Butbeforewecouldaffordsentimentality,sometoughnegotiatinglay
ahead.Gromykodidnotappearat10:00a.m.Instead,Dobrynininformedusthat
theSovietleadershipwasreviewingtheSALTpositiononceagain.Brez hnevdid
notshowupfortheplenarysessionthatafternoonintheelegantSt.Catherine’s
Hallwhichdealtwitheconomics, notNixon’sbestorfavoritesubject.Kosygin
chairedtheSovietside,andwasanalyticalandprecise,whichwasmorethan
couldbesaidoftheAmericans,whostucktofamiliargeneralities.Brezhnevwas
clearlyworkingontheSovietSALTposition.
MystaffandIwerefranticallyanalyzingvariouscombinationsoffigures;
thepermutationsseemedendless,butwehadtoensurethattheSoviets
dismantledthemaximumnumberofmissiles.Thenumbersgameofsubmarine
baselines—howmanycouldbetradedin,andwhentheywouldreachdifferent
levelsbyvariouscombinationsoftwelve‐tubeandsixteen‐tubeboats—forcedus
intonumerouscomputationsonlongyellowpads,drawnupbetweensessions
andthenquicklyscratchedupandconsumedduringmeetings.Wenevercould
figureouthowtheSovietscouldreachalevelof950SLBMsonsixty‐two
submarines.[
Forexample,someofthesecalculationsyieldedmystifyingresults:34Y‐class
submarinesx16missiles=544;plus28D‐classsubmarinesx12missiles=336,foratotalof
880;plus30missilesontheH‐class,equaled910.]Theydiditbythesimpledeviceof
assumingthatmostoftheirsubmarineshadsixteentubes,eventhoughtheyhad
severalwithtwelvetubes.
TheSALTdiscussions resumedat5:20p.m.inSt.Catherine’sHall—with,as
usual,onlyahalfhour’swarning.Wewerepreparedandso,ittranspired,were
theSoviets.TheSovietsidewasrepresentedbySmirnov,Gromyko,Dobrynin,and
GeorgiKorniyenko(ChiefoftheUSADivisionoftheForeignMinistry).The
Americangroupwascomposedofme,Sonnenfeldt,Hyland,andRodman.Both
delegationswerescheduledtogototheballetperformanceinNixon’shonor.On
theSovietsideneitherGromykonorDobrynincouldescapethisceremonialduty;
wehadthusanhourfornegotiation.Thediscussionwasbrisk;therewasnotime
foreitherbanterorformalisticpositions.Afteradayofagonizingexchangeswith
WashingtonandHelsinkiithadbeenconcludedthataprohibitiononanychanges
insilodimensionwascompatiblewithourMinutemanIIIprogram,afterall.But,
asIhavesaid,itwastoolate.Gromykoofferedusasa“concession”theposition
ofourdelegationinHelsinki,forbiddingonly“significant”changes;theSoviets
werepreparedalsotonoteaunilateralAmericaninterpretationoftheterm