Woodward D. Lloyd George and the Generals

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LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS

Frontispiece. David Lloyd George: his hair, which he allowed to grow long, rapidly

turned white during the war.

LLOYD GEORGE AND THE

GENERALS

David R.Woodward

Marshall University, Huntington, West Virginia

FRANK CASS

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published in 2004

by Frank Cass

11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada

by Frank Cass

29 West 35

Street, New York, NY 10001

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.

“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands

of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

Frank Cass is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available

from the British Library

ISBN 0-203-01013-2 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-7146-5507-4 (Print Edition)

ISSN 1465–8499

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

a catalog record for this book is available

from the Library of Congress

introduced into a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means,

electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior

written permission of the publisher of this book.

Contents

List of Illustrations vi

Preface vii

Preface to the New Edition x

Series Editor’s Preface xii

1 Birth of an “Easterner” 1

2 Balkanite 13

3 Munitions, Compulsion, and the Fall of Serbia 34

4 “Westerners” in the Ascendancy: The Somme Offensive 60

5 Wizard in the War Office 85

6 Lloyd George Attempts to Overthrow the Generals 104

7 The Nivelle Offensive 122

8 Passchendaele: The Rack of Choice 150

9 Strain 182

10 The Supreme War Council and British Military Plans for 1918 214

11 Command of the Allied General Reserve and the Fall of Robertson 248

12 The German Offensive and the Maurice Debate 278

13 The Uncertain Road to Victory 307

Bibliography 342

Index 350

List of Illustrations

Frontispiece. David Lloyd George ii

A section of the Hindenburg Line 8

Lloyd George watching the operation of a wire-cutting tractor 40

George V.Queen Mary, and Sir Douglas Haig in Abbeville, 1917 64

Sir Douglas Haig and General Sir Henry Rawlinson at Fourth Army

headquarters on the eve of the Somme offensive

Albert Thomas looks on as Lloyd George expresses his doubts to Sir

Douglas Haig and General Joffre about the use of cavalry in trench warfare

Lloyd George and Lord Reading watch a bombardment during the Somme

offensive

Lloyd George in the trenches 95

Lloyd George inspects the grave of a British soldier 164

Sir William Robertson and Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice at the

Paris inter-Allied conference in July 1917

184

Passchendaele in October 1917 207

“Ugly” Wilson and the British section of the Supreme War Council at

Versailles in January 1918

237

Preface

The British victory in World War I, achieved at immense human and material cost,

failed to create a better world and led to widespread disillusionment. Had victory

been worth the ghastly slaughter, and of equal importance, had the war been

conducted along right lines? Scapegoating flourished in Britain as both civil and

military leaders censured their rivals about their alleged blunders. Chief among

the combatants were David Lloyd George and the generals, who resumed their

wartime disputes in the publishing houses. This war of paper bullets had begun

almost as soon as the guns fell silent, with the liberal editor A.G.Gardiner initiating

the fray on November 30 with an article in the Daily News headlined “MR.

LLOYD GEORGE AND UNITY OF COMMAND: A LEGEND AND THE

TRUTH,” which attempted to strike down the notion that Lloyd George had “won

the war.” The generals and their sympathizers soon followed Gardiner into print

with polemical accounts of Lloyd George’s role in the war. The view that the

generals had won the war in spite of Lloyd George was canonized in the British

official history of the war compiled by BrigadierGeneral James E.Edmonds. To

be sure, Lloyd George had his defenders. None proved more one-sided than the

Welshman himself, who portrayed the generals in his memoirs as inept and stupid.

Nor has time stilled the passions aroused by Britain’s deadliest war. Witness the

angry reaction to the simplistic musical, Oh, What a Lovely War, which

characterized the military authorities as callous butchers, and the running battle

between John Terraine, the staunch defender of the “Westerner” Sir Douglas Haig,

and the late Captain Liddell Hart and his disciples, apostles of indirect strategy.

Too rarely have these often partisan accounts added to our understanding of the

how and why of decisions affecting the lives of tens of thousands of British

soldiers. Considerable literature exists on both Lloyd George and the higher

direction of the Great War, yet access to many private and official papers sealed

until the mid-1960s or later permits a fresh and more balanced look at Lloyd

George’s controversial role in military affairs and his frequently antagonistic

relationship with the British high command, which his “Eastern” or indirect

strategy exacerbated. The wealth of new material makes possible a detailed

description of how civil and military authorities grappled with the problems of

fighting a world war which centered around a great land war against Germany.

That misjudgments abounded is understandable. The magnitude and complexity

of events often overwhelmed the participants. Lloyd George, his civilian

colleagues, and the generals were no exception. The record underscores their

fallibility and reaffirms that the war posed few questions with simple, easy

answers.

That record has largely been reconstructed from diverse primary sources: the

contemporary press, Parliamentary Debates, the private papers, published diaries

and memoirs of those involved in formulating and executing military policy, and

the voluminous records of the Cabinet Papers. For the first time, an important

chapter in the distinguished and often turbulent career of one of Britain’s greatest

prime ministers can be given the comprehensive study it deserves. Also, new

evidence unearthed either clarifies or answers persistent questions concerning the

Calais conference, the Maurice debate, Lloyd George’s Balkanite strategy, the

government’s commitment to the Somme and Passchendaele offensives, Sir

William Robertson’s downfall, the government’s manpower policies, the creation

of a Supreme War Council and generalissimo, and other important topics. The

story, as it unfolds, examines the influence of the monarchy and press on the

decision-making process, and, from a wider perspective, weighs the difficult

relationship between the civil and military authorities in a democracy at war.

Where did the responsibility of the British civil authorities end in the conduct of

a total war which involved all elements of the nation? Where did the authority of

the soldiers begin?

This is narrative history for which I make no apologies. As A.J.P.Taylor once

observed, “After all, the distinguishing mark of history is that events happen in

order of time. How else can you present them?”

I am very much in the debt of the many individuals who assisted me in the

researching and writing of this book. The staffs of British libraries and archives

in which I worked and Miss Josephine Fidler, the acquisitions librarian of Marshall

University library, could not have been more helpful. Mrs. Margaret Gerke and

Mrs. Juanita Harold assisted me in typing the manuscript. Dr. Alan Gould, Dr.

Robert Maddox, Dr. Donna Spindel, and Dr. Michael Galgano, colleagues of mine

in the History Department at Marshall University, read and commented on some

of the chapters. Dr. Trevor Wilson of the University of Adelaide must be singled

out for special recognition. His extensive comment on my manuscript saved me

from some embarrassing gaffes and prodded me to rethink some of my

conclusions. The same can be said of Dr. Stuart Kaufman of the University of

Maryland, who read the entire manuscript. Fred Woodward, the director of the

Regent’s Press of Kansas, counseled me in various important ways. Any errors in

fact or interpretation, of course, are my responsibility. I am also most appreciative

of the summer grants-in-aid, sabbatical, and funds for typing given me by Marshall

University. Finally, I am grateful to my wife, Martha, for her encouragement,

understanding, and keen proofreading eye, and to my daughter, Catherine, for her

ready acceptance of a new environment in an English school and a flat in

Wimbledon while I completed my research.

viii

Facets of the manuscript have previously been published in Albion, The

Historian, and the Canadian Journal of History and appear here by permis sion.

I have made every effort to avoid infringing upon the copyright of any individual

or institution and regret any possible oversight in this regard. For permission to

quote materials to which they hold copyright, I wish to thank the following: the

government archives, Pretoria, South Africa; the British Library; the Public

Record Office; the India Office Library and Records; the Trustees of the Liddell

Hart Centre for Military Archives; the New College Library; the House of Lords

Record Office; the Imperial War Museum; the Beaverbrook Foundation; the

Bodleian Library; A.J.P.Taylor; representatives of the Spears and Robertson

families; Lord Scarsdale; Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II; Mark Bonham Carter;

Vice Admiral Sir lan Hogg; Lord Hankey; Lord Haig; Lord Esher; Andrew

Rawlinson; Lord Derby; and Major C.J.Wilson.

I also acknowledge my indebtedness to Anthony Sheil Associates, Ltd., in

respect of quotations from The Fifth Army by General Sir Hubert Gough; to David

Higham Associates, Ltd., in respect of quotations from Lloyd George: A Diary by

Frances Stevenson, edited by A.J.P.Taylor; to Wells Gardner, Darton & Co., Ltd.,

which currently holds the copyright for Ivor Nicholson & Watson, Ltd., in respect

of quotations from Lord Riddell’s War Diary, 1914–1918; and to William Collins

Sons & Co., Ltd., in respect of quotations from Politicians and the War, 1914–

1916 and Men and Power, 1917–1918 by Lord Beaverbrook.

Finally, I thank the Imperial War Museum for permission to reproduce the

photographs that appear on these pages.