Kissinger Henry. White House Years

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

Myownparticipationintheeconomicdeliberationsduringthisperiodwas

peripheral.FromthestartIhadnotexpectedtoplayamajorroleininternational

economics,which—toputitmildly—hadnotbeenacentralfieldofstudyforme.

OnlylaterdidIlearnthatthekeyeconomicpolicydecisionsarenottechnicalbut

political.AtfirstIthoughtthatIhadenoughonmyhandskeepingwatchonthe

stateandDefenseDepartmentsandtheCentralIntelligenceAgencywithoutalso

takingonTreasury,Commerce,andAgriculture.Itookacrash“tutorial”from

ProfessorRichardN.CooperofYaleUniversitytolearnther udimentsofthe

subject.IappointedthebrillianteconomistsFredBergstenandRobertHormatsto

mystaff.ButonthewholeIconfinedmyselftoawatchingbrief.ThusIattended

meetingsonthesubjectandIsentinformationmemorandatothePresident.ButI

didnotseektomanage,muchlessdominate,theprocessofpolicyformulationas

Ididinotherareasofnationalsecurity.(Thisdidnotpreventthosewhocriticized

mefor“dominating”stateandDefensefromalsocriticizingmefornor

dominatinginternationaleconomicpolicy.)



Iagreedenthusiasticallywhen,atOMBDirectorGeorgeShultz’surging,the

newpostofAssistanttothePresidentfo rInternationalEconomicAffairswas

createdattheWhiteHouse—thoughittec hnicallyrepresentedadiminutionof

mypower.PeterPeterson,itsfirstincumbent,andIestablishedacloseworking

relationshipreinforcedbypersonalfriendship.Peterson,equippedwithasubtle

andwide‐rangingmind,taughtmeagreatdealaboutinternationaleconomics;I

respectedhimenormously,andthiswasanotherreasonwhyIintervenedrarely

andonlywhenanoverwhelmingforeignpolicyinterestseemedinvolved.The

arrangementworkedwelluntilthefrontalassaultontheWhiteHousestaff

systembythenewSecretaryofTreasury,JohnConnally.



ConnallyhadbeenappointedtothepostinDecember1970.Nixon

consideredhischoiceofoneofthemostformidableDemocratsanextraordinary

coupthatsenthiminto transportsofself‐congratulatoryprideforweeks

afterward.FortowardConnallytherewasnoneofthatambivalentsenseof

competitionandinsecuritythatmarkedNixon’srelationswiththeotherCabinet

members.UnlikeRogersandLaird,ConnallyhadnothadanycontactwithNixon

duringpreviouscrisesinNixon’slife.NixonthereforedidnothavewithConnally

thesamefearofnotbeingtakensufficientlyseriously;fromConnallyhedidnot

needtheconstantreassurancethathewasindeedthePresident.Connally’s

swaggeringself‐assurancewasNixon’sWalterMittyimageofhimself.Hewasone

personwhomNixonneverdenigratedbehindhisback.



AndConnallywasindeedthemostformidablepersonalityintheCabinet.

Highlyintelligent,superblyendowedphysically,helookedandactedasifhewere

borntolead.Hisbuildwasmatchedbyhisego—butthosewhoaspiretotheapex

mustnotbecriticizedforthat;theycouldneverleadeffectivelywithout

extraordinaryself‐confidence.Hisamiablemannerneverobscuredtherealitythat

hewouldnothesita te toovercomeanyobstacletohispurposes.Hehadagreat

senseofhumor;butevenwhenlaughinghenevergavetheimpressionthatthe

momentdominatedhim.Hewasnottimidnordidhelackcourage.“Youwillbe

measuredinthistown,”hesaidtomeonce,“bytheenemiesyoudestroy.The

biggertheyare,thebiggeryouwillbe.”JohnConnally wasneverafraidofhis

opponents;herelishedcombatindefenseofhisconvictions.Whateveronemight

thinkofhisviews,hewasaleader.



Likemanyself‐madeTexans hepreferredthefrontalassaulttotheindirect

maneuver.Hewasconvincedthatthebestwaytotranscendthemalaiseof

Vietnamwasforourleaderstobevisiblyengagedinatoughdefenseof the

Americaninterest.HedemonstratedimmediatelythatthenotoriousNixon

“PalaceGuard,”whichforcedCabinetmemberstodealwiththePresident

throughWhiteHouseAssistants,couldnotsurvivethechallengeofadetermine d

Cabinetmember.HesimplyranoverPetePetersononinternationaleconomic 

policy.Herefusedtosendmemorandathroughorreceiveinstructionsfromhim;

ifheneededWhiteHouseguidancehesimplycrossedthestreetfromthe

TreasuryandwenttotheOvalOffice.HeshowedthattheWhiteHouse

dominanceofwhichsomuchwaswrittenreflectedthepassive acquiescenceof

theCabinetasmuchastheformalorganizationchart.HehadreducedPetersonto

theroleofaspectatorevenbeforeNixon endedPeterson’sagonybyappointing

himSecretaryofCommerce,apositionhefilledwithgreatdistinction.



Connallysawnoreasontotreatforeignerswithanygreatertenderness.He

believedthatinthefinalanalysiscountriesyieldonlytopressure;hehadnofaith

inconsultationsexceptfromapositionofsuperiorstrength.Hispresenceas

SecretaryofTreasuryguaranteedthattheeconomicdialoguewithEuropewould

notbedull;italsoensuredthattheEuropeancontributionwouldhavetobe

somethingmoresolidthanritualincantationsofgoodwill. 



Suchwasthestateofbureaucraticaffairswheninthespringof1971

Britain’simminententryinto theCommonMarketandthepressuresonthedollar

suddenlyrevivedtheissuesandargumentsthathadbecomestaples inthe

politicalandsecurityfield.Justastheneedfor“defenseburden ‐sharing”had

becomeaeuphemismforthereductionofAmericanforcesandapolicyof

retrenchment,sothenewfoundstrengthoftheindustrialdemocracieswas

invokedasanargumentforstructuralchangesintheinternationalmonetary

system.Usuallythepushwasinthedirectionofgreaterflexibilityofexchange

rates,which,sinceitwasincreasinglyclearthatthedollarwasstillovervalued,

wouldinfactmeanafurtherdeclineforthedollar.Allthiswasaccompaniedbya

newtoneofeconomicnationalism,evenmorestridentaftertheGerman

revaluationofthemark.



InMunichonMay28ConnallyspokeoftheresponsibilityoftheEuropeans

andJapaninamannerthatwasunmistakablyachallenge:



Wetodayspendnearly9percentofourGrossnationalProductondefense—nearly$5

billionofthatoverseas,muchofitinWesternEuropeandJapan.Financingamilitaryshieldisa

partoftheburdenofleadership;theresponsibilitiescannotandshouldnotbecastoff.But25

yearsafterworldwarII,legitimatequestionsariseoverhowthecostoftheseresponsibilities

shouldbeallocatedamongthefreeworldallieswhobenefitfromthatshield…



NolongerdoestheU.S.economydominatethefreeworld.Nolongercan

considerationsoffriendship,orneed,orcapacityjustifytheUnitedStatescarryingsoheavya

shareofthecommonburdens.



And,tobeperfectlyfrank,nolongerwilltheAmericanpeoplepermittheirgovernment

toengageininternationalactionsinwhichthetruelong‐runinterestsoftheU.S.arenotjustas

clearlyrecognizedasthoseofthenationswithwhichwedeal.



AndonJune7,atameetingoftheOrganizationforEconomicCooperation

andDevelopment,SecretaryRogersandUnderSecretaryofStateNathaniel

Samuelsfollowedwithacomparablyassertive,ifmoredelicatelyphrased,

approach.



Suchlanguagehadnotbeenheardsincetheformationofouralliances.It

shookthecrockeryofourbureaucracyalmostasmuchasitdidthecomfortable

assumptionofouralliesthatthedoctrineofconsultationgavethemavetoover

unilateralAmericanactions.Firstofall,Connally’sexplosionignitedacontestin

Washington.PaulMcCrackenwantedtomovethediscussionofourresponseto

theemergingmonetarycrisisintotheWhiteHouseCouncilforInternational

EconomicPolicy,wherealltheeconomicagencies(aswellasmystaff)were

represented.Connallydidnotrelishallowinghisauthoritytobedilutedinthis

way.Connally’spreeminencewasmade unambiguouswhenNixondecidedto

bypasshisownsystemandaskedConnallytosubmitrecommendationsbased

onlyon“consultation”withPaulMcCracken,ArthurBurns(headofthefederal

ReserveBoard),GeorgeShultz,andPeterPeterson.Noneofthemhadthe

bureaucraticclouttostanduptoConnally.Stateand Defensewereexcludedfrom

theprocessaltogether.



Theeconomicagenciesagreedthatthedollarwasovervaluedandthatthis

worsenedourbalanceofpayments.Theydisagreedontheremedy.Shultz

favoredcontinued“benignneglect”ofthedollar—ineffectlettingthedollarfloat.

Burnsleanedtoincreasingthepriceofgold. McCrackenurgedtheorthodox

approachofmultilateralconsultationsforgreaterexchange‐rateflexibility.Each

oftheproposalshadmajorforeignpolicyconsequences.“Benignneglect”ofthe

dollarwouldbeconstruedasadeliberatepressuretacticbytheotherindustrial

democracies.Increasingthepriceofgoldwouldpenalizethosecountries,likethe

FederalRepublic,thathadbeentryingtohelpatoururgingbyholdingtheir

reservesindollarsratherthangold.Multilateralconsultationswouldbeasignalof

businessasusual;theygaveavetotoanysignificantparticipant.Atthetime

Connallyfavoredmaintainingtheexistingsystemoffixedexchangerates:an

uNorthodoxythenthatdoesnotnowlooksooddinthelightofexperiencewith

floatingrates.



ByearlyAugustprotectionistsentimentandtalkaboutretaliationagainst

discriminatorytradepracticeswereincreasing.Petersonurgedimportrestrictions

againstJapanunlessitrevaluedtheyen.Connallysuggestedanimportsurcharge.

Withforeignpolicyconsequencesclearlyimminentbynow,Iassembledthe

SeniorReviewGroup.This,forthefirsttime,broughttheStateDepartment

formallyintothepolicymakingprocess.Thediscussionwasinconclusivebecause

everyonerecognizedthatIhadneitherthepowernorindeedtheknowledgeto

insistonanyparticularpolicyline.Eachagencythereforepreferredtoreserveits

positionforthemeetingofprincipalsunderConnally’saegiswherethefinal

decisionswouldhavetobemade.Nevertheless,IaskedtheReviewGroupfor

optionsbyAugust17.



Withinafewdayseventshadovertakentheleisurelypaceofinteragency

deliberations.ThecrisisConnallyhadforeseen,andperhapssought,wasuponus.

OnMonday,August9,thedollarfelltoitslowestpointvis‐à‐visthemarksince

WorldWarII.OnWednesdayspeculationagainstthedollarabatedsomewhat.

However,onThursdayEuropeancentralbankswereagainforcedtobuyover$1

billion.AnNSCstaffmemorandumpointedout:



Thereislittlelikelihoodthatthesituationwillworkitselfoutwithouteithera

revaluationofEuropeancurrencies(whichisthemostprobablecourseofactionforthe

Europeans,giventhepresentcrisis);adevaluationofthedollar;orU.S.measurestorestrictthe

importsofforeigngoodstothiscountryandencourageU.S.exports(whichwilltake

legislation).TherewillalsoprobablybestrongeffortsonthepartoftheEuropeanstorestrict

theamountsofdollarsheldbytheircentralbanksandtoapplyotherstringentmeasures

againstthedollar.



ConnallynowurgedNixontoadoptawholeseriesofsweepingmeasures;it

turnedoutthathefavoredallofthemeasuresthatmystaffwasputtingforward

asalternatives.ThatSaturday,August14,justbeforeleavingforasecretmeeting

inPariswithLeDuc Tho,IhadaconversationwithNixon.Inafavoritetechnique

forbreakingnewshisinterlocutormightnotlike,Nixonwaselliptical.He

mentionedinpassingthathewouldmakea majorspeechoneconomicpolicythe

followingnight.Withhisfinelyhonedskillinavoidingunpleasantsubjectsheran

hisplannedsurchargeonimportsbymesolightlythatitsimpactdidnothitme

untilafterward.Ishouldnothavebeensurprised.Ihadseenhimusethesame

techniqueonRogerstwicewithinrecentmonthswhenhisSecretaryofStatehad

beenexcludedfrommajorpolicydeliberations—andhewasgoingtouseiton

RogersagainwithinaweekovertheBerlinagreement,thistimeadvancingthe

ingeniousargumentthatitwouldtakesomeofthestingoutofourallies’

reactionstohisneweconomicpolicy.Thefactwasthatadecisionofmajor

foreignpolicyimportancehadbeentakenaboutwhichneithertheSecretaryof

Statenorthenationalsecurityadviserhadbeenconsulted.Iaskedsome

perfunctoryquestionsabouttheattitudeofCongressbutmadenoother

comment.Therewasnopointtoit.SinceNixonhadalreadymadehisdecision,

therewasnosenseindebatingit.Thetimeformetoexpressmyviewswould

comeifforeignpolicyconsequenceswereobviouslyoverwhelming.



Thenextday,August15,thePresidentmadeatelevisionaddressoutlining

hisneweconomicpolicy.Onthedomesticsideheannouncedvariousmeasuresto

reducebothunemploymentandinflation,suchasinvestmentcredits,repealof

theexcisetaxonautomobiles,accelerationofincometaxexemptions,a$4.7

billioncutingovernmentspending,postponementofgovernmentpayraises,and

aninety‐dayfreezeonwagesandprices.Therealthrustofthenewprogram,

however,wasinthemeasuresto defendthedollarabroadandtorectifyour

balance‐of‐paymentsdeficit.Nixonannounceda10percentreductioninforeign

economicassistance,a10percentsurchargeonallimports,andsuspensionofthe

convertibilityofthedollarintogoldorotherreserveassets.



Withonedramatic gestureNixonhadbrokenthelinkbetweenthedollar

andgold,therebyopeningthewayforeffectivedevaluation;hematchedthe

internationalmovewithaprogramtocopewithinflationandprotectionismat

home—andbeganthetorturedprocessofsystematicinternationaladjustment.It

wasanextensionofhisboldstrokesinforeignpolicytothefieldofeconomics.

TheBrettonwoodsagreement,whichhadregulatedinternationalmonetary

arrangementssince1944,wasbeingmadeirrelevant.Thiswastohavemany,

largelyunforeseen,consequencesastheyearswenton.Theimmediate

significanceofthenewprogramwasitseffectabroad;itwasseenbymanyasa

declarationofeconomicwarontheotherindustrialdemocracies,andaretreatby

theUnitedStatesfromitspreviouscommitmenttoanopeninternational

economicsystem.Theindustrialdemocracies,especiallyJapan,wereinastateof

shockbecauseofthesuddennessoftheannounce ment,theunilateralnatureof

someofthemeasures,andthenecessitytheyimposedtoconsideraformal

restructuringoftheentireinternationaleconomicsystem.Clearly,wewere

headingintoaperiodofintensenegotiations,conflict,andconfrontation.



WhenduringtheeveningofAugust16IreturnedfromParistoafait

accompli,IfoundNixonelated.Forthesecondtimeinamonthhehadtakenthe

worldbystunningsurprise;hesawhimselfasrevolutionizinginternational

economicsashehadalreadytransformedinternationaldiplomacy. Hereveledin

thepublicitycouphehadachieved.Asheoftendidheaskedmeinnumerable

timestoreciteforeignreactions,whichweremixedatbest;hewasdelightedby

thedomesticapproval.Inthismoodofeuphoria,NixononAugust19stoppedin

Dallasand(provingthatPresidentialmindsrunintandem)utteredthefollowing

memorablewords:“Thegreatchallengeofpeaceisforeachofusindividuallyand

forallus,as‘onenationunderGod,’torededicateourselvestothismagnificent

Americandream.Withthisasourmoralequivalentofwarwecanmoveintoa

generationofpeace.”Itwashardtogowrongwithaplatformthatofferedpeace

asthemoralequivalentofwar.



MyownviewsabouttheAugust15measureswereagnostic.LaterIgrew

concernedabouttheunsettlingimpactofaprolongedconfro ntationonallied

relationships.Atthattime,however,I didnottrustmyjudgment enoughtotakea

positiononthemeritsofthenewmeasures.AftertheeventIcametotheview

thatsomeshockhadpro bablybeenneededtobringaboutseriousnegotiations.

Mymajorconcernwastoendconfrontationwhenithadserveditspurposeand

topreventeconomicissuesfromoverwhelmingallconsiderationsofforeign

policy.



Formally,themeasuresrepresentedanefforttoforcenewparities,thatis

tosay,toestablishvaluesforthevariouscurrenciesmoreinlinewiththeirreal

purchasingpowerandthustodeprivesomealliedcountriesoftheunfair

advantageofpeggingtheircurrenciesatlevelsmosthelpfultotheirexports. In

time,infact,itledtotheabandonmentofafixedsystemofexchangeinfavorof

ourpresent“floating”systeminwhicheachcurrencyfindsitsownlevelonthe

basisofshort‐termsupplyanddemand.



Ittookusnearlytwoyearstogetafullyfloatingexchange‐ratesystem

acceptedbyourallies.Itsadvocatesthoughtitwouldavoidtheperiodiccrisesin

whichfixedratesweredevaluedwhencurrencyreservesranoutorrevaluedin

thefaceofsurpluses.Therewouldbe“painless”dailyadjustments;speculators

woulddisappear;exchangerateswouldmorefaithfullyreflectunderlying

economicstrengths;countrieswouldnotbebankruptedoftheirgoldand

currencyreservessupporting“artificialrates.”Ithasnotquiteworkedoutthat

way.Thenewsystemhasbeensubjecttocrisesandpanicsevenmoredramatic

thantheoldsystemoffixedrates.Ithasgivenspeculatorsnewopportunities.Far

frombeingimmutablytiedtoeconomicperformance,rateshavebeenvulnerable

touncertaintyandspeculationandespeciallytotransfersofcapitalbalances.

Reserveshavestillbeenspenttopreservesomesemblanceofstabilityina

variationoftheoldsystemoffixedparities.Nobodyin1971,ofcourse,predicted

thattheOrganizationofPetroleumExportingCountrieswouldraisethepriceof

oilfivefoldandcreatenewbillionsofdollarsofvolatilemoney.Butthisisto

anticipateasequeltotheNixon‐Connallyspectacularthatisstillworkingitselfout

andthatwasthenunforeseeable;problemsofthedollar,theOPECbalances,and

thewholesystemofinternationalpaymentswill,Isuspect,remainonthe

internationalagendafortheindefinitefuture.Theimmediateconfrontationin

1971wastheurgentconcerntobringaboutarealignmentofcurrencieswithin

thefixedsystem(whichhadsomethingliketwomoreyearsoflife).Itwasnotjust

therateforthedollarthatwasaffected;theratesamongothercurrencieswere

inevitablyinterlinked.



Connally’sstrategywastoputforwardnospecificAmericanproposalto

resolvethecrisis.Hereasonedthatthelongertheimportsurchargeremained,

thestrongerourbargainingpositionwouldbe.HefearedthatanyAmerican

proposalwouldenableallothernationstocombineagainstiteventhoughthey

wouldneverbeabletoagreeonapositiveprogramoftheirown.Hence,aseries

ofmeetingsofdeputyfinanceministersonSeptember3inParisandoffinance

ministersinLondononSeptember15‐16endedinconclusively.DeputySecretary

oftheTreasuryPaulVolckerannouncedthattheUnitedStatesdidnothavea

particularplanforsolvingthecrisis.Talkswereinaphaseof“consultations,not

negotiations.”



Mountingtensionswerethereforeinevitable.Theotherindustrialnations

resentedbeingpressuredintoadaptationsoftheireconomicpolicieseventhough

theyknewverywellthatwithoutpressuretheywouldalmostsurelynot have

actedatall.ManywereshockedbythenewAmericanassertiveness.Wewould

havetotreadanarrowpathbetweenmaintainingenoughpressuretoprovidean

incentivefortheadjustmentswewereseeking,andevokingatradewaraswellas

jeopardizingpoliticalrelationshipsbuiltupoverdecades.Isoughttomakemy

contributioninfindingthatbalance.



Atfirst,IhadsympathizedwithConnally’sviewthatwithoutameasureof

confrontationourtradingpartnerswouldavoidthehardchoicesimplicitina

majorrealignmentofthegridofexchangerates.ButastimewentonIbeganto

suspectthatConnallywassufficientlyTexantorelishagoodscrapforitsown

sake.AtleasthejudgeditwouldstrengthentheAdministrationathomeifitwas

perceivedasaruggeddefenderofAmericannationalinterests.Butinmyviewthe

optimumtimetosettleiswhentheothersideisstillsuspendedbetween

conciliationandconfrontation.Onceithasdecidedonconfrontation,itcannot

yielduntilthetestofstrengthisfaradvanced.Mypreferencewas,therefore,to

goalongwithhard‐nosednegotiatingforatimebuttostopshortofall‐out

confrontationthatwouldthreatenourAlliancerelationships.Iwasreinforcedin

thisviewwhenArthurBurnsshowedmealistofretaliatorymeasuresplannedby

ourmajortradingpartnerswhichwouldproduceanoutcomeonbalancehighly

disadvantageousto us.



Whilewaitingforthemomenttoenterthefray,Imovedontwofronts.I

usedtheregularNSCmachinerytoworkoutpoliticalandeconomicapproaches,

especiallytoJapan,inordertosoftentheeffectoftheAugust15shockandto

giveusarunningstartforanewperiodofcooperationoncewehadsurmounted

thepresentcrisis.UnderSecretaryofStateandformerAmbassadortoJapan

AlexisJohnsonperformedyeomanservicehere.AtthesametimeIsoughtto

movetowardarticulating somedefinableobjectivesthatwouldpermit

negotiationstostart.IproposedtoNixonthatheformasmallgrouptoestablish

anegotiatingposition.ItwascomposedofConnally,PaulMcCracken,George

Shultz,andme.ArthurBurnswaskeptadvised.NixonexcludedPetersonbecause

ofConnally’sobjections,butIkeptinclosecontactwithPeteinformallyandhe

madeamajorcontribution.ThegroupmetaboutonceaweekduringOctober.It

developedthebasicschemeonwhichthesettlementwasultimatelyachieved.

ThefinalplanwaslargelytheworkofConnally,Shultz,andBurns;myeffortwas

toencouragearesolution,toexplainthepoliticalimplications,andintheendto

movematterstoaconclusion. 



Forawhilemattersgotworse.InapressconferenceonSeptember16

Nixonhadrelatedtheliftingofthesurchargenotonlytoreformofthemonetary

systembutalsotoburden ‐sharing,traderestraints,andnon‐tarifftrade

barriers—anagendasoincapableofrapidfulfillmentastothreatentomakethe

surchargepermanent.HerepeatedthesamethemeonSeptember23.Bytheend

ofSeptember,however,themeetingsofthesmallgroupwerebeginningtobear

fruit.AttheannualmeetingoftheInternationalMonetaryFundConnallylinked

theendofthesurchargeexclusivelytoanagreedmonetaryreform.Tensions

mountedagainwhen,inOctober,Connallystillrefusedtoputforwardaspecific 

schemeformonetaryreform;hehadnotyetinhisviewsqueezedthemaximum

outofthesituation.SincetheEuropeansandJapanesecouldnotagreeamong

themselves,thepracticalresultwasthattheimportsurchargecontinuedinforce,

thusraisingthedangerthatsoonerorlatertheothercount rieswouldretaliatein

aboutofeconomicnationalism.Moreover,IfearedthatiftheEuropeancountries

andJapansufferedarecessionwhichcouldbeascribedtoouractions,there

wouldbenowantofvoicesblamingitonus,andpermanentdamagewouldresult

notonlytoourforeignpolicybuttothedomesticstructuresofourallies.Nonew

economicarrangement,howeverbeneficial,couldcompensateforsuch achange.



Tobringmatterstoahead,IrecommendedtoNixonthatheintervene

personallywiththeEuropeanheadsofstate.Myoriginalideawasasummitofthe

Westernleaders.However,Pompidoumadeitclearthathewasnotinterested;

heknewhewouldnotbeabletocreateacommonEuropeanfront;incaseofa

stalemateBrandtwouldbeundergreatpressuretosidewiththeUnitedStates.

Thereforewedecidedtoinitiateaseriesofbilateraltalks.ThekeywasPompidou.

HeathwouldavoidchoosingsidesbetweenFranceandtheUnitedStates.Ifwe

linedupwithBrandt,wewouldevokeFrenchresentment;wecouldalwaysdo

thatiftheapproachtoPompidoufailed.Ourpreferredstrategywastopermit

Pompidoutoestablishapos itionofleadershipinEuropebynegotiatingtheterms

ofasettlementwithus.Wealwayshadinreservethethreattoisolatehimifhe

weretotallyintransigent.Ididnotthinkthislikely.Ijudgedthateveryonewould

beeagertosettleifanAmericanproposalgavetheopportunity.AndIwas

confidentthatNixonwouldnotwantapublicimpressionofdeadlocktoemerge

frommeetingsinwhichhewasinvolved.



OnNovember9ourAmbassadortoFrance,DickWatson,calledonmeat

theWhiteHouse,andIaskedhimonhisreturntoParistoarrangeameeting

betweenNixonandPompidou.Pompidouagreedinprinciple.Theprojectnearly

ranagroundinadisputeoverthevenue,essentiallyanissueofprestige.The

Frenchwereattheirprickliest.ItwasNixon’sturntovisitFrance,buthecouldnot

visitonecapitalalone.AtourofEurope,however ,woulddestroytheideaof

separatenegotiations.Ontheotherhand,Pompidouwouldnotacceptour

proposalofaFrenchislandintheWestIndiesbecauseitwouldforcehimtotravel

adisproportionatedistanceandbecause,thoughFrenchsoil,itwouldnotbe

consideredascomparabletohisownvisittoAmerica.Wefinallysettledonthe

neutralsiteofthePortugueseislandsoftheAzores.Themeetingwasscheduled

forDecember13.Pompidou,asIhadsuspected,insistedthatweshouldnot

discusseconomicissueswithanyotherEuropeanleaderbefore;thissuggested

thathewasinamoodto settle.HeurgedthattheGroupofTen,thefinance