Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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unilateralstatementwhichthe Sovietshadrejectedseemedtooriskytousatthe

WhiteHouse;andthereforeweplacedthewholeissueonthesummitagenda.



Thethirdissue,howto countSLBMs,wasmorecomplexstill.MyApriltrip

hadsettledthattheSovietswouldbepermitted950SLBMsonsixty‐two

submarines,butithadleftopenwhichmissilesandsubmarinetypeswouldbe

included.TheSovietstookthepositionthatsomethirtymissilesonoldernuclear

H‐classsubmarinesaswellassomesixtymissilesontheevenmoreancientdiesel‐

poweredG‐classsubmarineswerenot“modern,”andhenceshouldnotcount

againstthetotal.Inotherwords,theywantedninetyoldermissilesessentially

outsideoftheagreement.



IthadalsobeenagreedwithBrezhnevinApril—followingLaird’sschemeof

January—thattoexpandfromtheircurrentnumberstoreachthepermittedtotal

of950theSovietswouldhavetodismantleolderICBMsandSLBMs.Butthepoint

wherethisdismantlingwouldstart—intheSALTjargon,the“ baseline”—hadbeen

lefttothenegotiatorsatHelsinki.Predictably,theSovietswantedthebaselineat

ashighanumberaspossible,whichwouldhaverequiredaminimumof

dismantling;wewanteditaslowaspossible,soastogetridofallolderICBMs

andSLBMs.Calculationswerecomplicate dfurtherbecauseourfirstattemptwas

toestablishthebaselineatthenumberofmodernsubmarinestheSovietwould

possesswhenthetreatywassigned.TheSovietsclaimedtheyhadforty‐eight;we

estimatedforty‐three.Evenhadwebeenabletoagreeonthisnumber,wewould

stillhavebeenwrestlingoverhowmanymissilesthisamountedto.Forthe

Sovietshadtwotypesofmodernsubmarine:TheD‐classcarriedtwelvemissiles

each;theY‐class,sixteen.Inshort,therewasconfusionaplentywhenBrezhnev

andNixongotdowntoworktheafternoonofTuesday,May23.



Twomeetingstookplace,thefirstfrom4:00to6:00p.m.inSt.Catherine’s

Hall,thesecondfrom7:20to9:50intheGeneralSecretary’sofficeintheKremlin.

OnlyIaccompaniedNixontothefirstsession—officiallyasanote‐taker;sinceI

foundmyselfheavilyinvolvedinthenegotiationIhaddifficultyperformingmy

officialfunction.Hence,forthesecondsessionwebroughtalongHalSonnenfeldt

asnote‐taker.Brezhnevatbothmeetingswasaccompaniedbyhiscloseaide

AndreiAleksandrov,whoneverspoke,andbytheinterpreterSukhodrev.



Themeetingsdemonstratedthatheadsofgovernmentshouldnot

negotiatecomplexsubjects.NeitherBrezhnevnorNixonhadmasteredthe

technicalissues;bothwerelagginghoursbehindthedelegationsinHelsinki,who

weregoingmerrilyaheadontheverysamepoints.



Thefirstmeetingtooktheleadersintothebogofseekingtodefine“heavy”

missiles.TomyamazementBrezhnevadoptedaviewconstantlyrejectedbythe

Sovietdelegation,totheeffectthattherewasnoneedtochangethedimensions

ofSovietsilosandthattheSovietshadnointentionofincreasingthediameterof

theirmissiles;thisimpliedthattheywouldacceptafreezeonsilodimensionsas

wellasonmissilevolume.Inotherwords,heseemedtoleantoouroriginal

proposalofmonthsearlier,heretoforeadamantlyrejectedbytheSovietSALT

delegation.Moreover,Brezhnevseemedtobefavoringaproposalincompatible

withtheweaponstheSovietswereactuallybuilding.HisdisclaimerofSoviet

intentionstoincreas ethediameterofSovietmissilesalsoturnedouttobe

contrarytothefacts.Toestablishthepointclearly,IexplainedtoBrezhnevthat

wewantedanunambiguouslimitonsilomodificationbecause newlaunch

techniquescouldimprovethecapabilitiesofmissiles.Thiswasnotsimplya

theoreticalargument;wehadgoodreasontobelievethatthiswaspreciselywhat

theSovietswereupto.Brezhnevstrenuouslydeniedwhatweknewtobetrue;he

evendrewdiagramstoproveIwastalkingnonsense;ofcoursewecouldnot

contradicthim,lestwerevealtheextentorsourceofourknowledge.Inaddition,

hetookumbragewheneverIdescribed thecharacteristicsofSovietweapons;the

Sovietpassionforsecrecywassuchthatwheneverwerevealedourknowledgeof

theircapabilities theSovietleadersbecamevisiblyflusteredandirritated.Asa 

gestureofgoodfaith,however,Brezhnevformallyproposeddroppingtheword

“significant”altogetherfromthearticleprohibitingincreasesinsilodimensions;

thiswouldhavepreventedanysiloincrea se. 



Brezhnev’scompletereversaloftheSovietpositioninacceptingafreezeon

missiledimensionsseemedtocreateaproblemforus,sinceaccordingtorecent

Pentagoncalculations—latershowntobeerroneous—afreezeonsilosizewould

preventourinstallingtheMIRV’dMinutemanIIIinexistingMinutemansilos.So

weturnedBrezhnev’sastonishingproposalaside,producingthesurrealisticresult

thattheleadersseemedtohaveswitchedroles:Brezhnevwasveeringtowardthe

AmericanpositionofsomemonthsbeforewhileNixonappearedtobeadopting

theviewoftheSovietSALTdelegationinHelsinki.FourdayslatertheJointChiefs

decidedthatwecouldhavelivedwithit,afterall.BythentheSovietshad

withdrawnBrezhnev’ssuggestion,astheywereboundto,nomatterhowNixon

responded,inviewofitsincompatibilitywithprojectedSovietprograms.



ThediscussionofSLBMswaslessatvariancewiththepositionsatHelsinki;

neitherwasitdistinguishedbyprecision.OnthisissueBrezhnevcoincidedwith

hisdelegation:Forty‐eightSovietsubmarinesshouldbethebaselineforstarting

totradeinoldersubmarinesandICBMsfornewersubmarine‐launchedmissiles.

Nixonaskedmetohandlethispartofthediscussion.Isuggestedthatwemight

acceptforty‐eightsubmarinesasabaselineifitincludedthenineolderH‐class

submarines.Thisproposalirrita tedBrezhnevnotalittle,sinceevenbySoviet

calculationsitwouldhavereducedtheSovietbaselinefiguretothirty‐nine

modernsubmarines;anditwouldhaveforcedtheSovietseithertoscraptheH‐

classaltogetherortoforgoonenewmodernsubmarine(withtwelvetosixteen

missileseach)foreachH‐classsubmarine(withthreemissileseach)retained.He

thereforeshiftedthediscussiontothenumberofUSsubmarinespermittedunder

theagreement.Weinsistedonanupper limitofforty‐four,allowingusanumber

ofmissilesequaltotheSovietbaseline.(Toreachthatnumberwewouldhaveto

tradeinforty‐eightofourolderTitanICBMs,whichthePentagonhadbeen

wantingtoscrapforyearsandIhadkeptinservicefortradingpurposes.)But

sinceweinfacthadonlyforty‐onemissile‐carryingsubmarinesandourJoint

ChiefsofStaffhadrejectedbuildingnewonesuntiltheTridentserieswasready,

NixoncouldtellBrezhnevpainlesslythatwewouldnotexercisetheoptiontoadd

threeadditionalsubmarinesduringthefive‐yeartermoftheagreement.



Themindnowbogglingatallthenumbersonthetable,bothsidesagreed

toarecessofanhour.Iusedthetimeto telegraphGerardSmithanaccountof

thesurprisingturnofevents.



Wereassembledat7:20p.m.inBrezhnev’sKremlinoffice,whichwas

locatedinabaroque‐façadedbuildinginafarcorneroftheKremlindownthe

streetfromtheGrandKremlinPalace.Oneenteredthroughafairlynarrow

carpetedhallwayandwentupsomesteps toaricketyelevator.Thethirdfloor

wasusedbythePolitburo;thesecondfloorhousedtheCouncilofMinisters.

Brezhnev’sofficewasatleastthirtyyardslong,andcontainedatablelarge

enoughforthePolitburomembersandtheiralternates,usuallyatotaloftwenty‐

one.AttheendofthattableandperpendiculartoitwasBrezhnev’senormous

desk,onesideofwhichwastakenupwithatelephoneconsolecontainingso

manybuttonsthatitcreatedtheimpressionthatonlyatrainedorganistwouldbe

abletomanipulateit.



Thetwoprincipalsplungedrightbackintothethickofthings.Brezhnev

openedthemeetingbyacceptingourproposeddistanceof1,500kilometers

betweenABMsites.Unfortunately,unknowntoeitherleader,theAmerican

delegationinHelsinkihadalreadysettledfortheSovietproposalof1,300

kilometersthatmorning.Brezhnevhadofferedusabetterdealthanour

negotiatorshadalreadyaccepted.Itmadenodifference;wewerefinallystuck

withtheversionnegotiatedatHelsinki;thedifferencewasmarginalanyway.



Afterthismisfiretheleaderschargedonceagainintothetrickyareaof

defining“heavy”missiles.DuringtherecessIhadwarnedNixonthatbecauseof

theMIRVproblemheshouldnotstrayfromthepositionofourdelegationuntil

weheardfromSmith;butheshouldtrytogettheSovietstoagreetoour

definitionof“significant.”ThereforeNixontoldBrezhnevthatweinsistedona

provisionthattherebeno“significant”increaseinsilodimensions(whichthe

Sovietshadalreadyaccepted)anddefined“significant” as15percent(whichthe

Sovietshadrebuffed).Brezhnev,havingofferedatotalfreezeonsilosizeinthe

earliermeeting,seemedalittlebaffledthatwewouldnotgoalongwithwhathad

beenourpositionmonthsearlierandwouldtakecareofourfearofanupgrading

ofSovietmissiles.AtthatpointIthoughttherewasnoharminresurrectinganold

Americanidea,thusfarflatlyrejectedbytheSoviets,thatagreedlimitationsapply

notonlytosilodimensionsbutalsotothevolumeofmissiles.Thiswouldhave put

amuchsharperconstraintontheSoviets’missiledevelopment,sincetheywould

nothavebeenabletoimprovetheiruseoftheexistingsilospace.Brezhnev

seemedtogoalongwiththataswell.Itwasthelasttimeweencounteredhimin

aSALTnegotiationwithoutadvisers.



IstillcannotunderstandwhatBrezhnevthoughthewasdoing.Washe

offeringusgenuineconcessions?DidheknowenoughofourMinuteman

conversionprogramtoexpectustoturnhissuggestionsdown?Ordidhesimply

becomeconfusedbythetechnicaldetailsandfailtograspthedistinction

betweensilodimensionandmissilevolume?



Whenthetwoleader sturnedtoSLBMstheysimplyrepeatedthe

argumentsoftheearliersession.ItwasleftthatGromykoandIwouldmeetthe

nextmorningtoseewhetherwecouldfo rmulate jointinstructionstothe

delegations.Butbeforethismeetingactuallytookplacetherecamethetenseand

slightlybizarreencounterbetweenNixonandtheSovietlea dershipatBrezhnev’s

dacha.



<<Contents>>



****



ConfrontationattheDacha



hisdramaticconfrontationbeganwhentheGeneralSecretaryoftheCentral

CommitteeoftheSovietCommunistPartykidnappedthePresidentofthe

UnitedStates.BrezhnevhadinvitedNixontodinneronMay24totakeup

“outstandingissues”;hehadindicatedthatonlythetopSovietleadershipwould

bepresent.TheexclusionofGromykowasasignaltoconfineattendanceonour

sidetomembersoftheNSCstaff.WeweretoldfirstthatBrezhnevmeantto

discusstheMiddleEast,butduringtheafternoonDobrynintoldmethatthemost

likelysubjectonhisleader’smindwasVietnam;atthatpointtheissuehadnot

comeupexceptfortheincantationabouthow“difficult”ithadbeenforthe

SovietleaderstoreceiveNixon.Ithereforedesignat edWinstonLord,myaidefor

allthemostsensitivenegotiations,andJohnNegroponte,nowtheVietnam

expertonmystaff,toaccompanymetothedacha.Theplanhadbeentoleave

aboutanhourafterthedailysigningceremony(thistimeoncooperationin

space),proceedinginamotorcadeeventhenbeingassembledbytheSecret

Service.

T



Brezhnevcrossedeverybodyup.AsheandNixonwereleavingthesigning

ceremonyhesuddenlysuggestedthattheygotogethertothedachaimmediately.

Nixonaccepted—therewaslittleelsehecoulddo,sinceBrezhnevwasphysically

propellinghimintohiscar—andoffthetwoleadersspedinBrezhnev’sbigZIL

limousine.Pres identialAssistantslearnratherquicklytostayclosetotheirchiefs,

especiallyonforeigntrips.IjumpedintoaSovietfollow‐upcar,shoutingtoan

aidethatLordandNegroponteshouldmaketheirwaytothedachaontheirown. 



Itwasanabsurdorder.NoAmericanknewwherethedachawas.NoSoviet

officialwouldtellthem.NoAmericancarwasimmediatelyavailable.Lordand

NegroponteturnedfranticallytoaseriesofSovietbureaucratsforassistance.

Theystoicallypretendedignorance—eithernotunderstanding Englishorrefusing

totaketheresponsibilitytoorderacartogototheheavilyguardeddacha.Nearly

desperate,fornoPresidentialaidewillinglymissesahigh‐levelmeeting—and

theyhadallmybriefingpapers—LordandNegropontefinallymanaged(withBill

Hyland’shelp)toreachGeneralAntonov,headofthesectionoftheKGB

responsibleforforeignleaders’security.Heauthorizedtheirdepartureforthe

dachaandprovidedacar—butthiswasnotarrangeduntilBrezhnevandNixon

(andI)hadalreadyreachedthedacha.Forinthemeantimethesmallmotorcade

containingNixonandBrezhnevinonecarandmeinanotherhadspedoutof

Moscow.ItwasfollowedbyNixon’sowncar,fullofSecretServiceagentsbeside

themselvesthatthePresidentoftheUnitedStateshadbeenabductedinfrontof

theirveryeyesbytheSovietUnion’sNumberOneCommunist.



Nexttoridinginforeignairplanes,theSecretServiceabhorforeigndrivers

andcars.Theyhadgoodreasoninthiscase.Itturnedouttobeaharrowingtrip.

ThemainavenuesinMoscowhaveatleastsixlanes,ofwhichtheinsidelaneis

reservedforthehighestlevelofVIPs.Anycarontheinsidelanehasautomatic

precedenceateachintersection.IftheSovietpublicwerelessdisc iplinedorless

awareofregulations,nomemberofthePolitburowouldsurviveforlong,fortheir

chauffeurscruisethroughMoscowatseventymilesanhourandpaynotthe

slightestattentiontotrafficlights,relyingonthefactthateachintersectionwill

beclearedattheirapproach.Furthermore,thecarsinthemotorcadeclosely

tailgateeachotheratracing‐carspeeds.Theaccompanyingsecuritycars swing

backandforthinascissorslikemotion.Ifthefrontcarweretostopsuddenly,

carnagewouldbeinevitable.It isaninvigoratingexperience.Afterawhile

fatalismsetsin.TheonlyplacewhereInevercompletelyconqueredaqueasy

feelingwasattheentrancetotheKremlin,whereonehurtlesfirstacrossawide

boulevardthroughheavytrafficcomingfrombothdirections,and,having

survivedthatcrossing,speedsthroughthefifteenth‐centuryBorovitskyGate,

whichisbarelywideenoughforone‐waytraffic.Ifanyoneweretomissasignal,

theoddsinfavorofsurvivalatthespeedatwhichSovietVIPcarstravelare

negligible.



Thedachawasaboutaforty‐minutedrive,evenatimmodestspeed,from

theKremlin.ItwassetonalittleriseinaheavilywoodedareaalongtheMoscow

River.Therewasnootherhouseinsight.Itwasheavilyguardedbyuniformed

KGBpersonnel.ThedachawasbuiltinclassicSovietstylenottoodifferentfrom

theguesthousesinLeninHills.Itwastwostorieshigh,comfortablewithouteither

appearinglavishorrisingtoelegance.Thegroundfloorhadononesidealittle

officeandacomfortablyappointedlivingroomoverlookingalawnleadingtoa

boatlandingontheMoscowRiver.Ontheothersideofthehallwasamovie

projectionroom.Nexttoittherewasasmallconferenceroomfurnishedvery

sparselywithanovaltableandagrandfatherclockbythewall.Theconference

room,likethesittingroom,overlookedtheriver.



Theeveningwastobemarked bysudden,unpredictablechanges.Having

successfully“kidnapped”thePresidentonce,Brezhnev,inhighgoodspiritsonour

arrivalatthedacha,thenwhiskedhimdowntotheboatlandingforahydrofoil

ride.IfollowedinanotherhydrofoilwithAleksandrov.[

BrezhnevgaveNixononeof

thesehydrofoilsasagift,inreturnfortheCadillacthatwegavehimforhisautocollection.]Far

behind,wallowinguncomfortablyinourwake,wasaconventionalvesselloaded

withthesameSecretServiceagentswhohadnowseentheirchargeabducteda

secondtimebythewilySovietleaders,thistimebywater.



Thehydrofoilclearlysoughttobreakthespeedrecordoftheofficial

limousines,and,forallIknow,succeeded.Yet,despitethecommotionandthe

obviousfrenzyofthosewhoseprocedureswerebeingsototallyviolated,the

excursiongavemeafeelingofextraordinaryserenity.Onbothsidesoftheriver

therewerebirchgrovesthatpunctuatedasoftlyundulatinglandscapeextending

ingreenwavestothefarhorizon.Theview wasconsolingratherthanspectacular.

ItwasaglimpseofthatoceanoflandwhichisRussia.Acrossthisexpansehave

streamedinvadinghordesfrombothEastandWestoverthecenturies;intheend,

eachwasovercomebytheenduringpatienceofapeoplestubbornlyclingingto

itsnativesoilandpreservingitsownidentityamidstallviolenceandcruelty—

eventhatinflictedbyitsownleaders.



Whenwereturnedtothedachaaboutanhourlater,KosyginandPodgorny

hadarrived,ashadtheconsiderablyput‐uponLordandNegroponte.Butbefore

ourmeetingcouldstartIhadfirsttosettleadisputebetweentheKGBandthe

SecretService.Determinednottolettheirchargebecartedoffonyetanother

wildride,anddoubtlesssmartingwithindignationattheirSovietcounterparts,

theSecretServicehaddriventhePresident’scarrightuptheporticoofthedacha,

blockingitsentranceandconstitutingapotentialdangertoallincaseoffire.The

KGB,needlesstosay,werenowasirateastheSecretServicehadbeenhalfan

hourearlier.Inanegotiationasfraughtdiplomaticallyasanyinmycareer,Ifinally

persuadedtheSecretServicetomovethePresident’scarfromBrezhnev’sfront

doorinreturnforapromisethatNixonwouldusenoforeign‐madelimousine or

heathendriveronhisreturntoMoscow.InfairnesstotheSecretServiceone

muststressthattheyhaveoneofthemostanguishing jobsintheworld.Onlya

groupwithrarededicationtodutycantakeonresponsibilityforprotectingthe

President—anassignmentinwhichtheycannotaffordasinglemistake.They

mustfollowtheirownprocedures;theycannotallowexceptions.Myhumorous

anecdotesabouttheminthisbookshouldnotconcealmyadmirationandindeed

affectionfortheagentsIknewandwhoalsoprotectedme.Theyareafirst‐rate,

talented,andprofessionalcorps.



AtlasttheSovietleadersandNixonmovedintotheconferenceroomto

faceeachotheracrosstheovaltable.The discussionstartedharmlesslyenough

withBrezhnevreviewingthestatusofvariousnegotiations.Hesuggeste dthat

GromykoandIpickuptheSALTdiscussionstodistillsomecommoninstructions

forthedelegationsinHelsinki.Nixonfellinwiththespiritoftheexchangeand

listedsomeissuesonwhichprogressseemedpossible,suchastheestablishment

ofaUS‐Sovieteconomiccommission.Finally,whenBrezhnevmentionedin

passingthattheMiddleEastandVietnammightbeworthdiscussionatsome

point,anditseemedasiftheshadowboxingmightgoonallnight,Nixondecided

toputVietnamsquarelyonthetable.Ifhehadnot,theSovietleaderssurely

wouldhave;theywereloadedforbear.



Nixonbeganbyarguingthatthe“collateralissue”ofVietnamshouldnot

interruptthebasicprogressinourrelationswhichwasbeingachieved.(Theside

thatseeksafreehandalwaysclaimsthatlinkagedoesnotapplytoit.) Hethen

gaveaconciseandfirmsummaryofourposition.HewasawarethattheSoviet

UnionhadanideologicalaffinitywithHanoi.Butwedidnotchoosethismoment

forthe“flare‐up”inVietnam. Hanoi,aidedbySovietequipment,had.Oncethe

offensivetookplace,“wehadtoreactaswedid.”Wecouldnotreconsiderour

policyunlessHanoiindicatednewflexibilityinitsnegotiatingstance.Moscow,he

needled,shouldusetheinfluenceitacquiredthroughsupplyingmilitary

equipmenttomakeHanoithinkagain.Asforus,weweredeterminedtobringthe

wartoaconclusion,preferablybynegotiation,ifnecessarybymilitarymeans. 



NowthatthesubjectwasVietnam,theeasycamaraderievanished;the

atmospherecloudedsuddenlyfromonesecondtotheother.Eachofthethree

SovietleadersinturnunleashedadiatribeagainstNixon,who,exceptfortwo

one‐sentenceinterruptions,endureditindignifiedsilence.Notonlywasthe

substancetoughbutthetonewascrudelyhectoring.Brezhnevledoff.He

complainednotonlyaboutour“cruel”bombingbutaboutthewholehistoryof

ourinvolvementinVietnam,whichseemedtohimdesignedtoembarrassthe

SovietUnion.HerecalledthatNorthVietnamhadfirstbeenbombedin1965

whileKosyginwasvisitingHanoi.Hedeniedthatmilitaryactionswereneededto

endthewar.Hanoiwaseagertonegotiate;allwehadtodowastogetridof

ThieuandacceptHanoi’s“reasonable”politicalprogram.Therewereseveralnot

toosubtleallusionsthatbarelystoppedshortofcomparingAmericanpolicywith

Hitler’s.Ineffectconfirmingthevalidityofourstrategy,Brezhnevexplainedthe

Sovietreasoningforgoingaheadwiththesummit:



Itwascertainlydifficultforustoagreetoholdthismeetingunderpresent

circumstances.Andyetwedidagreetoholdit.Iwanttoexplainwhy.Wefeltthatpreliminary

workpriortothemeetingwarrantedthehopethattwopowerswithsucheconomicmightand

suchahighlevelofcivilizationandalltheothernecessaryprerequisitescouldcometogetherto

promotebetterrelationsbetweenourtwonations.



InanonsequiturthatrevealedagaintheSoviets’rawnerveabout China,

BrezhnevassailedtheChineseforanimmoralforeignpolicyandcitedthe

ShanghaiCommuniquéassupportingevidence;inhisviewthefactthateach

partyhadstateditsownpositionwithoutdefiningacommon standmadethe

wholedocumentunprincipled.



Beforewecouldpenetratethelogicofthiscuriousattackonadocument

wehadsigned,itwasKosygin’sturn.WhereBrezhnevhadbeenemotional, he

wasanalytical;whereBrezhnevhadpoundedthetable,Kosyginwasglacially

correct,though,asIsaid,insubstancethemostaggressiveofthetroika.He

recalledhisconversationswithLyndonJohnson,whohadfirstpredictedvictory

andfailed.HeimpliedthesamefateforNixon.Hecomplainedbitterlyabout

damagetoSovietshipsandlossofSovietlivesinHaiphonghar bor. Hehintedthat

Hanoimightreconsideritspreviousrefusaltopermitforcesofothercountriesto

fightonitsside—promptingNixontoretortthatwewerenotfrightene dbythat

threat.KosyginturnedthisintoadigatChinabypointingoutthatPekinghad

beenpreparedtosendintroopsin1965buthadbeenrebuffedbytheNorth

Vietnamese.KosyginsuggestedthatwegetridofThieu;theMoscowsummitwas

alogicalplacetocometogetheronsuchaproposal;hewasreasonablysureit

wouldbeacceptedbyHanoi.(Sowerewe.WedidnotthinkwerequiredSoviet

helptosurrender.)



Podgornyconcludedthepresentations.Thethirdleaderinarownow

demonstratedtheSovietinsecurityaboutChina.Thereissomethingabouttheir

huge,complexneighborthatunsettlesSovietreasoning.HewasinHanoi,hesaid,

whenhelearnedofmysecrettriptoChinatheprevioussummer.Hewasableto

reassuretheNorthVietnamesebytellingthemthatNixonwasplanningtovisit

Moscowtoo—asifadoubleselloutandisolationwasbetterforHanoithanone!

Hethensecondedhiscolleagues’remarks:ThewarinVietnamwas“unlawful,”

and“sheeraggression.”Podgorny’sepithetsweretheequalofhiscolleagues’,

thoughhisdeliver ywasblanderandhistoneactuallymilder.WhilePodgornywas

talking,Brezhnevwasmarchingupanddownbehindhisback,mutteringto

himself.Itwasnotfullyclearwhetherhewastryingtolendemphasisto

Podgorny’sremarksorwasgettingbored.



Suddenlythethoughtstruckmethatforallthebombastandrudeness,we

wereparticipantsinacharade.Whilethetonewasbellicoseandthemanner

extremelyrough,noneoftheSovietstatementshadanyoperationalcontent.The

leadersstayedwellclearofthreats.Theirso‐calledproposalswerethesimple

slogansoftheParisplenarysessions,whichtheyknewwehadrepeatedly

rejectedandwhichwehadnoreasontoacceptnowthatthemilitarysituation

wasalmostdailyalteringinourfavor.TheSovietleaderswerenotpressingus

exceptwithwords.Theywerespeakingfortherecord,andwhentheyhadsaid

enoughtohaveatranscripttosendtoHanoi,theywouldstop.



Andsoitwas.Nixon,whobehavedwithremarkabledignitythroughout,

repliedcalmlybutfirmly,sayingthathetrustedthewarwouldbesettledsoon.

HenotedcoldlythattheUSSRhadbeen“instrumental”inAprilingettingthe

secrettalksresumed;wewerethen“somewhatdisappointed”whentheNorth

Vietnamesewere“moreintransigentthaneverbefore.”Hereferredpointedlyto

Brezhnev’scease‐fireoffer,whichwehadacceptedbutHanoihadrejectedoutof