Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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IsentthismemorandumtothePresidentonAugust27,pointingoutits

“seriousimplications.”Thefiguresrepresentedtheexactoppositeofwhatthe

PresidenthadorderedandhadpromisedtoThieu.TheJCS“recommendations”

weretheproductoffiscalguidance,notofastrategic preference:“Theproposed

acceleratedredeploymentswouldineffectspendallthebenefitsofthe

Cambodianoperationonourwithdrawalscheduleratherthanusingthese

benefitsaspossibleleverageinachievinganegotiatedpeace.”



InthefirstroundNixonheldfirm.OnSeptember4IsentLairdanotethat

thePresidentinsistedontheoriginalschedule.Butitwasalosingbattle.By

OctoberitwasclearthatLairdwasproceedingaccording tohisownfiscal

guidance.Neverlackingdari ng,heproposedtoannouncetheaccelerated

withdrawalattheregularPentagonbriefingonMonday,October12.Atthispoint

Ithrewinthetowel.Thieutookourvolte‐facewithgoodgrace,havinglongsince

decidedthattherewasnopointindebatingourinexplicabledomestic

maneuvers.HepointedoutthattoreplacethedepartingAmericanforceshe

wouldhavetowithdrawintoVietnamataskforcethathadsoughttokeeproads

openinCambodiaandcomplicatethereestablishmentofCommunistsanctuaries

there.WewerethussloughingoffourdomesticproblemsontoSaigon,and

SaigonwaspassingitsdifficultiesontoPhnomPenh,whichbecametheultimate

victimofeveryone’sfrustrations.



Inthisautumnofseeminglullitbecameimperativetodevelopastrategy

forendingthewar.InNovember,undertheimpactoftheunexpectedsetbackin

theCongressionalelections,Nixoncamebackagaintohisprojectofannouncing

in1971analmosttotalwithdrawal,coupledwithaquarantineofNorthVietnam

andtheresumptionofheavybombing.Istilldidnotbelievethatsuchanattempt

toforcearapidconclusioncouldwork.Thesuddenwithdrawal,evenifitdidnot

wrecktheSouthVietnamesegovernmentandtheprospectsofVietnamization,

wouldconveysuchasenseofimpatiencetoHanoithatthequarantineandthe

bombingwouldservelittlepurpose.Hanoiwouldsimplybuckledownand

endure,countingonthedomesticuproarheretostopourmilitarypressure.Itold

thePresidentthatevenfromthepoliticalpointofviewhisproblemwaslessone

ofwithdrawingin1971thanofpreventingacollapseinVietnamin1972.



NixonandIspentagreatdealoftimeinNovember1970workingouta

morepracticalstrategy.Wehadtoputastoptotheendlessmaneuveringover

withdrawalrates.Irecommendedthatwhenthecurrentwithdrawalincrement

wascompletedinMay1971weshouldannounceanothersubstantialreduction,

perhapsontheorderof100,000oversixmonths.Thiswouldstillmaintain

securityinSouthVietnamthroughitsPresidentialelectionscheduledforOctober.

Afterthat,whenourforceswouldbedowntoabout180,000,wewould

announcefairlyfrequentsmallerreductionsuntilwehadreachedaresidualforce

ofabout50,000volunteersbythesummerof1972.Thesewouldremainuntil

therewasasettlement.Sometimein1971,dependingonthesituation,wewould

announcetheendofAmericanparticipationingroundcombat operations.

Sometimein1971,too,wewouldoffertheNorthVietnameseamorerapid

withdrawalinreturnforacease‐fire.Ifitwererejected,wewouldknowthatwe

wouldfaceanoffensivein1972.Theoutcomeofthewarwouldthendependon

whethertheSouthVietnamese,aidedonlybyAmericanairpower,wouldbeable

toblunttheassault.Peacewouldthuscomeeitherattheendof1971oratthe

endof1972—eitherbynegotia tionorbyaSouthVietnamesecollapse.



Forthisstrategytosucceed,however,itwasimperativetoweakenthe

NorthVietnameseasmuchaspossibleintheinterval.TheCambodianoperation

haddelayedHanoi’slogisticsbuildupfo ratleastfifteenmonths;everymonth

gained,wehoped,strengthenedtheSouthVietnamese.Welookedfo rwaysto

consumeHanoi’ssupplies,topostponefurtheritsreadinessforoffensive

operations,andtoblunttheassaultshoulditcome.Ifwewereseriousabout

Vietnamization,wehadtoma nage,inspiteofourdomesticdissent,three

concurrenteffortsuntilSaigoncouldstandonitsownfeet:Americantroop

withdrawals;therapidstrengtheningofSouthVietnameseforces;andthe

progressiveweakeningoftheenemy.[

Thedemandfortotalwithdrawal,incidentally,was

neverimposedonSouthKoreaundermuchmorefavorablecircumstanceseventwenty‐five

yearsaftertheendofhostilities.

]



ThestrategyNixonandIdevisedinNovember1970wascarriedoutin

essencein1971and1972.Anditworked.Wemanagedtowithdrawallourforces

withinlittlemorethanayearofthechosendateoftheMcG overn‐Hatfield

amendment.Andweaccomplishedthiswithoutoverthrowinganallied

government.[

TheonecircumstancewecouldnotforeseewasthedebacleofWatergate.It

wasthatwhichfinallysealedthefateofSouthVietnambytheerosionofexecutiveauthority,

strangulationofSouthVietnambywholesalereductionsofaid,andlegislatedprohibitions

againstenforcingthepeaceagreementinthefaceofunprovokedNorthVietnamese

violations.

]



ItwasthepursuitofthisstrategythatledustotheLaosoperationof1971.



<<Contents>>

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****



TheLaosOperation



hattherewasboundtobeanothertestofstrengthwasevidentinthe

stridencyofNorthVietnam’spublicstatements.Forexample,atthe100th

plenarysessionofJanuary21,1971,XuanThuyridiculedourOctober7cease‐fire

proposal.QuotingliberallyfromAmericanwarcritics(acommonpractice),he

demandedthatwerespondpositively toMadameBinh’seightpoints.Reporting

onaplenarysessionoftheCentralCommittee,theNorthVietnameseParty

newspaperNhanDancalledforarelentlesswareffortnomatterhow“fierce” and

“protracted”thewarmightbe.

T



Duringthelastmonthsof1970Iaskedtheexpertsinthegovernmentand

onmystafftosubmittheirassessmentsofthemilitaryandpoliticalprospectsfor

thenexttwoyears.



Itwasclearattheendof1970thatHanoiwouldneedmostof1971to

protect,enlarge,andrebuilditssupplysystem.Hanoi’sbigpushwasexpectedfor

1972,inordertohavea maximumimpactonourPresidentialelection.Ameeting

oftheSeniorReviewGrouponJanuary15,1971,triedtoforecastmoreprecisely

thesituationtheSouthVietnamesewouldfacein1972.Ourstudiesconcluded

thatifUStroopwithdrawalsandtheenemy’ssupplybuildupcontinuedattheir

currentrates,theSouthVietnamesemightbeshortbyeightbattalionsofwhat

theyneededtoresist,evenifwecontinuedtostalematetheenemyinCambodia

andLaos.(Thiswascalledthe“battaliondeficit”insystemsanalysisjargon.)The

deficitwouldbethirty‐fivebattalionsifHanoiweretoachieveadecisivevictoryin

LaosandCambodiabeforeitsoffensiveof1972.



TheCommuniststrategywoulddependonacombinationofguerrillaand

regular(calledmain‐force)unitsthatwhipsawedthedefenders . Ifwe

concentratedonguerrillas,theenemy’smain‐forceunitswouldoccupylarge

partsofSouthVietnam.Ifwedealtwiththemain‐forceunits,theguerrillaswould

makegainsinthecountryside.Whereverthenexusbetweenguerrillaandmain‐

forceunitscouldbebroken,enablingSaigontoconcentrateononeortheother,

Saigongainedtheupperhandfairlyrapidly.AftertheCambodianoperationthe

warvirtuallyendedintheSouthernhalfofSouthVietnamuntilwellinto1972,

andeventhenneverregainedfullforce.TheNorthVietnamesedivisionsin

CambodiawereabsorbedwithrebuildingandprotectingtheCambodian

sanctuaries;theywereconfinedtoshallowhit‐and‐runraidsacrossthefrontier.

IntheNorthernregionsthenexusbetweenmain‐forceunitsandguerrillas

continued;NorthVietnamesesupplylineswereshort.Pacificationprogresswas

correspondinglyslow.



Itwasherethatthedeficitintroopsshowedupinourstatistics.Butthe

figuresdidnottrulyreflectthenatur eoftheproblem.Itwasnotjustaquestion

ofnumbersbutwheretheunitswerelocated.TheSouthVietnamesearmywas

organizedonthebasisoftwodivisionsforeachoffourMilitaryRegions,withan

airbornedivision,amarinedivision,andvariousRangerandspecialforcesunits

representingastrategicreserve.ThankstothesuccessoftheCambodian

operation,therewereexcesstroops(inthejargon,abattalionsurplus)forevery

foreseeablecontingencyinMilitaryRegions3and4,SouthernSouthVietnam.In

theNorthernregionsweexpectedasubstantialdeficitdespitethemilitary

stalemateinCambodiaandLaos.



Butwecouldnotmeetourproblembymoving“surplus”Southerntroops

intothe“deficit”Northernareas.Exceptforthestrategicreserve,eachdivision

wastiedtotheMilitaryRegioninwhichitwasstationed;andSoutherndivisions

werejudgednottobeusefulforfightingintheNorthernCentralHighlandsand

alongtheDemilitarizedZone(DMZ).Therewereseveralreasons.Divisionswere

stationedwheretheywererecruited.Thedependentsofthetroopslivednear

theirbivouacareas;andexperiencehadshownthatadivisionwhichwasmoved

outofitshomeregionwouldrapidlysufferdesertionsandlossofmorale.(During

theNorthVietnameseoffensivein1972the21stDivision,whichhadbeen

outstandingintheMekongDelta,wasmovedintotheSaigonarea notseventy‐

fivemilesdistant;itsperformancewaspathetic.)Moreove r, anysuch

redeploymentwouldberesistedbythegeneralscommandingtheaffected

MilitaryRegion;thesewereindispensablepropsoftheSaigongovernment;they

judged—correctly—thattheirpoliticalinfluenceatthecapitalboresome

relationshiptothenumberoftroopstheycommanded.SouthVietnamese

commanderswerealsoconstrainedinthenumberofcasualtiestheycould

tolerate—especiallyinoffensiveoperationsthatthenearbydependentsmight

considerunnecessary.Forallthosereasonsstatisticalanalysisunderstatedthe

strategicproblem.Inpracticewehadonlythestrategicreserveavailabletofillthe

gapintheNorth.



Ifthisanalysiswerecorrect,twoconclusionsfollow ed.Theenemyhadto

bepreventedfromtakingoverCambodia andLaosifVietnamizationwastohave

anychanceofsuccess.Andtheenemy’sdry‐seasonlogisticsbuildupwouldhave

tobesloweddown,orifpossibleinterrupted.Oneobvioussolutionwouldhave

beentokeepanadditionalAmericancombatdivisioninthecountrythroughthe

1972dryseasonasastrategicreserve.Behinditsshield,pacificationcouldhave

beenacceleratedinMilitaryRegions1and2,freeingtheSouthVietnamese

divisionstoresistanenemymain‐forceattackin1973.Thiscouldneverbe

considered,however,inthefaceofourdomesticsituation.Ourproblemthus

becamehowtomakeuptheeight‐battaliondeficiteitherbystrengtheningthe

SouthVietnameseorbyweakeningtheNorthVietnamese,especiallyby

disruptingtheirlogisticsbuildup.



Thisiswhythoughtturnedtoanallied dry‐seasonoffensive,whichwould

disrupttheCommunistlogisticseffort,reducethebattaliondeficitexpectedfor

1972,andenhanceHanoi’sincentivetonegotiate.Thewinterof1971wouldalso

bethelastyearthatAmericancombattroopswouldbeavailable.Whileour

redeploymentsanddomesticsituationprecludedtheuseofAmericantroopsin

offensiveoperations,ourforcescouldassumestaticsecurityfunctionsandsofree

SouthVietnamesetroopsforspoilingattacks.



Istronglyencouragedtheconceptofadry‐seaso noffensivein1971,inthe

faceoftheessentialindifferenceofthedepartments,whowerebatteningdown

againstdomesticstorms.Therewereneveranycomplaintsaboutbureaucratic

prerogativeswhentheWhiteHouseassumedresponsibilityforVietnamplanning;

thedepartmentswereonlytooeagertosaddle theWhiteHousewiththeonus

fortheinevitabledomesticuproar.Ithoughtitmydutyassecurityadvisernotto

awaitdisasterspassivelyorsimplytogambleonthemostfavorablehypothesis.

Hanoi’sresupplyeffortwasrunningattwicetherateofthepreviousyear.A

campaigntoweakenHanoi’scapacitytolaunchattacksforaslongaspossible

wouldgiveusamarginofsafety.Facedwiththeprospectofyearlyspoiling

offensives,Hanoimightprefertonegotiate.



Originally,Ithoughtthatthebestplaceforadry‐seasonoffensivewas

Cambodia.Myideawasto commitSaigon’sstrategicreserveandoneofthe

divisionsguardingthebordertowipeoutNorthVie tnamesesuppliesandforces

inCambodiaandtodestroythegrowingCambodianCommunistinfrastructure.

ThiswouldeliminateanyresidualthreattotheSouthernhalfofSouthVietnam;it

wouldsquelchthestill‐developingKhmerRougeandperhapsenabletheLonNol

governmenttocontrolmostofthecountry.Thieuwouldbeabletoshifthis

strategicreservetotheNorthtorepelaCommunistattackin1972,orperhapsto

mountanotherspoilingoffensivebeforeNorthVietnam’slogisticspreparations

hadruntheircourseinthefollowingyear.Itmightevenhavebeenpossibleto

moveoneoftheregulardivisionsNorthforpacificationpurposes.



TheadvantageoftheCambodianoperationwasthatitwasalmostcertain

tosucceed.NorthVietnameseforcesinCambodiawerestillsubstant ially

occupiedwithconta iningLonNol’sforces;theCambodianCommunistswerenot

yetstrongenoughtostandontheirown.TherewerepracticallynoNorth

Vietnamesereservesavailable;inCambodiaNorthVietnameseunitscouldnot,as

inVietnam,hideinthepopulation. CambodiawasattheendoftheNorth

Vietnamesesupplylines;itcouldnotbesignificantlyreinforced.Anda

demonstrablesuccesswouldstrengthentheself‐confidenceoftheSouth

Vietnameseandlendapsychologicalboostforthealmostinevitableshowdownin

1972.Thedrawbackofmyconceptwasthatitdealtonlyindirectlywithour

biggeststrategicconcernfor1972:apossible NorthVietnameseattackinthe

CentralHighlandsandacrosstheDemilitarizedZone.



ThePresidentagreedwithmyrecommendation.WithhisapprovalIsentAl

HaigandateamofNSCstaffmemberstoVietnamtostudytheprospects.Haig

returnedwiththereportthatBunker.Abrams,andThieuthoughtadry‐seaso n

offensiveimperative.However,theyrecommendedamuchmoredaring concept

thanmine.Theyproposedtodealwiththeenemy’slogisticsbuildupinonefell

swoopbycuttingtheHoChiMinhTrailinLaosneartheDemilitarizedZone. 



InthedensejunglesofSouthernLaos—onthesovereignterritoryofastate

whoseneutralityHanoihadformallyrecognizedintheGenevaAccordsof1962—

theNorthVietnameseovernearlyadecadehadbuiltacomplexsystemofroutes

throughwhichtheyfunneledtheirsoldiersandsuppliesintoSouthVietnam.The

HoChiMinhTrailinfactconsistedofmorethanfifteenhundredmilesofroads

andanelaboratetrailnetwork(seethemapabove).Atitshubwasthesmall

provincialtownofTchepone,onwhichalltrailsconvergedandfromwhich

suppliesandmenweretheninfiltratedintoSouthVietnam.TheHoChiMinhTrail

wasmannedbysome40,000to50,000NorthVietnameselogisticstroops,

togetherwithsupportingsecurityforces.Itoperatedeachyearfromabout

OctobertoMay,whentheonsetoftherainyseasonmireditandmadeit

impassable.AtthatpointNorthVietnamesetroopsgenerallywithdrewuntilthe

nextdryseason.



Between1966and1971theCommunistshadusedtheHoChiMinhTrailto

infiltrateatleast630,000NorthVietnamesetroops,100,000tonsoffoodstuffs,

400,000weaponsand50,000tonsofammunition,ortheequivalentof600

millionroundsintoSouthVietnam.SincetheoverthrowofPrinceSihanoukand

theclosingoftheportofSihano ukville,Hanoihadbecomealmostcompletely

dependentontheHoChiMinhTrailforitslogisticseffortintoSouthVietnam.



ItwasGeneralAbrams’sview,asconveyedbyHaig,thatiftheHoChiMinh

Trailcouldbedenied totheCommunists,oreffectivelydisruptedforevenonedry

season,Hanoi’sabilitytolaunchmajoroffensiveoperationsintheSouth(and

Cambodia)wouldbesignificantlycurtailed,ifnoteliminated,foranindefinite

future.Abramsthereforeproposedaboldplan.Americanforceswouldsetup

blockingpositionsalongtheDMZinSouthVietnamWestwardtotheLaotian

border.IntheprocesstheimportantroadjunctionandairstripofKheSanh—

sceneofabittersiegebytheNorthVietnameseduringthe1968Tetoffensiveand

sinceabandone d—wouldbereoccupied.Americanartillerywouldmoveuptothe

Laotianfrontier.ThecrackSouthVietnamesefirstDivisionwouldthencrossinto

LaosalongRoute9andheadforTchepone,buildingdefensivefirebasesalongits

exposedNorthernflank.Whenitwasabouthalfwaytotheobjective,theairborne

divisionwouldseizetheTcheponeairfieldandlink upwithatankcolumncoming

overland.(seethemapbelow.)Theentireassaultwouldtakefourorfivedays.

Therestofthedryseasonwouldbespentininterdictingthetrailanddestroying

thelogisticscomplexassumedtoliealongit,andespeciallyaroundTchepone.A

successfulcampaignwasexpectedtogainusatleasttwoyears,sincetheenemy

wouldneedoneyeartorebuild thelogisticsstructure,perhapslongerifthere

werelaterSouthVietnamesespoilingoffensives.



AsforCambodia,AbramsproposedamoremodestoperationthanIhad

envisagedoriginally.HewoulduseoneoftheVietnamesedivisionsfromMilitary

Region3tocrosstheborderintotheChuprubberplantationwheretheNorth

Vietnamesewereestablishinganewbasearea.SinceMilitaryRegion3was

commandedbyGeneralDoCaoTri,consideredSouthVietnam’sablest,most

daring(andincidentallymostcorrupt)commander, Abramspromisedhimselfa

maximumdisruptionofHanoi’slogisticsstructureinCambodia.Bothofthese 

planswerestronglyendorsedbytheJointChiefsofStaff.



Itwasasplendidprojectonpaper.Itschiefdrawback,aseventsshowed,

wasthatitinnowayaccordedwithVietnameserealities.SouthVietnamese

divisionshadneverconductedmajoroffensiveoperationsagainstadetermined

enemyoutsideVietnamandonlyrarelyinside.Theywouldbedoingitthistime

withoutAmericanadvisersbecausethesewerebarredbytheCooper‐Church

amendment.ThesameamendmentproscribedeventheAmericanofficerswho

guidedourtacticalairstrikes,thussharplyreducingtheeffectivenessofourair

support.WashingtondidnotunderstandthatVietnameseunitshadpractically no

trainedgroundcontrollerswhocouldspeakEnglish;excessiveamount softime