Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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wouldbelostasrequestsforairsupportwentupanddowntheentirechainof

commandofthetwosides.TheSouthVietnamesedivisionsweresimplynotyet

goodenoughforsuchacomplexoperationastheoneinLaos.NorwastheSouth

Vietnamesehighcommandsufficientlyexperiencedtohandletwomajor

operationsatthesametime.FinallyTcheponewaslocatedattheprecisepoint

thatHanoicouldmosteasilyreinforce.Itsstrategiclocationmadeitpossibleto

bringuptroopsfrombothNorthandSouthVietnam.



In1962IhadbeenaskedbyPresidentKennedytobriefthecrustyWest

GermanChancellorAdenaueronsomeofthemilitaryideasoftheyoung

Administration.AdenauerhadhisdoubtsaboutstatesmenofKennedy’s

generation;hewasevenmoreskepticalaboutthestrategicdoctrinesMcNamara

wasdeveloping.Atonepointheinterruptedmeinthefullflightofmyoratoryto

askhowIknewwhatIwaspresentingwastrue.Ihadbeenbriefedbyageneral,I

responded.Hadthegeneralwornauniform,theChancellorwantedtoknow.

WhenIallowedthatIdidnotremember,hesuggestedthatIaskthegeneralto

repeathisbriefingincivilianclothes;ifIwasstillimpressedIshouldlethimknow.



Thissardonicadvicewouldhavestoodusingoodsteadin1971.Instead,

weallowedourselvestobecarriedawaybythedaringconception,bythe

unanimityoftheresponsibleplannersinbothSaigonandWashington,bythe

memoryofthesuccessinCambodia,andbytheprospectofadecisiveturn.

Energiesweresoonabsorbednotincarefulanalysisbutintheinterdepartmental

maneuveringthroughwhichtheNixonAdministrationmadeitsdecisions.



Nixonwasdeterminednottostandnakedinfrontofhiscriticsashehad

theyearbeforeoverCambodia.ThistimehewouldinvolvehiskeyCabinet

officersineveryfacetofthedecision‐making,toforcethemtotakesomeofthe

heatoftheinevitablepubliccriticism.Butthisdeterminationdidnotextendto

confrontingbothRogersandLairdatthesametime.Togetaroundhisreluctance

togiveorderstohissubordinates,andjudgingRogerstobethemostlikely

recalcitrant,NixonconceivedtheideaoffirstmaneuveringLairdintotheposition

ofproposingwhatNixonpreferred,andthenlettinghisSecretaryofDefense

becometheadvocateoftheplanwithintheNationalSecurityCouncil.He

thereforeconsideredittimewellspenttopresideoverasuccessionofmeetings,

eachcoveringexactlythesametopic.Foreachmeetingonemoreparticipantwas

added—someonewhoseviewNixondidnotknowinadvanceorwhomhejudged

tobepotentiallyhostile.Thetheorywasthatanyrecalcitrantwasmore likelyto

goalongwithaconsensusbackedbythePresidentthanwithafree‐for‐all.Bylate

JanuaryIhadheardthesamebriefingatleastthreetimesandwasapproaching

battlefatigue.Nixonwasearninghimselfhighmarksforactingability.Helistened

eachtimewithwide‐eyedinterestasifhewerehearingtheplanforthefirsttime.

Hisquestions—alwaysthesame—wereapropermixtureofskepticism,

fascination,andapprovaldesignedtoconveytothenewrecruitthathischiefwas

interestedandwelldisposed.Andsinceeverybodyelsehadalreadyagreed,it

tookastrongindividualtostandhisground inopposition.Noonetried.



ThusHaigfirstreportedtothePresidentabouthistriptoIndochinainmy

presence.NixonnextaddedTomMoorer,ChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,to

confirmthathewasaboard.OnDecember23,Haigpresentedthesamereportto

NixoninthepresenceofMelLaird;Moorer,notindicatingthathehadbeenin

touchpreviously,supportedtheLaosplan.Nixonindicatedthathefavoredthe

operationintheChupplantationinCambodiaandthathewaswelldisposed

towardcuttingtheHoChiMinhTrail.HeaskedLairdto lookintotheconcept

duringatripheplannedtotaketoSoutheastAsiainearlyJanuary.



Laird,asalways,wascomplex.Hewasawareofthedomesticpressures

againstthewar;buthealsofavoredmovesthatwouldreducetherisksof

withdrawal.HeprobablyhadalsoalreadyheardsomethingfromMoorerand

AbramsthroughhisownbackchannelsaboutapossibleLaos‐Cambodia

operation.Whateverthereason,LairdbackedtheconceptofcuttingtheHoChi

MinhTrail,arguingthatitwouldbuyusatleastayear.Hethoughtthatthefirst

majoroffensiveoperationbytheSouthVietnamesearmywithoutanyUSground

supportwouldbeclear‐cutevidenceofthesuccess ofVietnamization.Vastly

relieved,Nixonapprovedbothplansinprinciple,subjecttoreviewafterLaird’s

forthcomingtrip.



Nootherseniorofficialswereinformedoftheplanning,whichcontinuedin

thePentagonandinSaigonwhileLairdtookhistrip,startingonJanuary5,1971.

OnhisreturnNixoncalledanothermeetingintheOvalOfficeforJanuary18.Its

participantswerethoseoftheDecember23meetingplusRogersandHelms.As

before,theonesignificantunknownquantity,Rogers,wastobepresentedwitha

unitedfrontofallofhiscolleagues.Helmsdidnotcount,becauseasCIADirector

hewasnotsupposedtoputforwardpolicyrecommendations.Nixoncouldalso

assumefromexperiencethatHelms,havingstatedhisviews,wouldnotpursue

theminpublic.ThepretextforthemeetingwasLaird’sreportonhistrip.



Lairdplayedhisrole toperfection.Hespentagreatdealoftimeon

technicalaspectsofVietnamization,theforthcomingpresidentialelectionin

Vietnam,theperformanceofThaiforcesinLaos,theneedtomonitorequipment

deliveriesinCambodia.Hecovered,infact,everyconceivablesubjectexcepta

dry‐seasonoffensive.Afterhisaudiencewasthoroughly anesthetized,Laird

turnedtothesubjectofdry‐seasonoperationsbywayoftheireffectonspeeding

upourrateofwithdrawal,asubjectpresumedtobeclose toRogers’sheart.

Throughout,Nixonmadeencouragingnoises,askingquestionswithfeigned

amazementwhilesteeringtheconversationtoitsordainedconclusion.



ButLairddidnotdroptheothershoeimmediately.HeintroducedRogersto

theconceptofadry‐seasoncampaignbydescribingasmallSouthVietnamese

operationinCambodia,involving some4,000ARVNmarines,toopenRoute4

fromPhnomPenhtothesea.HewentonfromtheretodescribetheSouth

VietnameseplantoseektodestroythebasesintheChupplantation,whichhe

characterizedaccuratelyassimilarinconcepttotheCambodianincursionofthe

previousyear.NoobjectionswereraisedbyanyoneonceLairdhadmadeclear

thatnoAmericanforceswouldbeinvolved.Nearlytwohourshadbynowelapsed

withoutourhavingreachedtheheartofthematter.AtthispointNixoncalleda

fifteen‐minuterecess,perhapstosavortheunusualharmonyamonghisadvisers.



Whenthemeetingresumed,Lairdatlastpresentedtheconceptofthe

Tcheponethrust,withtheaidofmaps.Heindicatedthatthefirstphase,the

movementbyUSforcestotakeupblockingpositionsalongRoute9insideSouth

VietnamandtoreoccupyKheSanhasaforwardbase,shouldstartaround

January29.PhaseII—theleapfroggingofVietnameseunitsalongRoute9into

Laos—wouldfollowaroundFebruary8.



Itwasnowtimefortheoneremainingmajorofficialwhohadnotbeenpart

ofthepreviousplanningtotakeaposition.Rogers’sreactionwasalmostacarbon

copyofLaird’sfourweeksearlier.Afterreassuringhimselfthattherewouldbeno

significantincreaseincasualties,hesupportedtheplanaspresentedbyLaird.He

insistedthatitwascrucialthattheoperationsucceed;LairdandMoorer

vehementlyaffirmedtheircompleteconfidence.Helms,whoalsohadnot

participatedbeforebutwhoseopinionwasnotdecisiveforNixon,turnedoutto

betheonlyadvisertoraiseseriousquestions.Hepointedoutthattheproposed

operationhadbeenfrequent lyconsideredinthepastandhadalwaysbeen

rejectedastoodifficult.LaterIlearnedthatfouryearsearlierourthenVietnam

commander,GeneralWilliamWestmoreland,hadthoughtthatsuchanoperation

wouldrequiretwocorpsofAmericantroops.Thoughhewasnowamemberof

theJointChiefsofStaff,nosuchviewwassubmittedtotheWhiteHousein1971.



Thediewascast.Nixongavehistentativeapprovaltoproceed.Ischeduled

WSAGmeetingsstartingJanuary19tocarryoutdetailedplanningforthefirst

timeonafullinteragencybasis.



ThestrengthofthiselaborateprocedurewasthatNixon,whenconfronted

withasoberanalysisofhisstrategicoptions,hadthecouragetofacethereality

thatunlesssomestepsweretakentointerrupttheNorthVietnamesebuildup,

thesituationofSouthVietnam inthenextyearwouldbecomeprecariousindeed.

Theconceptofadry‐seasonoffensivewascorrect;Nixonactedboldlyinordering

it.TheflawinNixon’smethodofadministrationsoonbecameevident,however.

Somuchtime,effort,andingenuitywerespentintryingtoorganizeaconsensus

ofthesenioradvisersthattherewastoolittlelefttoconsidertheweaknessesin

theplanortoimposedisciplineontherestofthegovernme nt.Therewasnorole

foradevil’sadvocate.Ateverymeeting,togaintheacquiescenceofthepotential

recalcitrant,Nixonwouldoffersomanymodificationsthatthecomplexplanhe

wasseekingtopromotewaseventuallyconsumed.SinceeachCabinetmember

wasconcernedaboutthedomesticreactiontoAmericaninvolvement,Nixonat

everyLaosplanningsessionagreedtoreducetheAmericanparticipationandto

putnewrestraintsonouractions.Eachofthesestepsmayhavebeenminor;the

cumulativeimpactwasconsiderable,practicallyandaboveallpsychologically.

Filteringdownthroughlayersofcommand,itwasboundtoconveyasenseof

hesitationtothefieldcommanders;theyinturnhadtofocusasmuchonthe

restraintsasontheirmainjob:prevailingonthebattlefield.



APresidentcannot takeawaythecurseofacontroversialdecisionby

hesitationinitsexecution.Theuseofmilitaryforceisadifficultdecisionthat

mustalwaysbemadewithaprayerfulconcernforBismarck’sprofounddictum:

“woetothestatesmanwhosereasonsforenteringawardonotappearso

plausibleatitsendasatitsbeginning.” Aleader’sfundamentalchoiceiswhether

toapprovetheuseofforce.Ifhedecidestodoso,hisonlyvindicationisto

succeed.Hisdoubtsprovidenojustificationforfailure;restraintinexecutionisa

boontotheotherside;therearenoawardsforthosewholosewithmoderation.

Oncethedecisiontouseforcehasbeenmade,thePresidenthasnochoicebutto

pursueitwithtotaldetermination—andtoconveythesamespirittoallthose

implementingit.Nationsmustnotundertakemilitaryenterprisesormajor

diplomaticinitiativesthattheyarenotwillingtoseethrough.



TheNixonmethodofgovernmentworkedwellwhenthemilitaryproblem

wasrelativelystraightforwardandcouldbecarriedoutinonedaringmoveasin

Cambodia.Itwaseffectivealsoforpurposefulsolitarydiplomacyconductedbya

trustedassociateworkingwithasmallstaff,suchasintheopeningtoChina,the

Vietnamnegotiations,andthevariousdiplomaticmovestowardtheSovietUnion.

Difficultiesarosewhenasustainedmilitaryeffortwasneeded,asinLaos,orwhen

thediplomacywastoocomplextobehandledbythesecurityadviser’soffice,as

intheIndia‐Pakistancrisis.Thentheabsenceofconsensusorevenunderstanding

inhibitedcoherenceandcommitment.Departmentsexcludedfromkeydecisions 

weretemptedintoassertionsofbureaucraticself‐will.Whenonlyaverysmall

groupknewwhatthePresidentintendedandonlypartofthatgroupagreedwith

thepurposes,aninordinateamountoftimewouldbeconsumedlaterby

wrangling,dissociation,orattempts(usuallyinvain)toimposediscipline.Though

thePresident’scomplexpersonalityprovidedtheimpetus,I,astheorganizerof

theseproceduresandastheirdrivingforce,must,ofcourse,sharethe

responsibilityfortheshortcomings,justasIhavebeengivenperhapsundue

creditforthesuccesses.



Whathappenedin1971wasthatthego vernmentalconsensusofthe

December23andJanuary18meetingsbegantoevaporateassoonasRogerswas

exposedtothepassionateoppositionofhisexperts.ByJanuary21itbecame

apparentthatstatewasdraggingitsfeet. AtWSAGmeetingsUnderSecretaryAlex

Johnsonbegantosurfaceobjectionsthatdidnotchallengethedecisionbut

wouldhavedelayeditsimplementationindefinitely—abureaucraticma neuverin

whichJohnsonwassuperblyskilled.Thedevicetoprocrastinate wasinsistenceon

thepriorapprovaloftheLaotianPrimeMinister,SouvannaPhouma.



Itwasastrangeargument.TheNorthVietnamesehadbeenoccupyingpart

ofLaosforadecade,inflagrantviolationoftwoGenevaAccords.Theyhadin

effectseizedalltheterritoryadjoiningtheirborderandmostofSouthernLaosas

thelogisticsbaseforoperationsinVietnam.NoLaotianwrithadruninSouthern

Laosforyears;whateversparseLaotianpopulationhadlivedtherehadbeen

expelledbytheNorthVietnamese.WehadbeenbombingtheHoChiMinhTrail

foratleastfiveyearswithSouvanna’sacquiescencebutwithouthisformal

approval.AnyonefamiliarwithSouvannahadtoknowthathewelcomedour

actionsbutfearedtoendorsethemlesthesupplytohispitilessneighbora

pretextforfurtherescalation.It wasanextraordinaryconceptthatourlegal

positiontointerruptthelogisticsbaseaimedatSouthVietnamwouldrequirethe

concurrenceoftheleaderwhoseownofficialswere notpermittedinthe

Southernpartofhiscountryandwhowasbarelyholdingoninthefaceofthe

NorthVietnameseonslaughtintheNorth.Anyoneevenvaguelyfamiliarwith

Souvannahadtoknowthathewouldwelcometheoperationbutwouldnotwant

tobeconsultedbeforehand.Whathewouldhavepreferredwastoadoptthe

positionofSihanoukwithrespecttothebombingofthesanctuaryareas:sinceno

Laotianofficialswerepresent,hedidnotknowwhatwasgoingonandcouldnot

taketheresponsibilityfortheactionsofeitherside.



Intheevent,dayswereconsumedinexchangeswithourembassyin

VientianeabouthowtoapproachSouvanna—whichwas,ofcourse,whytheidea

wasputforwardtobeginwith.Totheacutedisappointmentofatleastsomeof

ourofficials,ourAmbassadorinLaos,MacGodley,reportedthatSouvanna’stacit

concurrencewasprobable,providedwekepthiminformed.Godleywas

instructedtoobtainamorespecificendorsement. Onceagain,Souvanna,who

knewverywellthathiscountry’ssurvivaldependedonaNorthVietnamese

defeat,failedtoliveuptothehopesoftheopponentsoftheoperation.Hegave

qualifiedapprovalsolongasitdidnotlas t morethanthreeweeks.Godleywas

sentbackinwithayetmoreformalapproach.ButSouvanna,whounderstoodhis

country’sneeds,refusedtoplay:nomatterhowmanyopportunitieshewas

given,hewouldnotopposetheoperation,whichmeantthatheinfactwelcomed

it.



ItwasbecomingclearthattheStateDepartmentobjectionswentbeyond

theprocedural.Rogerswasquiteexplicitinseveralconversationswithme.I

thereforerecommendedto thePresidentthatheovercomehisreluctanceto

debatewithhisfriendandholdanothermeetingoftheseniormembersofthe

NSC.ItwasscheduledforJanuary27.



Beforethatmeeting,onJanuary25Ireviewedthemilitaryplanningwith

AdmiralMoorer.Iraised—perhapstoolate—anumberofconcerns.Ifcuttingthe

HoChiMinhTrailwaspotentiallyasdecisiveasAbramsthought,itwascertain

thattheNorthVietnamesewouldfight.Theymightevenwelcomeanopportunity

toinflictasetbackontheSouthVietnamese. AndTcheponeatthehubof

communicationscouldbereinforcedwithNorthVietnamesedivisionsredeployed

quicklyfrombothNorthandSouthVietnam.Howmanycasualtiescouldwerisk

havinginflictedontheSouthVietnamese? Howlongcouldtheysustain

operations?GiventheimmobilityoftheSouthVietnamesedivisions,wherewere

replacementsgoingtocomefrom?Howwouldthesedivisionsreactwhen

deprivedforthefirsttimeofAmericanadvisersandaircontrollersduringthe

mostbitterfightingoftheirexperience?Andwerewesurethatourairsupport

wouldbeadequateandtimelyunderthesenovelcommandarrangements?Ifthe

objectivewassoimportant,shouldwereinforceourairpower? Isubmitteda

memorandumtoNixonwithquestionsalongthislineforusewithMoorerand

arrangedforameetingofthetwoforJanuary26.



Nixondidnot,infact,askthequestionswiththeexplicitnessthatIhad

suggested,butinhisindirectwayhemanagedtotouchonallthepoints.Moorer

wasemphaticinhisreassurances.Iftheenemyfought—andprobablyitwould—

Americanairpowerwouldisolatethebattlefieldandinflictheavylossesthat

wouldbedifficulttoreplace.Ifitdidnot,itssupplysystemwouldbedestroyed.

TheoperationwouldensurethesuccessofVietnamization,increasingourability

towithdrawforcesmorerapidly.ItwouldhelptheCambodiangovernmentinits

struggleforsurvivalbycuttingoffenemysupplies.Inshort,“decisive”results

wereprobable.



Thusarmed,Nixonmetallhissenioradvisers—Rogers,Laird,Helms,

Moorer,Haig,andme—onJanuary27.Asusual,overhalfofthemeeting

concernedirrelevancies:howtotestifywithrespecttoAmeric anairactivitiesin

Cambodia;thepublicrelationshandlingofthesmallSouthVietnameseoperation

toopenRoute4inCambodia;theprecisemeaningofPresidentialstatementsof

thepreviousJuneforswearing AmericancombatactivityinCambodiaexceptfor

interdiction;theplannedoperationintheChupplantationinCambodia.



AfteraboutanhourofthisthePresidentaskedAdmiralMoorertoreview

theattackonTchepone.Moorer’spresentationfollowedsubstantiallyhisbriefing

ofthePresident.WhenMoorerfinished,Nixonhadrunoutofstallingtime;

Rogershadtobegivenhisdayincourt.Inanextraordinarilyeffective

presentationRogersarguedthattheriskswereexcessive.Theenemyhad

intelligenceofourplans.Abattlewascertain.WewereaskingtheSouth

Vietnamesetoconductanoperationthatwehadrefusedtoundertakewhenwe

had500,000troopsinVietnambecausewethoughtwewerenotstrongenough.

IfSaigonweresetback,wewouldriskallthegainsofthepreviousyearandmight

shakeThieu’spositionintheprocess.Lessconvincingly,heraisedtheissueof

Souvanna’sconcurrence;theLaotianPrimeMinistermightwellbeoverthrownas

aresultoftheoperation, hethought.



Exceptforthelastpoint,Rogers wasrightontarget.Unfortunately,Nixon

simplydidnotbelievethathisSecretaryofStateknewwhathewastalkingabout.

HehadheardsimilarobjectionstheyearbeforeoverCambodiaandnoneofthe

predictedhorriblecontingencieshadmaterialized.HeacceptedAbrams’sand

Moorer’swordastomilitaryfeasibility;heknewfromGodleythatSouvannawas

sympatheticregardlessofwhatpublicpositionhemighttake.Hetherefore

orderedtheChupoperationandPhaseIoftheTcheponeoperationtoproceed

immediately.(PhaseI wasthesecuringofRoute9totheLaotianborderby

Americanforces.)ButhealsoorderedAdmiralMoorertostudywhetherthe

airborneassaultonTcheponecouldeitherbeeliminatedorconductedwithout

Americanairlift.(Theissueherewaswhetherhelicopterstouchingdownto

deliverSouthVietnamesetroopsconstituted“groundcombatinLaos,”proscribed

bytheCooper‐Churchamendment.)AnyonefamiliarwithNixonshouldhave

knownthatoncehehadgonethisfar,hewouldnotbedeflecte d.Theorderto

proceedwithPhaseImadecertainthathewouldorderPhaseII,however

tortuousthemaneuversbeforehegavethefinalword.Butnotalltheparticipants

understoodNixon.EvenregularassociateslikeMoorercouldnotbecertainthat

hehadinfactmadeuphismindthatday.Theuncertaintyandhesitation

suggestedbyhisrequestforfurtherstudyoftheairborneoperationwasboundto

bemagnifiedasitmoveddowninthemilitaryhierarchy.



Theonsetofanothermilitaryoperationautomaticallyexcited

Congressionalandmediapressures.OnJanuary21,havingreadreportsof

AmericanairstrikesinsupportofSouthVietnameseoperationsinCambodia,

sixty‐fourmembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesintroduc edlegislationtoban

theuseoffunds“toprovideU.S.airorsea‐combatsupport”foranymilitary

operationsinCambodia,apparentlyonthetheorythatHano iwasentitledto

undisturbedsanctuariesfromwhichtoa ttackouralliesandtoinstalla

CommunistgovernmentinPhnomPenh.OnJanuary27SenatorsGeorge

McGovernandMarkHatfield,alongwithnineteenSenatecolleagues,

reintroducedtheproposedVietnamDisengagementAct,which,toallowforthe

passageoftime,nowrequiredthewithdrawalofallAmericantroopsby

December31,1971(insteadofJune30).



AsPhaseIoftheLaosoperationbegan,theDefenseDepartmenturged,

andtheWSAGagreed,thatthepressinSaigonbebriefedonthemilitary

movements,butunderanembargo;thiswouldbothprotectsecurityandprevent

inaccurateandmisleadingreports.Thisprovedtobeanaivemistake.Theofficial

briefingsacceleratedagrowingsprayofleaks.TheSaigonpresscorpsmight

observetheembargo,buttheywerefreetoinformtheircolleaguesin

Washingtonofthebasicfactsandthesewereundernorestraint.Inan

extraordinaryperformancetheWashingtonpresscorpsandtheTVnetworksnot

onlydroppedthebroadestpossiblehintsofanimminentalliedoperationinLaos;

theyalsotreatedtheembargoasamajorstoryinitself,asinisterplotof

deceptionandcoverup.



Editorialcommentwasnotlongdelayed.OnFebruary3theNewYork

TimesandtheLosAngelesTimesexpresseddisquietabouttheplannedoperation.

OnFebruary5theWallStreetJournaljoinedin,andlestitbeignoredtheNew

YorkTimesaddedanothereditorialemphasizingthatanyattempttochokeoff

suppliesthroughLaoswasboundtofailbecausetherewassolittletochokeoff.

ObviouslytheTimeshaddifferentstatisticiansfromtheCIA’s,whoestimatedthat

18,000tonshadalreadypassedthroughTcheponeinthecurrentdryseason.

Manyotherjournalsjoinedthechorus.OnFebruary1theStateDepartment

briefedRepublicanSenatorGeorgeAikenonthesamebasisasthepresscorpsin

SaigonhadbeenbriefedbyAbramsandwithidenticalresults;thestorywasout

withintwenty‐fourhours.



ToNixon,allthiswasonlytooreminiscentofhis1970experienceover

Cambodia.Andasin1970hewithdrewintohisshellandsoughtthesupportof

thoseadviserswhohethoughtbackedhispolicy.OnFebruary1,I briefedAgnew,

Connally,andMitchellabouttheLaosoperation.Igavethemadetailedaccount

oftheprosandcons—allowing formyownbiasinfa voroftheoperation—

includingdetailednotesofRogers’spresentationofJanuary27. Notsurprisingly—

thiswas,afterall,whytheywerebeingbroughtin—theyfavoredgoingahead.

Thenextmorning,February2,IcirculatedtoRogers,Laird,andHelmsafive‐page

memorandumthatsetouttheprosandconsandincludedRogers’spointsof

January27opposingtheproject;Iinvitedcomments.Nonewasforthcoming.

NixonmetwithRogers,Laird,Helms,Moorer,Haig,andmeat5:00p.m.Thatday.

Nonewargumentsemerged.



Latethatevening,afteraperformancebythesingerBeverlysillsatthe

WhiteHouse,IsawNixonagain.Mydiaryindicates—itwasanincidentIhad

forgottenuntilIconsultedmynotes—thatIsuggestedhetakeanotherlookatthe

proposedoperation,whateveritsundoubtedmilitaryadvantages.Surprisehad

beenlost;ourgovernmentwasclearlydivided.Nixonappearedrelieved;he

seemedmoreinterestedinaSovietsummit.



Oncelaunchedonwhatheconsideredthestrongcourse,however,Nixon

wasgenerallynottobedeflected.Thenextmorning,February3,hetoldmethat

hehaddecidedtogoaheadandtopaythepricebothdomesticallyandwiththe

Soviets.HethencalledinMitchellandConnally,whourge dhimtoproceed.From

about12:30to2:00P.M.,AdmiralMoorerandIbriefedSenatorJohnStennisin

myoffice;Nixonwanderedinandtookthethreeofusbacktohisownofficeto

continuethediscussion.WhenStennisagreedthattheoperationmadesense,

Nixongavethe“execute”order.Ihelditupafewhourstohaveachanceforone

morereviewwiththeWSAGandonemorediscussionwiththePresident.At6:00

p.m.IinformedtheprincipalsofthePresident’sdecision.



OnFebruary8SouthVietnamesetroopsbeganPhaseIIbycrossingthe

Laotianborder.OnFebruary9RepresentativeThomasP.O’Neillandthirty‐seven

cosponsorsintroduced legislationnotonlyforbiddingdirectUSinterventionin

LaosbutalsoAmericansuppor tofanykindforanymilitaryoperationinLaos.We

wereembarkedonanotheractintheGreektragedybywhicheachparticipantin

ournationaldebate,followingthelogicofhisownnature,broughtaboutnational

paralysis.TheLaosoperationsoughttospeedourextricationfromVietnamwhile

preservingSouthVietnam’schancesforsurvivalandourinternationalcredibility.

Thedebatewasovermotives:whetheranAdministrationthatwaswithdrawing