Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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throughtheChannel,eithersummariesofconcludednegotiationsorprecursors

oflaterones.WhatwaslefttonegotiatewasturnedovertoGromykoandmefor

late‐nightsessionsduringtheweekandmeetingsmostofthedayonSaturday,

May27,whilethePresidentwassight‐seeinginLeningrad,andonMay28,while

hewaspreparinghistelevisionaddresstotheSovietpeople.



Thesummit’sjaggedrhythmwascompoundedbythefactthatschedulesin

theSovietUnionseemtohaveatbestanapproximatequality.Themeetingtimes

printedonourprogramswerelargelytheoretical.Wewouldsometimesbekept

waitingforhourswhiletheSovietleaderscaucused,attendedPolitburosessions,

orsimplydisappeared.Onecouldneverbesureofthetime,place,orsubjectofa

meeting,regardlessofwhathadbeenagreedinadvance.(Thiswastrueonlyof

thetopleaders.GromykoasForeignMinisterwasmeticulouslypunctual.)Itwas

neverclearwhetherthenumerousdelaysandtheconstantswitchingoftopics

wereaformofpsychologicalwarfareorsimplyreflectedtheSovietworkingstyle.

Inanycase,theprocedurenevervariedthroughoutmydealingswithtopSoviet

leaders.WhenBrezhnevvisitedtheUnitedStatesin1973,hesatonhisveranda

atCampDavidinfullviewofNixon’scabin,talkingwithhisadvisersrightthrough

ascheduledmeetingwiththePresident,whomhekeptwaitingfortwohours

withoutexplanationorapology.Thatsameyear,afterbeingkeptwaitingforfour

hoursduringavisittoMoscow,IfinallygotresultsbytellingaSovietprotocol

officialthatIhadalwayswantedtospendmywintervacationinMoscow.This

producedBrezhnevwithinhalfanhour(ormaybehewasreadyanyway).

WheneverpossibleDobryninwouldshowupduringtheseunscheduledintervals,

suavelyconciliatorybutobviouslynotableorwillingtoexplainwhatwas

happening.



Theonefixediteminthedailyschedulewasthesigningceremony,

generallyat5:00p.m.eachday,forthesubsidiaryagreementsnegotiated

beforehand.TheentireSovietandAmericandelegationswouldmeetinthe

KremlininalargeroombehindtheimpressiveSt.VladimirHallwherethesignings

weretotakeplaceinfrontofacrowdofjournalists,photographers,officials,and

onlookers.Thewaitingroomlookedliketherecreationhallofaself‐made

industrialtycoon:pottedplantsarrangedinnodiscerniblepatternand

punctuatedbymassivefurniturethatwasmoreexpensivethanelegant.The

AmericanandSovietdelegationsawkwardlysegreg atedthemselvesinopposite

corners,perhapsbecausetheSovietofficialsresponsibleforthetechnicalsubjects

hadhadlittlepreviouscontactwithnon‐Communistforeig nersandsimplydidnot

knowhowtobehaveonaninformalorpersonallevel.Whattheylackedinparlor

gracestheymadeupforindetermination.Whenthesignalwasgiventhatthe

timeforsigninghadarrived,theyshowedRussianresilienceandtoughnessin

elbowingtheirwaythroughthedoorsaheadoftheirstartledguests.Theyacted

asifSovietprestigewasatstakeingettingtothesigningceremonyaheadofthe

Americandelegation.Suchdedicationdeservesnottogounrecognized.History

mustrecordthatinaweekofsigningceremoniestheSovietdelegations,however

differenttheircomposition,neverlettheirsidedown.Theywoneveryraceto

everysigningceremony.



Therandomnatureoftheplanningemergedwiththefirstplenarysession

onTuesday,May23.ThemeetingtookplaceinSt.Catherine’sHall,alarge,

ornatelygildedroom,furnishedsparselywithelegantcandelabraandcarved

chairsaroundalongrectangulartablecoveredinbeigefelt.TheAmericans

enteredatoneendofthelongroomandtheSovietsfromtheoppositeone;the

twodelegationsmetandmilledaboutuntiltheyfinallysortedthemselvesoutand

tooktheirplacesoppositeeachother.OntheAmericansideNixonwasinthe

middle,flankedbyRogersandme;thefullcomplementofWhiteHouseandState

Departmentaideswaspresent,guaranteeingthatNixonwouldsaynothing

significant.ThetopSovietleadershipwasseatedwithBrezhnevinthemiddle,

flankedbyPodgornyandKosygin;theSovietgroupincluded,among others,

GromykoandDobryninplustheinterpreterSukhodrev.Thetablewasdividedin

themiddle—asifitwereafrontier—byarowofbottlesoffizzyGeorg ianmineral

waterandcrystalglasses.Afterafewminutesoftheobligatorypressand

televisionphotographs,theofficialconversationsofthesummitconference

began.



Theyimmediatelyransquarelyintotheunpredictable.Wehadbeenledto

expectthatEuropewouldbethemaintopic,andtheNSCstaffhadpreparedthe

President’sbriefing withthatinmind.Thatsubjectneverreallycameup.This

turnedthosestaffaideswhohadworkedonthepapersrabidlyanti‐Soviet,there

beingnofurylikethatofaPresidentialadviserwhohasbeenshowntobeless

thanprescientbeforehischief.



Brezhnev’swelcomingspeechrepeatedthesoontobefamiliarpointthatit

hadnotbeen“easy”fortheSovietstoagreetothemeeting.Thenexthalfhour

wasdevotedtofamiliarizingtheotherparticipantswithdecisionslongsince

reachedintheChannel.Brezhnevproposedthattherebeasigningceremony

eachafternoon.Nixonfellinstep,observingthattheMoscowmorningpapers

wouldthushavesomethingtoreportwhileintheUnitedStatesthesignings

wouldmaketheeveningtelevisionshows.WhatBrezhnevthoughtofthe

propositionthattheMoscowjournalsneededNixon’shelpinfindingnewsmust

belefttohisautobiography.Nixonthenheldforthatsomelengthaboutthe

importanceheattachedtothemeetings.Hewascarefultoincludecaveatsabout

continuingdifferences,notingthathehadthereputationofaColdWarrior.

Kosygininterveneddrylythatheseemedtohaveheardso merumorstothat

effectsometimeinthepast.



Bantercontinuedevenaftertheconversationsturnedtoeconomic

relationsandSALT.Brezhnevsaid,halfse riously,thatUS‐Sovietrelationswould

makegreatprogressifwecouldgrantcreditsofthreetofourbilliondollarsfor

twenty‐fiveyearsat2percentinterest.Kosygininterjectedthatitwouldthenbe

possibletosupplytheUnitedStateswithlargequantitiesofgenuineSovietvodka,

whichwasfarbetterthantheémigrévodkawewereusedto;Brezhnevsuggested

thatheandKissingercouldsetupacompany.NixonrespondedthatIalready

madeenoughmoney—wherehegotthiserroneousideaIdonot know.



Nixondidnotmuchlikesmalltalk.Hethereforequicklymovedtospellout

thelinkagebetweentradeandcreditsandprogressonSALT.HesaidthataSALT

agreementwouldhelphimgetthesupportintheCongressforexpandedtrade

relations.KosyginandBrezhnevinsistedthattradewasimportantinitsownright.

ToourastonishmentPodgornysuddenlyintervenedtosaythatSALTwasmore

importantthancommercialtiesbecauseitdealtwithnationalsecurity.Brezhnev

acknowledgedthisbutaddedthatthetradematterswere“closetotheheartof

thepeople.”Podgornywasnottobeput off,however,andreiteratedthatSALT

wasmoredifficultandmoreimportant.RogersspokeuptorepeatwhatNixon

hadsaidaboutthedifficultyofgettingsupportintheCongressforMostFavored

Nationtreatmentunlesstherewereotheragreements.Podgornyhungin:While

tradewasimportant,SALTwasmoreimportantstill.Finally,Kosyginswitched

sides,stressingtheimportanceofreachingaSALTagreementwhiletheUnited

StatesandtheSovietUnionstillenjoyedapracticalduopolyofnuclearweapons;

therewasreally“nootheralternative.”Nixon,lookingforawaytoavoidthe

blowupofHangchow,suggestedthatGromykoandRogersconcentrateon

Europeansecurityissues,andthusimpliedthatIshouldhandleallothertopics.

BrezhnevtookhiscueandproposedthatGromykoandIworkonSALT;whilewe

wereatit,headdedratherskillfully,wemightalsogivesomethoughttogeneral

principlesthatshouldgovernrelationsbetweenourtwocountries.Brezhnevalso

notedthattheSALTnegotiatorsinHelsinkihadsofarfailedtoreachagreement

ononeortwopoints,andsuggestedthatheandthePresidenttakethemupat

4:00p.m.betweenthemselves.Thebureaucraticbooksbeingfinallycleared,the

firstplenarysessionhadachieveditsprincipal purposeandadjourned.Gromyko

wastheoneclearvictim,sincehehadbeendesignatedtonegotiatewitheach

Americanbureaucracyandtoattendallplenarysessionsaswell.



Thissetthetoneforallotherformalsessions. Exceptforthediscussionon

SALTandabrieffinaldiscussiononVietnam,theSovietteamoperatedasthe

troikaofKosygin,Podgorny,andBrezhnev.Brezhnevusuallymadetheopening

statementfortheSovietside,butwithagreatshowofeliciting theagreementof

hiscolleaguesandgivingthemampleopportunityforcommentsoftheirown.

Podgornyusedtheplatformerraticallyand,atleastasfarastheAmericanside

wasconcerned,unpredictably.Kosygin,alwaysdisciplinedandincisive,borethe

burdenofdiscussiononeconomicmattersafterintroductoryremarksby

Brezhnev,andhechairedoneplenarysessionfromwhichBrezhnevwasabsent.



OntheAmericansidethecompositiondependedonthesubjectmatter,

andsincetheSovietschangedtopicscontinuallytherewasanoccasionalscramble

tofieldthecorrectline‐up.Iattendedallhigh‐levelmeetings,andwasthesole

senioradviserintheonesdealingwithSALTandVietnam.Wheneconomic

subjectswerediscussed—asinthefirstplenarysessiononMay23andthe

afternoonofMay25—Rogers,PeterFlanigan(AssistanttothePresidentdealing

withinternationaleconomicaffairs),andevenRonZieglerwerepresent.The

discussionsonEuropeonMay24includedRogersaswellashisStateDepartment

advisers.TheexchangeontheMiddleEastontheafternoonofMay26included

theentireSovietleadershipbutonlythreeAmericans—thePresident,me,and

PeterRodmanasnote‐taker.ButsinceStateDepartmentparticipationinthe

summitwasmorefrequentandmorevisiblethanithadbeeninChina,we

avoidedtheinternalbickeringthatsomarredtheendofthePekingsummit.



<<Contents>>



****



TheSovietPowerStructure:KosyginandPodgorny



hesemeetingswiththetopSovietleadership,thoughinconclusive,provided

interestinginsightsintotheSovietpowerstructure.Brezhnevheldno

governmentalpositionbutwasclearlythetopman;yetheappearedtoneedthe

supportofKosyginandPodgornytocarrythePolitburowithhim.Atanyrate,he

madeagreatshowofinvolvingtheminalldecisions,goingsofarastoinsistthat

theinvitationforaSovietreturnvisittotheUnitedStates—whichwasincludedin

thecommuniqué—mentionthenamesofhisassociates.Onmilitarymatters

BrezhnevasChairmanoftheCouncilofNationalDefenseseemedtohave

exclusiveauthority;hencehemetNixonalonetodiscussSALT.OnVietnam,too,

heseemedtohaveadominantvoice,suggestingthatrelationswithHanoiwere

probablyhandledprimarilyasaPartymatter—exceptforonecollectiveattempt

tobrowbeatNixon,duringwhichKosyginshowedthegreatestpassion.

T



OfBrezhnev’scolleaguesKosyginwasbyfarthemostimpressive.Though

subordinatetoBrezhnevinpowerandauthorityandnotchargedwithconducting

definitivetalksonsensitiveissues,hespokeonthemwithassuranceandalways

withgreatprecision.Heseemedtomasterdetailsmorecompletelythan

Brezhnev.AmongourownexpertsKosyginhadthereputationofbeingmore

liberalthanBrezhnev.OnthebasisofmycontactwithhimIconsideredthata

superficialjudgment.AsPrimeMinister,hewasinoperationalcontrolofday‐to‐

dayactivitiesoftheSovietgovernment—outsideofthesecurityandforeignpolicy

fields.Inevitably,thisproducedacertainpragmatism.Hewasclearlyfascinated

byWesterntechnology,andcouldspeakeloquentlyabout theadvantagesof

increasedcommercewiththeUnitedStates,thoughheneverfailedtoclaimthat

hewasdoingusthegreaterfavorbyopeninguptheSovietmarkettoourexports.

Butoutsidetheeconomicarea,onforeignpolicyquestions,forexample,Kosygin

struckmeasorthodoxifnotrigid.Itseemedalmostasifhecompensatedfor

managerialpragmatismbythestrictestpietyonideologicalmatters.



Kosyginwasclearlymorepolishedandbettereducatedthanhiscolleagues.

Perhapsthiswasbecausehehadbeenaccustomedtofunctionattheupper

reachesofSovietpowerformorethanthirtyyears.Brezhnev,forexample,was

stillamiddle‐levelpartyofficialwhenKosyginhadjoinedthetopgroupoftwenty

orsoSovietleaders.Ontheotherhand,Kosygin’scapacityforsurvivalmaywell

havederivedfromthefactthatheneveraspiredtotheverysummitofpower.

SuccessiveleadersbeginningwithStalinhadvaluedhiscompetence;nonehad

seenhimasapotentialrival.Hismaincareerhavingbeenonthegovernmental

side,helacked,inanyevent,thepowerbasewithinthePartymachineryfrom

whichtoaimforthepinnacle.Atthesametime,Kosygincouldneitherhave

reachedsoneartothetopnormaintainedhimselfthereforsolongifhewere

entirelyunskilledinKremlinpolitics.Hemusthaveplayedoneofthekeyrolesin

thepalacerevoltthatoverthrewKhrushchev,forexample.Buthislongevitywas

duetothefactthathisactionswerenotinservicetopersonalambition.His

commitmenttodutywasvividlyillustratedwhenhiswifewasfatallyill;Kosygin

wentaheadwithhisday’schores,evencontinuingtostandonLenin’stombto

reviewaRedSquareparadeafterthemessageofherdeathreachedhim.



Kosyginwasshrewdinassessingcharacter—obviouslyarequirementfor

survivalintheSovietsystem.Brezhnevseemedtoplayontheaspirations,

ambitions,andweaknessesofhisinterlocutorsbyinstinct;Kosygingavethe

impressionofdoingsoonthebasisofskillfulcalculation.Heeveninspired

CommerceSecretaryMauriceStanstodreamthatthetwoofthemmightjoinas

hard‐headedbusinessmentosettletheworld’sillsbyeconomicexchange;

innumerableotherAmericanbusinessleaderscameawayfrommeetingwithhim

salivatingattheprospectofhugecontractsandpreparedontheirreturntodo

battlewithanobdurateAdministrationforcreditsandexportlicenses.Atthe

sametime,KosyginwasequallyskillfulduringtheVietnamwarinholdingout

prospectsforarmscontroltovisitorslikeAverellHarriman,providedonlythatwe

wouldendtheconflictinIndochinaonHanoi’sterms.



Kosyginhadthereputationofbeingdour.AndIsawlittleevidenceofthe

senseofhumorsomeofourexpertshaddetectedbeneaththeglacialexterior.

Eithermyonlyattempttostrikealighttonebackfired,orelseKosygin’shumor

wastoosubtleforme.TheSoviets,liketheChinese,hadinsistedthatNixonuse

oneoftheirplanesforinternaltravel,fromMoscowtoKiev.Asalways,theSecret

Serviceresisted;asinChina,itsobjectionswerefinallyovercome.Attheendof

thesummit,afterthedepartureceremonyatVnukovoAirport,weboardedthe

SovietVIPplane,whichwassomewhatlargerandconsiderablymoreostentatious

thanAirForceOne.Infullviewoftheworldpress,andtotheconsiderablechagrin

ofourSoviethosts,itsenginesrefusedtostart.Whileabackup planewasbeing

readiedKosyginstormedontheplaneandsaid:“Telluswhatyouwanttodowith

ourMinisterofAviation.Ifyouwanthimshotonthetarmacwewilldoso.”He

lookedasifhemightbeserious.Iattemptedtoeasehisembarrassmentby

speakingofthewickednessofobjects.Ifonedroppedapieceoftoastitwouldfall

onthebutteredsideindirectproportiontothevalueoftherug,Isaid;whenone

droppedacoinitalwaysrolledaway,nevertowardone.Kosyginwasnottobe

consoledbysuchtransparentattemptstoshiftresponsibility.“Thisisnotmy

experience,”hesaid,fixingmewithabalefulglance.“Ihavedroppedcoinswhich

rolledtowardme.”



AsforPodgorny,hewasthehardesttofathom,perhapsbecausethere was

nodepththeretopenetrate.Heclearlywasthirdininfluenceamongourhosts,

thoughbyprotocolrank—theequivalentofheadofstate—hecamebefore

Kosygin.Hehadagrandfatherlyairabouthimandseemedmo rerelaxedthanhis

colleagues,thoughhischain‐smokingreflectedtherealitythattheclimbtoeven

nearthetopoftheSovietpyramidgeneratesenormousinnertensions.Hehad

neithertheelementalforceofBrezhnevnorthesharpintellectofKosygin.He

spokehispiece;hesometimesintervenedineccentricways;buthenevergave

theimpressionofsomeonewhowasexpectedtoprevail,dominate,orexercisea

decisiveinfluence.



ThiswasthetriothatconfrontedNixonatmostsessions—especiallyatthe

dramaticoneconcerningVietnam,ontheeveningofMay24.



<<Contents>>



****



RoundOneonSALT:BrezhnevandNixon



B

ythetimeofthesummit,discussionsonstrategicarmslimitationhadbeenin

progressfornearlythreeyears.Thedetailedtalkswereconductedbyour

SALTdelegation,ledbyGerrySmithwithgreatpersistenceandskillbothin

diplomacyandinthebureaucraticmaneuveringofWashington.Themeetings

alternatedbetweenHelsinki(thepreferredSovietsite)andVienna(whichfor

somereasonNixonpreferred).Forthefinalphaseofthenegotiationsthetwo

delegationsweremeetinginHelsinki.



Wheneveradeadlockpersistedintheseformaltalks,theWhiteHouse

tendedtointerjectitselfthroughtheChannel.GenerallyDobryninandIwould

workoutanagreementinprincipleonthestalematedissue;thedelegations

wouldthendevelopelaboratetechnicalimplementationandthetextual

language.ThefirsttimewasinMay1971, whenDobryninandInegotiatedthe

breakthroughtoincludeoffensiveaswellasdefensivelimitationsinSALT.The

secondoccurredduringmyApril1972Moscowtalks,whenBrezhnevagreedto

includesubmarine‐launchedballisticmissiles(SLBMs)intheoffensivefreeze.



Therehadbeenseveralreasonsforthesehigh‐levelinterventions.Onewas

theperennialproblemofleaks.Instructionstothedelegationwentthrougha

machinerythatspewedforthhundredsofcopiesofeachdocument;however

discreetindividualdelegationmemberswere,itwasimpossibletomaintain

secrecy,especiallyonissuespoliticallymostsensitivetobothsides.Second,the

complexmachinerysetupinourgovernment toreviewSALTissueswas

extremelytime‐consuming.Rapiddecisionswereimpossible;everyelementof

thebureaucracyhadatleastaninitialveto.Third,Nixonwasdeterminedthatthe

creditforSALTgotohimandnottoSmith.Innumerableinstructionstothateffect

wereissuedeitherdirectlyfromtheOvalOfficeorthroughHaldeman.Andthe

feelingwasunderstandableenough.Nixonhadbeenharassedforyearsforhis

allegedbellicosity;antiwardemonstratorshadmarchedagainsthimcontinually

sincehebecamePresident.ItisnodiscredittoNixonthathewantedtobe

rememberedasapeacemaker;norwasitadistortionofthefacts,howeverthis

mightdiscomfithisperennialcritics.HehadseentheSALTprocessthroughto

nearculmination.Nixon’spenchant forhyperbole—suchas“agenerationof

peace”—couldnotobscuretherealitythatafteryearsofdomesticturmoiland

divisivewaranewinternationalorderwasgraduallyemerginginwhichSALTwas

playinganimportantpart.



Needlesstosay,theofficialSALTdelegationwasnotenamoredofthis

periodicWhiteHouseinvolvement.Theyhadgonethroughyearsofpainstaking 

effort,largelyunrecognizedbythepublic.Itwasonlyhumanthattheywantedto

playacentralroleattheturningpointswhichtheirdedicationandabilityhad

madepossible.Itwasnottheirfaultthatthekeydecisionswerepolitical, 

involvingdomesticaswellasforeignpolicyconsiderationsforbothsides.Atthe

sametime,wecouldnotslowoureffortstoresolvedeadlockedissuessimplyto

maintainthemoraleofourdelegation.Painfulasitwasforournegotiatingteam,

occasionallyhigh‐levelinterventionwasessential.(Thepracticehasbeen

continuedbyoursuccessorsaswell.)



Bythetimeofthesummitonlythreeissuesstoodinthewayofcompleting

aSALTagreement.Theyhadnotbeenleftbydesign,thoughnodoubtBrezhnev

andNixonwouldhavereservedoneissueforthemselvesforaceremonial

concludingnegotiationiftheHelsinkitalkshadprogressedwithunexpected

speed.WhilewewereinMo scow,infact,theHelsinkidelegationsmadesome

progresseachday.BrezhnevandNixon(andultimatelyGromykoandI)pickedup

theremainingdeadlocks.Allthetimethedelegationscontinuedtheirwork.This

arrangementcreated,asweshallsee,someconsiderabletension.



Thethreeremainingissueswere(1)thedistancebetweenthetwoABM

sitespermittedbythetreaty;(2)whatincreasesinsizeorvolume,ifany,of

existingICBMsandICBMsilosshouldbepermitted;and(3)whatSLBMswereto

becounted.Eachoftheseissueswas,regrettably,highlytechnical. Ishalltryto

rendertheminlaylanguage;someunderstandingofthemisessentialforan

evaluationoftheSALTdebate.(Thereadercanskiptothenextsectionifhisor

herinterestinthesedetailsisnotoverwhelming.)



ThespacingbetweentheABMsiteswasoneofthosetrivialproblemsthat

emergeasaresidueinthelaststagesofanynegotiation;theyaregenerallyas

complexastheyareunimportantbecausebythenbothsideshaveexhausted

theirstoreofconcessions.TheproblemwastopreventthetwoABMsitesfrom

beingsosituatedthattheycouldsupporteachotherandtherebymergeintoa

nucleusfromwhichitwouldbepossibletoexpandrapidlyintoadefenseofa

largepartofthecountry.Forthisreasonweadvocatedthewidestpossible

spacing.Weproposed1,500kilometers(937miles);theSovietsputforward1,300

kilometers(812miles).Thedifferencewasinsubstantial;politicalleaders,itsoon

turnedout,couldmakenocontributiontoresolvingit;itquiteliterallysolved

itself.



Theothertwoissueswerepotentiallymoreserious;theywerestillopen

preciselybecausetheywerepoliticallyintractable.



First,howtodefineandlimit“heavy”missiles;thatis,whatshouldbethe

sizeofICBMspermittedbytheagreement?Theoffensivefreezebannedthe

constructionofnewICBMsilosbutpermitted“modernization”ofICBMs.Only

thosesilosthatwereactuallybeingbuiltatthetimetheagreementwassigned

couldbecompleted. Theseprovisionspresentednospecialproblemforus,

becausewehadonlyoneimportanttypeofICBM,theMinuteman,norwerewe

buildinganynewsilos.TheSoviets,however,hadtwomaintypesofmissiles:a

“light”ICBM—theSS‐11,whichwasinfactlargerthantheMinuteman—anda

“heavy”monster—theSS‐9,ofgreatthrowweight,whichhadnoequivalentinthe

Americanarsenal.IftheICBMfreezelefttheSovietsfreetoplace“heavy”missiles

intothesilosnowhousingSS‐11s,theagreementwouldbemeaninglessandthe

Sovietswouldbeabletobuildupahugeedgeinthrowweightdespitethe

agreement.



Accordingly,conversionofsilosfrom“light”to“heavy”wasprohibited—

buttheSovietssoughttodeprivetheclauseofoperationalmeaningbybalkingat

anyagreeddefinitionof“heavy.”TheAmericanproposalwasthatnomissilewith

avolumelargerthantheSS‐11couldbeputintothesilosheretoforecontaining

“light”missiles.TheSovietshadconsiste ntlyrejectedthislimitationoranyvariant

ofit.Wesuspectedthattheywereworkingona“light”missilelargerthantheSS‐

11butsmallerthantheSS‐9.Ourdelegationthereforecameupwithanother

formula,totheeffectthatthedimensionsofasilocouldnotbechanged.This

wouldhavebeenalooserconstraintthanrestrictionsonthevolumeofthemissile

itself,becauseitwouldpermittheSovietstoincreasethesizeoftheirmissilesby

usingtheexistingsilosmoreefficiently.Wealsoranintotroublebecausethe

Pentagonfearedthataprohibitiononalteringsilodimensionsmightprevent

conversionofoursilostoMIRV’dmissiles(MinutemanIII).(Thisturnedouttobe

wrong,butbythenwehadalreadydugourselvesintoapositionthatasitturned

outwedidnotneed.)



Forallthesereasonsourdelegationhadadvancedthepropositionthatit

was“significant”increasesinsilodimensionsthatshouldbebanned.TheSoviets

hadagreedtothis,butrefusedtodefine“significant”;theyflatlyrejectedtheUS

proposaltodefineitasmeaningnomorethana10to15percentincrease.Our

delegationproposedmakingaunilateralstatement—whichwouldnot,ofcourse,

bebindingontheSoviets—thatweunderstood“significant”tomean10to15

percent,preciselywhattheSovietsrefusedtoaccept.Torestanagreementona