Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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hand.HeproposedthatwetakeupVietnamagainlaterintheweek.Wewould

continuetonegotiatewiththeNorthVietnamese,butitwaspointlessifthey

werenotwillingtomakepeace.WewerenotexpectingtheSovietstosolvethe

problem,but,hesaid,“maybe youcanhelpus.”Kosygincommentedsharplythat

anewproposalwasneeded,andthePresidentrepliedequallysharplythatthe

discussionhadalreadygoneontoolong.



AtthispointBrezhnevobviouslydecidedthattherecordwascomplete.He

allowedthatwehadhada“mostseriousdiscussiononaproblemofworld

importance,”asifitwereanabstractdebateamongprofessors.Hesaidhedrew

theconclusionfromNixon’sremarksthattheUnitedStateswaspreparedtolook

forareasonablesolution—apropositionhardtoarguewith.Kosyginchimedin

thatnotasingleshipcarryingmilitaryequipmentwasonthewaytoVietnam;

“onlyflourandfoodstuffs,noarmamentwhatever.”Thismightsuggestthat

MoscowwasbringingpressureonHanoi,oritmightmeannothingsinceallof

NorthVietnam’sharborswereinanyeventclosedbymines.



ThefactwasthatexceptfortheirbullyingtoneinthissessiontheSoviet

leaderstreatedVietnamasasubsidiaryissueduringthesummit.Thetopleaders

revertedtoVietnamonlyoncemorewhenBrezhnevaskedNixonwhetherwe

couldmodifyourproposalofJanuary25byhavingThieuresigntwomonths

beforeanewelectionratherthanoneaswehadproposed.Nixonhintedthathe

mightbewilling tosuggestthisifHanoiwouldacceptourotherterms.



Asfortheeveningatthedacha,bythetimetheSovietleadershadspoken

theirVietnampieceforthreehours,itwas11:00p.m.Themoodthereupon

shiftedassuddenlytocongenialityasithadtoanimosityafewhoursearlier.We

wereescortedupstairstoadiningroomthatappearedtooccupyvirtuallythe

entiresecondfloor.Despitethelatehourafullfour‐coursemealwasserved,

precededbytheusualgroaningassortmentofhorsd’oeuvres.



Brezhnevwasnowuncharacteristicallyreserved,perhapsfatig ued,

althoughheenteredtheplayjoviallyonseveraloccasions.Immediatelyuponthe

startofthedinner,Kosyginbegantooffertoasts,tryingtogethisgueststoput

awayasmuchSovietcognacaspossible.Duringthecourseofthemealhedrank

atleasttwoglassesofcognacforeachAmericanguest.Hejokinglydisparagedthe

drinkingcapacitiesofthetwoyoungestmembersoftheAmericansidewhenhe

noticedthatLordandNegropontewerenotemptyingtheirglassesentirelyat

eachtoast.Everyonegratefullysteeredclearofserioustalk.Therewere

wisecracksandanecdotesthroughout,althoughthejovialitywasattimes

somewhatforced.Itwasasiftherewastacitmutualagreementtorestorethe

goodpersonalrelationsthathadobtainedbeforetheVietnamdiscussi onandthat

werenowtolastthroughtheremainderofthesummit.TheRussiansspoke

romanticallyandproudlyofLakeBaikal—itshugesize,itsbeauty,andaboveallits

cleanliness.BrezhnevcomplainedthatNixonhadinaccuratelydescribeditas

pollutedwhenseekingtodemonstratetheglobalnatureoftheenvironmental

probleminaspeech.TheGreatLakeswereverydirty,Brezhnevsaid,butnotLake

Baikal.Nixon’sremarks,hesaid,hadprobablybeendraftedbyDr.Kissinger—I

wastoblameandshouldbeexiled.NixonsuggestedSiberia.Brezhnevoffered

LakeBaikalsothatIcouldlearnitswondersfirsthand.SendingpeopletoSiberia

wasasubjectofraucousmerriment,atleastontheSovietsideofthetable.



Seriousnesssurfaced,however,whenBrezhnevadvancedtheproposition

that,despitethelate hour,GromykoandanotherseniorSovietofficialwere

waitingformeinMoscowtoresumeSALTnegotiations.Iwasnoteager,afterthe

motorcade,thehydrofoilride,thebr utalVietnamdiscussion,andtheheavymeal,

tomeetafreshSovietteamheadedbytheindefatigableGromyko.Thoughitwas

alreadypastmidnightNixon,feelingnopain,mademeavailable.ThismeantthatI

nowfacedtheprospectofserioustalksbeginning atabout1:00a.m.Kosyginsaid

thatifIfailed,LakeBaikalwouldbetoogoodformyexile.Isuggestedthathewas

goadingmetoseewhetheranintoxicateddiplomat couldkeephisnumbers

straight.ImadeupmymindthatIwouldstalltheeveningsessionunlessthe

Sovietsunexpectedlyacceptedourterms.



Wehadgonefromgoodhumortobellicositybacktojovialityinfivehours.

TheSovietleadersboisterouslyescortedusdownstairs.Tothenearlyaudible

reliefoftheSecretServicewespedoffinanAmericanmotorcadewithSoviet

motorcycleescort.IrodewiththePresidentbacktotheKremlin.Hecouldlook

forwardtobed,ItoafreshSovietnegotiatingteam.



<<Contents>>

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****



TheSALTNegotiationsConclude



rezhnevandNixonhadconcludedtheirSALT discussiononMay23by

suggestingthatGromykoandIwouldmeettocontinuetheworkthenext

morning;intheeventGromykodidnotshowup.Andnowonder. Forclearlythe

Sovietnegotiatorswouldhavetoregroupafterthevariousconcessionsofferedby

theirmercurialGeneralSecretary.GerardSmiththoughtthatwemusthave

misunderstoodBrezhnev.HisSovietcolleaguesmaywellhavebeenafraidthatwe

hadunderstoodhimonlytoowell.WhiletheSovietscaucused,negotiationson

SALTremainedinabeyancefornearlythirtyhours.ThatiswhenIwasthrowninto

thefray,afterthedachasession,duringtheearlymorningofMay25.

B



TheintervalgaveusanopportunitytosolicitSmith’sadvice.Thiswastime‐

consumingbecausecommunicationswithHelsinkiwereastonishingly

cumbersome.TheWhiteHousecommunicationscenter,asonallPresidential

trips,movedwiththePresident;itwasnowlocatedintheKremlin.TheState

DepartmentcommunicationscenterwaswithRogersintheRossiyaHotel.Delay

inkeepingeveryoneinformedwasinherentinthephysicalarrangements;getting

thesamedocumentsintothehandsofallprincipalswasalmostimpossible.The

normalreportingcablesfromHelsinkiwentthroughStateDepartmentchannels

toWashington,withacopytotheEmbassyinMoscow.Theywerethenroutedto

theRossiyaHotel,wheretheStateSecretariatcombinedthemwithnumerous

other“interesting”cablesandsentthemtotheNSCofficeattheKremlin.There

theywereputinreadingfiles,whichtheNSCstaffexaminedbetweenmeetings

andotherwork.Ifthematerialwasjudgedsufficientlyimportant,summaries

werepreparedforthePresident.



FormoresensitivemessagesSmithcouldusethebackchanneltome

throughtheWhiteHouseSituationRoominWashington.Thisaddedhoursof

delay,becausetheSituationRoomhadtoretransmitSmith’smessagewith

specialsecurityrestrictionstotheWhiteHousecommunicationsroominthe

Kremlin.TherewasanopentelephonelinetoHelsinki,whichdidnotallowany

seriousdiscussion.Therewasa securetelephonelocated attheEmbassy,several

milesaway.



Inretrospectitwouldhavebeenbettertohavebroughtbothdelegations

toMoscowandletthemcontinuetheirworkthereinsynchronizationwiththe

summit.GivenNixon’sfeelingsaboutwhoshouldgetcredit,Idoubtthathe

wouldhaveagreedifIhadproposedit.WeshallneverknowbecauseIdidnotput

forwardtheidea,notuninfluencedbyvanityandthedesiretocontrolthefinal

negotiation.Itwasunderstandablymaddeningforthedelegationtobeexcluded

fromtheculminationoftheirpatientandskillfuleffortsoversomanyyears.And

wepaidthepricethatnegotiators,excludedfromaprocesstheyconsidertheir

prerogative,arelikelytotakeaharderpositionafterthefactthanwhenthey

conductthetalksthemselves.(UntilwereachedMoscowthedelegationhad

almostinvariablytakena“softer”positionthantheWhiteHouse,whichisnormal

foroverseasnegotiators.)



ThisshowedupinSmith’sreactiontotheproblemsofsilosizeandSLBMs.

SmiththoughtitwouldbeagreatideatomarryBrezhnev’sideaofincluding

missilevolumetoourarithmeticofhowtodefinea“significant”changeinsilo

size:



IfatMoscow[hewiredme]youcangetagreementthattherewillbenosignificant

increase(a)inthesizeofICBMsilolauncher,or(b)inthevolumeofICBMsbeyondthatofthe

largestlightICBMcurrentlydeployedbyeitherside,andyougettheword“significant”further

definedtobenomorethantentofifteenpercent,thatwouldbegreatimprovement.



SmithwaslessclearaboutSLBMs.Heinsistedoncompulsoryreplacement

ofoldermissilesfromthestartoftheagreement.Heofferednoprecisemethod

forcalculatingthebaseline;Isuspectedthathewaskeepingopenhisoptions.If

wecouldnotgetanadequatesubmarinedeal,arguedSmith,weshouldconfine

theoffensivefreezetoICBMs.Thelastsentenceofhiscableshowedthe

frustrationsofbeingfarfromthesceneofdecisionandtheperennial—if

misguided—convictionthatPresidentialAssistantsprevailbykeepingfromthe

Presidenttheviewsofkeysubordinates:“Itrustyouwillputtheseconsiderations

tothePresident.”Alltheseconsiderationswereindeedplacedbeforethe

Presidentassoonastheyarrived,aswaseveryotherbackchannelmessagefrom

Smith.



IreviewedallthiswithNixonontheridebacktotheKremlinfromthe

dacha.IdidnotthinktheissueofsilodimensionswasreadyforaPresidential

decision.WewouldfirsthavetoseeifandhowtheSovietswouldslideoff

Brezhnev’ssuggestions;iftheyslidoffthem,weshouldtrytonaildownanagreed

definitionof“significant”asmeaning10to15percent;aunilateralstatement,as

thedelegationhadsuggested,wouldinmyviewbeunenforceable.Onlyifthe

SovietsprovedadamantinmaintainingtheHelsinkipositionwouldthePresident

havetoinvolvehimself.



ItwasdifferentwiththeSLBMs.Therewasnodisputethatitwasinour

interesttobringaboutthedismantlingofthelargestnumberofolderSoviet

missiles.Butitwasalsoimportantto keepinmindtherealitiesofournegotiating

position.IfweexcludedSLBMs,asSmithproposed,wewouldwindupwitha

theoreticalSovietcapabilitytoproduceatleast200moremodernSLB Msthan

werepermittedundertheagreement(onthebasisoftheeightsubmarinesunder

constructioneachyear,whichhadbeentheSovietprogramforthepastfive

years).Inaddition,theywouldkeepallofthe209olderICBMsandninetyold

SLBMs.Strikingatoughposewaseasyenough.Thepracticalquestionwashow

wecouldpossiblybebetteroffwithnoSLBMfreezeandupto500additional

Sovietmissileswhen,nomatterwhattheoutcomeinMoscow,ourJointChiefsof

StaffwereopposedtoanynewAmericansubmarinebuildingprogramduringthe

five‐yearlifetimeoftheproposedagreement.



Inordertoavoidtheimpossiblenumbersgameofagreeingonhow many

submarinestheSovietsactuallyhad,thehighlyesotericdebatesaboutwhat

constitutedasubmarineactually“under construction,”andthedisputeoverhow

manywereintheD‐classandY‐class,mystaffandI hadworkedoutadifferent

approach.WeestablishedprioritiesamongtheSovietmissileswewantedtohave

dismantled,andthensubtractedthesefromthepermittedtotalof950.Wewould

thenexpressthe“baseline”innumbersofmissilesratherthanofsubmarines.Of

themosturgentpriorit yweretheseventyolderSS‐7ICBMslocatedin“hardened”

silos.Thesehadverylargethrowweightand,intheirsilos,aconsiderable

invulnerability;iftheywerenotdismantled,theymighteventuallybemodernized

andaddconsiderablytoSovietcapabilities.Nextinpriorityweretheroughly135

SS‐7andSS‐8ICBMson“soft”launchpads.Theirvulnerabilitymadethem

dangerousasfirst‐strikeweaponsandtheirthrowweightgavethemconsiderable

potentialfordestruction.ThethirdprioritywerethemissilesinH‐class

submarines,numberingaboutthirty.Theirrange(900miles)wasrelativelyshort,

butthesubmarinewasnuclearandthereforecapableofsustainedoperations.

ThelowestpriorityfordestructionwerethesixtymissilesonoldG‐class

submarines.Theirrangewasshort(300to700miles);theG‐classwasdiesel‐

poweredandnoisyandhadlimitedendurance.Itwasimprobablethatacountry

possessing1,500ICBMsandnearly1,000modernSLBMswouldcartsixtyshort‐

rangemissilesacrosstheAtlantic oneasilydetectedsubmarinesthathadto 

surfacebeforetheycouldfire.Infact,noG‐classsubmarinehadoperatedoffour

shoressince1966.



TheproposalIputbeforeNixononthetripbacktotheKremlinwasto

establishthebaselineat740“modern”SLBMs,beyondwhichtheSovietswould

havetostarttradinginoldmissiles.ThiswouldforcetheSovietsto destroyallof

theirolderICBMsiftheywantedtoreachtheagreedSLBMtotalof950.We

wouldtheninsistthatthebaselineof740includeallofthethirtymissilesonthe

H‐classsubmarines,givingtheSovietsthechoiceoftradingtheminlateror

countingthemagainstthe950ceiling.WewoulddothebestwecouldwiththeG‐

class,butIwarnedNixonthatwemighthavetocomebacktohimforfurther

decisions.Nixonsaidhewouldthinkaboutthisapproachandletmeknowbefore

IleftforthemeetingwithGromyko,scheduledtotakeplaceattheForeign

Ministry.



WhenIreturnedtotheNSCofficeintheKremlin,Ifoundthatourdomestic

basewasindangerofcollapsing.OnMay24BernardGwertzmanoftheNewYork

Timeshadbeentherecipientofamajorleakthatenabledhimtogivethebasic

numbersunderdiscussionatHelsinkiandinMoscow.Suddenlyallhellbroke

loose.SenatorsGoldwaterandJacksonreactedwithexpressionsofgrave

concern.Aconservativerevoltloomed.Thecanardthatwehad“conceded”

numericalsuperioritytotheSovietsmadeitsfirstappearance.TheJointChiefs,

Haigreported,weregettingrestless;theywereclosetoabandoningtheposition

whichtheyhadendorsedbeforeourdeparture,andwhichincludedmostoftheir

urgentrecommendations.



Theargumentabout“conceding”numericalinequalitywasdueeithertoa

misunderstandingortodemagoguery.Inequalitystemmedinthefirstinstance

fromourpredecessors’decisiontorespondtotheSovietbuildupnotby

increasingthenumberoflaunchersbutbyaugmentingourwarheadsthrough

MIRVs.TheJohnsonAdministrationhadhadastrategicdoctrineof“assured

destruction.”Abandoningcounterforce,itcalculatedourprogramonthebasisof

ourabilitytoinflictindustrialandciviliandamage.So longasSovietaccuracies

werepoorandtheyhadnoMIRVs—sothatourICBMswerevirtually

invulnerable—ourstrategiccapacitywasnotimpairedbythesizeoftheSoviet

force;hence,duringtheSovietbuildupoftheSixtieswedidnotaddtoour

missiles.EventheMIRVsweredevelopednotasananswertotheSoviets’missile

programbutasaripostetotheirABM.Wehadthenmadea deliberatedecision

toconcentrateonanewsubmarineprogram,theTrident,ratherthanproduce

moreofourexistingsubmarines.Sinceittakesfromsixtonineyearstodevelop

newweapons,theNixonAdministrationwasinaseriousbindintheearly

Seventies,madeworsewhentheCongresseachyearopposednewstrategic

programsandcutthedefensebudgetevenbelowtheminimumlevelsproposed

bytheAdministration.Thefreezeinoffensiveweaponshadbeenfirsturgedby

DeputyDefenseSecretaryPackardinthesummerof1970tokeeptheexisting

numericalgapagainstusfromgrowing.IthadbeenrequestedagainbySecretary

LairdinhismemorandumofJanuary18,1972,asbeingesse ntialtogiveusthe

opportunitytoredressthestrategicbalance.Ithadbeenknowntobeunder

negotiationsinceMay1971withoutanysortofprotest.Ifweabortedthe

negotiationsnow,thenumericalgapwouldwiden.Theagreementathandwould

maketheSovietsreducetheirnumbers.Noprogramweweredeve lopingwould

beaffectedbythefive‐yearfreeze.Wehadnochoiceexcepttoproceed.



TheseweretheconsiderationsIputtoNixon,whomIfoundstretchedout

onamassagetableafterourreturnfromthedachaaroundoneinthemorning.

HewashavinghisbacktreatedbyDr.KennethRiland,who,forhismagicin

treatingsorebacksandrelievingsymptomsoftension,wasoneofthemore

valuablemembersofthePresidentialentourage.Myexplanationsrequired

considerablecircumlocutionbecauseNixonrefusedtousethebabbler,andwe

couldbesurethattheSovietswerelisteningin.Idoubtthatmyevasionsfooled

many.InanyeventitcoulddonodamagefortheSovietleaderstorealizethat

ourdomesticoppositionsetlimitstoourflexibility.(Wouldthatsuchalimitation

hadbeenequallyapparenttoouropponentsinHanoi!)



Lyingnakedontherubbingtable,Nixonmadeoneofthemorecourageous

decisionsofhisPresidency.Indangeroflosingthesupportoftheright,whichhe

consideredhisessentialbase,facedbyaSALTnegotiatorrecommendingthathe

dropsubmarinelimitsfromthenegotiation,andwiththeJointChiefsofStaff

wobbling,Nixonhadthestrengthofpurpose—after thegruelingVietnamsession

atthedacha—toordermetoproceedalong thelinesIhadoutlined.Forallhe

knew,nobodywouldsupporttheapproachoffreezingbothICBMsandSLBMs.

Nevertheless,hetoldmeto ignorePentagonobjectionsiftheywentbeyond

previouslyagreedpositions,andtostandfirmagainstSmith.Hewouldnotbe

swayedbypoliticsathome;andhewouldnotbepushedbytheSovietsbeyond

whatIhadsuggested.Nixontookaheroicpositionfromadecidedlyunheroic

posture.



BeforeleavingfortheForeignMinistry,IsentasharpcabletoHaigtelling

himofthePresident’sdecision.Hisjobwastorallysupport,notsimplyto

transmitconcerns.Heshould,intheprocess,asktheJointChiefsandDeputy

DefenseSecretaryRushaboutSmith’sproposaltodropSLBMsfromthe

agreement.



Thusprepared,IatlastfacedGromykoat1:15a.m.intheStalinist‐style

wedding‐cakeskyscraperthathousestheSovietForeignMinistryinseedy

opulence.GromykowasaccompaniedbyapersonalitynewtoallAmericans

present.HewasintroducedasDeputyPremierL.V.Smirnov.ThoughBrezhnev

hadmentionedhisnameduringdinnerIdidnotknowexactlywhohewas.It

requiredanexchangeofnoteswithmycolleaguesSonnenfeldt andHylandto

determinethatheheldthepositionofchairmanoftheSovietMilitary‐Industrial

Commission,aParty‐stateorganizationinchargeofalldefenseindustries.

Smirnovturnedouttobebullet‐headed,heavyset,andbrilliant;hemadeitclear

thatonlysuperiororderscouldhavelandedhimnowinapositionthatsoseverely

taxedhislimitedresourcesofself‐control.GivenSovietsecurityconsciousness,it

isdoubtfulthathehadmetmanyforeigners.Surelyhehadnevernegotiatedwith

potentialadversaries.Mystyleofeasybanteratfirstdrovehimupthewall;itwas

clearlyinconsistentwithhisimageofthesolemnityoftheoccasion.WhenI

starteddescribingthecharacteristicsofSovietweapons,Smirnov’sirritation

turnedtofrenzy.Itwasnotcompletelyclearwhetherhewasappalledthata

capitalistshouldknowsomanydetailsoftheSovietweaponsprogram,orthathis

owncolleagues—including probablyGromyko—werelearningfrommewhatthe

Sovietsystemhadsuccessfullykeptfromthem.Whateverthereason,Smirnov

becamesoangrythatGromykohadtotakehimoutoftheroomandcalmhim

down.Whenthemeetingreassembled—bywhichpointitwas2:30—Ipickedup

whereIhadleftoff,producinganotheroutburstaswellastheneedforyet

anotherrecess.Yetaftertheculturalshockhadwornoff,SmirnovandIgotalong

famously.HeturnedouttobeoneoftheablestandmostintelligentSoviet

leaderswithwhomIdealt.Oncehehadgraspedthatpomposityisnota

prerequisitefordiplomacy,heexhibite dawickedsenseofhumor.



Inthatlate‐nightsession,however,wefacedtheproblemthatSmirnov

kneweverythingaboutweaponsandlittle aboutdiplomacy,whileofGromyko—

notyetaPolitburomember—exactlytheoppositewastrue.Hisskillwas

diplomacy;hisbriefingonweaponssystemhadobviouslybeenrudimentary.He

couldputforwardtheofficialSovietpositionbutnotnegotiateit;thiswasatask

lefttoSmirnovandme.Gromykofoundhimselfintheunusualpositionofmaking

soothingnoiseswhenevermattersbetweenmeand Smirnovthreatenedtoget

outofcontrol.



Tobeginwith,Gromykowasinaframeofminddourevenbyhisstandards.

Foronhimfellthepainfuldutyofwithdrawingalmosteverythingputforwardby

BrezhnevduringhismeetingwithNixonthepreviousday.Hehandledit

masterfullybypassingaroundpapersthatsummeduptheallegedstateofplayon

variousissues—allofthematvariancewithBrezhnev’sposition.Heavoidedany

comparisonwithwhatBrezhnevhadsaid;heleftthediscoveryofany

discrepanciestome.OnepaperstatedthatthedistancebetweenABMsites

wouldbe1,300kilometers.Anotherpaperspokeofbanning“significant”changes

insilodimensionsbutmadenoreferencetomissilevolumenordefinedtheterm

“significant.”OnSLBMsGromykogavemethestandardSovietposition

establishingforty‐eightmodernsubmarinesastheSovietbaseline.Isawthe

differencesimmediatelyandputGromykothroughhispacesoverthem;thiswas

lessinthehopethathemightgobackonthem—whichwasnotpossible,given

therealitiesoftheSovietweaponsprogram—thaninthehopeofplacinghimon

thedefensiveandtoallowmetowasteenoughtimetoavoidaserious

negotiationinmygeneralstate offatigue.IneedledtheSovietsaboutthechange

intheirposition,askingclarifyingquestionsandprofessingastonishmentand

outragethatastatementbytheGeneralSecretarywasnotconclusive.Allthis

tookupthebetterpartofthemeetingandestablishedtheprinciplethatthe

Sovietsowedussomething.



Gromyko’sformulationswereareturntoorthodoxy.AsIhavepointedout

already,thedifferenceof200kilometersonthedistancebetweenABMsiteswas

notimportant;eventuallyIwouldyieldonthat,butnotwithoutestablishingsome

claimtoreciprocity.WithrespecttosilodimensionsIwasdeterminedto

transformourdelega tion’snonbindingunilateralstatementintoabindingmutual

definition.ButmymajorconcernwastogettheSovietstodismantlethelargest

possiblenumberoflaunche rsaspartoftheSLBMfreeze.



ToachievethisIhadtwoassets.ThediscrepancybetweenwhatBrezhnev

hadsaidandwhatGromykonowputforwardwasthefirst.Second,Brezhnevhad

indicatedatthedachathathewaseagertosigntheSALTagreementonFriday

evening(bythenonlythirty‐sixhoursaway)andallSovietofficialswouldtakethis

asafirmdirective.ItwasnotNixonbutBrezhnevwhowasunderpres surewith

respecttoSALT.Apartfromtheself‐imposeddeadline,hehadpermittedthe

summittoproceeddespitethebombingandminingofNorthVietnam.Hehad

purgedShelestfromthePolitburo.He,muchmorethanNixon,whohadachieved

histriumphsimplybyarrivinginMoscow,neededasuccess.AsinPeking,I

thereforesloweddowntheprocessofnegotiationstotestwhosenerveswould

provetobestronger.(Iwasarmed,inanyevent,byNixon’scommenttome—

providedhereallymeantit—thathewaspre paredtoleaveMoscowwithouta

SALTagreement.)



Aroundthreeinthemorningwhentherewasnotimeleftforreal

negotiationIintroducedanoutlineofourpositionwithabaselineof740SLBM

launchers.BeforeSmirnovcouldexplodeathirdtime,IlettheSovietswinoneby

confirmingourdelegation’sacceptanceof1,300kilometersasthedistance

betweenABMsites.Gromykomercifullyputanendtothemeetingbydryly

suggestingthatitwasgettingtobeeithertooearlyortoolate.Weleftitthatwe

wouldmeetagaininsixhours’timetoresolvetheremainingdifferences.



IreturnedtotheKremlinaround4:00a.m.InlatespringatthatNorthern

latitude,thefirstraysofsunlightwerefallingonitsgoldendomes,ochrewalls,

andredbrickbattlements. BelowmeinthestillnesslayMoscow,mergingintothe

GreatRussianplainwithnonaturalobstacletointerruptone’sgaze.Inthesilence

ofthatearlymorningIwalkedthroughthevast,emptysquaresoftheKremlin,

seizedbyoneofthoseraremomentsofhopethatmakestheendlessstruggle

withthecontingentendurableforstatesmen.Thoughwewerenotyetagreed,

thetoneofthemeetingmadeitlikelythatwewouldbeabletonegotiat eatreaty

withintheguidelinesapprovedbyNixon.Therewasachancethatwewere

participatinginaneventthatwouldgivemankindabreathingspace,andwith

luckstartaprocessthatcouldleadtoamoretranquilfuture.

