Encyclopedia of Russian History

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Deeply conservative, Suslov oversaw the offi-

cial press and personally scrutinized publications to

ensure conformity. According to Fedor Burlatsky

(1988), he would also comment on everything writ-

ten by members of the Central Committee depart-

ments. In 1969 he directed the dismissal of the

progressive Novy mir editorial board. A hardline sup-

porter of communism, he disliked the company of

Westerners. At one Kremlin reception he placed ta-

bles between himself and foreign diplomats. Known

as the “sea-green incorruptible of the Soviet estab-

lishment,” Suslov protested against increasing cor-

ruption in the party. In 1982 he died from a stroke

that reportedly followed a heated discussion with

an individual who was trying to cover up Brezh-

nev family scandals.

See also: AGITPROP; CENTRAL COMMITTEE; COMMITTEES

OF THE VILLAGE POOR; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE

RUSSIAN FEDERATION; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE

SOVIET UNION; HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Burlatsky, Fedor. (1988). Khrushchev and the First Rus-

sian Spring, tr. Daphne Skillen. New York: Scribners.

McCauley, Martin. (1997). Who’s Who in Russia since

1900. London: Routledge.

Tatu, Michel (1968). Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev

to Kosygin, tr. Helen Katel. New York: Viking.

LAINE

INNON

SUVORIN, ALEXEI SERGEYEVICH

(1834–1912), publisher, editor, critic, playwright.

Alexei Sergeyevich Suvorin was born into a

provincial military family and, by becoming a

journalist, made his greatest contribution to Rus-

sia as publisher and editor of its most influential

pre-Revolution conservative daily newspaper, New

Times, and as publisher of Chekhov.

First commissioned in the military, Suvorin re-

signed at age nineteen to concentrate on teaching,

journalism, and literature. After working for sev-

eral Russian newspapers and periodicals over the

next fifteen years, he and a partner acquired the

faltering St. Petersburg daily, New Times, in 1867.

It became the flagship of a financially successful

business that came to include book publishing, sales

in company bookstores and railway station kiosks,

and a school for printers. Suvorin grasped the op-

portunities provided by a relaxation of tsarist cen-

sorship in 1865, the demands of an increasingly

literate population, the mass production made pos-

sible by the new printing technology, and fast re-

porting of news by means of the telegraph.

As a seasoned literary critic and aspiring play-

wright, Suvorin in 1895 started his own theatri-

cal company and installed it in his own theater. He

wrote the revealingly personal Diary of A. S. Suvorin

(1923), an account of the literary and political life

of his time never translated into English.

Suvorin recognized the literary promise of An-

ton Chekhov when he first published stories in

small Russian publications. During their thirteen-

year collaboration from 1886 to 1899, Chekhov

published major stories and plays with Suvorin.

The two became close friends, and that bond eased

for Suvorin the tragedies of his own family life.

Both his first wife and a son committed suicide,

while another son and a daughter died of illnesses.

See also: CHEKHOV, ANTON PAVLOVICH; JOURNALISM

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ambler, Effie. (1972). Russian Journalism and Politics: The

Career of Aleksei S. Suvorin, 1861–1881. Detroit: Wayne

State University Press.

Bartol, R. (1974). “Aleksei Suvorin: Russia’s Millionaire

Publisher.” Journalism Quarterly 51:411–417.

HARLES

A. R

UUD

SUVOROV, ALEXANDER VASILIEVICH

(1730–1800), generalissimo (1799), prince, field

marshal, and count.

Perhaps the greatest Russian military leader of

all time, Alexander Suvorov never lost a battle. He

is generally credited among the founders of the

Russian school of military art. Suvorov entered ser-

vice in 1748 and first saw conventional combat

during the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763). As a

regimental commander from 1763 to 1769, he de-

vised a regulation that became a model for combat

training and service practices. As a brigadier and

major general from 1768 to 1772 he was instru-

mental in defeating the Polish Confederation of Bar.

During Catherine II’s First Turkish War (1768–1774)

SUVOROV, ALEXANDER VASILIEVICH

1503

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

he won ringing victories at Turtukai and Kozludji

(both 1773). Suvorov subsequently (1776–1779,

1782–1784) campaigned in the Crimea and the

Kuban, where he imposed greater Russian control

and where he refined unconventional tactics ap-

propriate to circumstance and enemy. During

Catherine’s Second Turkish War (1787–1792), he

defended Kinburn (1787), fought at Ochakov (1788),

won battles of near-annihilation at Fokshani and

Rymnik (1789), and successfully stormed Izmail

(1790). After service against the Swedes in 1791,

he returned to the southwest, where in 1794 and

1795 he subjugated rebellious Polish patriots.

Though briefly banished under Paul I (1796–

1801), Suvorov served in the war of the Second

Coalition against revolutionary France. In Italy

during 1799, he led Austro-Russian armies to daz-

zling victories on the Adda and the Trebbia and at

Novi. After disagreement with the Austrians, Su-

vorov in September 1799 successfully extricated

Russian forces from northern Italy over the Swiss

Alps in a campaign that probably exceeded the

achievements of Hannibal two millennia before.

Suvorov left three important legacies to his mil-

itary heirs. First, he insisted on progressive, realis-

tic training tailored to the characteristics of the

peasant soldier. Second, he left in his Art of Victory

(1795–1796) a set of prescriptions for battlefield

success. He saw the primary objective in war as the

enemy’s main force. He counseled commanders in

pursuit of victory to observe his triad of “speed,

assessment, and attack.” Speed was all-important:

“One minute decides the outcome of battle, one

hour the success of a campaign, one day the fate

of empires . . . I operate not by hours but by min-

utes” (Menning, 1986, pp. 82–83). Third, Suvorov’s

record in the field inspired emulation from subse-

quent generations of Russian military officers.

However, many would-be inheritors forgot his ad-

monitions about flexibility, and sought slavish im-

itation rather than flexible adaptation.

See also: MILITARY ART; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; RUSSO-

TURKISH WARS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Longworth, Philip. (1965). The Art of Victory. The Life and

Achievements of Field-Marshal Suvorov, 1729–1800.

New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Menning, Bruce W. (1986). “Train Hard, Fight Easy: The

Legacy of A. V. Suvorov and His ‘Art of Victory.’”

Air University Review 38(1):79–88.

RUCE

W. M

ENNING

SVANS

Svans call themselves Mushwän (plural Shwanär).

Nominally Georgian Orthodox, they preserve

many pagan beliefs and practices. They inhabit a

high mountainous area in northwestern Georgia

beneath the main Caucasus chain, in the upper

reaches of the rivers Ingur (Upper Svanetia) and

Tskhenis-Tsqali (Lower Svanetia). Svan was first to

split from the Common Kartvelian that also pro-

duced Georgian, Mingrelian, and Laz. The four main

(and divergent) dialects are: Upper and Lower Bal

(Upper Svanetia); and Lent’ekh and Lashkh (Lower

Svanetia), although linguistic particularities char-

acterize virtually each hamlet. The language is not

taught, and all Svans educated in Svanetia since the

introduction of universal schooling by the early

Soviets have received instruction in Georgian. The

largely mono-ethnic population of Svanetia is usu-

ally estimated at 50,000, although the disastrous

winter of 1986–1987 caused many to abandon

the region, especially Upper Svanetia. In the 1926

Soviet census, 13,218 declared Svan nationality,

although thereafter all Kartvelian speakers became

classified as Georgians. Annual heavy snowfalls

meant that Svans were historically excluded from

the outside world for months, penned up with their

livestock inside appropriately compartmentalized

stone dwellings, alongside which stood the unique,

twelfth-century, square towers for which Svane-

tia, especially Upper Svanetia, is famous. While rich

in forests and minerals, the limited arable areas pro-

duce little apart from grass and hay, potatoes, and

barley, the source of the local hard liquor (haräq’).

Goiters were frequent through iodine deficiency;

the difficulties associated with providing another

staple were depicted in the silent film Salt for Svane-

tia. Ibex, chamois, and bears have long been

hunted. Svan men often served as migrant labor-

ers in Mingrelia during the winter months.

During the early nineteenth century, Lower

Svanetia became part of Dadiani’s Mingrelia. In

1833 the Dadishkelian princes of western Upper

Svanetia accepted Russian protection, governing

their own affairs until the princedom was abolished

in 1857. The eastern part of Upper Svanetia ac-

knowledged no overlord, thus becoming known as

“Free Svanetia.” Later in the century, Russia took

control of the area through military action, com-

pletely destroying the village of Khalde, as described

in a moving short story by Sergo Kldiashvili.

See also: CAUCASUS; GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; MINGRE-

LIANS

SVANS

1504

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Freshfield, Douglas. (1896). The Exploration of the Cauca-

sus. 2 vols. London: E. Arnold.

Hewitt, George. (1996). A Georgian Reader: with Texts,

Translation, and Vocabulary. London: SOAS.

Palmaitis, Letas, and Gudjedjiani, Chato. (1985). Svan-

English Dictionary. New York: Caravan Books.

Phillipps-Wolley, Sir Clive. (1883). Savage Svanetia. 2

vols. London: R. Bentley and Son.

B. G

EORGE

EWITT

SVECHIN, ALEXANDER ANDREYEVICH

(1878–1938), military theorist and intellectual.

Alexander Svechin was one of the key intellec-

tual leaders of the Red Army during the golden age

of Soviet military theory (1918–1937). Svechin, an

artilleryman, was a crucial figure in establishing a

new and revolutionary understanding of modern

war. Drawing on military thinkers of the nineteenth

and late eighteenth century and his own intense

study of the imperial Russian military experience,

Svechin reformulated the meaning of the term

strategy. Classically, strategy meant the art of con-

ducting military campaigns. With the coming of

the Industrial Revolution, war became thoroughly

mechanized and industrialized—and total. Svechin

was one the earliest theorists to recognize that the

material and creative challenges of total war would

revolutionize the very concept of strategy.

Svechin published his views in print under the

title Strategy. The work was published in two edi-

tions in 1926 and 1927. Here he defined strategy

as “the art of combining preparations for war and

the grouping of operations for achieving the goal

for the armed forces set by the war.” Through much

of his professional career Svechin carried on a

lengthy debate with another important Soviet the-

orist, Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky. Svechin’s work in

Strategy and elsewhere informed his view that mod-

ern war would be characterized by attrition (izmor).

Tukhachevsky argued a contrary view, that with

the help of technology, states could still fight swift

decisive wars of annihilation (sokrushenie). In the end,

history decided the argument in Svechin’s favor.

A prolific writer, Svechin was also a brilliant

teacher who educated a generation of Soviet military

leaders who helped win World War II. He was exe-

cuted as an enemy of the state on July 29, 1938.

See also: MILITARY ART; MILITARY DOCTRINE; MILITARY,

SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; TUKHACHEVSKY, MIKHAIL

NIKOLAYEVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Naveh, Shimon. (1997). In Pursuit of Military Excellence.

London: Frank Cass.

Schneider, James J. (1994). The Structure of Strategic Rev-

olution: Total War and the Roots of the Soviet Warfare

State. Novato, CA: Presidio.

Svechin, A. A. (1992). Strategy, ed. Kent D. Lee; intro-

ductory essays by Andrei A. Kokoshin, et. al. Min-

neapolis, MN: East View Publications.

AMES

J. S

CHNEIDER

SVYATOPOLK I

(c. 980–1019), grand prince of Kiev, replacing

Vladimir Svyatoslavich, the Christianizer of Rus.

The identity of Svyatopolk’s father is uncer-

tain. Around 980, after Vladimir had his half-

brother Yaropolk killed, he slept with Yaropolk’s

Greek wife, a former nun, and she gave birth to

Svyatopolk. Because he was born of adultery, the

chronicler explains, Svyatopolk (“the Cursed,” by

which appellation he came to be known) was stig-

matized for the rest of his life. Nevertheless,

Vladimir treated him as his son. Before 988, it ap-

pears, he gave Svyatopolk the town of Turov.

While there, Svyatopolk established friendly rela-

tions with the Poles and, around 1013, married the

daughter of Boleslaw I and accepted Latin Chris-

tianity. Later he plotted with the Poles against

Vladimir, and the latter imprisoned him. After

Vladimir died in 1015, Svyatopolk, allegedly his el-

dest surviving son, bribed the Kievans to accept him

as their prince, even though many preferred his half-

brother Boris, perhaps in keeping with Vladimir’s

wish. Because Svyatopolk’s succession was chal-

lenged, he initiated a fierce campaign to eradicate

his half-brothers, who posed a threat to his rule.

Thus he had Boris, Gleb, and Svyatoslav killed. In

1016, however, Yaroslav of Novgorod and his

Varangians defeated Svyatopolk and his Pechenegs

near Lyubech. Svyatopolk fled to the Poles, where

Boleslaw I joined him; together they evicted Yaroslav

from Kiev in July 1018. In 1019, after the king de-

parted, Yaroslav attacked Svyatopolk and defeated

him. As Svyatopolk fled, his reason and strength

failed him, and he died somewhere between the Pol-

ish and the Czech lands.

SVYATOPOLK I

1505

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

See also: GRAND PRINCE; KIEVAN RUS; VLADIMIR, ST.;

YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dimnik, Martin. (1996). “Succession and Inheritance in

Rus’ before 1054.” Mediaeval Studies 58:87–117.

Franklin, Simon, and Shepard, Jonathan. (1996). The

Emergence of Rus 750–1200. London: Longman.

ARTIN

IMNIK

SVYATOPOLK II

(1050–1113), prince of Polotsk, Novgorod, and his

patrimony of Turov, and grand prince of Kiev.

Svyatopolk, son of Izyaslav and grandson of

Yaroslav Vladimirovich (the Wise), became grand

prince in 1093 after the death of his uncle Vsevolod.

He and his cousin Vladimir Vsevolodovich (Mono-

makh) of Pereyaslavl sought to unite the princes of

Rus against the nomads, but their cousin Oleg Svy-

atoslavich of Chernigov refused to cooperate. In re-

sponse, they evicted Oleg from Chernigov and, in

1097, forced him to accept their terms at a congress

of princes at Lyubech. They all pledged loyalty to

each other and agreed that each one would retain

the patrimony of his father. Soon after, Svyatopolk

broke his pledge by ordering the blinding of Vasilko

Rostislavich of Terebovl, whom David Igorevich

falsely accused of plotting against Svyatopolk.

When Monomakh and Oleg waged war against Svy-

atopolk, he promised to punish David, but instead

attempted to seize Galician towns from Vasilko and

his brother. When the latter cut off the wheat and

salt supply to Kiev, Svyatopolk confiscated salt from

the Caves Monastery and sold it at inflated prices.

In 1100, at Vitichev (Uvetichi), he concluded peace

with Monomakh and Oleg, and punished David by

appropriating his patrimony of Vladimir in Volyn.

After that, he and his cousins campaigned against

the Polovtsy in 1103, 1107, and 1111. Their re-

sounding victories forced the nomads to stop their

incursions for over a decade. Svyatopolk died on

April 16, 1113, and was buried in the Church of

St. Mikhail in Kiev, which he had built.

See also: CAVES MONASTERY; GRAND PRINCE; KIEVAN RUS;

NOVGOROD THE GREAT; VLADIMIR MONOMAKH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dimnik, Martin. (1994). The Dynasty of Chernigov,

1054–1146. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediae-

val Studies.

ARTIN

IMNIK

SVYATOSLAV I

(c. 942–972), son of Igor and Olga; nominal grand

prince of Kiev.

Svyatoslav I Igorevich became the nominal

grand prince of Kiev in 945, after his father Igor’s

death. He expanded Kievan Rus to its furthest lim-

its, but overreached himself and failed to consolidate

his rule. Svyatoslav was the first prince with a

Slavic name, but he remained a Varangian at heart

and refused to adopt Christianity.

According to the Primary Chronicle, he assumed

power between 956 and 964 when his mother, the

regent, was deposed. Around 963 he attacked the

Khazars on the lower Don and eventually destroyed

their state and opened the steppe to other nomads.

He also defeated the Vyatichi and the Volga Bulgars

in the northeast, and the Yasians (Ossetians) and

Kasogians (Cherkasses) in the Kuban region. His

southeastern campaigns took him to the Caspian

Sea. He thus secured control of all the trade routes

between the Dnieper and the Volga. In 967 he cap-

tured northern Bulgaria and made Pereyaslavets his

headquarters. The Pechenegs attacked Kiev in 968,

forcing him to return home and drive them into the

steppe. At that time he partitioned Rus between his

sons: Yaropolk received Kiev, Oleg the Derevlyane,

and Vladimir Novgorod. He then returned to

Pereyaslavets, which he proposed to make his cap-

ital. He campaigned against the Greeks in Bulgaria

and Thrace until 971, when Emperor John I

Tzimisces forced him to accept humiliating peace

terms. While Svyatoslav was returning to Kiev in

972, the Pechenegs attacked and killed him. They

used his skull as a drinking cup.

See also: KIEVAN RUS; PECHENEGS; PRIMARY CHRONICLE;

RURIKID DYNASTY; VLADIMIR, ST.; YAROPOLK I

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Vernadsky, George. (1948). Kievan Russia. New Haven,

CT: Yale University Press.

ARTIN

IMNIK

SVYATOPOLK II

1506

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

SVYATOSLAV II

(1027–1076), grand prince of Kiev and progenitor

of the dynasties of Chernigov, Murom, and Ryazan.

Before Svyatoslav’s father Yaroslav Vladimiro-

vich the Wise died in 1054, he gave Svyatoslav

Yaroslavich the patrimony of Chernigov, including

Murom, Ryazan, and Tmutarakan. After his fa-

ther’s death, Svyatoslav and his brothers Izyaslav

and Vsevolod ruled as a triumvirate for some

twenty years. They asserted their authority over

all the other princes and defended Rus against the

nomads, primarily the Polovtsy (Cumans). In 1068

Svyatoslav scored a great victory over the Polovtsy,

after which he formed alliances with them. The fol-

lowing year the Kievans invited him to replace

Izyaslav as prince, but he refused to depose his

brother. Svyatoslav became the most powerful

prince in the land. In addition to his patrimonial

lands, he established his rule over the Beloozero re-

gion and Novgorod. In 1072, when the brothers

translated the relics of Saints Boris and Gleb in

Vyshgorod and issued the Law Code of Yaroslav’s

Sons (Pravda Yaroslavichey), he expressed solidarity

with Izyaslav for the last time. The following year

he evicted Izyaslav from Kiev and therewith dis-

obeyed his father’s directive to live at peace with

his brothers. By doing so, however, he gave his

heirs the right to rule Kiev after him. Four years

later, in 1076, he died in Kiev. Svyatoslav was a

patron of culture, learning, and the Church. He com-

missioned two miscellanies and founded monaster-

ies in Chernigov and Kiev. He probably completed

building the Cathedral of St. Savior in Chernigov

where he was buried.

See also: IZYASLAV I; KIEVAN RUS; VSEVELOD I; YAROSLAV

VLADIMIROVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dimnik, Martin. (1994). The Dynasty of Chernigov,

1054–1146. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediae-

val Studies.

ARTIN

IMNIK

SWEDEN, RELATIONS WITH

The establishment, starting in the late eighth cen-

tury, of a number of Swedish settlements in the

eastern Baltic led to regular interaction with East-

ern Slavs. Staraya Ladoga (Aldeigjuborg) became an

important Scandinavian center on the southeastern

shore of Lake Ladoga, but the Varangians gradu-

ally extended their operations southeastward along

the Novgorod-Kiev axis. Many of them served in

Gardariki (the “land of towns”) territory as dukes,

merchants, and mercenaries and were collectively

known as Rus (the basis for the word Russia). The

local princes, starting with Rurik (Rörik) who be-

came the ruler of Novgorod (Holmgard), had ex-

clusively Scandinavian names.

Even as the Scandinavian elite became Slavicized

by the tenth century, a special relationship—in the

form of dynastic marriages and joint military cam-

paigns—continued into the early twelfth century.

However, almost endemic conflict soon followed as

Finland became a focus of the expansionist impulses

of Sweden and the Grand Duchy of Novgorod alike.

The Karelian tribes were baptized by Novgorod,

whereas Swedish crusades into southwestern Fin-

land began in the 1150s. By the late thirteenth cen-

tury, the Swedes reached Karelia and established the

fortress of Viborg (Vyborg in Russian), as well as

Landskrona in the Neva estuary. The 1323 Treaty

of Orekhovets/Nöteborg between the two rivals

drew a border stretching across central Finland to

the Viborg district, but did little to stall Swedish

expansionism into northern Finland. A century and

a half of relative calm was followed by renewed

warfare in the late fifteenth century, but protracted

peace negotiations with the newly independent

Vasa Sweden and a growth of trade led to a grad-

ual normalization of relations after the 1520s.

The weakening of the Livonian Order created a

power vacuum in the eastern Baltic and the basis

for renewed conflict between Sweden and Muscovy.

Gustav Vasa’s 1555 attack on Russia marked the

beginning of Swedish aspirations for regional hege-

mony. The “Great Eastern Program” was designed

to turn Sweden into a pan-Baltic power that could

enrich itself by taxing the rapidly growing trade

flows between Eastern and Western Europe. The

Livonian War of 1533–1584 ultimately left Swe-

den in control of the northern coast of Estonia,

while Muscovy gained temporary control of Narva,

which became the country’s leading export port.

The Teusina/Tiavzino peace (1595) formally rec-

ognized Swedish control of Finland.

Sweden intervened during the Russian Time of

Troubles, initially in support of the Moscow gov-

ernment but soon as a conqueror of the Novgorod

region (in 1611–1612). Following the failure of

SWEDEN, RELATIONS WITH

1507

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

efforts to place a Swedish candidate on the Russian

throne, Gustav Adolf (Gustavus Adolphus) sought

to force a union between Novgorod and Sweden

and directed his expansionist attention at the Kola

and White Sea coast, albeit unsuccessfully. The 1617

treaty of Stolbovo marked the peak of Swedish ex-

pansion into Russia, leaving the country in control

of Ingria (Ingermanland; roughly today’s St. Pe-

tersburg region) and the Western half of Lake

Ladoga. Novgorod was returned to Russia.

Russian-Swedish relations were strong after the

war, and the new Romanov rulers subsidized

Swedish involvement in the Thirty Years’ War in

1630–1634, among other things. In spite of a

steady expansion of trade, political ties deteriorated

under Queen Christina. Russia renewed its attempts

to gain access to the Baltic in the 1650s and at-

tacked Sweden in 1658. In spite of some initial ter-

ritorial gains, the Peace of Kardis in 1661 ratified

the prewar status quo. The closing decades of the

century saw a steady expansion in Russian trade

via Swedish possessions, even in the face of peri-

odic diplomatic disputes. Tsar Peter I (the Great) in

the late 1690s managed to assemble an interna-

tional alliance designed to challenge Swedish su-

premacy in the Baltic region. The Great Northern

War of 1700–1721 led to the Swedish loss of its

Baltic provinces and the establishment of Russian

hegemony in the region.

Russia in the eighteenth century took an active

interest in Sweden’s internal affairs. Although

Russian engagement on the Ottoman front led to

alliance treaties with Sweden, Swedish revanchism

triumphed at home, and a campaign against Rus-

sia from 1741 to 1743 sought to regain the lost

eastern territories. The catastrophic war was fol-

lowed by the loss of southeastern Finland to Rus-

sia. A defensive alliance was signed between the two

countries, and the absolutist regime of Gustav(us)

III in the 1770s sought Russian support for a

Swedish conquest of Norway. A lack of success

eventually led to another war against Russia from

1788 to 1790. The Peace of Värälä reaffimed the

prewar status quo, while Gustav crowned his ca-

reer by establishing an alliance with Russia.

Sweden and Russia were allies against Napoleon

until the French managed to use the Treaty of Tilsit

to induce Alexander I to conquer Finland in the

last Russo-Swedish war of 1808–1809 (Treaty of

Fredrikshamn). Royal attempts to continue the war

were made impossible by a bourgeois revolution in

Sweden. The French Marshall Jean Baptiste Berna-

dotte (Karl Johan) was elected Swedish heir to the

throne in 1810 in order to gain Napoleon’s sup-

port for the reconquest of Finland. However, he in-

stead turned to France’s opponents in order to make

possible a Swedish takeover of Norway. In 1812,

Sweden declared itself neutral in European conflicts,

but a secret alliance was signed with Russia.

Popular Russophobia increased in the 1830s

and 1840s, and Oskar I began to pursue closer ties

with Great Britain and Denmark. A border dispute

with Russia in the 1850s led Sweden to seek

British-French guarantees. The two powers in 1856

forced Russia to demilitarize the Åland Islands.

Anti-Russian sentiment was further boosted by

the Polish uprisings and the Russification mea-

sures adopted in Finland toward the end of the cen-

tury. In spite of this, the government defined its

neutrality even more strictly in 1885. Nonetheless,

Russia’s recognition of Norwegian independence in

1905 was caused by suspicions of pan-Nordic

union and Sweden’s pro-German stance.

The gradually more tense political relations did

not prevent the establishment of growing economic

and cultural ties. Russia accounted for 5 to 6 per-

cent of Swedish imports in the late nineteenth cen-

tury, but in the years leading up to the October

Revolution, Russia was the third- or fourth-largest

destination of Swedish exports. Swedish direct in-

vestment grew and, for instance, Nobel Industries

developed a substantial presence in Russia. Sweden

harbored many intellectual refugees from Russia.

Sweden remained neutral in World War I, in

spite of popular pressures for an alliance with Ger-

many. The neutral position allowed Sweden, as the

first Western power, to establish relations with the

new Bolshevik regime. A Swedish-Soviet trade

treaty was signed in the autumn of 1918, although

formal diplomatic recognition only followed in

1924. Ties again deteriorated in the 1930s but, fol-

lowing the rise of fascism, Sweden backed Soviet

membership in the League of Nations. In spite of

an official position of neutrality during World War

II, Sweden openly supported its neighbor during

the Soviet-Finnish Winter War of 1939–1940. A

brief conflict with the Soviets in 1942 followed So-

viet efforts to sink Swedish freight ships carrying

German goods. Another source of tension came

from the flight of many Balts (mainly Latvians and

Estonians) to Sweden. While 160 Baltic military of-

ficers were returned to the USSR in 1945 and 1946,

civilian refugees were permitted to stay in Sweden.

The Soviets strongly opposed Swedish efforts

to establish Nordic security cooperation after the

SWEDEN, RELATIONS WITH

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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

war, and Sweden returned to its policy of non-

alignment, albeit with secret cooperation with the

West. Moscow valued Sweden’s decision not to ac-

quire nuclear weapons, and the two countries often

found themselves adopting similar positions re-

garding international disputes. Sweden gained fur-

ther favor by staying out of the European

Economic Community and by supporting the ESCE

(European Coal and Steel Community) process.

Growing tensions were caused by Afghanistan and

sightings of Soviet submarines in Swedish waters,

one of which was stranded in 1981. Ties were nor-

malized under Gorbachev. Commercial relations

were relatively modest during the Soviet and post-

Soviet period.

See also: DENMARK, RELATIONS WITH; FOREIGN TRADE;

GREAT NORTHERN WAR; LIVONIAN WAR; NARVA,

TREATY OF; NORWAY, RELATIONS WITH; NYSTADT,

TREATY OF; STOLBOVO, TREATY OF

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kirby, David. (1990). Northern Europe in the Early Mod-

ern Period: The Baltic World, 1492–1772. London:

Longman.

Kirby, David. (1995). The Baltic World, 1772–1993: Eu-

rope’s Northern Periphery in an Age of Change. London:

Longman.

ARMO

T. K

OTILAINE

SYN BOYARSKY

A ranking in the Muscovite state service system,

held by provincial petty noble cavalrymen who

comprised the bulk of the campaign army up to

the middle of the seventeenth century.

The syn boyarsky (pl. deti boyarskie) comprised

Muscovy’s middle service class, below the metro-

politan nobility but higher in status than the

contractually recruited commoner cossacks and

musketeers. Syn boyarsky literally means “boyar’s

son,” reflecting this group’s mixed origins (younger

sons of Moscow boyars, slave or free retainers of

formerly independent appanage princes, sons of

clergymen or peasants, etc.) in the fifteenth and

early sixteenth centuries.

The syn boyarsky was legally free in the sense

that he was exempt from taxes, and he was enti-

tled to own peasants and to sue in defense of his

precedence honor. But he was required to serve the

sovereign for life in the field army, in the garrisons,

and in the lower levels of provincial administra-

tion. A few deti boyarskie owned some allodial land,

but most depended primarily upon the sovereign’s

bounty in service-conditional land and cash and

grain issues to outfit themselves and their retainers

for duty. The syn boyarsky’s bounty entitlements

were determined in part by his service capacity as

assessed at inspection and in part by his past ser-

vice, past rank, and the services and ranks of his

forebears. The average syn boyarsky owned no

more than five or six peasant tenants. Upon re-

tirement his son or another male kinsman usually

received part or all of his service lands and took

over his service obligations.

See also: BOYAR; MESTNICHESTVO; MUSCOVY; POMESTIE;

STRELTSY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hellie, Richard. (1971). Enserfment and Military Change in

Muscovy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

RIAN

AVIES

SYTIN, IVAN DMITRIEVICH

(1851–1934), Russia’s leading pre-Revolution pub-

lisher of books, magazines, and the top daily news-

paper, Russian Word (Russkoye slovo).

Ivan Dmitrievich Sytin, had literate but poor

peasant parents and only two years of schooling

in his native village of Gnezdnikovo, Kostroma

Province. Venturing first to the Nizhny Novgorod

Fair at fourteen as helper to a fur-trading uncle, he

apprenticed at fifteen to a Moscow printer-mer-

chant who helped him start a business in 1876, the

year of his marriage to a cook’s daughter who

would be vital to his success.

Like his mentor, Sytin issued calendars, posters,

and tales that itinerant peddlers sold to peasants

throughout the countryside. When in 1884 Leo

Tolstoy needed a publisher for his simple books (the

Mediator series) meant to edify the same reader-

ship, his choice of Sytin raised this unknown to re-

spected status among intellectuals. Sytin then began

to publish for well-educated readers and branched

into schoolbooks, children’s books, and encyclo-

pedias by investing in the new mass-production

German presses that cut per-unit costs. His rise as

an entrepreneur who exploited the latest technol-

SYTIN, IVAN DMITRIEVICH

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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

ogy led contemporaries to tag him “American” in

method.

Sytin claimed that he became a newspaper pub-

lisher in 1894 at Anton Chekhov’s urging, and he

hired able editors and journalists who made his

Russian Word the most-read liberal daily in Rus-

sia. Lessening censorship and rapid industrializa-

tion in the last decades of the tsarist regime helped

Sytin add to his publishing ventures and kept him

a millionaire through the economic disruption of

World War I. After the 1917 Revolution, Sytin re-

ceived assurances from Vladimir Lenin that he

could publish for the Bolshevik regime, only to be

cast off as a capitalist after Lenin died in 1924. The

final decade of his life was marked by gloom, aus-

terity, and obscurity, offset only by his church at-

tendance and his writing of memoirs (published in

the USSR in 1960 in a shortened edition). His down-

town Moscow apartment is today an exhibition

center in his honor.