Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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over150,000troopsayearmightbebentonvictory(atermlongsinceturned

intoanepithet),whethertheefforttoendawarwhilefulfillinganobligationto

analliedpeoplewasreallyasubterfugeforitsindefinitecontinuation.Allthe

time,afloodofCongressionalresolutionssoughttocutoffanyflexibilityor

freedomofmaneuver.

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<<Contents>>

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LamSon719:TheMilitaryOperation

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heoperation,conceivedindoubtandassailedbyskepticism,proceededin

confusion.Itsoonbecameapparentthattheplansonwhichwehadbeenso

eloquentlyandfrequentlybriefedreflectedstaffexercises,notmilitaryreality.As

avisitortoVietnam,Ihadbeenimpressedthatoneofthemostunambiguous

successesofVietnamizationwasinexportingtotheSouthVietnameseour

techniquesofmilitarybriefing.TheessenceofwhatIcametodubthe“idiot

briefing”istooverwhelmthevictimwithsomanyfactspresentedwithsuch

invincibleself‐assurancethatheisfortunateifhecankeepupwiththewords.His

chanceofquestioningthesubstancedisappearsintheinsinuatingsequenceof

charts,arrows,andstatistics.Heissoproudtobeabletodistillaquestionoutof

thewelterofmaterialthathelosesthefacultyofinsistingthattheanswermake

sense.

T



TheVietnamesestaffplan,approvedandnodoubtreviewedbyourmilitary

commanders,hadimpressivelypredictedarapidinterruptionofthetrailsystem

tobefollowedbyasystematicdestructionofthelogisticsstructure.Butfromthe

beginningitbecameclearthattheSouthVietnamesedivisionshadnotbeen

trainedforthedaringthrustenvisagedby“LamSon719”—theVietnamesename

fortheoperation.[

LamSonwastheplaceofabattleinNorthernVietnamwherethe

VietnamesewonanancientvictoryagainsttheChinese.

]Theirexperiencehadbeenwith

staticdefenseinSouthVietnam;theiroffensiveoperationshadbeenusually

unopposedsweepsofthecountrysideinsupportofpacification.Heretheywere

propelledintoanalienlandscape,deprivedforthefirsttimeofAmericanadvisers

andaircontrolle rs,andaskedtotakeontheformidable NorthVietnamese

divisionsclosetotheirvitalsupplybases.Theyproceededinsocautiousafashion

astoinvitethesortofset‐piecebattleinwhich,asIpointedouttoAdmiral

MooreronFebruary22,theNorthVietnameseexcelled.IftheSouthVietnamese

continuedtheirdefensivetactics,Iwarned,theymightwellberunoutofLaos.



Asforus,by1971ourcommandinSaigonhadconcentratedfornearlytwo

yearsonpreventingdisasterwhileredeployingforces.Indeed,itwasbeing asked

toreduceitsforcesby60,000whiletheLaosoperationwasgoingon.Itsimply

couldnotadjusttoperformingbothofitsmissions:withdrawalandoffensive

operations.ItremainedsilentwhiletheVietnameseheadquartersforthebattle

remainedinacomfortableper manentbase overfiftymilesfromTchepone.Itdid

notsetupaspecialcommandstructureforwhatwasdescribedtoWashingtonas

a“decisive”operation.ItnevertestedwhetherVietnameseaircontrollerscould

replaceAmericanones;toolatewefoundoutthatmanyoftheVietnamesespoke

noEnglish.TheuntestedVietnamesedivisionswerethusdeprivedofmuchofthe

airsupportonwhichtheoriginalplanhadcountedtocontrolthebattle.With

businessasusual,theLaosoperationhadtocompeteforreso urceswithallthe

otherrequirementsforIndochina.Inevitably,theeffortbecam estalled,andthe

hopesforadecisiveturnwerethwarted.



WitheverypassingdayafterPhaseIIstartedonFebruary8,itbecamemore

obviousthatwhatwastakingplaceresembledtheoriginalplanonlyinthe

briefingsahaplessJCSColonelwasinflictingonmeeverymorning.Theusual

procedurewhenthingsgowrongisto trytoavoidinformingthehighestlevelsof

governmentinthehopethattheproblemwillgoawayandonthetheorythattoo

manyrawfactsmightpanicWashington.Buttheproblemdidnotgoaway.

NothingcouldobscuretherealitythattheSouthVietnameseunits,after

penetratingonlyeighttotwelvemiles,simplystoppedanddugin.Wefoundit

impossibletotellwhattheyweredoing,whethertheywerecuttingsupplyroutes,

searchingforcaches,orsimplyawaitingaNorthVietnameseassault.



Militarycommanders,likemostofficials,tendtodevelopaheavy

investmentintheirownplans.InthefaceofaclearlystalledoperationIwasgiven

anewdateforthepromisedmovementintoTcheponeonsixdifferentoccasions

betweenFebruary8and22. Nonematerialized.OnFebruary13,Ibegantopress

AdmiralMoorerforanassessmentbyGeneralAbramscomparing“actualARVN

troopmovementsandtimephasingwiththoseoriginallyplanned,andreasonsfor

anydeviationstherefrom.”ItwasnotuntilFebruary16thatGeneralAbrams

replied,givingsometechnicalreasonsprimarilyhavingtodowithenemy

antiaircraftfire,considerationsthattoalaymanappearedforeseeableinthe

originalplanning.Abramsconcludedoptimistically:“Iamconfidentthatthetask

thatwasinitiallylaidoutwillbedone.”



Butnotmuchchangedoverthenextfourdays.Optimisticreportsfromthe

fielddidnotsquarewiththeobviousstalemateontheground.NotuntilMarch

18—aftertheoperationwasover—didWashingtonfindoutthatonFebruary12

PresidentThieuhadorderedhiscommanderstobecarefulinmoving Westandto

stoptheoperationaltogetherassoonastheyhadsuffered3,000casualties.Given

Hanoi’sprobablepenetrationoftheSouthVietnamesehighcommand(farbetter

placedthanweweretounderstanditsworkings),thishadtobeknowntothe

enemy,whothereforecouldorganizearesponsedesignedtomaximizecasualties

ratherthancontestterritory.WewouldneverhaveapprovedtheTcheponeplan

intheWhiteHousehadsucharestrictionbeencommunicatedtous.



OnFebruary20IaskedBunkeragainforhisandAbrams’sappraisal,adding:

“Inmyviewitisessentialthattherebeaclearunderstandingthattheobjectiveof

thisoperationisnottoseizerealestateorsuppliesbuttodisruptandinterdictto

theextentpossiblethetrailitself.”ThisledAbramsandBunkertocallonThieu

andhismilitarychiefofstaff,GeneralCaoVanVien.Onthebasisofthis

conversationAmbassadorBunkerreported:“webothcameawayfeelingthat

thereisnoquestionabouttheGVN’ssteadiness andtheirdeterminationtosee

theoperationthrough.”OnthesamedayIwassufficientlyworriedtoaskHaigto

visitVietnamforhison‐the‐spotassessment.TheideawassquelchedbyLairdand

Moorer,whoconsideredthesendingofaWhiteHouseemissaryasa

demonstrationofla ckofconfidenceinGeneralAbrams,whichtheywouldnot

countenance.



OnFebruary23,MoorerwasabsentfromWashington,whichmadeGeneral

WestmorelandActingChairmanoftheJCSonthebasisofseniority.Iusedthe

occasiontoaskforabriefing;inrealityIwantedWestmoreland’sassessment.

AccordingtotheprotocoloftheJoint Chiefs,theWhiteHousewassupposedto

dealwiththeChairman,notindividualchiefs;hence,wecouldnothaveearlier

approachedWestmorlanddirectly.



WestylookedlikeourbeauidealofanAmericanofficer:straightasan

arrow,handsome,serious.Likesomanyofhiscolleagueshehadlaunchedhimself

intoVietnamwithself‐confidentoptimismonlytowithdrawinbewildermentand

frustration.Saddledwithrestrictionsforwhichtherewasnoprecedentin

manuals,confrontedwithanenemyfollowingastrategynottaughtinour

commandcolleges,hesoonfellintoatrapthathasbeenthebaneofAmerican

commanderssincetheCivilwar:substitutionoflogisticsforstrategy.



WithrareandconspicuousexceptionslikeDouglasMacArthur,ourmodern

generalshavepreferredtoweardowntheenemythroughtheweightofmateriel

ratherthantheboldstroke,throughsuperiorresourcesratherthansuperior

maneuvers.Inthistheyreflectedthebiasesofanonmilitary,technologically

orientedsociety.Butwarsofattritioncannotbewonagainstanenemywho

refusestofightexceptonhisownterms.TheVietnamterrain,thenatureof

guerrillawarfare,theexistenceofsanctuaries,allcombinedtomakeitimpossible

forWestmorlandtoweardownhisadversaryashe sought.Instead,theNorth

Vietnamesehidinginthepopulationandabletochoosetheirmomentforattack

woreusdown.Andthenthe1968Tetoffensive,thoughamassiveNorth

Vietnamesemilitarydefeat,turnedintoapsychologicaltriumphbystartinguson

theroadtowithdrawal.(InfairnessitmustbestressedthatWestmoreland

laboredunderpoliticalrestrictionsthatbarredanyofthemajormaneuversthat

mighthaveproveddecisive—sealingofftheHoChiMinhTrailin1967,for

example.)



Whateverthereason forhisfailure,Westmorelandlivedthroughthe

neglectsufferedbythosewhohaveteeteredontheedgeofpopularacclaimand

whomthepublicthenpunishesfornotlivinguptotheirassignedroles.Whoever

isatfault,theyareconsignedtoanoblivionallthemorebitterforhavingbeen

justonestepawayfrombeingcastashero.Westmorelandsatinthesumptuous

officeoftheArmyChiefofStaff,deliberatingoverweaponsprocurement,

enjoyingthedeferenceoftheuniformedserviceduetohisposition,butignored

bythepolicymakers.Hewasalmostneverconsultedaboutthewarhehad

conductedwithgallantry,ifnotalwaysultimatesuccess.Hisadvicehadnotbeen

soughtindividuallyabouttheproposedassaultonTchepone,thoughwewere

toldthathehadendorsedittogetherwiththeotherJointChiefsofStaff.



WhenIsawWestmo relandonFebruary23,hisassessmentwasbleak.He

didnotthinkthattheforcesassignedtotheLaosoperationwereadequate;he

himselfhadconsideredthatfourAmericandivision swouldbeneededtoseize

andholdTchepone;theSouthVietnamesehadallottedlessthantwotothe

operation.Nordidheconsiderafrontalassaultthebestwaytointerruptthetrail

system.Herecommendedhit‐and‐runraidsbyair‐mobileunitsoutofKheSanh

tocutthetrailsatvarious points.Thiswouldthrow theCommunistsupplysystem

intoamaximumofturmoilandachieveourobjectivesatmuchlessrisk.Even

allowingforanaturalbiasagainsthissuccessors,Westmoreland’scomments

madeagreatdealofsensetome.



TheydidnotmakesensetoLairdandMoorer,who arguedthat

Westmorlandhadfailedtoobjectwhiletheplanwasunderconsideration.They

wereconvincedAbramswouldresentbeingsecond‐guessedbyhispredecessor.

Theyinsistedonthehallowedprincipleoftheautonomyofthefieldcommander.

Buttheoriesofcommanddidnotsolveourbasicproblem:tofindoutwhetherwe

wereachievingtheobjectiveofinterruptingtheCommunistsupplysystem.No

doubtwewerehavingsomeeffect.Thesuppliesbeingconsumedinthebattle

wouldnotbeavailablefartherSouth.Notallofthereportsofcachesfoundcould

bewrong—thoughonecouldnothelpnoticingthattheclaimsweremuchless

exuberantthanintheCambodiaoperationofthepreviousyear.



Beyondthat,itwashardtoknow.Wewerebeingtolddailythatthetrails

werebeingcut.Yetreportsfromautomaticsensorsalongthemindicated

considerabletrafficonsomestretches.TheJCSColonelbriefingmeeverymorning

arguedthatthiswasbecauseoftheenemy’sdesperateshuttlingofsupplies

betweenwaystationsinthestressofcombat.Itmadenosensetome.Thetruth

probablywasthatthesupplieswerebeingsloweddownandusedup;theywere

notinterrupted.



Aninterestingstudyofthepathologyofmilitarycampaignswouldbeto

determineatwhatpointanobjectivebecomesanobsession.Moscowfor

napoleon,VerdunandStalingrad fortheGermans,GallipolifortheBritish,

becamemagnetsthatattractedever‐mountingresourceslongaftertheoriginal

reasonforthecampaignhaddisappeared.Soitwasonamuchsmallerscalewith

Tchepone.OnFebruary24Iputthreequestionstomybriefingofficer:(1)why

wereweheadingforTchepone,wheretheenemywaswaiting,whentheroads

couldbecutjustaswellfartherSouth?(2)whywerewenotbypassing Tchepone

totheWestandcuttingRoute23(parallelingtheThaifrontier)withahelicopter

assault?(3)IfweweredeterminedtotakeTchepone,whywerenotmore

reservesbeingcommitted?Therepliessimplyreiteratedtheplanfortheoriginal

operation;theytoldmewhatweweredoingbutnotwhy.



BylateFebruaryNorthVietnamhadshiftedmorethan40,000troops

towardthebattle,amuchlargernumberthanwehadbeentoldwaspossible.[

At

onepointIdiscussedtheLaosoperationwithYitzhak Rabin,Israel’sbrilliantChiefofstaffinthe

sixDaywarandthenAmbassadortoWashington.HepredictedthattheNorthVietnamese

reactionwouldcomefromdivisionstemporarilywithdrawnfromSouthVietnamandattacking

fromtheSouth,notfromtheNorthaswehadexpected.Hewasprovedright.]Saigon’s

forces,becauseoftheterritorialbaseofitsdivisions,remainedconstant.Atthe

WSAGmeetingonFebruary23IpointedouttherisksandaskedAirForceGeneral

JohnVogt,representingtheJCS,fortherationaleofthecontinuedfrontalattack

onTchepone.Hereplied:“Arationaleislackinginthereport.”Itbecame

embarrassinglydifficult toexplainourpolicywhenthefactsweresoelusiveandI

begantosuspectthateventhePentagonhadnoideawhatwasgoingon.



OnMarch1,IcabledmyconcernsdirectlytoBunkerviabackchannel:



Sincetheoperationhasbeenlaunched,thePresidenthasreceivedreportsonawide

rangeofmodificationstotheplanbroughtonbythehostofveryrealdifficultieswithwhichthe

ARVNhavebeenconfronted,onlytodiscoverthateventsonthegroundandsubsequent

operationalreportinghavenotbeenconsistentwiththeforecasts.Specifically,wehavefound

ourselvesinthefollowingposition:



(i)ThePresidentwasinitiallybriefedtotheeffectthatARVNforceswouldseize

TcheponefourtofivedaysafterH‐Hour;



(2)OnFebruary15,hewastoldthatweather,supplyproblems,conditionsonRoute9,

andenemyresistancewoulddelayachievingthisobjectiveforaperiodof8to10days.



(3)Subsequently,thePresidentwasinformedthatTcheponewaslessimportant

becauseallroutesgoingthroughTcheponewerebeingcutsoutheastofTchepone.



(4)Subsequently,thePresidentwasinformedthatamodifiedschemeofmaneuver

wouldbeadoptedwhichwouldplacetworegimentsattackingonanorthwestaxisalongRoute

914andthehighgroundtotheNorthwiththeobjectiveofseizingTchepone.



Sincereceivinginformationonthesevariousconceptualapproaches,eventsonthe

groundhavenotconfirmedourabilitytoaccomplishthem.Thishasquitenaturallyresultedin

concernshereastotheoverallfutureoutlookoftheoperation.Anadditionalfactorwhich

concernsmegreatlyisthelimitedARVNstrengthwhichhasbeeninvolvedinthisoperationata

timewhentheenemyhasobviouslycommittedhisfullresources…



Wewilldoourbesttoholdthefort.Butwemustknowwhatweareupagainst.Thereis

nochancetokeeppanicfromsettinginifweareconstantlyoutstrippedbyevents.



ButourSaigoncommandhadseentoomanyhortatorycablesfromanxious

civiliansoversixyearsofwar.Thetemptationwastoignorethefevered

Washingtonpolicymakersandtopersevere;toomanycriseshadbeenweathered

inthismannertochangethemodeofoperationnow.Bunkersentbacka

soothingtelegramonMarch3describingthededicationofThieuandViento

success(whichwasnottheissue):“Inoperationsofthiskind,onecannotbetied

topreconceivedideasofwhatmightbethoughtofasidealprocedures.Aposture

hastobemaintainedflexibleenoughtoadapttofluidconditionswhichmaybe

governedbyweather,terrainorchangesinenemytactics.”Thiswas

unexceptionable,butitdidnotanswerourfundamentalconcern,whichwasnot

procedural:Towhatextent,ifany,wereweinterruptingtheenemybuildupby

whateverplan?Theconclusionseemedtoputourfearstorest:“GeneralAbrams

andIarebothconfidentthatifweholdsteadyonourcourse,theCambodiaand

Laosoperationswillhavetheimpactontheenemy’sactivitiesinSouthVietnam

andourtroopwithdrawalswhichweoriginallycontemplated.”



Andforafewdaysthingsseemedtoimprove.Inmajorbattlesbetween

SouthVietnameseandNorthVietnameseunitstheNorthVietnamesegrudgingly

gaveground(atleastifourreportsweretobebelieved).Anewassaultwas

launchedinthedirectionofTcheponeonMarch3,andbyMarch6theSouth

Vietnamesewerecloseenoughtothatobjectivetosustaintheclaimofhaving

capturedit.ButsoonthesuspiciongrewthattheywantedTcheponeonlysothat

theycouldwithdrawfromLaosaltogetherwithoutlossofface.AsearlyasMarch

8AbramsinformedusthatSouthVietnamesecommanders,havingoccupiedthe

Tcheponearea,consideredtheirmissionaccomplishedandwereeagertoretreat.



Thisrancounte rtoanyconceptoftheoperationasIhadunderstoodit;

therewasnopointinriskingsomuchtooccupyanabandonedLaotiantownfor

threedays.ThewholepointoftheexercisewastodisrupttheNorthVietnamese

trailsystemforthebetterpartofthedryseasonandtodestroyasmanycachesas

couldbefound.WhenIcalledthistoBunker’sattentiononMarch9,heand

AbramspaidanotheroftheirvisitstoThieu,fromwhichtheyemergedwitha

mystifyingclarification:ThieuwasnotwithdrawingfromLaosbutrotatinghis

units.Hewouldpullbackelementsofhisstrategicreservebutreplacethemwith

freshunits.AftersomeweeksofexploringforcachesintheTcheponearea,these

newunitswouldthenwithdrawtothesoutheastalongRoute914through

CommunistBaseArea611,destroyingtheCommunistsupplysystemalongthe

way.(seethemapatthestartoftheChapter.)



Twofactorspromptedmydoubts.Thieudidnotvouchsafetouswhatfresh

unitshewastalkingabout,andwecouldnotimaginewhattheymightbe;we

certainlydidnotknowofany.Forovertendayswehadbeenurginghimto

committheotherdivisionfromMilitaryRegion1—theThirdDivision. Thieuhad

refused,judging—correctly,aseventsthefollowingyearproved—thattheThird

Divisionwasnomatchforbattle‐hardenedNorthVietnamese.Where,then,were

thereplacementscomingfrom?ThepoorColonelfromtheJCSwhobriefedme

everymorningfoundhimselfthevictimof mysarcasmwhenherecitedthe

officialversioninthefaceofoverwhelmingevidencethattheSouthVietnamese

were,infact,retreatingfromLaos.Therewasnotevenaprete nseofanattempt

toexitviaBaseArea611.Wedidnotknowit,buttheSouthVietnamesehad

reachedThieu’squotaofcasualties:Theoperationwasover,thoughtheydidnot

tellus.



NowIinsistedonsendingHaigtotakeafirsthandlook.BythistimeLaird

knewsomethingwaswrong;hewaseagertospreadresponsibility,andacceded

readily.InthemeantimeIsentoffanotherbackchanneltoBunkeronMarch18:



IhopeThieuunderstandsthatthePresident’sconfidenceisanassetheshouldnot

lightlydissipateandthatthismaybehislastcrackatmassiveU.S.support.



ByMarch19Haig’sarrivalinVietnamputanendtoallillusio ns.He

reportedthatafterthreeweeksofuninterruptedcombatthecommandersofthe

twoSouthVietnamesedivisionswerenolongerwillingtocontinuetheoperation:

“MyvisittoICorpshasconvincedmethattheissuenowisnotfeasibilityof

reinforcingandremaininginLaos,buturgentneedtoimpressuponARVNthe

necessityofmovingoutonlywithfullconcentrationofUSfirepowerinanorderly

andtacticallysoundfashion.”WithinafewdaystheretreatfromLaoswasinfull

swing.OnthewholetheSouthVietnameseextricatedthemselvesintolerable

fashion,exceptfortheunedifyinganduntypicaltelevisionpicturesofafew

panickysoldiersclingingtothelandinggearofthehelicopters.Itwouldhavebeen

difficultinthebestofcircumstancesfortheWhiteHousetogiveabalanced

assessment;thosepicturesdestroyedanysuchprospect,andWashingtonwasso

badlyinformedandtheoperationdeviatedsomuchfromtheoriginalplanthatan

alternativesetoffactswasnotavailableintime.



TheattackontheChupplantationinCambodiawassimilarlyinconclusive.It

achievedgoodresultssolongasitwascommandedbyGeneralDoCaoTri,oneof

thefewoffensive‐mindedcommandersintheSouthVietnamesearmy.Butafter

Tri’sdeathinahelicoptercrashonFebruary23itboggeddowninthekindof

SouthVietnamesecautionthatinvitedwhatitsoughttoavoid.Gradually,the

operationsimplypeteredout,thoughnotwithoutasharplocalsetbacknearthe

CambodiantownofSnuol.



Thedry‐seasonoffensiveof1971wasawatershed.Itmarkedthelast

offensiveoperationinwhichAmericantroopsparticipated,eveninasupporting

role,inIndochina.Itclearlydidnotrealizeallourhopes;nordiditfailcompletely. 

AsalwaysinVietnamthetruthlaysomewherebetweentheclaimsofthe

Administrationandtheabuseofthecritics.TheassaultonTcheponedidnot

interrupttheNorthVietnameselogisticsbuildupsufficientlytopreventan

offensivebyHanoiin1972.Itsloweditdown,however,enoughtodelaythestart

ofthe1972offensiveforseveralmonthsuntiltowardtheendofthedryseason

andtoconfineitsmaximumimpacttotheareasclosesttoNorthVietnam.The

majorenemythrustin1972cameacrosstheDemilitarizedZone,whereHanoi’s

supplylineswereshortestandleastaffectedbytheoperationsinCambodiaand

Laos.ThefartherSouththeNorthVietnameseattemptedtoattackin1972,the

weakerwastheirimpact,becausetheirsanctuariesandsupplysystemhadbeen

disruptedbyouroperationsintheprevioustwoyears.Asitwas,thecombination

ofSouthVietnamesegroundforcesandAmericanairpowerenabledusjust

barelytoblunttheNorthVietnameseoffensivein1972.Withouttheattrition

causedbytheincursionsintoLaosandCambodia,thiswouldhavebeen

impossible.Thecampaignsof1970and1971,inmyview,savedusin1972.



Atthesametime,theLaosincursionfe llfarshortofourexpectations.

Therewereseveralreasonsforthis.Ourplannersprovedlessmeticulousin

assessingVietnameseoperationsthaninstudyingourown.Hadtheforcesbeen

American,theywouldneverhaveundertakensomajorachallengetoNorth

Vietnam’scapacitytosustainthewarintheSouthwithsolittlemarginforerror.

OurcommandinSaigonhadbeentransformedbyWashingtonpressuresintoa

redeploymentheadquarters.Suddenlyitwasbeingaskedto overseecomplex

offensiveoperationsintwowidelyseparatedtheaterswhileadheringtoa

withdrawalscheduleinwhichitdidnotbelieve.Itwasbarredbylawfromhaving

itsownmenonthegroundwiththeadvancingtroopseventocontrolourair

operations;anditwasinthestraitjacketoflimitationsonairsortiesmechanically

imposedbybudgetarycuts.OurcommandinSaigonoperatedbyrote;itdidnot

changeestablishedprocedurestoensurethesuccessofapotentiallydecisive

operation.AndWashingtonactedbyreflex;itwasmoreabsorbedinfending off

theassaultsofitscriticsathomethantheassaultsoftheenemyinthefield.



AsfortheSouthVietnamese,Laosexposedmanyoftheirlingering

deficiencies.Theirplanningturnedouttobelargelyabstract.Itformalistically

imitatedwhatwastaughtatourcommandandgeneralstaffschoolswithout

adaptationtolocalconditions.InretrospectIhaveevencometodoubt whether

theSouthVietnameseeverreallyunderstoodwhatweweretryingtoaccomplish.

OurobjectivesurelywasnotTcheponeoranyothergeographictrophy.Itwasto

slowupNorthVietnameseresourcesandlogisticsthroughoutthedryseasonso

astopulltheteethofthe1972offensive,whenonlyresidualAmericanforces

wouldbeleft.WhatThieuseemedtowant—itlateremerged—wasaquick

spectacular,notalong‐rangestrategy.Aboveall,theSouthVietnamesesuffered

fromtheflawsinherentintheirmilitaryorganization.Theyhadfewreserves;their

toleranceforcasualtieswassmall,exceptindefensivebattles.Eachcommander,

awarethathispoliticalinflue ncedependedinpartonthestrengthandmoraleof

theunitshecommanded,waseagertohusbandhisassetsandreluctanttoincur

lossesforwhatseemedadistantobjective.TheSouthVietnamesehadfought

betterthanbefore;buttherewasnoblinkingthefactthattheresult hadbeen

inconclusive.Thedry‐seasonoffensiveof1971didnotforecloseanassaultby

Hanoiin1972aswehadhopedthoughitalmostsurelylesseneditsimpact.Itwas

probablenowthatwewouldfaceanothermajormilitarychallengethenextyear.

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