donesoonlyforty‐eighthoursbeforethesuggesteddate.Hanoiaccepted,but
offeredMay30instead.WecounteredwithMay31,partlysoasnottoaccept
Hanoi’sdate,butalsoforlogisticandsecurityreasons.(Itwasthelastdayofa
longweekend;myabsencewouldthereforenotbenoted.)
BeforethemeetingIsubmitted toNixonanewseven‐pointpeaceprogram
Iproposedtotable.Thoughbasicallyskeptical,andafraidthatHanoiwouldtryto
stringusalong,Nixonauthorizedourproposaltobeputforwardasa“finaloffer.”
Itwas,infact,themostsweepingplanwehadyetoffered,workedoutbyme,
LordandSmyserofmystaff,clearedbyBunker,andapprovedbyThieu.Itsought
tobringournegotiatingproposalsintolinewithouractions.
Theseven‐pointplanrecogniz edthatsincewewerewithdrawingmostof
ourforcesunilaterallywecouldnotusethemtobargainfortotalHanoi
withdrawal.Wewouldtrytouseourresidualforceasabargainingcounterwhile
recognizingthatthemountingCongressionalpressuresfordeadlines—reflectedin
theever‐increasingvotesfortheMcGovern‐Hatfieldtypeofamendment—would
soonerorlatermakeirrelevanteventhispotentialconcession.Weoffered,asour
firstpoint,tosetadatefortotalwithdrawal.Wegaveupthedemandformutual
withdrawal,providedHanoiagreedtoendalladditionalinfiltration intothe
countriesofIndochina.Theproposalso ughttogetusoffthetreadmillof
demandingmutualwithdrawalwhileweinfactcarriedoursoutunilaterally;we
would,ineffect,tradeourresidualforceforanendofinfiltration.Theoretically,
NorthVietnameseforceswouldwitherawayiftheycouldnotbereinforced.To
besure,theymightviolatetheprohibitionagainstreinforcement(ourpoint4);
butinthatcasetheywouldignoreaprovisionforwithdrawalaswell,asinfact
theyhaddoneinLaosadecadeearlierandweretodoinLaosandCambodiaa
fewyearslater.Whatevertheagreement, itwoulddependonourwillingnessto
enforceit.Weproposed,asourthirdpoint,acease‐fireinplacethroughout
Indochinatobecome effectiveatthetimewhenUSwithdrawalsbegan,basedon
afinalagreedtimetableunderinternationalsupervision(point5).Oursixthpoint
calledforguaranteesfortheindependence,neutrality,andterritorialintegrityof
LaosandCambodia,withbothsidesrenewingtheirpledgetorespectthe1954
and1962GenevaAccords.Werepeatedourproposalfortheimme diate release
bybothsidesofallprisonersofwarandinnocentciviliansonhumanitarian
groundsandasanintegralpartoftheUSwithdrawaltimetable(point7).The
politicalfutureofSouthVietnamwastobelefttotheSouthVietnamesetosettle