 28/3/I.C.-36.
42. Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1917, 3:305.
43. “Joint Note 1,” December 13, 1917, W.P. 69, CAB 27/8.
44. War Cabinet (302), December 19, 1917, CAB 23/4.
45. Haig, “Memorandum on the Question of an extension of the British front,” December
15, 1917, M.P.C. 21, CAB 27/14.
46. See the comment by Auckland Geddes, the Ministry for National Service, and
General Macready’s concurrence with these sentiments. Cabinet Committee on Man-
Power (2), December 11, 1917, CAB 27/14.
47. Minister quoted is not identified in minutes. War Cabinet (292), December 5, 1917,
CAB 23/4.
48. Esher Diary, December 1, 1917, Esher MSS, 2/20, and Esher to Haig, December 2,
1917, Haig MSS, no. 214f.
49. Army Council (240), December 5, 1917, W.O. 163/23, and R.H.Brade to Wilson,
December 7, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/23/1/31. In his diary, Wilson notes that
he immediately wrote Hankey about Brade’s letter, but he did not send in a formal
protest until December 15, 1917. See Wilson Diary, December 9, 1917, and Wilson
to Lloyd George. (Brade’s letter inclosed), December 15, 1917, Lloyd George MSS,
F/23/1/31.
50. Cabinet Committee on Man-Power (1), December 10, 1917, CAB 27/14, and General
Staff, “Estimated Strength of opposing forces,” December 8, 1917, M.P.C. 5, CAB
27/14, and War Cabinet (296), December 12, 1917, CAB 23/4.
51. Allenby virtually had to apologize to Robertson for his success. In opposition to the
advice that Robertson had given the War Cabinet, he asserted that he could more
easily defend the Jerusalem-Jaffa line than his old Gaza-Beersheba position. Allenby
to Robertson, December 7, 1917, Robertson MSS, 1/14/109.
52. Derby to Lloyd George, December 11, 1917, Lloyd George MSS, F/14/4/83.
53. See Derby to Lloyd George (Derby to Haig, December 12, 1917, inclosed),
December 13, 1917, Lloyd George MSS, F/14/4/85, Haig Diary, December 15, 1917,
and January 1, 1918, nos. 120 and 123, and Robertson to Haig, August 24, 1917,
Haig MSS, no. 116. Another casualty among Britain’s war lords, which was
unrelated to Cambrai, was Jellicoe, who was dismissed on December 24.
54. Repington to Northcliffe, November 12, 1917, Northcliffe MSS, vol. 101.
55. Northcliffe to Sassoon, December 13, 1917, Northcliffe MSS, vol. 8.
56. Robertson to Haig, August 17, 1917, Robertson MSS, I/23/45.
57. Memorandum by Derby, December 3, 1917, Army Council (239), December 3,
1917, W.O. 163/22. One suggestion by the Ministry of National Service, which the
Army Council resisted, was to lower the age for service in France from nineteen
years to eighteen years and six months. See “Memorandum by the Army Council
THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL AND BRITISH MILITARY PLANS FOR 1918 243
on the Memorandum of National Services on the Problem of the Maintenance of the
Armed Forces,” November 28, 1917, Robertson MSS, I/11/13.
58. War Cabinet (293), December 6, 1917, CAB 23/4.
59. See, for example, John Terraine, Impacts of War, 1914 and 1918 (1970), p. 138, and
Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen, 1:317.
60. Hankey Diary, December 6, 1917, 1/3.
61. Lieutenant-Colonel J.H.Boraston, ed., Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches: December
1915–April 1918 (1919), pp. 133–35, and Wilson Diary, January 9, 1918. Haig
probably believed these figures because as late as January 7, he believed that “the
best defence would be to continue our offensive in Flanders.” Haig Diary, January
7, 1918, no. 123.
62. General Staff, “Estimates of German casualties on the British front and on other
fronts in 1917,” December 11, 1917, M.P.C. 10, CAB 27/14. Apparently the figure
was closer to 500,000. See Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire
During the Great War, 1914–1920, p. 361.
63. Hankey, “Note by the Secretary,” December 8, 1917, M.P.C. 2, CAB 27/14.
64. Cabinet Committee on Man-Power (1), December 10, 1917, CAB 27/14.
65. Anglo-French Conference, December 18, 1917, M.P.C. 23, CAB 27/14, and “Note
on attacks with a limited objective by the French General Staff,” December 16, 1917,
M.P.C. 24, CAB 27/14. When this Anglo-French conference turned to French
defensive preparations in its afternoon session, Robertson and Macready were
included.
66. Cabinet Paper G.T. 3265 of January 7, 1918, CAB 24/38.
67. See Draft Report of Cabinet Committee on Man-Power, March 1, 1918, CAB 27/14.
68. War Cabinet (316A), January 7, 1917, CAB 23/13.
69. Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen, 1:320–22.
70. Macready, “Summary of the requirements of the Army in men in order to maintain
fighting efficiency of the Expeditionary Forces,” December 10, 1917, M.P.C. 4,
CAB 27/14.
71. Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War, 1914–
1920, pp. 371–74.
72. Esher Diary, December 1, 1917, 2/20.
73. See Draft Report of Cabinet Committee on Man-Power, March 1, 1918, CAB 27/14.
74. When this was being advocated in late 1917 the British government hoped that
American battalions might be brigaded with British troops to restore British divisions
to their original strength. Discussions among the French, British, and Americans
leading to this, however, went nowhere. See Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen, 1:
326–31 and Hankey Supreme Command, 2:744–46.
75. Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1918, 1:52, n. 1.
76. Churchill, World Crisis, 4:91–102, and Churchill to Lloyd George, January 19, 1918,
Lloyd George MSS, F/8/2/3.
77. Cabinet Committee on Man-Power (4), December 15, 1917, CAB 27/14.
78. Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1918. Appendices, Appendix 7, and War
Cabinet (316), January 7, 1918, CAB 23/5.
79. Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1918, 1:52, n. 1, and B.H.Liddell Hart,
Through the Fog of War (1938), p. 273. These reinforcements, however, still fell
some 160,000 men short of what Haig originally demanded.
244 LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS
80. The government after March 21 discovered 106,000 men (nine-tenths infantry)
available for immediate dispatch to France. When 88,000 men home on leave and
18,000 trained men available as drafts up to April 20 were added, some 212,000 men
were found to send to France by April 20. “Talk with Colonel C.Allanson,” August
19, 1937, Liddell Hart MSS, 11 /1937/69, and War Cabinet (372), March 25, 1918,
CAB 23/5. Another consideration for the general staff was that the Admiralty did
not reject the possibility that the German navy might transport an invasion force of
160,000 men to the British Isles. See Robertson’s memorandum, “Troops required
for Home Defence.” Cabinet Paper G.T. 3212 of January 3, 1918, CAB 24/38.
81. Hankey, Supreme Command, 2:803.
82. Entries of December 16–19 and 28, 1917, Diaries of C.P.Scott, pp. 322 and 324.
83. Times (London), December 15, 1917.
84. War Cabinet (307A), December 28, 1917, CAB 23/13, and Balfour to Cecil,
December 28, 1917, Balfour MSS, Add. 49738.
85. Cabinet Paper G.T. 3145 of December 29, 1917, and G.T. 3191 of January 3, 1918,
CAB 24/37.
86. Fischer, Germany’s Aims in First World War, pp. 475–509, and John
W.WheelerBennett, Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace, March 1918 (1938), pp.
99–148.
87. War Cabinet (312–13), January 3, 1918, CAB 23/5.
88. Ibid. (312), January 3, 1918, CAB 23/5.
89. Author’s italics. War Cabinet (314), January 4, 1918, CAB 23/5.
90. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 2:1514.
91. Ibid., 2:1510–17.
92. David R.Woodward, “The Origins and Intent of David Lloyd George’s January 5
War Aims Speech,” The Historian 34 (November 1971): 22–39. Confirmation that
this was Lloyd George’s intention can be found in Hankey Diary, December 29,
1917, 1 /3.
93. Esher to Hankey, January 13, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/23/2/9.
94. Times (London), January 19, 1918.
95. Lloyd George to Robertson, December 11, 1917, Lloyd George MSS, F/44/3/38,
Lloyd George to Robertson, December 14, 1917, Robertson MSS, I/19/13, and War
Cabinet (296–97), December 12–13, 1917, CAB 23/4.
96. Cabinet Paper G.T. 3112 of December 26, 1917, and G.T. 3191 of January 3, 1918,
CAB 24/37.
97. Allenby to Robertson, December 20, 1917, Appendix IV, in Cabinet Paper G.T.
3112 of December 26, 1917, CAB 24/37.
98. Amery to Lloyd George, December 30, 1917, Lloyd George MSS, F/2/1 /10, and
Amery, “Note on Sir W.Robertson’s Memorandum of 26th December,” December
30, 1917, CAB 25/41.
99. David R.Woodward, “British Intervention in Russia During the First World War,”
Military Affairs 41 (December 1977): 171–75, and ‘The British Government and
Japanese Intervention in Russia During World War I,” Journal of Modern History
46 (December 1974): 663– 85.
100. Amery to Lloyd George, December 29, 1917, Lloyd George MSS, F/2/1 /9, and
Amery, “The Military and Strategical Position in the Turkish Theatre and South
Russia as a Whole,” January 4, 1918, CAB 25/68, and Amery, ‘The Turkish and
South Russian Problem,” January 4, 1918, CAB 25/43.
THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL AND BRITISH MILITARY PLANS FOR 1918 245
101. L.S. Amery, My Political Life, vol. 2: War and Peace, 1914–1929 (1953), p. 129.
102. Milner to Lloyd George, December 23, 1917, Lloyd George MSS, F/38/2/27.
103. Initially Wilson resisted being pinned down about German intentions. When he
finally submitted a report at the prime minister’s urgings, he was wide of the mark,
arguing that the best time for any German attack would be after May 1 and incorrectly
predicting the point of the German assault. See Hankey to Lloyd George (Wilson to
Hankey, December 27, 1917, inclosed), December 29, 1917, Lloyd George MSS, F/
23/1/37, and Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1918, 1:78.
104. Wilson Diary, December 30, 1917.
105. Ibid.
106. Amery to Lloyd George, January 12, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/2/l/ll.
107. Wilson Diary, January 16, 1917.
108. Wilson to Lloyd George (“Joint Note 12” inclosed), January 20, 1918, Lloyd George
MSS, F/4/7/9, and Duncannon to J.T.Davies, January 21, 1918, Lloyd George MSS,
F/47/7/10.
109. Robertson to War Office, January 25, 1918, CAB 25/68.
110. War Cabinet (332), January 28, 1918, CAB 23/5. Robertson, however, continued to
fight a rearguard action to limit Allenby’s military operations. See Robertson to
Allenby, February 2, 1918, Robertson MSS, I/32/80. Allenby responded on February
23, after Robertson had been forced out as C.I.G.S.: “Smuts had a clear policy of
action formed in his mind; and we merely discussed the method of carrying it out.
I won’t t go into questions of Imperial Strategy; but, from a local standpoint, the
plan appears possible.” Allenby to Robertson, February 23, 1918, Robertson MSS,
1/21/86.
111. Derby to Lloyd George, January 18, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/14/5/2.
112. Hankey Diary, January 19, 1918, 1/3.
113. ‘Talk with Lloyd George at Criccieth,” September 24, 1932, Liddell Hart MSS, ll/
1932/42c.
114. Hankey Diary, January 18, 1918, 1/3.
115. Milner to Lloyd George, January 18, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/38/3/4.
116. Smuts to Lloyd George, January 21, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/45/9/9, and Hankey
Diary, January 21, 1918, 1/4. Earlier Haig had told Repington: “We should either
make war or make peace.” Repington, First World War, 1914–1918, 2:174.
117. Hankey to Lloyd George, January 22, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/23/2/11.
118. Repington, First World War, 1914–1918, 2:149.
119. Ibid., p. 191, and Repington to Gwynne, January 19, 1918, Gwynne MSS, 21.
120. Repington to Gwynne, January 20, 1918, Gwynne MSS, 21. Roskill erroneously
suggests that Amery was the source of Repington’s information. Roskill, 1877–1918,
p. 480.
121. Cabinet Paper G.T. 3469 of January 27, 1918, CAB 24/40.
122. Stamfordham, “Record of a conversation with the Prime Minister,” January 22, 1918,
RA GV F1259/4.
123. ‘Talk with Lloyd George at Criccieth,” September 2, 1932, Liddell Hart MSS, ll/
1932/42c.
124. Repington had assured Gwynne that either Maurice or Macdonogh would get this
article past the censor, but the editor of the Morning Post simply ignored the Official
Press Bureau. See Repington to Gwynne, January 20, 1918, Gwynne MSS, 21. For
246 LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS