Woodward D. Lloyd George and the Generals
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FEBRUARY 15 (FRIDAY)
With no compromise possible between Robertson and the government, it was
obvious that a political brouhaha could not be avoided. Robertson refused to bend,
but he placed the government in an awkward position by not resigning or stating
unequivocally that he “refused absolutely to take either of the positions offered to
him.”
73
Apprehension stalked the halls of Whitehall when Plumer’s reply was received.
Coached by Robertson, Plumer took his position on the command of the general
reserve and refused to head the general staff. Hankey was indeed right when he
noted that it “looked suspiciously like a ‘rig’ by the great General Staff trades
union.”
74
Plumer’s refusal opened the door of the general staff to Wilson—Lloyd
George’s first choice as C.I.G.S. Plumer had only been selected because Lloyd
George realized that violent opposition to Wilson in the army and Parliament
would make the supersession of Robertson more difficult. But, at the same time,
Plumer’s support of Robertson put the government in a precarious position. Bonar
Law and Milner agreed that the government’s “position had now become one of
great gravity, and that if the Government stuck to its guns, it ran the risk of
defeat.”
75
That evening Milner and Wilson talked with Lloyd George at Walton Heath.
To their great relief they found the prime minister “in a very fighting humor.” As
he told them, he now realized “the miserable cowardice and double dealing of
Derby and of all Robertson’s plots & plans.” Although now determined “to catch
a hold and govern,” he was pessimistic about the results, but at least he would “go
down fighting.” A hopeful sign was that Asquith seemed unwilling to go to the
brink over the government’s relations with the military authorities. “Esher tells
me that Lansdowne & Asquith have agreed that you must be kept in office,”
Hankey had written that day. Still there were many uncertain elements. Milner
and Wilson feared that Curzon, Cecil, Derby, and perhaps even Balfour would
resign. And what stance would the powerful Chamberlain take in Paliament?
76
Haig’s position in the end might decide the issue. When in London, he had
raised no real difficulties and had even pressured Robertson to go to Versailles.
But his position now seemed uncertain. On the fifteenth, Robertson in a private
and confidential letter pleaded in so many words for his support. If I agreed to go
to Versailles, he firmly told the field marshal, “I would have been a useless tool
at Versailles with Wilson here as C.I.G.S.” Haig immediately telegraphed Derby
that the “only permanent solution of difficulty is that C.I.G.S. should have his
deputy at Versailles in same way as French have Foch and a subordinate general
at Versailles.”
77
COMMAND OF THE ALLIED GENERAL RESERVE 267
FEBRUARY 16 (SATURDAY)
Lloyd George began to act like the nation’s leader. First, on Milner’s advice, he
visited George V.Combining forcefulness with reasonableness, he told the king
“that he could not continue to be responsible unless he and his colleagues were
free to take the measures they considered necessary to meet the situation.”
78
Robertson would be given yet another chance to either remain as C.I.G.S. or go
to Versailles. If he refused, Wilson would be made C.I.G.S., and Haig would be
consulted about his replacement at Versailles. When Lloyd George brought this
formula before the War Cabinet, Derby attempted to scramble it by asking if Haig,
who had been summoned to London and would arrive that evening, were to be
consulted about the relationship between the C.I.G.S. and the British permanent
military representative. This suggestion was immediately waved down by the War
Cabinet. Haig could have his man at Versailles, but he was not about to be allowed
to reopen the question that had paralyzed the government for days. But what if
Haig refused to go along? The War Cabinet decided that if this occurred the prime
minister should refuse to accept his resignation. The only divisive note sounded
was Derby’s usual threat to quit the government if Robertson were forced out.
79
After the War Cabinet adjourned Lloyd George summoned Robertson to
Downing Street and went through the motions of repeating the government’s
terms. Robertson asked for time to consider his response and later that afternoon
wrote a formal letter of refusal (but not resignation).
Thus ended one of the “most anxious days” of Lloyd George’s life. “Have you
packed up? We may be out next week,” he told one of his secretaries.
80
FEBRUARY 17 (SUNDAY)
At 9:30 A.M.Robertson paid Haig a visit. The day before, he had impressed upon
the field marshal in a letter that the government planned to argue in Parliament
that Haig agreed with the new Versailles machinery. “I think you should know
this,” he pointedly noted. In short, the dagger in Robertson’s back would have
Haig’s name on it. In their conversation Wully emphasized that the machinery of
Versailles was not really the fundamental issue. “H.Wilson as C.I.G.S. would get
the country into difficulties."
81
Haig, however, believed that he had done all that
he could for Robertson through his support of Robertson’s position on the
command of the general reserve. Unlike Derby, he was not about to be dragged
down by Robertson’s obstinacy.
Later that day Haig conferred with the prime minister at Walton Heath. To his
immense relief, Lloyd George discovered that the field marshal, although he
disapproved of the Versailles arrangement which divided the C.I.G.S.’s power,
was quite prepared to accept the removal of Robertson and the resignation of Derby
without a murmur of protest. “We discussed the whole position for hours,” Lloyd
George writes. “Haig put up no fight for Robertson. He clearly did not approve
268 LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS
of his defiance of a decision come to by the Government.” As for Derby’s possible
resignation, “he sniffed it aside with an expression of contempt.”
82
Derby, in contrast to Haig, had his letter of resignation out of his pocket “for
the 28th time about.” The prime minister, who was eager to put his man Milner
in Derby’s place, decided to make an effort to retain his services for the time being.
If he resigned, Derby would be free to tell Parliament that both Haig and Plumer
agreed with Robertson’s criticisms of the Versailles machinery. Hankey was
subsequently delegated to see the “flabby jelly” and try to persuade him from
quitting the government.
83
That evening Lloyd George sang Welsh hymns, his
spirits considerably lifted by Haig’s acquiescence.
The enigmatic Scotsman’s position, especially his willingness to accept the
transfer of Robertson to Versailles, had proven to be Wully’s Achilles’ heel. What
explains the breakdown of the Haig-Robertson alliance that had given the soldiers
control of British strategy since late 1915? Was it Haig’s sense of duty to his
country? His distaste for “squabbling in high places”?
84
His understanding of
political realities? Or was it his belief that Robertson, whom he unfairly blamed
for the “side show” in Palestine, had outlived his usefulness? Who can speak with
certainty about the motives of this distant and paradoxical figure?
The day did not end without a bizzare twist. Derby and Robertson seemed
prepared to make a last stand in the War Office. Wully told reporters that he had
not resigned; and Derby, when Wilson telephoned him about his new duties,
refused to see him.
FEBRUARY 18 (MONDAY)
It was now apparent to Robertson that he stood almost alone. Many of his
supporters had talked resignation but everyone stayed in their place. Dependent
upon his pay for a livelihood Robertson swallowed his pride and accepted the
humiliation of a home command in southeastern England, the eastern command.
Was this Lloyd George’s final revenge? “Why not the Boy Scouts?” someone
asked in Parliament to the accompaniment of laughter when Bonar Law made this
announcement.
On the eve of his appearance before Parliament to give the government’s case,
Lloyd George must have been confident of success. Earlier his government seemed
about to fly apart, with some ministers such as Milner and Barnes threatening to
resign because he refused to take a firm line against Robertson, and others such
as Cecil, Curzon, and Derby threatening to go because they believed that he was
ignoring the advice of the military authorities. But in the end they had all been
talked around.
85
The origins of the crisis lay in Lloyd George’s determination to
wrest control of British strategy from Robertson and Haig. Yet when the
showdown came the debate within the War Cabinet largely focused on the issue
of civilian supremacy. Robertson had been maneuvered by his own obstinacy and
by Lloyd George’s superior political skills into taking an untenable position. He
could not win when it was a question of final authority resting with the civilian
COMMAND OF THE ALLIED GENERAL RESERVE 269
rather than with the military authorities. If Parliament were faced with a choice
between himself and Robertson on this issue, he would be chosen. Moreover,
Robertson could be replaced. But who could replace him? Asquith? Lansdowne?
Chamberlain? Henderson? Lloyd George feared Asquith the most. The former
prime minister, however, eschewed the fight to a finish which some of his
supporters urged upon him. J.A.Spender, his close friend and the editor of the
Westminster Gazette, told Esher that the Liberal leader “does not mean to push
the attack right home. He has no desire to take office now.”
86
Even if Asquith had
gone all out, his bid for power would surely have fallen short. A headline in the
Daily Mail perhaps caught the popular mood best: “WHICH WOULD YOU GO
TIGER HUNTING WITH? ASQUITH OR LLOYD GEORGE?”
87
FEBRUARY 19 (TUESDAY)
Lloyd George stood before the House with a carefully worded text. A troublesome
point was Haig’s exact position. Lloyd George had wanted to say that Haig
considered the Versailles machinery “workable,” but when Haig protested, the
wording had been changed to “prepared to work under this arrangement.”
88
As
for any conflict with Robertson, Lloyd George maintained that his relations with
the C.I.G.S. for the past two years have been not merely “friendly, but cordial.”
When Asquith, who knew better, pressed him on whether he had misrepresented
Robertson’s position on the creation and command of the general reserve in his
statement to Parliament on the twelfth, Lloyd George took considerable liberty
with the truth: “I certainly never knew that Sir William Robertson had any
objection in principle; quite the reverse.”
89
When Asquith refused to accept this
statement, he was jeered. The mood of Parliament was to end the squabbling and
get on with the war.
With Asquith pulling his punches, the biggest challenge came from
Chamberlain, who focused on the press attacks upon the army and navy leadership
and the prime minister’s relations with the powerful press lords. On the previous
day, Northcliffe had joined Beaverbrook and Rothermere in the government as
director of propaganda in enemy countries. But this issue was less explosive than
the charge of interference with the generals, which Lloyd George had deftly
sidestepped.
In later years, Lloyd George gave a lurid account of the crisis over Robertson’s
dismissal. In his purple prose: “Robertson and his friends meant this time to fight
to a finish, and they had every hope of being able to build up a Parliamentary
combination drawn from all parties which would reverse the Versailles decision,
supplant the Government, and substitute for it one which would make Robertson
virtual dictator for the rest of the War, as Hindenburg was in Germany and by the
same means.” This view has been deemed “nonsense” by Wully’s apologist,
Victor Bonham-Carter, but there are clearly elements of truth in it. Gwynne even
touted a Robertson ministry which included Asquith. Whether Robertson ever
considered becoming prime minister is doubtful. But his actions leave little doubt
270 LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS
that in a desperate attempt to keep strategy out of Lloyd George’s hands he put
himself above the government, hoping to destroy either Versailles or Lloyd George
in the process.
90
On the other hand, the “soldiers’ party” had almost no chance of
success. Asquith, although in touch with Robertson and his supporters, would not
be a party to such an arrangement, and, more importantly, civilian control of the
army was deeply ingrained in the English political and military tradition.
Although Robertson had been squashed, and Versailles saved, Foch still
commanded a phantom army. Haig continued to make it clear that he had no
divisions to contribute, telling Bonar Law that he would prefer being replaced to
turning over any of his troops to the Executive War Board.
91
Haig’s position was
reprehensible, for he would not really be losing divisions by handing them over
to Foch. To the contrary, if the Germans massed their troops in his sector, his only
hope of fighting on even or near even terms was to receive immediate assistance
from the general reserve. Although Lloyd George, despite what he maintains in
his memoirs, was surely aware of Haig’s stance, he did not make an issue of it,
perhaps hoping that the field marshal would bow to pressure applied by the
Executive War Board, Pétain, and Clemenceau. Pétain, however, was just as
suspicious and jealous of Foch as Haig and Robertson had been of Wilson when
he was the British permanent military representative. The French commander in
chief readily agreed with Haig that a personal understanding between them, rather
than the creation of the general reserve, was the best way to coordinate the Anglo-
French response to a great German offensive. Clemenceau, caught in the middle
between Foch and Pétain, tended to favor the latter, telling Haig on February 25
that “he would arrange to ‘écarter’ (set aside) Foch gradually.”
92
Another obstacle
to the formation of the general reserve was the position taken by Rawlinson, Haig’s
choice as Wilson’s successor at Versailles. Haig thought that Rawlinson would
“play the game honestly” (e.g., support the army against the politicians) and his
view was soon confirmed. At lunch with Haig on March 5, Rawlinson assured
him that he would “wholeheartedly” support his position on the general reserve.
93
By this time even Foch’s paper army was rapidly disappearing. Initially Foch had
requested a general reserve of thirty divisions, approximately one seventh of the
Allied forces. But Haig, encouraged by Pétain and Clemenceau, clung stubbornly
to all of the divisions under his command. Meanwhile, Pétain attempted to reduce
the number required of him. Curiously Clemenceau continued to support Pétain,
telling Wilson that the general reserve would initially consist of only the British
and French divisions withdrawn from Italy.
94
On March 4, seventeen days before
the German storm broke, the Executive War Board threw up its hands in despair
and in essence turned the negotiations with Pétain and Haig over to the political
leaders. Rawlinson’s hands, however, were thrown up in glee rather than in
despair. “The trouble to my mind is Rawly’s attitude,” wrote General Sackville-
West, Wilson’s friend and informant at Versailles. “He thinks he can decide what
share the British are to take & as he backs D.H. the situation is getting just the
same as when Wully always said yes to D.H.” In fact, Sackville-West argued that
Wilson had helped create a monster in the Executive War Board. “Versailles is to
COMMAND OF THE ALLIED GENERAL RESERVE 271
become an appanage or buffer between L.G. & D.H. & you are left out—It wants
some thinking over which no doubt you have done.”
95
It all depended on whose ox was being gored. When Wilson was at Versailles,
he had steadily worked to undermine the C.I.G.S.’s authority. Standing in
Robertson’s shoes, he was now unhappy with the role played by Rawlinson.
Another concern of Wilson’s was Foch’s falling star. If Foch’s days were
“numbered,” as he believed, the less influence Versailles had the happier he would
be. “If we get in place of him a man of the type of Pétain the less Versailles handles
the Reserve the better,” he wrote SackvilleWest.
96
When the War Cabinet discussed Haig’s attitude on March 6, Wilson defended
his actions in the strongest possible terms.
The present situation has arisen largely owing to the delays in settling the
composition of the Inter-Allied General Reserve, which was certainly in no
sense the fault of the Field Marshal, and were not unconnected with the
political crisis which had arisen after the last Versailles Conferences. Field
Marshal Haig had now completed his arrangements with General Pétain; he
was faced with a possibility of an immediate attack; and he did not like to
risk the dislocation of his arrangements at this particular juncture by
allocating a portion of his Reserves to the Inter-Allied General Reserve.
The War Cabinet, somewhat taken aback by Wilson’s virtual endorsement of
Haig’s obstructionism, refused to accept the field marshal’s position as
“necessarily final,” although it was admitted that the prospect of an imminent
German attack made it awkward to force his hand at the moment.
97
Lloyd George was unwilling to fight to the last ditch over the general reserve.
When Wilson first told him on March 4 that Haig had unequivocally refused to
hand over even one division to the Executive War Board, he admitted that he was
not prepared to run the risk of Haig’s resignation by forcing him to comply with
Versailles.
98
He obviously hoped to avoid taking on the army again so soon after
surviving his bitter confrontation with Robertson.
On the eve of a meeting of the Supreme War Council in London in midMarch
to decide finally the fate of the general reserve, only Foch of those who really
mattered was a zealot on the subject. The British government’s willingness to
capitulate on an issue which it had proclaimed far and wide to be essential,
however, was embarrassing. At the very least, Milner argued, the principle of the
general reserve must be preserved. More than the security of the Allied forces was
involved in Milner’s view. “If Haig (or Haig & Pétain?) kill it now, I doubt if it
will ever revive. And we shall have once more passed under the yoke of the
generals.”
99
On March 14 Lloyd George, Wilson, and Hankey discussed ways of salvaging
something of the general reserve. They finally hit upon the idea of considering the
British and French divisions in Italy as the general reserve. When this proposal
was made at the Supreme War Council, Orlando remarked to Lloyd George, “‘That
272 LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS
is very ingenious indeed,’” prompting Clemenceau to add, “‘And if an Italian says
that, you may know it is.’” Only Foch, whose preeminent position was being
demolished, hotly protested this face-saving device until Clemenceau silenced
him with a wave of his hand and the command to “shut up.” As for Haig’s and
Pétain’s agreement to assist each other, Lloyd George insisted that this private
understanding be immediately communicated to Versailles and that the permanent
military representatives work out a common plan to send aid to Italy if the Germans
struck south of the Alps.
100
Although the principle of the general reserve had been preserved, this was an
empty and futile gesture. On the day the German blow fell, SackvilleWest was
correct when he wrote Wilson: “The Executive War Board is dead, dead as a door
nail.”
101
In its place had been put a personal understanding between the French
and British commanders in chief. This suited Haig’s purpose because he was
determined to destroy Foch’s executive authority. Before journeying to London
for the Supreme War Council he and Rawlinson agreed that the functions of the
Executive War Board “should be advisory, not executive.”
102
Haig had taken one
of the gravest risks of his military career by putting his faith in Pétain, whose
previous career had not heightened his reputation for taking bold or risky steps.
How prophetic was Wilson’s remark when he told Haig that in a crunch “he would
have to live on Pétain’s charity & he would find that very cold charity.”
103
Contrary to his memoirs,
104
Lloyd George was partly to blame for the collapse
of the general reserve. Fearing the political repercussions of a confrontation with
Haig, he did not order him to cooperate with the Executive War Board. If
Robertson had retained control of the general staff, the prime minister almost
certainly would have been more resolute, attempting to save the Executive War
Board and the general reserve as a counterweight to the general staff. In the final
analysis, undermining the “Westerners” was always more important to him than
the concept of a strategic reserve. Yet even if Lloyd George had fought to save
the general reserve, he probably would have failed. The obstructionism of
Clemenceau, Haig, Pétain, Wilson, and Rawlinson, not to mention the imminent
German offensive, made its demise almost inevitable in March.
NOTES
1. Robertson to Haig, January 12, 1918, Robertson MSS, I/23/78.
2. Haig Diary, January 24, 1918, no. 123.
3. Ibid., October 18, 1917, no. 118.
4. Wilson Diary, December 6, 1917.
5. See David Robin Watson, Georges Clemenceau: A Political Biography (1974), p.
296.
6. Wilson Diary, December 17, 1917, and Clemenceau to Lloyd George, December
17, 1917, Lloyd George MSS, F/50/1/27.
7. War Cabinet (301), December 18, 1917, CAB 23/4.
COMMAND OF THE ALLIED GENERAL RESERVE 273
8. War Cabinet Paper G.T. 3343 of January 15, 1918, CAB 24/39, and Hankey Diary,
January 22, 1918, 1/4.
9. Milner to Lloyd George, November 3, 1917, Lloyd George MSS, F/38/2/20.
10. Observer, December 16, 1917.
11. Esher to Lloyd George, December 12, 1917, Lloyd George MSS, F/16/1/22.
12. Anglo-French Conference, December 23, 1917, CAB 28/3/I.C.-37, and War Cabinet
(306), December 26, 1917, CAB 23/4.
13. In January 1918, when Foch first talked with Haig about a generalissimo, the British
commander in chief “jumped up like a jack-in-the-box, and, with both hands shot
up to heaven, exclaimed: ‘Monsieur Clemenceau, I have only one chief, and I can
have no other. My King.’” See Clive to Maurice, December 18, 1917, Maurice MSS,
3/5/63, and Georges Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory (1930), p. 34.
14. Wilson Diary, January 9–11, 1918.
15. Maurice Diary, January 10, 1918, 4/3.
16. Milner to Lloyd George (Wilson to Milner, January 14, 1918, inclosed), n.d., Lloyd
George MSS, F/38/3/2.
17. War Cabinet (329), January 23, 1918, CAB 23/5.
18. Robertson (memorandum) to Lloyd George, January 30, 1918, Robertson MSS, I/
24/3.
19. Wilson Diary, January 30, 1918.
20. Hankey to Lady Hankey, January 31, 1918, Hankey MSS, 3/23.
21. Wilson to Lloyd George, January 25, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/47/7/15.
22. Supreme War Council, January 30, 1918, CAB 28/3/I.C.-39.
23. Wilson Diary, January 30, 1918.
24. Hankey Diary, January 30, 1918, 1/4.
25. Supreme War Council, January 31, 1918, CAB 28/3/I.C.-40.
26. Hankey Diary, February 1, 1918, 1/4.
27. Robertson to Derby, February, 1918 (misdated 1916), Derby MSS, 920 (17).
28. Supreme War Council, February 1, 1918, CAB 28/3/I.C.-41.
29. Supreme War Council, February 1, 1918, CAB 28/3/I.C.-42.
30. Robertson to Lloyd George, February 1, 1918, Robertson MSS, I/24/5/1.
31. See Wilson Diary, January 28 and February 2, 1918, and Hankey Diary, February
2, 1918, 1/4.
32. Captain Peter E.Wright, At the Supreme War Council (1921), p. 62, and Supreme
War Council, February 2, 1918, CAB 28/3/I.C.-43.
33. Haig Diary, February 2, 1918, no. 123, and Supreme War Council, February 2, 1918,
CAB 28/3/I.C.-43.
34. See Supreme War Council, February 1, 1918, CAB 28/3/I.C.-41.
35. Amery to Lloyd George, February 3, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/2/1/15, and
Hankey Diary, February 3, 1918, 1/4. Milner apparently believed that his
appointment as secretary of state for war had been settled and he discussed with
Wilson the changes that needed to be made in the personnel of the War Office. See
Wilson Diary, February 4, 1918.
36. Robertson to Derby, February 2, 1918, Derby MSS, 920 (17), and Robertson to
Stamfordham, February 2, 1918, RA GV F1259/13.
37. Derby (memorandum) to Lloyd George, February 4, 1918, Derby MSS, 920 (17),
and War Cabinet (338), February 4, 1918, CAB 23/5.
38. Army Council (242), February 4, 1918 (adjourned to February 6), W.O. 163/23.
274 LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS
39. Esher Diary, February 4, 1918, 2/21.
40. Haig to Lady Haig, February 5, 1918, Haig MSS, no. 149.
41. Derby to Haig and Robertson to Haig, February 7, 1918, Haig MSS, no. 123.
42. Haig to Derby, February 8, 1918, Derby MSS, 920 (17).
43. Repington to Gwynne, February 5, 1918, Gwynne MSS, 21, and Repington, First
World War, 1914–1918, 2:207–10.
44. The best primary source for untangling the confused events of mid-February is
Milner’s day-by-day account. Memorandum by Milner (misdated February 14,
1918), Milner MSS, dep. 374. The view from the palace can be found in
Stamfordham’s memorandum, a running account from February 13 to 18. RA GV
Fl259/32.
45. Milner to Lloyd George, February 8, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/38/3/10.
46. See undated drafts marked “A” and “B” by Milner in Lloyd George MSS, F/38/3/
13. Also see memorandum by Milner, Milner MSS, dep. 374.
47. Randolph Churchill, Lord Derby, “King” of Lancashire: The Official Life of Edward
Earl Derby, 1865–1948 (1959), p. 321, and A.M.Gollin, Proconsul in Politics: A
Study of Lord Milner in Opposition and in Power (1964), p. 482.
48. Memorandum by Milner, Milner MSS, dep. 374, and Wilson Diary, February 9, 1918.
49. Haig Diary, February 9 and 11, 1918, no. 123, and Lloyd George to Milner, February
9, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/38/3/11.
50. Wilson Diary, February 10, 1918.
51. Milner Diary, February 10, 1918, Milner MSS, dep. 89, and memorandum by Milner,
Milner MSS, dep. 374.
52. Robertson to Derby, February 11, 1918, Robertson MSS, 1/24/11.
53. Army Council (243), February 11, 1918, W.O. 163/23, Gwynne to Asquith, February
11, 1918, Gwynne MSS, 14, and Robertson to Derby, February 11, 1918, Derby
MSS, 920 (17).
54. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 2:1676.
55. War Cabinet (342–43), February 11, 1918, CAB 23/5. Repington and Gwynne were
later prosecuted under the Defence of the Realm Act and forced to pay a nominal
fine. But the Morning Post was never shut down.
56. Wilson Diary, February 11, 1918.
57. Milner to Lloyd George, February 11, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/38/3/12.
58. Haig Diary, February 11, 1918, no. 123.
59. War Cabinet (344A), February 12, 1918, CAB 23/13, Hankey Diary, February 12,
1918, 1/3, and memorandum by Milner, Milner MSS, dep. 374.
60. Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph, February 13, 1918.
61. H.C.Deb., 5th series, vol. 103 (February 12, 1918).
62. Daily News, February 16, 1918.
63. Hankey Diary, February 12, 1918, 1/3, and Esher to Hankey (passed on to Lloyd
George), February 13, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/23/2/14.
64. Hankey Diary, February 13, 1918, 1/3.
65. Memorandum by Milner, Milner MSS, dep. 374, Hankey Diary, February 13, 1918,
1/3, and Derby to Lloyd George, February 13, 1918, Derby MSS, 920 (17).
66. Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen, 1:235, and memorandum by Derby (shown to
prime minister), February 13, 1918, Derby MSS, 920 (17).
67. Wilson Diary, February 13, 1918, and Milner to Lloyd George, February 13, 1918,
Lloyd George MSS, F/38/3/13.
COMMAND OF THE ALLIED GENERAL RESERVE 275
68. War Cabinet (347A), February 16, 1918, CAB 23/13.
69. “Statement by General Sir William Robertson,” War Cabinet (345A), February 14,
1918, CAB 23/13.
70. Stamfordham Memorandum, RA GV F1259/32, and Robertson to Stamfordham,
February 14, 1918, RA GV F1259/23.
71. Hankey Diary, February 14, 1918, 1/3.
72. Wilson Diary, Feburary 14, 1918.
73. Memorandum by Milner, Milner MSS, dep. 374.
74. Robertson to Plumer, February 4, 1918, Robertson MSS, I/34/45, Plumer to Derby,
February 15, 1918, Derby MSS, 920 (17), and Hankey Diary, February 15, 1918, 1/3.
75. Memorandum by Milner, Milner MSS, dep. 374.
76. Ibid., Wilson Diary, February 15, 1918, Esher Diary, February 15, 1918, 2/21, and
Hankey to Lloyd George, February 15, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/23/2/15.
77. Robertson to Haig and Haig to Derby, February 15, 1918, Haig MSS, no. 123.
78. Stamfordham Memorandum, RA GV F1259/32, and War Cabinet (347A), February
16, 1918, CAB 23/13.
79. Memorandum by Milner, Milner MSS, dep. 374, and War Cabinet (347A), February
16, 1918, CAB 23/13.
80. Entry of February 17, 1918, Lord Riddell’s War Diary, p. 314.
81. Robertson to Haig, February 16, 1918, Haig MSS, no. 123, and Haig Diary, February
17, 1918, no. 123.
82. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 2:1689, and Haig Diary, February 17, 1918, no. 123.
83. Hankey Diary, February 17, 1918, 1/3.
84. Haig Diary, February 16, 1918, no. 123.
85. Cecil was perhaps the most determined to resign. See Cecil to Bonar Law, February
17, 1918, Bonar Law MSS, 82/9/6, and Cecil to Lloyd George, February 18, 1918,
Lloyd George MSS, F/6/5/19.
86. Esher Diary, February 18, 1918, 2/21.
87. Daily Mail, February 14, 1918.
88. Davidson to Hankey, February 18, 1918, Bonar Law MSS, 84/7/3.
89. H.C.Deb., 5th series, vol. 103 (February 19, 1918). Robertson had been conspiring
with Asquith. See Robertson to Asquith, February 16, 1918, Asquith MSS, 32.
90. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 2:1673, Bonham-Carter, Soldier True, p. 333, and
Gwynne to Mrs. Asquith, February 18, 1918, Gwynne MSS, 14.
91. Haig Diary, February 18, 1918, no. 123.
92. Ibid., February 24, 1918, no. 123.
93. Haig to Lady Haig, February 21 and March 5, 1918, Haig MSS, nos. 149–50.
94. Wilson Diary, February 26, 1918, and The Memoirs of Marshal Foch (1931), p. 241.
95. Sackville-West to Wilson, March 5, 1918, Wilson MSS, file 12 B.
96. Wilson to Sackville-West, March 4, 1918, Wilson MSS, file 12 B.
97. War Cabinet (360A), March 6, 1918, CAB 23/13.
98. Wilson Diary, March 4, 1918.
99. Milner to Lloyd George, March 14, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/38/3/19.
100. Hankey Diary, March 17, 1918, 1/3, Supreme War Council, March 14–15, 1918,
CAB 28/3/I.C.-47 and 50, and Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 2:1720.
101. Sackville-West to Wilson, March 21, 1918, Wilson MSS, file 12 B.
102. Haig Diary, March 10, 1918, no. 124.
103. Wilson Diary, March 13, 1918.
276 LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS