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(andunanswerable)thequestionofwhoorwhatisinfluencingtheiractions.For
Bourdieu,tolimitsocialscientificobservationtothepointofviewofagentsisto
treatagentsasinstrumentsofknowledge,leavingunexaminedtheobjective
structuresthathaveproducedthisknowledge.Hisultimateaimisnottogive
prioritytotheexplanationofthesocialscientistorthesocialactor,butto
apprehendthelimitsimposedonscientificknowledgeitself.InBourdieu’sview,
theselimitsdonotoriginateinsociallydeterminedsubjects,whetherinformants
orsocialanalysts,butinthesocialdeterminantsofdifferentformsofsocial
practice,includingsociologyitself.
NiklasLuhmannoffersaradicallydifferentviewofsociety,althoughlikeLatour
heconceivesofcontemporarysocietyintermsofcomplexitiesand
contingenciesratherthanasthesocialtotality(albeitbasedinstruggle)impliedin
Bourdieu’swork.ForbothLatourandLuhmann,thereisnooverarching,
integratingspacefromwherethedevelopmentofsocietycanbemeasuredor
coordinated.Luhmannelaboratesaviewofsocietythatisstructuredaccording
toaprincipleoffunctionaldifferentiation(Luhmann1985,1995,2006).The
worldisconstitutedbyamultiplicityoffunctionalsystems(e.g.law,finearts,
science,education,media)andwhathereferstoastheenvironments,
inhabitedbyhumansandnonhumansalike,thatsurroundthem.Incontrastto
Latour,however,Luhmann’stheoryreduceshumanindividualstomere
observers.Althoughsocialsystemsinteractwithenvironments,theyremain
essentiallyfreefromtheinfluenceofhumanactors.Functionalsystemsare
operationallyclosedandincommensurable;theyestablishandreproduce
themselvesautopoietically–i.e.theyareselfreferentialandselforganized–
drawingonpastandpresentresourcesfortheircontinuedexistence.
Interactionsbetweensystemandenvironment,whilstleavingthesystem’s
operationalclosureintact,can,however,setoffperturbationsorirritations,
whichmayprecipitatechangesinthesystem’sbehaviour.
CentraltoLuhmann’stheorizationofthesocialarehisviewsonmeaningand
whathereferstoascommunications.Drawingonphenomenology,Luhmann
suggeststhatsocialsystemsoperateinasimilarwayashumanmindsor
intentionalsubjects;theyprocessinformationalinputfromtheworldintheform
ofutterancesandthenselectwhatismeaningful.ForLuhmann,socialsystems
alsoprocessmeaningsselectively,effectivelyproducingthemselvesinand
throughcommunicationsjustasmindsproducethemselvesthroughthoughts.
Importantly,however,mindsandsystemsarekeptapartinLuhmann’sworld;
communicationsproduceonlycommunications.Communicationsproduce
themselvesbyencodinginbinarytermsothercommunicationsperceivedas
relevanttothesystem–forexample,intranslation,thehistoricalsource/target,
literal/freedichotomies–anddiscardingothersasmereirritations,unlessthese
areimportantenoughtoforcethesystemtoadjustitscodingorientations.Social
systemsdeveloprulesandregularitiessuchthat,intime,theybecomestructured
inpredictableways.Patternsofexpectationsbecomeestablishedwhich,
togetherwithhighlevelsofefficiencyandspecialization,allowthatsystemto
furtherdistinguishitselffromanother–thuscontributingtoandmaintainingboth
theirfunctionaldifferentiationandthecomplexcharacterofmodernsociety.
Translationscholarshaveexploredtherelevanceofthesetheoriestothefieldof
translationandinterpretinginanumberofways.Theseincludetherelationship
between,forexample,translatoragencyandsocialstructure,historical,social
andcognitiveprocesses,humanandnonhumanactors,andtranslation
products,processesandrelationsofpower.Theworkofthesetheoristshas
contributedtotheendeavourtomaketranslatorsandinterpretersmorevisible,
orinthecaseofLuhmann,invisibleassocialactors.Ithasalsoinformedthe
conceptualization,atboththetheoreticalandmethodologicallevel,ofempirical
researchdesignedtoexaminetranslationactivity,includingtraining,inthe
contextsofitsoccurrence.Bourdieu’swork,themostwidelydiscussedwithin
thefield,hasbeenappliedtoarangeofempiricalandtheoreticalissuesfrom
literaryandnonliterarytranslationtosignlanguageandpublicservice
interpreting(Simeoni1998;Gouanvic1997,1999,2001;Inghilleri2003,
2005a;Wolf2006;seealsothecollectionofarticlesinHeilbronandSapiro
2002;Inghilleri2005b).Latour’sActorNetworkTheoryhasbeentakenup
particularly,