
Scholars generally agree that these years shaped
an understanding of imperial Russia, and the task
of reform that dominated his later political career.
Of primary importance was his experience of rural
life. For much of the 1890s the young district mar-
shal of the nobility also led the life of a provincial
landowning gentleman. Residing on his family es-
tate, Kolnoberzhe, Stolypin took an active interest
in farming, managing income earned from lands
both inherited and purchased. He also experienced
the variety of peasant agriculture, perhaps most
notably the smallholding hereditary tenure in
which peasant families of nearby East Prussia of-
ten held arable land.
Stolypin’s understanding of autocratic politics
also took shape in the provinces. There he first en-
countered its peculiar amalgam of deference, cor-
ruption, bureaucracy, and law. In 1899 an imperial
appointment as provincial marshal of nobility in
Kovno made him its most highly ranked hereditary
nobleman. Within three years, in 1902, the pa-
tronage of Viacheslav von Pleve, the Minister of
Internal Affairs, won him appointment as gover-
nor of neighboring Grodno province. Early 1903
brought a transfer to the governorship of Saratov,
a major agricultural and industrial province astride
the lower reaches of the Volga river valley. An in-
cubator of radical, liberal, and monarchist ideolo-
gies, and the scene of urban and rural discontent in
1904–1905, Saratov honed Stolypin’s political in-
stincts and established his national reputation as an
administrator willing to use force to preserve law
and order. This brought him to the attention of
Nicholas II, and figured in his appointment as Min-
ister of Internal Affairs, on the eve of the opening
of the First State Duma in April 1906. When the
tsar dissolved the assembly that July and ordered
new elections, he also appointed Stolypin to chair
the Council of Ministers, a position that made him
the de facto prime minister of the Russian Empire.
His tenure from 1906 through 1911 was tu-
multuous. Typically, historians have assessed it in
terms of a balance between the conflicting imper-
atives of order and reform. Ironically enough, con-
temporary opponents of Stolypin’s policies, most
notably moderate liberals and social democrats who
pilloried Stolypin for sacrificing the possibilities of
constitutional monarchy and democratic reform to
preserve social order, offered opinions of his poli-
tics that found their way, however circuitously,
into Soviet-era historiography. In this view,
Stolypin favored punitive force, police power, clan-
destine financing of the press, and a general negli-
gence of the law to dominate political opponents
and assert the preeminence of a superficially re-
formed monarchy. Hence, in August 1906, he es-
tablished military field court-martials to suppress
domestic disorder. More drastically, he undertook
the so-called coup d’état of June 3, 1907, dissolv-
ing what was deemed an excessively radical Second
State Duma and, in clear violation of the law, is-
suing a new electoral statute designed to reduce the
representation of peasants, ethnic minorities, and
leftist political parties.
A second view, shared by a minority of his con-
temporaries but a majority of historians, accepted
that Stolypin never entirely could have escaped the
authoritarian impulses widespread in tsarist cul-
ture and especially pronounced among those upon
whom Stolypin’s own influence most depended—
moderate public opinion; the hereditary nobility,
the imperial court; and ultimately the tsar,
Nicholas II. Given such circumstances, without or-
der the far-reaching “renovation” (obnovlenie) of the
economic, cultural, and political institutions of the
Empire envisioned by Stolypin would have been po-
litically impossible. Of central importance to this
interpretation was the Stolypin land reform, first
issued by administrative decree in 1906 and ap-
proved by the State Duma in 1911. This major leg-
islative accomplishment aimed to transform what
was deemed to be an economically unproductive,
politically destabilizing peasant repartitional land
commune (obshchina) and eventually replace it
with family based hereditary smallholdings. Yet,
the reform initiatives of these years were not lim-
ited only to this “wager on the strong,” but ex-
tended into every important arena of national life:
local, rural, and urban government; insurance for
industrial workers; religious toleration; the income
tax; universal primary education; university au-
tonomy; and the conduct of foreign policy.
In September 1911, Stolypin’s career was cut
short when Dmitry Bogrov assassinated him in
Kiev. Once a secret police informant, Bogrov’s back-
ground spawned persistent rumors of right-wing
complicity in the murder of Russia’s last great re-
former, but by all authoritative accounts the as-
sassin acted alone. Some scholars argue that
Stolypin’s political influence, and especially his per-
sonal relationship with Nicholas II, was waning
well before his death, in large measure as a result
of the western zemstvo crisis of March 1911. Yet,
Abraham Ascher, Stolypin’s most authoritative bi-
ographer, credits the claims of Alexander Zenkovsky
that Stoylpin was contemplating further substan-
STOLYPIN, PETER ARKADIEVICH
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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY