Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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Dobryninwasagoodchessplayer.Attheendofthemeeting,outofthe

blue,heaskedwhetherthePresidenthadasyetdecidedonreceivingTrade

MinisterPatolichev.Iwasnotalittlestartledbytherequest;itcouldonlymean

thattheSovietleadershaddecidedtofallinwithourapproachofbusinessas

usual.TryingtomatchtheAmbassador’sstudiedcasualness,IallowedthatI

probablywouldbeabletoarrangeameetingintheOvalOffice.Playingalittle

chessmyself,Imentionedthatitwascustomaryontheseoccasionstoinvitepress

photographers.Dobryninthoughtthishighlyappropriate.



Ineverycrisistensionbuildssteadily,sometimesnearlyunbearably,until

somedecisiveturningpoint.TheconversationwithDobrynin,ifnotyetthe

turningpoint,deflatedthepressure.Weknewthatthesummitwasstillon.Every

daythatpassedwithoutcancellationmadeitmorelikelythatitwouldtakeplace.

InthatcaseHanoiwouldbeisolated;wewouldhavewonourgamble.Iquickly

scheduledameetingbetweenthePresidentandPatolichevforthenextmorning.



WeawokeonMay11tothefirstofficialstatementreleasedbyTASS.Itwas

bothbelatedandmild.TheSovietUnionconsideredouraction“inadmissible”and

“willdrawfromthisappropriateconclusions.”TheUnitedStateswasadvisedto 

returntotheconferencetableinParis.TheSovietgovernment“resolutely”

insistedthattheAmericanmilitarymeasuresbe“cancelledwithoutdelay,”which

Moscowknewwastechnicallyimpossible;andthatfreedomofnavigationbe

respected,whichwasirrelevantsincewewerenotinterruptingshipsatsea.As

fortheaidfortheNorthVietnamese,TASSemployedsomestrangelanguage.It

notedthattheSoviet“people”(thatis,notthegovernment)“associatesitself”

withthestruggle.TheSoviet“people”wouldcontinuetogivetheVietnamese

people“thenecessarysupport”(not“increased”support,asHanoiasked).The

statementreekedofprocrastinationandhesitation.



ThatwasnottheattitudeofNikolaiPatolichevwhenheappearedforhis

thirty‐minutecourtesycallintheOvalOffice.Pressandphotographerswere

usheredintowitnesswhathasbeencalled“theusualcontrivedcordiality.”

But

inthiscase,contrivedornot,thesmilingpicturesconveyedtheSovietmessage

anditunambiguouslyspelledsummit.Eventhebanterforthepresswassymbolic

andbySovietstandardsextremelysubtle;thesubject(Ihavenoideawhy)was

thedifferingpronunciationinPolishandRussianoftheword“friendship.”Lest

anyonemissthepoint, PatolichevwasallsmileswhenhelefttheWhiteHouse. A

televisionreporteraskedhimifthesummit wasstillon.“Weneverhadany

doubts,”repliedtheSovietMinister,wide‐eyedattheseeminglyinexhaustible

obtusenessofAmericans.“Idon’tknowwhyyouaskedthisquestion.Haveyou

anydoubts?”



ThelastremaininguncertaintywasremovedwhenDobryninandImetover

lunchthesamedaytocontinueourregulardiscussionofsummitpreparations.

DobryninclaimedthattheUnitedStateswas“makingtoomuch”oftheSoviet

roleinVietnam;Istressedthattheimportantthingwastosettlethewar.Forour

part,wewerepreparedtoresolvethemilitaryissuesaloneortoagreeongeneral

principlesofapoliticalsettlement.Inthemiddleoftheluncheon,oneof

Dobrynin’saidesbroughtinamessagefromBrezhnevinRussianreplyingto

Nixon’sletterofMay8.UsuallytheSovietEmbassysuppliedawrittentranslation.

InthiscaseDobrynin’sassistantdidthehonorsinawaywhich,hadthemeaning

oftheletterdependedonprecision,mightwellhavedefeateditspurpose.But

evenaroughoraltranslationleftnodoubtthatBrezhnevwasavoidinganyhintof

confrontation,despitetheletter’sconventionalblusterwarningagainstthe

consequencesofouractions.IaskedinnocentlywhetherBrezhnev’swarning

referredtonewactionsortostepsthathadalreadybeentaken.Obviously,

repliedDobrynin,hispatienceseeminglytriedbymydenseness,theGeneral

Secretarycouldonlyhavemeantadditionalmeasurestothoseannouncedon

May8.SinceitclearlypleasedDobrynintoplaytheprofessor,Iaskedwhythe

letterhadnotreferredtothesummit.Dobryninansweredthatsincewehadnot

askedaboutitinourcommunicationofMay8,thePolitburohadseennoneedfor

aresponse.(ForanyonefamiliarwithSovietdiplomatictacticssuchdelicacywasa

novelexperience.)Iaskedwhetherweshouldhaveaskedaquestionaboutthe

summit.“No,”saidDobrynin,“youhavehandledadifficultsituationuncommonly

well.”



Thesummitwason.Thatcrisiswasover.

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OnMay11Peking,too,washeardfrom.APeople’sDailycommentator

expressedresolutesupportforthepeopleofVietnamand“extremeindignation

andstrongcondemnation”oftheminingofNorthVietnam.Buttheauthor

neitherdenounced NixonnorindicatedanyChineseresponsetotheinterdiction

campaign.ChinawasVietnam’s“reliablereararea,”whichistosayitwouldtake

noaction.Evenmoreastonishing,thePeople’sDailyprintedtheentiretextofthe

President’sspeech.ProbablytheChineseleaderswantedtheirpeopletolearnof

ourchallengetotheSovietUnion. Whateverthemotive,itwasthefirsttimethe

Chinese“masses”hadseenanaccountofHanoi’sintransigenceandofourpeace

program.ThedourfanaticsoftheNorthVietnamesePolitburocouldonly

interpretitascooldissociationbytheirtwomajorallies.



TheSovietUnion’sEasternEuropeanalliesquicklyfellintostep.APolish

ViceForeignMinisterindicatedpublicly thatNixon’sprojectedvisittoPolandwas

stillon.Sinceface‐to‐facetalkswereimminent,Polandhadnoneedtosayany

moreabouttheminingofNorthVie tnam;inotherwords,weweresparedevena

proformaprotest.



Bythen,too,NewZealand,Australia,Thailand,SouthKorea,andBritain

hadpubliclyindicatedfullsupport;therestofourNATOalliesandJapa nhad

privatelyexpressedunderstanding.Nonehadexpressedopposition.ASindlinger

telephonepollshowedthat86percentoftheAmericanpublicsupportedthe

President’sspeech;OpinionResearchputtheapprovalat74percent.Andthe

Sovietresponseneutralizedalmostallvocalopposition.



Fromthenon,summitpreparationscontinue damicablywithDobrynin.On

May12,heandIwerealreadydiscussingprotocolpoints,suchasthegiftstobe

exchanged.AfterthattheemphasiswasonSALTandothersummittopics.



OnMay11IjudgedHanoisufficientlyisolatedtoresumecontact.IsentLe

DucTho,whowasstillinParis,anextractfrommypressconferenceofMay9,

whichstressedourreadinesstoresumenegotiations.LeDucThocutelyrepliedby

sendingmeanextractfromhispressconferenceofMay12;hehadrepeatedthe

insistenceonacoalitiongovernment,thoughinalanguagemuchmoremoderate

thanhehadusedto meonMay2.Oncemorethisdemonstratedthefallacyofthe

popularmyththatHanoiwouldbeconciliatoryonlywhenweshowed“goodwill.”

Theoppositewasinfacttrue.OnMay12Duckyhadaffirme danunconditional

readinesstoresumetalks:



IfMr.Nixonreallydesiresseriousnegotiations,asfarasweareconcerned,faithfulto

ourseriousattitudeandgoodwill,wearedisposedtoseektogetherwiththeAmericanside,a

logicalandreasonablesolutiontotheVietnameseproblem.Duringthecourseofthelasttwo

decades,initsfightforindependenceandliberty,theVietnamesepeoplenegotiatedfora

peacefulsolutiontotheVietnameseproblemwiththeFrenchGovernmentin1954,and

participatedinthepeacefulsolutionoftheLaotianproblemwiththeUnitedStatesin1962.

Consequentlyatpresent,thereisnoreasonnottoarriveatanegotiatedsolutiontothe

Vietnameseproblem.Thisquestion,ofcourse,dependsonMr.Nixon’sattitude.



IwascertainnowthatseriousnegotiationswouldresumeonceHanoi’s

offensivehadrunitscourse.



Andtheoffensivestalled.TheNorthVietnameseattackonHuénever

developedfullsteam.Kontumdidnotfall;neitherdidbesiegedAnLoc.TheSouth

VietnamesecounteroffensivetorelieveAnLocdevelopedwithexcruciating

slowness.ButthetacticaluseofB‐52sintheSouthwasclearlydisruptingthe

NorthVietnamesebuildup,andaftersomemonthstheminingwouldmakeit

increasinglydifficultfortheNorthVietnamesetoaccumulatesuppliesforanother

bigpush.



Unbelievablybythestandardsofourfevereddomesticdebate,Vietnam

disappearedentirelyasapointofcontentioninourdialoguewiththeSoviet

Union.OnMay12Dobryninhandedmeanote—intheprivateChannel—that

grudginglyacceptedthePresident’sexpressionofregretattheharmtoSoviet

shipsandseamenandhisassurancethatcarewouldbetakentoavoidsuch

incidentsinthefuture.Nothingwassaidabout theblockadeofNorthVietnam.

OnMay14wereturnedaconciliatoryreplyrepeatingourassuranceswithrespect

toSovietshipping.WealsoinformedMoscowthatwhilethePresidentwasoutof

thecountryHanoiwouldnotbeattacked.Byimplicationbombingwouldcontinue 

againstalltherestofNorthVietnam,includingHaiphong.Thiswasdone.



LaterinthedayofMay14,Dobrynindeliveredanotethaturgeda

resumptionoftheParisnegotiations.Ifitwerepossibletoannouncethisin

advanceofthesummit,“thatwouldinmanywaysbefavorabletotheSoviet‐

Americanmeeting.”TheSovietsproposedthatneithersidesetpreconditionsand

thattheplenaryandsecretmeetingsproceedintandem.Thesewerepresented

asSovietsuggestions“onourownbehalf”andnotfromHanoi.However,the

KremlinwaspreparedtopassourresponseontotheNorthVietnamese.



Clearly,someonehadblinked.Lessthanaweekaftertheresumptionof

full‐scalebombingandtheblockadeofNorthVietnam,effortswerebeingmade

toresumenegotiations“withoutpreconditions”—afarcryfromHanoi’sprevious

smuginsistenceonthe“correctness”ofitsterms.IfMoscowpresentedthese

propositionsonitsown—whichitclaimedbutIdoubted—theisolationofHanoi

hadproceededmorerapidlythananyofushaddaredtohope. IfHanoiwasusing

Moscowasanintermediary,ithadatlastbegunitsretreattowardamore

negotiableposition.



Wethoughtitprematuretoannounceareturntotheplenaries.Itwould

confuseourpublic;itmightgeneratedemandsformilitaryrestraintwhenthe

bestchanceforarapidsolutionwastoconveyourimplacability.OnMay15I

handedanunsignednotetoDobryninthatagreedinprincipletothereopeningof

theplenarysessions.However,toavoidraisingfalseexpectationsitshouldbe

precededbyaprivatemeetingwithLeDucTho.Ifwemadeprogress,plenaries

couldresume.Originally,ournotehadincludedatoughparagraphwarningof

“themostseriousconsequences”iftherewasfurthermilitaryescalationbythe

NorthVietnamese.WhenDobryninbalkedatbeingaskedtopassonathreat,I

hadtheoffendingparagraphtypedonaseparatesheetofpaperandcalleditan

“oralnote.”Dobryninwithdrewhisobjectionsandaccepteditinthisform.Such

arethelittlevictories ofdiplomatsoveroneanother.



OnMay17DobrynintoldmethatMoscowhadurgedourprocedural

proposalonNorthVietnaminthestrongestlanguage.Noreplywaseverreceived

fromHanoi—perhapsbecauseitsplannerslackeda strategyforthenew

challenge,perhapsbecausetheyfearedthatfailureofanewmeetingwouldlead

toanotherroundofescalation.



Meanwhile,ImetalmostdailywithDobrynintoworkoutthesummit

agendaandschedule.TheSALTnegotiatorswereputtingtheirtextintofinal

shape.Thevarioussubsidiarynegotiationsweremakingrapidprogress.OnMay

17DobryninwasinvitedtospendthenightatCampDavid.Afterbreakfastwith

thePresidenthetoldmethatMoscowwouldsparenoefforttomakethesummit

asuccess.However,becauseofVietnamthepublicwelcomeinMoscowcouldnot

beaswarmashadoriginallybeenplanned,Dobryninsuggested.Thiscleverjabhit

Nixonwhereithurt—inthepublicre lationsfield.(Italsogaveaninsightintothe

“spontaneity”oftheSovietmasses.)



Peking,too,demonstratedthatithaditsprioritiesstraight.Ina

conversationwithmeinNewYorkonMay16,UNAmbassadorHuangHua

repeatedtheofficiallinethatChinastoodbehinditsfriends.Buthedidnotdemur

whenIpointedoutthatwehadwarnedPekingatleasthalfadozentimesofour

determinationtoreactstronglyifHanoisoughttoimposeamilitarysolution.Nor

didouractionsinVietnampreventHuangHuafromencouragingavisitbymeto

PekinginJune.WehadnotonlyachievedafreehandinVietnam;wewouldbe

abletocontinueatthesametimetheconstructionofthelargerdesignofour

foreignpolicy.



<<Contents>>



****



Postlude



hemediaandCo ngress soonshiftedtheirposition,retreatingtothefamiliar

attackson“indiscriminate”bombinganddemandsforalegislateddeadlineto

endthewar.SomepraisedtheSovietsfortheirrestraint;praiseforNixon’s

couragewassparse.

T



ItwasmyfatethroughouttheVietnamesewartobeinthemiddleofthe

crossfirebetweenmyformerassociatesandmynewchief.Perhapsmymost

poignantandfrustratingencounterofthatperiodwaswithsevenpresidentsof

IvyLeagueuniversities whocametotheRooseveltRoomoftheWhiteHouseon

May17,threedaysbeforeweleftforMoscow.Thesemen,headsofthemost

prestigiousAmericanuniversities,hadcometotellme,ineffe ct,thatrational

judgmentwasnolongerrelevanttothewarinVietnam.Oneofthemcomplained 

ofdestructionbeinginflicted“forreasons thatarenotclearandforacausethat

nooneseemswillingtodefend.”WhenItriedtoexplaintheissuesposedbythe

NorthVietnameseinvasionandaboveallbyHanoi’sinsistencethatwecollude

withthemtoimposeCommunistrule,hetookrefugeinthepassionsofthe

students:“Bethatasitmay,itisturninglargenumbersofyoungpeopleaway

fromtheircountry.”IrepliedthatIwasawareofthestudents’despair,but“wein

governmenthaveanobligat ionnotonlytoregisterwhatthestudentssaybutalso

toputitintotheframeworkofthelongerterm.”Wewerewillingtotake“any

reasonablestep,”butturningVietnamovertoanenemyrelyingonbruteforce

wasnotareasonablestep.Anotherofthegroupaskedhowheshouldexplainthe

costofthewartothestudents.Icouldonlyrespondbyaskinghowhewould

explainitifaftereightyear sofwarwedidforHanoiwhatitcouldnotdoforitself.



Butitwasadialogueofthedeaf.ThedistinguishedIvyLeaguepresidents

werenotinterestedinthemeritsoftheissuesindispute betweenusandNorth

Vietnam.Theywerethereasspokesmenofanemotion.Oneofthemstatedthat

noneofthestudentswouldreallycareifSaigonfell.Anotherallowedthatour

principlesmightbe“persuasive,”includingtheprincipleof“notlettingonegroup

dominateanother,”butsincewedidnothelppeopleinsimilarcircumstances

elsewhere,whydidwehavetodoitinVietnam?Inotherwords,unlesswe

defendedeverymoralpurposeeverywherewehadnorightto defendany

principleanywhere.Buttherealproblemboileddowntoamorepractical

concern.Oneofthemadmitted:“Idon’tseehowwecancontinuetorunour

universitiesifthewarescalates…WhatwillwefaceinSeptember?”Againstthis

lineofreasoningnopersuasionwaspossible,asillustratedbythefollowing

exchange:



KISSINGER:Ifwearetodoanythingforyourconcernswehavetofacethem

operationally…Thequestionofendingaidtopeopletodefendthemselves—againstapeople

whoareheroicandalsobrutal—isnotobvioustomeevenasamoralissue…Thisoffensivewill

establishanewbalanceofforcesonewayoranother.IfSaigoncollapses,thenewbalanceisa

fact.Ifnot,thatisalsoanewfact.ThereactionofPekingandMoscowisalsoanewfact.Ifit

fails,theycan’tgoon.



Butifwecanjustintroducesomecompassioninourdebate,ifinsteadofassumingthat

someofuswanttokillandsomehaveamonopolyonanguishoverthiswar,ifwecouldraise

thelevelofthedebatetotrytofindthingswecandotogether.Weneverwillagreeon

Vietnam.Thedebatespasseachotherliketrains,withoutthinkingthatthereareseriouspeople

ontheotherside.



Wethink—oddasthismayseemtoyou—thatitisimportantforthehealthofthe

societyandthestabilityoftheinternationalsystemthatwegetoutwithsomedignity.



UNIVERSITYPRESIDENT:Wetrytointroducefairnessandreasontothedebate—but

onlyatrisktoourownlives.Thatisafact.



Inotherwords,theheadsofthenation’sgreatestuniversitieshadlost

controloftheircampusesandexpectedthePresidentoftheUnitedStatestoease

theirdifficultybyreversingaconsiderednationalpolicytheninvolvingnearly

70,000Americantroopsandseveraloftheworld’smajorpowers.Thiswastobe

doneinthenameofmoralityeventhoughitsadmittedconsequencewasto

consignmillionsofSouthVietnamesewhohadrelieduponustoaCommunist

dictatorshipthattheoverwhelmingmajorityofthemrejectedandfeared.

Considerationoftheissueswasdismissed;theprofoundemotionthatnow

dominatedthecampuseswasbeyondrationalanalysis.Theideathatthe

PresidentoftheUnitedStateswasresponsibleforkeeping orderinour

universitieswasnovel,especiallycomingfromliberalacademicians.Itwasthe

ultimateexpressionoftheabdicationofinstitutionalleadersinoursociety,ofthe

abasementofthemiddle‐agedbeforetheyoung,ofthedismissalofrational

discoursebythosewiththegreateststakeinreason.



FromtheothersideofthebarricadesIwastherecipientoffrequent

missivesfromNixon,beratingmefortheinsufficientaudacit yandtoughnessof

themilitary’sprosecutionofthewar.OnMay9amemorandumdescendedon

me,urgingmetolookfornewwaysofhurtingtheenemywithairpower:



Wehavethepowertodestroyhiswar‐makingcapacity.Theonlyquestioniswhether

wehavethewilltousethatpower.WhatdistinguishesmefromJohnsonisthatIhavethewill

inspades.Ifwenowfailitwillbebecausethebureaucratsandthebureaucracyandparticularly

thoseintheDefenseDepartment,whowillofcoursebevigorouslyassistedbytheiralliesin

State,willfindwaystoerodethestrong,decisiveactionthatIhaveindicatedwearegoingto

take.Foronce,IwantthemilitaryandIwanttheNSCstafftocomeupwithsomeideasontheir

ownwhichwillrecommendactionwhichisverystrong,threateningandeffective.



OnMay10cameaPresidentialukase,oneofalongseries,expressinghis

faithintheefficacyofpsychologicalwarfare;asusual,hewildlyoverestimated

theCIA’scapabilityinthisarea.Hewantedthewordtobeputoutthatentire

NorthVietnameseregimentshadceasedtoexistandthatNorthVietnamese

moralewascollapsing.NixonthoughttheCIAhada“totallackofimagination”in

thesematters.OnMay13cameamemoundercuttingtheprevioustoughness

somewhatbysayingthatthethreenewAirForcesquadronssenttoVietnam

shouldmakeitpossibleforustoaccelerateourwithdrawalprogrambyallowing

ustoremoveadditionalsupportforces. ByMay15Nixonwasproposingthatwe

amassalltanksinSouthVietnamfor“atleastonesurpriseoffensiveagainstthe

enemy”insomeareawheretheycouldeffectivelybeused.Hesurmised—not

withoutreason—thattheseideasmightnotallbeappreciatedbyMoorer,

Abrams,Haig,andme,butheremindedHaigandmeoftheunconventional

brillianceofPattonandMacArthurandurgedthatwereadaninspiringpassage

fromChurchill.Correctlyhelamentedthatthemilitary,abusedforyearsby

civilianleadership,provedunabletorespondimaginativelywhengivenafreer

hand.(AlHaig,hegranted,“certainlyisanexception.”)OnMay18,Haigwas

appropriatelyhonoredbyaPresidentialmemoorderingthatourbombing

continuewhilethePresidentialpartywasinMoscow.(Haigwastoremainbehind

inWashington.)Nixonwrotethathewouldnotmakethesamemistakeaswhen

helimitedthebombinginconnectionwiththeChinatrip.AftertheMoscow

summithewantedmoreB‐52strikesintheHanoi‐Haiphongarea.OnSaturday,

May20,thedaywewereleavingforMoscow,theblizzardofpaperendedwitha

longmemorandum forHaigwithfurtherguidanceforthemilitarycampaign

againstNorthVietnamwhileNixonwasaway.Hewantednobasisforpress

storiesthatwewere“lettingup”duringthisperiod.Hewanteda“relentlessair

attack”andyetmoredoneonthepropagandafront.



Nixonwasentitledtosomereleaseforhisnervoustension.Forallhis

vulnerabilityandbravado,thefactremainsthathehadactedboldlyandwona

brilliantgamble.HechallengedtheSovietUnionandtoalesserextentChinaand

intheendimprovedrelationswithboth.Hepreventedthemilitarycollapseof

SouthVietnam,which(in1972) wouldhaveundercuttheserelationshipsandthe

entiredesignofourforeignpolicy. Afterweeksofimpatientmusingsabout

cancelingtheMoscowsummit,hesettledonthewiserstrategyofusingthe

SovietstakeinasuccessfulsummittorestrainaSovietresponse,togainafree

handinVietnam,andeventuallyto bringtofruitionourpatienteffortstobuilda

moreconstructiveUS‐Sovietrelationship.



Inretrospectalleventsseeminevitable.ThefactremainsthatI,theSoviet

expertonmystaff,aswellastheCIAandtheStateDepartment,allexpectedthe

Sovietstocancelthesummitandthatwasthebackgroundagainstwhichthe

Presidentmadehisdecision.(Ineverthelessurgedthemilitaryaction,becausea

summitheldunderconditionsofdemonstratedweaknesswouldnotbeworth

holding.)ThattheriskdidnotmaterializedoesnotdetractfromNixon’scourage

inrunningit.



WithhindsightitispossibletoseewhytheSovietschosenottoconfront

us.WithalltheupsanddownstheKremlinhadlearnedthecentralimportanceof

theUS‐Sovietrelationship.NomatterwhatourCongressionalembarrassments,

wewerelikelytoprevailinarealarmsrace—ifnotimmediately,thencertainlyas

theAmericanpublicmoodchangedundertheimpactofmountingtensions. 

LinkagewasnorhetoricalidiosyncrasyinSovieteyes.Cancellationofthesummit

wouldbringabouttheSoviets’worstnightmare:anAmericanrelationshipwith

PekingnotbalancedbyequaltieswithMoscow.Anditwouldhaveundermined

theSovietUnion’sentireEuropeanpolicy. Forthirtyyearsandforunderstandable

reasons,Moscowhadbeenpreoccupied bytheGermanquestion;Brandt’s

EasterntreatiesweremovingtowardaresolutionbeforetheGermanParliament,

buttheirfatewashangingbyathread.Ouractionwouldbepivotal.AnewCold

WarwouldalmostcertainlyhaveupsettheapplecartofBrandt’spolicy;the

SovietUnion’scarefullynurturedstrategyforEuropewouldhavecollapsed.A

cancellationwouldalsohavejeopardizedtheSovietUnion’seconomicprospects:

BrezhnevhadmadeastrategicdecisiontoseekWestern,andparticularly

American,tradeandtechnology;thathopewouldvanishwithoutasummit.And

inmanyothercrucialareassuchastheMiddleEast,aneraofconfrontation

openedunpleasantprospectsbeforetheSovietleaders.



Consciousofitsownvulnerabilities,theKremlinthereforecutloosefrom

itsobstreperoussmallallyontheothersideoftheglobe.Byproceedingwiththe

summit,Moscowhelpedneutralizeourdomesticopposition,whichgaveus

freedomofactiontobreakthebackofNorthVietnam’soffensive.Ourstrategyof

detente—posingrisksanddanglingbenefitsbeforetheSoviets—madepossiblean

unfetteredattempttobringourinvolvementintheVietnamwartoanhonorable

close.NixoncouldleaveforMoscowwithdignity,forwehadnotsacrificedthose

whohadputtheirtrustinus;withconfidence,sincetheinterlockingdesignofour

foreignpolicyhadwithstoodextraordinarystress;andwithhopethatwewere

layingthefoundationsofaglobalequilibriumwhichcouldbringsafetyand

progresstoananxiousthermonuclearworld.

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<<Contents>>

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