Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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ministersofthemajoreconomiccountries,mo veupanddisposeofameeting

scheduledforDecember15,thusassuringthatanysettlementwouldbeinthe

firstinstancebilateralbetweenFranceandtheUnitedStates.Nixonagreed.The

GroupofTenmetonDecember1inRomewithoutmajorresults,asplanned.The

stagewasthussetforthedecisivemeetingintheAzores.(Meetingshadalso

beenscheduledwith HeathforDecember20‐21inBermudaandwithBrandtfor

December28‐29inKeyBiscayne.)



WeleftfortheAzoresonthedaythattheIndia‐Pakistancrisiswasreaching

itsclimax.OnthejourneyNixonandIknewthatAlHaigwasmeetingwiththe

Chinese,andweexpectedthattheywouldinformusiftheyhaddecidedtohelp

Pakistanandthusmovematterstothebrinkofgeneralwar.Evenafterthe

Chinesenoteremovedtheneedfora militarydecision,wewerepreoccupied

throughoutourstayintheAzoreswithpreventingafinalassaultbyIndiaonWest

Pakistan.



MostofmytimeintheAzoreswasspentinnegotiatingthemonetary

issue—notmystrongsuit.Ihadarrivedatthisextraordinarysituationbecauseof

thevagariesofbothAmericanandFrenc hdomesticpolitics.OnoursideIwasthe

seniorofficialmostconvincedthatthepoliticalcostsoftheeconomiccrisiswere

growingprohibitive,andthattheEuropeanswerepreparedtosettleon

reasonableterms.OncethePresidentwasinvolvedhewantedasuccess.Andtrue

tohisusualpattern,heidentifiedthiswithhisbeingseentobethechiefactor—at

thattimehestillsawmeasasurrogate,notasacompetitorforpublicattention. 

Connally,inturn,wasnoteagertobeperceivedashavingmovedtocompromise.

Hewaswillingenoughtohaveanegotiation,buthepreferredtokeephimselfin

reserveforadeadlock(andasabroodingthreat).



AsfortheFrench,Pompidouwaseagertobeperceivedasthechief

architectofasettlement.RelationswithhisFinanceMinister,ValeryGiscard

d’Estaing—destinedtobehissuccessor—didnotseemclose;Pompidouseemed

determinedtoexcludehimfromthenegotiations.(Thisinturnmadeit

impossible,inanyevent,forConnallytoparticipatedirectly.)Lookedat

practically,however,itgaveusanimportantclue.ForifPompidouinsistedon

handlingthenegotiations,hewasexpectingthemtosucceed.



Soithappenedthatasolutionto themonetarycrisiswasbeingnegotiated

betweenPompidou,aleadingfinancialexpertandaprofessionalbanker,anda

neophyte;eveninmymostmegalomaniacmomentsIdidnotbelievethatIwould

berememberedformycontributionstothereformoftheinternationalmonetary

system.FromtheAmericanmilitarybasewhereourpartywasensconcedin

barracks(exceptforthePresident,whowasgiventhebasecommande r’smodest

house),IhelicopteredtoPompidou’selegantvillaatafarendoftheisland.Iwas

accompaniedonlybyGeneralWalters,whowastoactasinterpreter.Pompidou

greetedmewithhisunfailingcourtesy,attendedbyhisinterpreter,Prince

ConstantinAndronikof.Webreakfastedoverlookingthelushmeadowsandgentle

hillsofPortugal’soutpostintheAtlantic,oneoftherelicsoftheperiodwhenthat

smallcountrysentitssonsonstupendousexplorationsofunknownseas,inspired

byfaithandsustainedbygreed.



Asthingsturnedout,mynegotiationswithPompidouwerelessonesided

thanourrelativecompetenceineconomicsmighthaveimplied.Connallyhad

givenmearangeofpositionsthathewaspreparedtoaccept.Idecidedthatit

wouldbesuicidaltoengageinatechnical negotiation.OnceIstartedretreating

fromourmaximumposition,Iwouldhavenologicalstoppingpointuntilwehad

reachedourfinalfallback.Mybesttacticwastoturnignoranceintoanasset,and

technicalincompetenceintoaweapon.IfIadvancedonepositiononlyand

refusedtobargain,itcouldbepresented—withoutbelligerence—astheinability

ofanamateurtocompetewithaprofessional.Ithereforechosetousethefirst

sessiontoreconnoitertheterrain.AfterwardIwoulddevelopapositionwith

Connallyandsubmititthenextday.



TodetermineFrance’srealpositionIpresentedtheissuetoPompidouin

philosophicalandpoliticalterms.Asettlementwasnecessaryandinevitable.It

wasboundtobereachedwithsomeoftheEuropeancountries,giventheir

inabilitytoarriveatacommonposition.WewouldlikeitbestifFrancewould

takethelead.Mypresenceasanegotiatorguaranteedthatwewantedan

outcomecompatiblewiththeself‐respectandneedsofeachside;itwastheonly

politicallyviableresult.Intheestablishmentofanewinternationalmonetary

systemnobodycouldafforda “victory,”sincethenewarrangementcouldbe

maintainedonlybythewillingcooperationofallitsmembers.Ihadcometo

negotiate,nottoimpose.ItwouldhelpmeifPompidouwould statehisminimum

requirements.Iwoulddomybesttobringaboutanunderstandingresponse

whenNixondiscussedthemwithPompidouintheafternoon.Iftheyagreed,I

wouldsubmitaconcreteproposalthenextmorningifheweredisposedtoinvite

metobreakfastagain.



Itturnedouttobetherightapproach.Pompidoucouldnot forgosome

bitingandnotentirelyunjustifiedcommentstotheeffectthatoureconomic

policiesseemedtohimmoregearedtoourelectoralprocessesthantoglobal

concerns.Andheaskedhowwewouldreactifheweretoaskustoacceptsome

economicrestraintsbecauseitwouldhe lphimwithsomeconstituencies.But

havingmadehispoint,hegavemeabrilliantanalysisofthemonetarysituation

fromwhichIdistilledthatPompidouwouldnotaccept afreelyfloatingsystem.He

wouldintheendgoalongwithsomeupwardrevaluationofthefranc—ifonlyfor

reasonsofnationalpride—buttomaintainFrance’scompetitivepositionithadto 

belessthantherevaluationofthemark.Hewouldnotresistdevaluatio nbythe

UnitedStates.ThetotalpackageofAmericandevaluationandEuropean

revaluationwouldbearound9percent,withthefrancatsomedistancefromthe

markalongthatscale.AndPompidouinsistedthatwedefendthenewparities.

Forthis,hewaswillingtoacquiesceinourgoingoffthelimitedgoldstandard.It

wasagreedthatthemorningsessionwithNixonwoulddealwithareviewofthe

internationalsituation.Theafternoonsessionwouldcovermonetarymatters.



Nixon,Connally,andIreviewedPompidou’spresentationduringthelunch

break.Connallyagreedtogivemea proposalforestablishingnewparitiesintime

formybreakfastmeetingwithPompidou.Hewasextraordinarilyhelpful.



Itwasnoteasytojudgehowwelltheafternoonsessionwent,because

Nixondidnotplantoleavehis markonhistoryinthefieldofeconomics.

Pompidourepeatedhispresentationofthemorning.Presciently,hestressedthat

afloatingsystemwouldleadtochaos.Hewaspreparedtohelpestablishnew

paritiesprovidedtheyreflectedrelativeeconomicstrengths.Itcannotbesaid

thatNixonwasclearlyontopofthesubject. Hewantedasolution,nota

discussionofexchangerates.Ifgiventruthserum,hewouldnodoubthave

revealedthathecouldnotcarelesswhereinthenewscalethevariouscurrencies

weretobepegged.Andasalwayswheninvolvedinnegotiationsratherthan

generalexchangesofviews,hewasnervoustothepointofanxiety.Hewrapped

himselfingeneralobservations,notallofthemequallygermane.Buttheywere

enoughforPom pidoutosensegeneralagreementtowhathadbeendiscussedin

themorning.Thefinaldetailsweretobeworkedoutatbreakfastbetween

Pompidouandme.



IntheeveningConnallyandIputtheproposaltoPompidouintofinal

shape.ItoldConnallythatitwassenselessformetobargain,sinceIwouldbeon

myweakestground.Iwouldprefertopresentapositionsomewherebetweenour

minimumandmaximumpositionsandsticktoit.Itshouldbereasonableenough

forPompidoutobeabletoacceptitinprinciple,andadequatetoourneeds.

Connallywasnotbytemperamentinclinedtothisnegotiatingmethod,buthe

finallyagreedthatitwasthebesthecoulddowithanunworldlyprofessor.



IsubmittedthenumbersworkedoutbetweenConnallyandmeto

Pompidouoverbreakfast.Theextraordinaryaspectoftheencounterwasthat

FranceandtheUnitedStatesshouldhavetakenituponthemselvestoworkout

theexchangeratesforeveryoneoftheworld’simportantcurrencies.Agreement,

infact,wasreachedratherquickly,forourproposalhadtakenPompidou’s

reasonablerequirementsseriously.Wedraftedadocumentthatwasratifiedby

theprincipalsintheafternoon,atasessioninwhichforthefirsttimethefinance

ministersparticipat ed.TheagreementledtoaconferenceoftheGroupofTena

weeklaterinWashington.Alltheothernationsfellintoline;theSmithsonian

Agreementratifiedthenewmonetaryarrangements.



Theeconomiccrisiswasover,atleastuntil1974whenthefivefoldincrease

inthepriceofoilplacedbeforetheindustrialnationsthenecessityofreassessing

theentireworldeconomicsystem.Ithadbeenaccomplishedwiththeinevitable

apprehension,confusion,andanxietythatcomewhenanywell‐established

structureforconductingaffairsisscrapped.TheUnitedStatesabandonedgold

convertibilityinordertosecureamorerealisticanddefensiblesetofexchange‐

raterelationships.Butthesystemcouldnotlast.DespitetheSmithsonian

Agreement,afloatingdollarwasinevitable.AsRaymondAroncorrectlypointed

out,nonconvertibilityintogoldpresentedourpartnerswiththechoiceofeither

accumulatingdollarsindefinitelyorconsentingtoadevaluationwithallits

commercialdisadvantagestothem.

wewerestronginmonetaryaffairs;our

partnerswereincreasinglypowerfulcommercially.Thenewsystemwasboundto 

generateincreasingpressuresonthedollar,requiringsoonerorlateraneven

morebasicstructuralreformoftheworldeconomicsystem.



Nixon’sunilateraldecisionsofAugust15,1971,hadtheirdesiredeffect.

Alliedcohesionhadbeenstrainedbutnotbroke n.Atthisremoveitisdifficult for

metoassesswhetherthebrutalunilateralismcomingsosoonaftertheshockof

thesecrettriptoPekingmortgagedrelationsunnecessarilyformanyyearsto

come,orwhetherouralliesbytheirimmobilismleftusnootheroption.



<<Contents>>

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

High‐LevelConsultations:TheFinalRound



ineteenseventy‐oneendedwithanotherseriesofmeetingsbetweenNixon

andtheleadersofourclosestallies:France,Britain,andtheFederalRepublic

ofGermany.Exceptforthemonetaryissue,nogreatdecisionsemerged.Mostof 

thefundamentalissuesremainedinabeyance;butfoundationswerelaidfornew

approachesafterwehadextricatedourselvesfromIndochina.Onlythenwould

webeabletoovercometheEuropeanambivalences:doubtaboutAmerican

constancycoupledwiththeunwillingnesstoassumealargerburdenofthe

commondefense;pressuresfordétentesidebysidewithfearsofaUS‐Soviet

condominium;insistenceonconsultationoveranyAmericanglobalmovewhile

cateringtodomesticpopularitythroughtheappearanceofindependencefrom

andsometimesoppositiontoAmericanpreferences.



GivenNixon’slackofinterestineconomicissues,thepoliticalconversations

werebyfarthemostsignificantpartofhismeetingwithPompidouattheAzores.

Theyhadremarkablycompatibleviewsofinternationalaffairs.Bothwere

profoundlysuspiciousoftheSovietUnion,yetconvincedoftheneedto

demonstrateadesireforcoexistenceasthepreconditionofdomesticsupportfor

astrongforeignpolicy.Bothsoughtsecuritynotinabstractproclamationsof

goodwillbutinstrongdefensesandaninternationalequilibriuminwhichChina

playedaprominentpart.



TheydivergedbecausePompidoushareddeGaulle’spremonitionsthat,

howeverableNixon’sconductofforeignpolicy,theUnitedStates’internal

dynamicswouldinduceitsoonerorlatertowithdrawfromEurope.Hetherefore

favoredcreationofaEuropeanpoliticalunionbackedupultimatelybyacommon

Europeandefense—anideatowhichAmericahadbeeninhospitableatleastsince

the1950s.Pompidousaw apotentialincompatibilitybetweenourstrategyof

nucleardeterrenceandtherequirementsofEuropeansecurity.“Wewanttobe

protected,notavenged,”hesaid.“Revengewouldbesmallconsolationtousina

cemetery.”PompidouhadurgedNixontowardconciliationwiththeSovietUnion

whentheyfirstmetinFebruary1970.Nowthathisadvicewasbeingadoptedand

theMoscowsummitwasscheduled,Pom pidousharedalsodeGaulle’slong‐

standingdistasteforaUS‐Sovietcondominium;andheremainedprofoundly 

suspiciousthatinthelongrunGermannationalismwouldrespondtothesiren

callsfromtheEast.Heofferednobettersolutiontohisdilemmasthana

EuropeanSecurityConference,whichhethoughtwouldcurbeveryone’sappetite

forgoingitalone.Butonthewhole,Pompidou’sruminationswereintellectual

exercisesjustifyingthatcombination(sostrangetoAmericans)ofAlliance

commitmentandFrenchindependencethatinfacthasenabledFrancetoconduct

aseriousandresponsibleforeignpolicythroughouttheFifthRepublic.



InthesegeneralsurveysNixonwasathisbest.Hehadanexcellentgraspof

overallrelationshipsandhecouldartic ulateourpositionconc isely,often

eloquently.NixondidnotdifferwithPompidou’s analysisofEuropeanconditions.

AftersomeinitialhesitationhenowfavoredthefosteringofEuropeanunity;he

objected,however,tobasingitontheprospectofAmericanwithdrawal,whichhe

fearedwouldturnintoaself‐fulfillingprophecy.HeconcentratedonSoviet

relationsandtheopeningtoChina.Heexpressedhisownfearsaboutthelong‐

rangeimplicationsofOstpolitik.HepromisedthathistripstoMoscowandPeking

wouldnotencouragesentimentalillusio ns.HeexplainedourpolicyintheIndia‐

Pakistancrisis;Pompidouprofessedtoagreewithouranalysis.Butheleftlittle

doubtthatsinceweweremakingthedifficultdecisions,Francehadsomescope

forcynicalopportunism.Sincewewouldprotecttheequilibrium,Francewould

leantowardIndiaasthestrongerandmorepopulouscountry.



Pompidou’sreactionsreflectedthebasicEuropeanambivalence.Intimesof

tensionEuropeansadvocateddétente;inperiodsofrelaxationtheydreaded

condominium.Incrisistheylookedtoustomaintaintheequilibriumoutsideof

Europe,andundertheumbrellaoftheriskswewererunningtheydidnot

hesitatetoseekspecialadvantagesforthemselves.Theseattitudesactedatonce

asaspurandabraketoourEuropeanpolicy.Itimpelledustoadegreeofsharing

ofviewsunprecedentedamongallies,butitleftusfinallyfacetofacewiththe

necessityofmakingtheultimatedecisionsonthemostcriticalissues,especially

outsideofEurope.Anditprovidedanadditionalincentiveforustodevelopour

ownstrategyfordétente.InitsabsenceEuropeanleaderswouldmaketheirown

foraystoMoscowandbetemptedtogainthesupportoftheirleftbypretending

toactasabrakeonanallegedAmericanbellicosity,whichtheysecretly

welcomed.IfwehadourownoptiontowardtheEast,thesetendencieswouldbe

restrainedbythefearthatifpushedtoofarwecouldoutstripouralliesinarace

toMoscow.



ThemeetingwithHeathonDecember20‐21followedasimilarpattern,

exceptthatHeath,beingmorefamiliarwithAmericanthoughtprocesses,wasless

explicitaboutlong‐termtrendsthanPompidou.Hewasmorepreparedtotake

NixonathiswordwhenheexplainedourpriorityofAtlanticoverEast‐West

relations.HeathpursuedhisfavoritethemeofEuropeanunityandreassuredthe

Presidentthatitwouldbe“competitive,”notconfrontational.Itwasan

interestingandnotentirelyreassuringformulation,aconsiderablestepaway

fromtheautomaticcooperationtakenforgrantedbyourown“twinpillar”

Atlanticistsinthe1960sandbyallofHeath’spredecessors.Heathexplainedhis

ideasforthebestprocedureforAtlanticcooperation.FirstEuropeshoulddevelop

acommonpolicyataEuropeansummitorForeignMinisters’Conference.After

thataneffortwouldbemadetocoordinatewithus—anotherimportant

modificationoftheold“specialrelationship”basedonpriorconsultations

betweenLondonandWashington.Heathspokemorepassionatelythan

PompidouaboutEuropeandefense.WefacedinHeaththecuriosityofamore

benignBritishversionofdeGaulle.



ExceptontheseissuesHeath’sviewsparalleledours.Hesharedour

skepticismabouttheEuropeanSecurityConference.Hegavesomecredenceto

Pompidou’sbeliefthatitmightbuttresstheindependenceofEastEuropean

countriesbutsympathizedwithmyviewthatitwashardto explainwhythenthe

Sovietswouldpushitsoenergetically.Heath’smajorconcernwasnottobe

caughtinadisputebetweenFranceandtheUnitedStatesonthesubject.He

suggestedweputtheissueoffuntil1973,usingasa pretexttheneedtoratify

Germany’sEasterntreatiesfirst.



Thereviewoftheworldsituationwaswarmandharmonious. OntheIndian

subcontinentBritain’shistoricrelationshipwastooemotionaltocountenanceour

coldergeopoliticalassessment.Thetwoleadersdiscussedwhatwasperhapsthe

mostprofoundphilosophicalquestionfacedbyallthenationsoftheWestin

common.ItwasposedbyHeath:“Wearemovingmoreandmoreintoastateof

worldaffairsinwhicheffectiveactionisnolongerpossible.Howmuchcanyou

do?”ItledtooneofNixon’smoreeffectivepresentations,partofwhichhas

alreadybeenquotedinthepreviouschapter:



PartofthereasonforconductingourVietnamwithdrawalsoslowlyistogivesome

messagethatwearenotpreparedtopayanypriceforendingawar;wemustnowask

ourselveswhatwearewillingtopaytoavertwar.Ifwearenot,wehavetoughdaysahead…

Theestablishmenthasaguiltcomplex.Theycan’tstandthefactthatI,theirpoliticalopponent,

amrectifyingtheirmistakes.Inaddition,theestablishmenthasthisgrowingobsessionwith

domesticproblems.Theintellectualestablishmentisconfusedandfrustratedbytheirownrole,

andbytheUnitedStates’role.Theyhaveneverbelievedthattherewasanyrealdangerfrom

theleft.Theyareturninginward.Theyhavemadeitaproblemwhetherwearegoingto

continueourinvolvementintheworld.Thepointofthistoo‐longdiscourseisthis:Iknowthe

issue;I’llseeitthrough;wewillhaveaworldrole.You’llwakeupdayafterdaywondering

what’shappeningtous.Ourinitiativesarenecessarytogiveourpeoplehope.Apoliticalleader

mustconstantlyfeedhope—buthemustconstantlyknowwhatheisdoing,withoutillusion.



Nixon’slaterfatemustnotobscuretheimportanceofthispassage.Hewas

right;hehaddiagnosedboththeAmericanandtheAtlanticproblemcorrectly.



ThelastvisitorwasWillyBrandt.AswiththeotherEuropeanleadersthere

werefewoutstandingissues.ButunliketheotherleadersBrandtmadenoclaims

toaglobalrole;hepridedhimselfonavoidingit.Asaresulttherewasrelatively

littletodiscuss.ThepurelyGermanproblemshadbeennegotiated.Boththe

EasterntreatiesandtheBerlinAgreementwereawaitingratificationbythe

GermanParliament.WhenBrandtvisitedNixonatKeyBiscayneonDecember28

and29,1971,Ididnotattendthediscussions,beinglaidupwithinfluenza.This

didnotinhibitNixonfromfollowinghisusualprocedureofmeetinghisvisitor

accompaniedonlybyoneWhiteHouseaide(inthiscaseHaigsatinforme).

RogersandGermanForeignMinisterWalterScheelheldseparatediscussions.



ThemajortopicofconversationwasEast‐Westrelations.Inthosefar‐away

daysBrandtwastheleadingexpertontheSovietleaders;hehadmetthemmore

frequentlythananyone;noneofourseniorofficialshaddealtwithBrezhnev,

Kosygin,orPodgorny—exceptfora briefencounterbetweenNixonandPodgorny

atthereceptionintheElyséePalaceafterthememorialservicefordeGaulle.

Brezhnevespeciallywasanenigmatous.Brandt’ sassessmentofhimwasonthe

wholepositive.Brezhnev,accordingtoBr andt,initiallyhadbeenunfamiliarwith

foreignpolicybutinthepastyearhadgainedagreatdealofconfidence.Heno

longersimplyreadcarefullypreparednotes.BrandtthoughtthattheSoviets

genuinelywisheddétentepartlybecauseoftheirfearofChina.Heexpressedhis

gratificationatNATO’ssupportforhisOstpolitik.Nixonfrostilycorrectedhim,

sayingthattheAlliancedidnotobjecttothepolicy.ButtheFederalRepublichad

tomakethedecisionandaccepttheresponsibility.Brandtsuggestedthatthe

SovietsresentedthelinkagebetweentheGermantreatiesandtheBerlin

Agreement.HaighadtheimpressionthatBrandtwasnotallthatenthusiastic

aboutlinkagehimself,fearing“reverselinkage”—Sovietpressureontheaccess

routestoBerlintoacceleratetheratificationprocess.However,givenGerman

politics,Brandtsawnowaytoavoidit.TheBonnParliamentwouldsurelyrefuse

toratifythetreatieswithoutasatisfactoryimplementationoftheBerlin

Agreement.Asforus,thestateofaffairsdescribedbyBrandtwasnotwithoutits

compensations.ItgaveusalevertoexactrestrainedSovietbehavior,especiallyif

wehadtoreacttoaVietnamoffensive.TheSovietswouldnotwant aglobalcrisis

beforetheGermanParliamenthadvoted.



NixongaveapreviewofhisapproachtothePekingandMoscowsummits,

alsofollowingfamiliarlines.BrandtarguedthatEast‐Westtradeshouldnotbe

linkedtopoliticalnegotiations;heconsideredcommercea waytoleaventhe

Sovietsystem.HealsourgedaEuropeanSecurityConference,invokingthe

standardEuropeanargumentthatitwasdesiredpreciselybythemost

independentcountriesofEasternEuropeasameansofbuttressingtheir

autonomy.NomorethanPompidoubeforehimcouldheexplainwhytheSoviets

werepressingforaconferencethatwouldloosentheirholdonthesatelliteorbit.



Nixon,likeme,wasmoreskeptical.HewarnedthataEuropeanSecurity

ConferencemightfurnishanexcusetoCongressionalcriticsfortroopreductions.

Heurgedthatallofthealliesmoveinadeliberatefashion.NixonandBrandtboth

notedthatafterthebriefflurryofMaytheSovietshadcooledtotheideaof

mutualandbalancedforcereductions.Brandtstressedhisinterestinfostering

thetiesbetweenEuropeandtheUnitedStates.Itwasafriendlymeeting,

successfuleventhoughitdidnotaimforresults.



Thesegeneral,largelyphilosophicaldiscussionsbetweentheleadersof

EuropeandtheUnitedStatesthatmarkedthebeginningandtheendofthe1970‐

71periodreflectedthefactthattheseyearsoftheNixonAdministrationwerean

eventfulperiodinourrelationswiththeotherindustrialdemocracies.TheFederal

RepublicwasonthevergeofcompletingitsOstpolitik.Oursupportofithad

helpedchannelitinadirectioncompatiblewithAtlanticunityandWestern

cohesion.TheeconomicadjustmententailedbyBritain’simminententryintothe

CommonMarkethadproducedaperiodoftension.Butintheend,anew

monetarysystemhademerged,reached—atleastinitsfinalstages—ina

cooperativemannerthatgavethepr incipalnationsastakeinmaintainingit.The

militarystrengthoftheWesternAlliancehadbeenmaintainedinthefaceof

bitterassaultintheCongress.



Muchremainedtobedone.Aperiodofdétentewasclearlyapproaching.It

remainedtobeseenwhethertheAlliancewouldsucceedindistinguishing

betweenformandsubstance,whethera periodofrelaxationoftensionswould

slackentheeffortstomaintaintheequilibriumorprovideaspurtocohesionand

newcreativity.WehopedtoinfusetheAtlanticrelationshipwithanewspurtof

leadershipaftertheVietnamwarwasbehindus,foritwould—andmust—remain

thecornerstoneofourforeignpolicy.



<<Contents>>

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