Woodward D. Lloyd George and the Generals

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an amateur’s emphasis on numbers, overlooking the quality and leadership of the

troops involved.

Having stressed German strength, the chancellor of the exchequer wanted to

know what would happen if the British did break through. Would they really be

any better off? French, Lloyd George later told Stevenson, admitted that general

headquarters had not really considered its next move. Lloyd George then repeated

his views on the advantages of a Balkan offensive. When he left French, Lloyd

George, carried away by the force of his own convictions, believed that he had

won the field marshal over to his strategic views.

On the next day the War Council held an important discussion with French

leading off. The field marshal—supported by Churchill—was initially optimistic

about the chances of clearing the Belgian coast. But, Lloyd George wanted to

know, would the Zeebrugge operation result in decisive results? “How,” he asked,

“did Sir John French think that the German resistance was to be finally broken?”

The discussion then turned to the relative strength of the armies on the western

front. Brigadier-General G.M.W.Macdonogh, the able chief intelligence officer

of the British Expeditionary Force, argued that the Germans did not enjoy a

superiority on the western front. To the contrary, the Entente enjoyed an advantage

of 500,000 rifles. Lloyd George listened in amazement. Figures furnished him by

the War Office told a different story. The discrepancy between various sets of

figures supplied by the military was “extraordinary,” he noted. During the lunch

break he visited with Macdonogh in an attempt to reconcile the different figures.

When the War Council resumed its deliberations, Lloyd George announced

“that it would not be safe to base our calculations on a superiority of the Allies of

100,000 men. This, he suggested, was not a sufficient superiority to justify the

taking of the offensive.” His figures were not challenged by the soldiers. Thus the

Allies seemed strong enough to withstand any attack, but too weak to attempt one

of their own.

The Welshman then attempted to get his colleagues to look at the war as if there

were a single front. The proposed Zeebrugge operation must not “be discussed by

itself. The question was, did it contribute towards the main object of defeating the

enemy? What he feared was that we should sustain very heavy losses, and become

so entangled in this secondary operation as to prevent us from exercising a decisive

influence elsewhere when the opportunity presented itself.” As for the French,

what was Joffre’s plan for “overcoming Germany?” Kitchener replied “that, so

far as he knew, General Joffre had no big conception for terminating the

campaign.” French then volunteered that “General Joffre hoped to achieve some

success by his offensive, but relied on the Russians to finish the business.” He

then flatly admitted that Joffre “was not strong enough to break down the German

resistance.”

After this damaging admission by the military and with the discussion now

taking a favorable turn for his Balkan project, Lloyd George said that he “was

quite prepared to support General Joffre in any offensive movement which gave

reasonable prospects of success.” If Joffre, however, failed “to achieve success”

BALKANITE 17

and it, of course, seemed obvious from French’s and Kitchener’s previous remarks

that little could be expected from his offensive, Lloyd George wanted the

government “to try some entirely new plan.”

With the War Council now in favor of putting off a decision on the Zeebrugge

operation, attention turned to the East. “We ought also to consider,” Grey noted,

“what we should do in the event of a complete stalemate. For this purpose we

should study the possibilities of (a) co-operation with Serbia and (b) an attack on

the Gallipoli Peninsula.”

It was now quite late in the day. The blinds had been drawn to blot out the

approach of a winter evening. With the British leaders tired and ready for

adjournment, Churchill made a dramatic announcement which was to undermine

Lloyd George’s Balkan scheme even though this did not become apparent until

later. The first lord of the Admiralty revealed a plan by ViceAdmiral Carden, the

commander in chief in the Mediterranean, to launch a naval assault against the

Dardanelles, that narrow strip of water separating Europe and Asia Minor which

had been called the Hellespont in antiquity. “The idea caught on at once,” Hankey

notes in his memoirs. “The whole atmosphere changed. Fatigue was forgotten.”

Since no troops were involved and the Admiralty’s plan appeared to

complement his scheme, Lloyd George gave his approval. The army also gave its

assent, with Sir John French, in response to a query by Lloyd George, admitting

“that complete success against the Germans in the Western theatre of war, though

possible, was not probable.” Sir John also uttered words which were dear to the

Welshman’s heart. “If we found it impossible to break through, he agreed that it

would be desirable to seek new spheres of activity—in Austria, for example.” A

delighted Lloyd George then emphasized that there must be no delay in taking the

initial steps for a Balkan assault. “Not only should the question be studied,” he

said,” but actual preparations should be made. For example, rolling-stock would

have to be manufactured for the Salonica railway, and perhaps barges built for the

Danube.” Churchill, who had expressed opposition to Balkan operations, “agreed

that preparations should be made. At the worst they would be a good feint.”

The War Council then decided: “That if the position in the Western theatre

becomes in the spring one of stalemate, British troops should be despatched to

another theatre and objective, and that adequate investigation and preparation

should be undertaken with that purpose, and that a SubCommittee of the

Committee of Imperial Defence be appointed to deal with this aspect of the

situation.”

The War Council’s conclusion appeared to represent a great personal triumph

for Lloyd George. Within a week, he had played the dominant role in reversing

the War Council’s thinking. Even the generals had expressed some support for his

ideas. Kitchener’s hostility to trench warfare especially pleased Lloyd George. It

was now his view that “Kitchener was a big man and the best for the job.”

Only

Churchill appeared dead set against the project; and Lloyd George was naturally

much put out with him, even un fairly accusing him privately of seeking personal

glory with his naval schemes.

18 LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS

The War Council’s actions up to this point were sufficiently indecisive and

nebulous that almost everyone involved in the deliberations believed that his way

of thinking had been approved. The “Easterners” were happy with the War

Council’s tilt toward operations on the periphery. But this was deceiving for the

civilians did not really comprehend the ultimate consequences of other decisions

made by them at the same time. Although a final decision had been put off, the

War Council okayed preparations for the Zeebrugge operation. Of even greater

import, the War Council agreed to support offensive action in the spring in league

with the French. To be sure, this was made conditional. If the offensive failed,

British troops would be sent elsewhere. But this still left the initiative in the hands

of the generals on the western front. Would they admit failure? Almost certainly

not. Faced with stubborn German resistance, they would request more men and

equipment. This would drastically limit the number of British soldiers available

for action elsewhere. Closer to home, Kitchener alone decided what British troops

were available. His estimate of British reserves was colored by his opinion of the

large reserve force in Great Britain—the Territorials. Kitchener’s stuffy

professionalism led him to exclude the Territorials from any proposed

expeditionary force to the Balkans. “A Town Clerk’s Army”

was his

contemptuous dismissal of it. Kitchener was wrong. When sent into action on the

western front, they fought well. As French had informed the War Council, “They

had proved a great success, and had behaved very well in the trenches.”

To seize the initiative from the generals in the West, Lloyd George wanted to

send Allied troops to the Balkans as soon as possible. If the British delayed until

after the spring attacks, it might be too late. The War Office furnished him with

exactly the ammunition he needed—a paper warning of an imminent renewal of

the Austro-German attack against Serbia.

With the members of the cabinet

expressing great concern about Serbia, Lloyd George made his case as strongly

as possible for the immediate dispatch of a British force to the Balkans with the

political purpose of getting Rumania and Greece to commit themselves to the

Entente.

Following this cabinet meeting on the twentieth Lloyd George met with

Kitchener and Asquith. The prime minister was now obsessed with helping Serbia,

noting: “The main point at the moment is to do something really effective for

Serbia…. I am sure that this is right and that all our side-shows, Zeebrugge,

Alexandretta, even Gallipoli, must be postponed for this. The troops must come

either from those that we already have in France, or from those which we were

going to send there.”

After Kitchener promised to come up with the necessary

troops, Lloyd George then sent for the Greek Minister in London and informed

him that Britain was prepared to send an army corps to the Balkans if Greece and

Rumania threw in their lot with the Entente.

With momentum building in London for immediate intervention in the Balkans,

Lloyd George brought his powers of persuasion to bear against the French. Sir

John French had warned the government that the French government “would not

like it if we were to divert troops to some theatre of war other than France.”

But

Lloyd George was not so sure. Perhaps Sir John’s “Western” prejudices colored

BALKANITE 19

his views. On January 22, Lloyd George attempted to win over the French war

minister, Alexandre Millerand, at a dinner attended by, among others, Kitchener,

Churchill, Grey, and Asquith. Millerand, although he could not (or would not)

speak a word of English, made it clear that Joffre was committed to big attacks in

the West in 1915, which would require all possible British assistance. Any attempt

to help Serbia would have to wait until after the military results from the western

front were in.

Millerand was hostile to an expeditionary force being sent to the Balkans

because his government had already discussed and rejected this idea. Before the

“Easterners” had asserted themselves in London, Aristide Briand, the minister of

justice, had suggested in November that an Anglo-French force of 400,000 men

should be sent to Salonika to assist Serbia and open up a new front, an idea that

was supported by Franchet d’Espèrey, the commander of the Fifth Army, and

Joseph Galliéni, the governor of Paris. The French cabinet, then and later in early

January, however, had drawn back from challenging Joffre, who had achieved

dictatorial control over strategy.”

Unknown to Lloyd George, Kitchener had decided to support Millerand against

the British ministers. Although Kitchener saw merit in Lloyd George’s proposal

for military-political action on Austria’s southern flank, he was not willing to

quarrel with Joffre. The night after Lloyd George talked with Millerand, Kitchener

dined with the French war minister at the French embassy. The Frenchman was

assured by Kitchener that “he would not press the Serbian scheme just now.”

The consequences of Kitchener’s understanding with Millerand were soon

apparent. On January 28 the newly created subcommittee of the Imperial Defence

Committee met in the War Office. Kitchener was in the chair. Churchill, Lloyd

George, and Arthur Balfour, who had been attending War Council meetings as

the unofficial representative of the Unionist opposition, were the other members.

Sir James Wolfe Murray, the chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Major-

General C.E.Callwell, the director of military operations, were included to give

professional advice.

Assistance to Serbia dominated the discussion. The approach of better weather

might herald an attack on that isolated and beleaguered state. Those present were

optimistic about overcoming any difficulties, technical or otherwise, in assisting

Serbia. The Serbian army was short of mounted troops, but Kitchener said that

“this was a deficiency which it would not be very difficult for us to make up.”

Also, according to Kitchener, Serbian roads “were all right” and the Danube was

not a formidable military obstacle. Lloyd George, with his plan to open up

communications with Serbia via Ragusa in abeyance, suggested for the first time

that the Bulgarian port of Dedeagatch in Thrace could be utilized. “This,” he

argued, “would have the double effect of drawing Bulgaria into the war and of

opening up a second line of railway to Nish.” Lloyd George’s statement speaks

volumes about his reading—or rather misreading—of Balkan politics. He thought

that the Balkan states would quickly fall in line if Britain resorted to force. The

20 LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS

British occupation of Dedeagatch would almost certainly have brought Bulgaria

into the war, but on Germany’s rather than Britain’s side.

As was his bent, Balfour attempted to sum up: “The conclusion to draw from

this and previous discussion was that the Adriatic should be ignored; that the naval

bombardment of the Dardanelles should be attempted; and that at any case a force

should be landed at Salonika.” Lloyd George responded “that he was very anxious

to send an army to the Balkans in order to bring all the Balkan States into the war

on our side and settle Austria. M.Venizelos had recently offered to come into the

war without conditions provided that Roumania did likewise.”

Kitchener agreed that it was “very desirable” to send troops to Serbia. He even

“expressed the view that ultimately we might send an army of 500,000 men to

Serbia, and if the Dardanelles were open we could maintain it there.” Then,

because of his pact with Millerand, Kitchener added an ominous “however.” The

government’s chief military adviser said that “he was not quite sure that the right

moment had arrived.” And then there was the question of troops. “It was difficult

to get British troops out of France, and he was sending his last man to France.”

Lloyd George was horrified by Kitchener’s casual attitude. A week earlier the

head of the War Office had been prepared to send an army corps to the Balkans.

The Welshman attempted to commit Kitchener to a specific date when troops

would be sent. Kitchener hedged: “There was no pressing necessity,” he said, “as

an Austro-German invasion was impossible owing to the snow.” But what of the

political role of these troops? Were not they also to be sent out to mobilize the

Balkans against Turkey and the Central Powers? If troops were not sent

immediately, perhaps they could be promised. “We ought to offer an army corps

to Serbia at once,” said Lloyd George, “naming the probable date of arrival.” The

discussion then veered away to the dispatch of two Territorial divisions to France

to participate in the proposed Zeebrugge operation. Should these troops not be

held back for possible use in the Balkans? The subcommittee decided to bring this

matter to the immediate attention of the War Council.

At this point prospects

for Lloyd George’s project seemed bright. If troops could be found, the sentiment

was to send them to Salonika rather than the Dardanelles. To be sure, Lloyd

George’s colleagues viewed the dispatch of troops to the Balkans solely in political

terms and were cool toward a major military effort against Austria. But Lloyd

George believed that once Britain made a troop commitment to the Balkans,

expanded Allied operations would inevitably follow.

At 6:30 that evening the War Council took up the question, with Kitchener

summarizing the position of the subcommittee. “They had,” he said, “discussed

the different theatres of war in which troops could be used.” Salonika had been

the first choice. In his next breath, however, Kitchener pointed out that there was

no need for haste and, besides, he had no troops to spare for the present. This

would be equally true in the future if Britain continued to send fresh divisions to

France.

BALKANITE 21

Balfour suggested that at least a brigade could be found to send to Salonika.

But he admitted, as Kitchener had pointed out, that British inter vention would do

no good in the long run unless it was backed with sufficient force.

Broad concern was expressed about Britain’s open-ended commitment to

France. With Joffre insisting that every available man be sent to the barbed wire

and trenches of the western front, Britain’s hands were tied. Lord Crewe, the

secretary of state for India, suggested “that the French had probably magnified

their danger, and wanted to make our flesh creep in order to obtain future

reinforcements.”

Despite the obstacles posed by coalition warfare, Lloyd George’s colleagues in

the War Council remained enthusiastic for limited military intervention in the

Balkans for political purposes. Churchill, now the motivating force behind an

attack on the Dardanelles, gave Lloyd George’s strategy a boost by arguing in

favor of the dispatch of the first available soldiers to Salonika as a political move

to influence the Balkan states.

The climax of the War Council’s meeting came when Churchill announced that

the Admiralty was now prepared to carry out the plan to attack the Dardanelles.

Rear-Admiral H.F.Oliver, the chief of the war staff, then told the ministers that

“the first shot would be fired in about a fortnight.”

At the conclusion of his busy day, Lloyd George was almost certainly relieved

that the government had at long last displayed some firmness of purpose. British

battleships would soon swing into action at the Dardanelles. His pet project,

however, remained at dead center. His efforts had been largely responsible for the

War Council’s general approval of intervention in the Balkans. Even Churchill

agreed that the first available soldiers should go to Salonika—not to the

Dardanelles. But it was obvious that as long as Kitchener counseled delay and the

French opposed the venture no decisive action to win over the wavering Balkan

states would be taken.

A telegram from the British minister to Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria, both

alarmed the chancellor of the exchequer and gave him leverage with the secretary

of war. A note was quickly dispatched to Kitchener:

You will I am sure have seen Telegram Number 14 in last night’s sections

from Sofia. It is so obviously the German interest to crush Serbia in order

to detach Bulgaria from the Triple Entente and to free a way to

Constantinople that it is risky to doubt the accuracy of the telegram. The

French delayed assistance to Antwerp until it was too late. This time the

responsibility is ours and we shall not be held blameless if a catastrophe

occurs.

Kitchener’s response was that he could only spare a brigade for intervention. He

then repeated what he had told the War Council. “To go there,” he wrote, “with a

small force such as a brigade would be useless unless followed up by others as we

22 LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS

should be laughed at as soon as it was discovered that we were only an Army pour

rire.”

Lloyd George’s rejoinder was to emphasize the link between military operations

and diplomacy. “I am fairly confident you will not get these Balkan States to decide

until they see khaki!”

To pry some troops away from the western front, Churchill was sent by the War

Council to France to persuade Sir John to divert at least two divisions to Salonika.

Churchill found French hostile to any military operations “on strategic grounds”

in southeast Europe. As usual, however, he proved malleable when confronted

with strong arguments from an “Easterner,” agreeing to hold two divisions at the

government’s disposal “from the middle of March onward.”

More important than the stance of the British generals was the position of

France. Britain was best suited for peripheral operations. But would her most

important Continental ally allow her to limit her commitment to the western front?

On January 29, Lloyd George had written Churchill: “Are we really bound to hand

over the ordering of our troops to France as if we were her vassal?… It would be

criminal folly if we allowed it to compel us to look on impotently while a

catastrophe was being prepared for the Allies in the Balkans.”

To force the

French high command to consider all fronts, Lloyd George began to consider for

the first time some joint military authority to coordinate the Entente military

efforts.

On February 1, with a new suit bought for the occasion, Lloyd George departed

for Paris to break down French resistance. Ostensibly, the purpose of his trip was

to attend a meeting with the French and Russian finance ministers. His mind,

however, was fixed on the Balkans—not the finances of the Triple Entente. To

his surprise and annoyance, he discovered when he talked to Alexandre Ribot, the

minister of finance, that Millerand had returned from London without mentioning

his discussions with the British ministers about an expeditionary force to the

Aegean. Lloyd George wasted no time in rectifying this situation. Without

instructions from his government, he took his case to the French government,

talking with President Raymond Poincaré, the foreign minister Theophile

Delcassé, the prime minister René Viviani, and the influential Briand, one of

France’s shrewdest and most able ministers.

Briand could not have been more enthusiastic about an Allied expeditionary

force to the Balkans, but Poincaré was doubtful that Joffre would approve of

French participation. The French president warned Lloyd George that “the

diplomatic and political considerations must be very strong to justify the French

Government in disregarding the views of the military authorities.” Joffre’s narrow

concern for the western front gave Lloyd George an opportunity to suggest for the

first time the creation of an Allied council to force the Entente generals to treat

the war as a single front. He urged upon Poincaré “the desirability of instituting

a council to sit in France with representatives from the Russian commander in

chief, the French commander in chief and the British commander in chief so that

those commanders in chief may be kept respectively informed of the intention and

BALKANITE 23

operations of their colleagues; there being at present a want of coordination

between the armies of the Allies which is an advantage to the German

commander.”

Lloyd George’s whirlwind diplomacy resulted in a special meeting of the

French cabinet on February 4. An Allied expeditionary force to Salonika “to assist

Serbia” was accepted in principle. But important qualifications were added: the

British must not renege on their promise to send four more divisions to France

and French participation would be delayed until Joffre was prepared to release the

necessary troops.

Lloyd George was cock-a-hoop with delight. Overlooking Poincaré’s

uncertainty about Joffre’s position he wrote Sir Edward Grey:

Briand was of opinion and so was the President, that if a joint note were

addressed to Roumania and Greece asking them whether they would be

prepared to declare war immediately if an Expeditionary Force of two

Divisions were sent to Salonika, and if they replied in the affirmative, then

no doubt General Joffre would gladly spare the necessary force. Briand said

it was too preposterous to imagine that if 40,000 men from the West brought

in 800,000 from the East, thus withdrawing German pressure on the West,

that any general could possibly object to such a plan.

On his way back to London, Lloyd George stopped by British general

headquarters. Sir John French, who was entertaining his second prominent

“Easterner” in several days, remained unenthusiastic about giving up any troops.

Lloyd George then asked what Sir William Robertson, French’s new chief of staff,

thought of the proposed Salonika expeditionary force. French said, “‘He is here.

Would you like to see him?’” Lloyd George answered in the affirmative and soon

he and Robertson were face to face for the first time. Their conversation gave no

hint of the bitter and explosive relationship that they were to have later. Sir John

presented Lloyd George’s proposal. Before Robertson could respond Lloyd

George butted in, “‘Before you answer, let me put the question in my way.’”

After hearing him out, Robertson, according to Lloyd George, proclaimed the plan

“‘good strategy.’”

Given the future battle over grand strategy between these two

men, Robertson’s alleged statement is extraordinary.

“My experience yesterday,” Lloyd George wrote Grey of his interview with

French and Robertson, “shows that the Generals if properly taken in hand can be

persuaded.” With the French ministers accepting an Allied expeditionary force to

the Balkans in principle and with the British generals apparently in line, Lloyd

George hoped that khaki would be on the way to the Balkans within a fortnight.

It could not come any sooner. Reports from the Balkans were ominous. German

soldiers were reported on the borders of Rumania and Serbia; and Bulgaria was

apparently on the verge of joining the Central Powers.

Lloyd George’s dynamism and persuasiveness had had a considerable impact

in London and Paris. But it should not be exaggerated. Moreover, there was an

24 LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS

element of opportunism that can not be overlooked. In his discussions with French

politicians and British generals, Lloyd George tended to hear only what he wanted.

Every positive response was eagerly seized upon; every negative response was

ignored or discounted.

On February 9, Britain’s war leaders gathered once again to discuss intervention

in the Balkans. The unity and clearness of purpose which Lloyd George sought

was absent. The War Council’s debate was long and contradictory, with the

generals, especially Sir John French, who had been invited to sit in, placing many

mines in the path of the proposed expeditionary force to southeast Europe.

Grey opened the discussion with a report that the French foreign minister,

Delcassé, who had followed Lloyd George to London to coordinate France’s and

Britain’s Balkan policy, had agreed to send a division to Salonika. But he had

added an important qualification—the French military authorities had to give their

approval. The Russians, who had been asked to participate in the venture, had told

Grey that they could provide only 1,000 Cossacks. Where, then, could the troops

come from?

Kitchener, who did not speak against the project, insisted that only firstline

troops should be sent, suggesting the 29th Division, the last remaining regular

division in Britain. Its place in the trenches of the West could be taken by the

North-Midland Division, the best of the Territorial divisions in Kitchener’s

opinion. This suggestion provoked an immediate response from French, who

argued against using Territorials in the front lines.

An exasperated Churchill then reminded French that “the original object in

sending four divisions to France was to enable Sir John French to undertake an

offensive operation against Zeebrugge.” But this on-again, off-again operation

was once again postponed. “Nevertheless,” Churchill stressed, “it was still

intended to send out the four divisions which were to be utilized for the purpose

of taking over a larger front from the French army, and so releasing French

troops…. He would receive the original number of reinforcements, the only

difference being that a Territorial division instead of a Regular division would be

sent.”

French continued to raise objections to the proposed expeditionary force. He

pointed out that as recently as six days ago General Joffre had opposed the idea.

He also argued that the Germans posed no immediate threat to Serbia and were

not in a position to influence events in the Balkans. Their forces, he argued, were

tied down by the Russians. Furthermore, if only Greece were coaxed to join the

Triple Entente by the presence of Allied troops, it was not worth the effort. In a

final hit at Lloyd George’s scheme, French suggested that conditions were so

primitive in Serbia that British soldiers would have a difficult time adjusting.

Lloyd George spoke often and forcefully during the discussion. He wanted

immediate action. The War Council had given its approval “in principle some

weeks ago.” Now the French government had also “expressed approval in

principle.” Yet nothing was being done while the Germans acted.

BALKANITE 25

The political advantages of an Allied force being sent to Salonika seemed so

overwhelming that the War Council overruled the commander of the British

Expeditionary Force. Grey was instructed to draft a note to Athens as the first step

of the dispatch of the 29th Division to Salonika. The delivery of the British note,

however, was to be delayed until the French ambassador in Athens received

instruction from Paris.

When the Anglo-French proposal was presented on February 15 to Venizelos,

the pro-Ally Greek premier, he turned it down. The limited intervention for

political purposes which the Allies envisaged had little attraction for the Greeks.

Rumania’s hesitancy also figured in Venizelos’s calculations. If Rumania had

been willing to commit herself to the Entente, the Greeks were prepared to do

likewise. Bad luck was another factor in the unsuccessful Anglo-French démarche.

The proposal was not backed up by the booming of Allied guns at the Dardanelles

as had been planned. Because of bad weather and other difficulties, the naval

assault had been delayed from the eleventh to the fifteenth, and finally to the

nineteenth.

Greece’s refusal to join the Entente until conditions were more favorable

effectively destroyed the momentum for intervention at Salonika. As Asquith put

it, “our eyes are now fixed on the Dardanelles.”

On February 16, the War Council

made the important decision to send the 29th Division to the Dardanelles instead

of Salonika.

From now on if troops could be scraped together, they were to be

sent to Turkey rather than the Balkans. Thus the Dardanelles campaign—which

had gained Lloyd George’s support because it originally involved only great ships

—completely undercut his plan to invade the Balkans.

At nine minutes to ten on the morning of February 19, the long-awaited naval

attack on the Dardanelles began. The large Allied armada of battleships which

had been assembled before the outer forts opened fire at long range. There were

delays caused by bad weather, but by the beginning of March the Turkish defenses

had been destroyed. A telegram from Athens offering immediate Greek aid added

to the confident mood of Britain’s war leaders. Discussion of an expeditionary

force to follow up the apparent success of the navy took on a new urgency.

The military and diplomatic events of the next few weeks, however,

demonstrated that the optimism of the War Council was premature. Russia, fearing

Greek designs on Constantinople, vetoed Greek participation and that country

once again drew back from intervention in the war. Meanwhile, as the Allied fleet

slowly and hesitantly continued its campaign, the Turks strengthened their

intermediate and inner defenses. The next major obstacle for the great ships was

the intermediate forts at the Narrows. On March 18, in brilliant sunshine on calm

waters, the Allied armada attempted to pound its way through the narrow passage

of water across which Lord Byron had once swum.

As the attack progressed, two British battleships and one French battleship were

sunk by mines in the dangerous waters. Three more warships were disabled.

Although Britain had suffered only sixty-one casualties, the loss of six capital

ships was ominous. The commander of the fleet, Vice-Admiral de Robeck, who

26 LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS