Woodward D. Lloyd George and the Generals
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How ironic it is that in the final analysis Lloyd George was paralyzed by the
very power he sought to control the military. It is perhaps fair to speculate what
the Welshman’s s position in June and July would have been if Asquith had still
held the reins of power. Lloyd George would almost certainly have roundly
condemned the prime minister for not standing up to Haig and Robertson and
vetoing the offensive. He would have been contemptuous of the argument that the
civilians could not overrule the generals on strategic questions when the life and
limb of tens of thousands of soldiers from Britain and the empire were at stake. It
is significant that no decision of the war was to cause him more regret. As he
admits in his memoirs, “it is one of the bitter ironies of war that I, who have been
ruthlessly assailed in books, in the Press and in speeches for ‘interfering with the
soldiers’ should carry with me as my most painful regret the memory that on this
issue I did not justify that charge.”
100
It will probably always be argued whether the decision to launch the
Passchendaele offensive was a case of Greek tragedy, or the tragedy of necessity,
where one laments, “What a pity it had to be this way,” or of Christian tragedy,
the tragedy of possibility, where one says, “What a pity it was this way when it
might have been otherwise.”
NOTES
1. Memorandum by Hankey, April 18, 1917, CAB 63/20.
2. Esher Diary, April 20, 1917, 2119.
3. Hankey, Supreme Command, 2:625–26.
4. Robertson to Haig, April 20, 1917, Robertson MSS, I/23/21.
5. Haig to Robertson, April 29 and 30, 1917, Robertson MSS, I/23/25, and I/14/78.
6. Robertson to Haig, April 30, 1917, Haig MSS, no. 112.
7. Cabinet Paper G.T. 594 of April 30, 1917, CAB 24/11.
8. At this juncture, Smuts used his considerable prestige to support the professionals
against the amateurs and their “interference” in strategy. When he sent his
appreciation of the situation to Robertson, he noted: “I hope what I have said may
be of some help to you so far as the War Cabinet is concerned.” Unhappy with
France’s previous domination of strategy in the West, Smuts found Haig’s plan
appealing because it was free of French interference and served special British
interests. However, unlike Haig, he did not believe a breakthrough possible and he
regretted “that the British forces have been so entirely absorbed” by the battle for
France. But with Britain’s allies wavering, he believed that Britain must keep the
pressure on the German army and avoid gambles in the outlying theaters. He hoped
that the pounding of German defenses might destroy the will of the enemy. Alas, as
Smuts admitted, “victory in this kind of warfare is the costliest possible to the victor.”
See Smuts to Robertson, April 29, 1917, Robertson MSS, 1/21/64, Cabinet Paper
G.T. 597 of April 29, 1917, CAB 24/11, and Rawlinson Diary, April 8, 1917, 1/7.
9. War Cabinet (128A), May 1, 1917, CAB 23/13.
10. Ibid.
11. Haig Diary, May 3, 1917, no. 113.
LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS 177
12. Cabinet Paper G.T. 657 of May 5, 1917, CAB 24/12.
13. Anglo-French Conference, May 4–5, 1917, CAB 28/2/I.C.-21.
14. At both Anglo-French conferences in London to discuss Nivelle’s plans, Haig had
made clear his intention to Nivelle and the British ministers that he planned to return
to his Flanders operation if the French failed to achieve their objectives. More
recently, on May 1, he sent a memorandum to the War Cabinet suggesting that his
northern operation be implemented. There is, however, no record of the War Cabinet
discussing his memorandum. See Terraine, Road to Passchendaele, pp. 1–84,
Hankey’s memorandum prepared for the prime minister, “The Development of the
Military Plans of the Allies in the Principal Theatres of War During 1917,” Cabinet
Paper G.T. 1925 of September 1, 1917, CAB 24/25, and memorandum by Haig, May
1, 1917, Derby MSS, 920 (17).
15. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 1:927.
16. Repington, First World War, 1914–1918, 1:559.
17. Cabinet Committee on War Policy (10), June 21, 1917, CAB 27/6.
18. War Cabinet (124), April 23, 1917, CAB 23/1.
19. Cabinet Papers, G.T. 606 of May 1, and G.T. 657 of May 5, 1917, CAB 24/12.
20. Repington, First World War, 1914–1918, 1:560.
21. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 2:1258.
22. Robertson to Lloyd George (Esher to Robertson, May 11, 1917, inclosed), May 13,
1917, Lloyd George MSS, F/44/3/12.
23. Robertson to Haig, May 14, 1917, Haig MSS, no. 113.
24. Richard M.Watt, Dare Call It Treason (1963), p. 182.
25. Paul Painlevé, Comment J’ai Nommé Foch et Pétain (1923), pp. 129–50.
26. William Henry Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, vol. 1:1917–1918, From the
Overthrow of the Czar to the Assumption of Power by the Bolsheviks (paperback
edn., 1965), p. 239.
27. War Cabinet (135A), May 9, 1917, CAB 23/13.
28. Cabinet Paper G.T. 703 of May 12, 1917, CAB 24/13.
29. Cabinet Paper G.T. 831 of May 20, 1917, CAB 24/14.
30. See Robertson’s appreciation of the situation in Cabinet Paper G.T. 678 of May 9,
1917, CAB 24/12.
31. Cabinet Paper G.T. 703 of May 12, 1917, CAB 24/13. Curzon had earlier warned
the subcommittee of the Imperial War Cabinet on territorial desiderata in the terms
of peace that if Britain’s allies failed to achieve their war objectives, “they might
press us to give up our oversea conquests in order to help them out of their
difficulties.” Subcommittee of Imperial War Cabinet (4), April 23, 1917, CAB 21/77.
32. Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen, 2:143. Also see War Cabinet (134), May 8, 1917,
CAB 23/2.
33. Captain S.W.Roskill, ‘The U-Boat Campaign of 1917 and Third Ypres,” Journal of
the Royal United Service Institution 104 (November 1959): 440–42. Roskill makes
the telling point that if the ports had been taken, the subs would have moved
elsewhere and continued their undersea assault. Furthermore, there were other, less
costly ways of shutting down these submarine bases.
34. See Cabinet Paper G.T. 497 of April 18, 1917, CAB 24/10. Fears over surface
warships using the Belgian ports proved to be unfounded.
35. See Haig Diary, May 7, 1917, and Haig to Nivelle, May 5, 1917, Haig MSS, no.
113; also see Haig to Robertson, May 16, 1917, W.P. 1, CAB 27/7.
178 PASSCHENDAELE: THE RACK OF CHOICE
36. Wilson to Haig, May 20, 1917, Haig MSS, no. 113.
37. Wilson Diary, June 2, 1917.
38. Bonham-Carter, Soldier True, p. 251.
39. Repington, First World War, 1914–1918, 1:571.
40. Haig Diary, May 18, 1917, no. 113.
41. War Cabinet (144), May 23, 1917, CAB 23/2.
42. Haig Diary, June 2, 1917, no. 114.
43. Wilson Diary, June 4, 1917.
44. See Robertson to Haig, April 28, 1917, Robertson MSS, I/23/23, and Robertson to
Haig, May 17, 1917, Haig MSS, no. 113. For a defense of Haig’s actions, see
Terraine, Haig: Educated Soldier, pp. 296–305.
45. Repington, First World War, 1914–1918, 1:571.
46. Wilson Diary, June 8, 1917.
47. Ibid.
48. “Conference held at Abbeville on the 7th June, 1917, between General Foch and
General Sir William Robertson,” W.O. 106/1513.
49. Haig Diary, June 9–10, no. 114.
50. Robertson to Haig, March 8, 1916, Robertson MSS, I/22/30. When Robertson told
the ministers of his conference with Foch at Abbeville, he gave no indication that
he had seen merit in assisting the Italians. He only indicated that the Italians might
soon launch an attack. Cabinet Committee on War Policy (1), June 11, 1917, CAB
27/6.
51. War Cabinet (159), June 8, 1917, CAB 23/3.
52. War Cabinet (156), June 6, 1917, CAB 23/3.
53. “Note by Milner,” June 7, 1917, War Cabinet (159A), June 8, 1917, CAB 23/16.
54. See Cabinet Paper G.T. 744 of May 17, 1917, CAB 24/13.
55. Repington, First World War, 1914–1918, 1:581, and memorandum by General
Bridges, June 14, 1917, W.P. 5, CAB 27/7.
56. Rennell Rodd to Lloyd George (notes of Cure’s conversation with Cadorna, June 2,
1917, inclosed), June 5, 1917, Lloyd George MSS, F/56/1/41.
57. Wilson’s statement is a poor reflection of his character. He knew that Foch and Pétain
opposed Haig’s strategy but did not say so. Opposed himself to Haig’s “insane” plan,
he favored detaching Bulgaria and Turkey. Wilson Diary, June 8, 1917.
58. War Cabinet (159A), June 8, 1917, CAB 23/16.
59. Ibid. (156), June 6, 1917, CAB 23/3. Also see Cabinet Paper G.T. 938 of June 5,
1917, CAB 24/15.
60. War Cabinet (159A), June 8, 1917, CAB 23/16.
61. Memorandum by Hankey, April 18, 1917, CAB 63/20.
62. Cabinet Paper G.T. 965 of June 7, 1917, CAB 24/15.
63. If divisional pioneer battalions are included, the reduction would be from 13 to 10
battalions.
64. Robertson to Haig, May 26, 1917, Haig MSS, no. 113, and Haig to Robertson, May
28, 1917, Robertson MSS, I/23/28.
65. There is conflicting testimony on this point. Robertson, as noted here, talked of
Britain winning “the war by herself.” Moreover, in his statement before the Cabinet
Committee on War Policy on June 19, Haig seemed to indicate that he would be
satisfied if the French, rather than launching vigorous infantry attacks, restricted
their activities largely to a prolonged artillery barrage which would mystify the
LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS 179
enemy and force him to keep reserves in the French sector. Terraine, however, points
to Haig’s memorandum of June 12, which indicated that he expected help from the
French and perhaps even from the Russians. See Terraine, Road to Passchendaele,
pp. 131–35.
66. See Rennell Rodd to Lloyd George (notes of Cure’s conversation with Cadorna,
June 2, 1917, inclosed), June 5, 1917, Lloyd George MSS, F/56/1/41.
67. Cabinet Committee on War Policy (1), June 11, 1917, CAB 27/6.
68. A significant portent for the future was the mention at this meeting of the necessity
of creating “a permanent Board of Allied Strategy” to enable the Allies to execute
effectively campaigns away from France and Flanders. Cabinet Committee on War
Policy (2), June 12, 1917, CAB 27/6.
69. Robertson to Haig, June 13, 1917, Haig MSS, no. 114.
70. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 2:1277.
71. Cabinet Committee on War Policy (7), June 19, 1917, CAB 27/6.
72. Hankey Diary, June 30, 1917, 1/3.
73. Cabinet Committee on War Policy (9), June 20, 1917, CAB 27/6.
74. ‘Talk with Sir Maurice Hankey at U.S. Club,” November 8, 1932, Liddell Hart MSS,
11/1932/43.
75. Cabinet Committee on War Policy (10), June 21, 1917, CAB 27/6.
76. Lowe and Dockrill, Mirage of Power, 2:260. The general staff could find little
evidence that Austro-Hungarian troops were suffering from a “‘loss of moral.’” See
Cabinet Paper G.T. 1319 of July 7, 1917, CAB 24/19.
77. Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen, 2:242, n. 2.
78. Note by Haig, June 22, 1917, W.P. 18, CAB 27/7.
79. Memorandum by Robertson, June 23, 1917, W.P. 19, CAB 27/7.
80. Cabinet Committee on War Policy (11), June 25, 1917, CAB 27/6.
81. Hankey Diary, June 30, 1917, 1/3.
82. War Cabinet (126), April 25, 1917, CAB 23/2.
83. Lord Beaverbrook, Men and Power, 1917–1918 (1956), p. 155.
84. Hankey Diary, April 30, 1917, 1/1.
85. Steven Roskill, Hankey Man of Secrets, vol. 1:1877–1918 (1970), pp. 379–85 and
Arthur J.Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, vol. 4:1917, Year of Crisis
(1969), pp. 152–65.
86. Men and Power, 1917–1918, p. 164.
87. Haig Diary, June 20 and 24, no. 114.
88. Haig’s diary entry does not make clear who made this suggestion, but it clearly
originated with Geddes and Haig. Haig Diary, June 26, 1917, no. 114. The Cabinet
Committee on War Policy, with no members of the military present, discussed the
Admiralty situation on June 27. Unfortunately no notes were taken. See Cabinet
Committee on War Policy (12), June 27, 1917, CAB 27/6.
89. Cabinet Committee on War Policy (13), July 3, 1917, CAB 27/6. Three days later
in a memorandum Wilson was more direct, writing: “The French themselves will
win no real success, I doubt even if they will put in another serious attack, this year.”
Wilson, however, had changed his tune since early June, now arguing that Haig’s
offensive was necessary to keep the French in the war. See Cabinet Paper G.T. 1313
of July 6, 1917, CAB 24/19, Haig Diary, June 28, 1917, no. 114, and Wilson Diary,
June 27, 1917.
90. Cabinet Committee on War Policy (15), July 6, 1917, CAB 27/6.
180 PASSCHENDAELE: THE RACK OF CHOICE
91. Robertson to Haig, July 21, 1917, Robertson MSS, I/23/40.
92. War Cabinet (191A), July 20, 1917, CAB 23/13.
93. Robertson to Haig, July 21, 1917, Haig MSS, no. 115.
94. Haig to Robertson, July 21, 1917, Haig MSS, no. 115.
95. Haig Diary, July 22, 1917, no. 115.
96. Cabinet Paper G.T. 1532 of July 25, 1917, CAB 24/21.
97. Haig Diary, July 31, 1917, no. 115.
98. Ibid., August 1, 1917, no. 115.
99. Hankey, Supreme Command, 2:702. Given the lack of spirit in the Italian army and
government, of course, there might never have been a “decisive victory” on the
Italian front.
100. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 2:1304.
LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS 181
9
Strain
A valid criticism of Lloyd George’s leadership during this period is that, having
accepted Haig’s Flanders offensive, he immediately attempted to undermine it.
To be sure, as Haig’s massive assaults made little headway, especially in October
and November, it can be argued that Lloyd George was not so resolute as he should
have been in trying to prevent Haig from wearing down the largest British army
ever put in the field in a single theater before or since. Still, with the government
promising its “whole-hearted support,” Haig deserved a fair chance.
In the following pages we will examine the inventive Welshman’s complicated
and at times mysterious maneuvers to restrain Haig. The tactics he considered—
and Britain has known few greater political tacticians—ranged from switching off
to another theater to a compromise peace with Germany at Russia’s expense to
the resurrection of a unified command. The immovable and granite-willed
C.I.G.S., who served as a buffer between general headquarters and the prime
minister, bore the brunt of Lloyd George’s machinations. The unending haggling
over strategy obviously took its toll on both men.
Because of the strain on British shipping, an offensive against the Turks was
held in abeyance for the moment by the British government.
1
But the War Cabinet
favored assisting General Cadorna in the autumn if Haig failed and, to implement
this policy, accepted Wully’s request that he be allowed to make all arrangements
with Foch and Cadorna in his “own way” at the Allied conference in Paris in late
July. “I promise the Cabinet that this method of procedure shall not interfere with
the execution of the plan if and when it is adopted,”
2
Robertson wrote on July 19.
The C.I.G.S., however, had no intention of allowing either Foch or Cadorna to
choose Italy over Flanders in 1917. With Britain assuming the major burden of
fighting the German army, he was going to insist on the support of Haig’s
offensive. The Russian offensive underway in mid-July made his task easier at
first. With the Russian army active, it seemed important for the Italians to apply
the pressure in their theater as soon as possible; hence, the War Cabinet agreed
that it was “undesirable” for Wully to make “definite arrangements with Cadorna”
at once for assisting him because he might be encouraged to delay his attack on
the Isonzo scheduled for mid-August.
3
The course of the last Russian offensive of the war, however, quickly gave
Lloyd George reason to question his high command’s strategy. Instead of reviving
the Russian army, it proved to be its death rattle. Austro-German counterattacks
drove the Russians back in panic along a 140-mile front and many heavy guns
were captured. Anti-war demonstrations broke out in Petrograd, and the peasant
soldiers, in Lenin’s phrase, began to vote for peace with their legs. Working at
cross purposes, the prime minister and Robertson crossed the Channel to attend
the Allied conference in Paris.
On July 23, Lloyd George dined with Thomas and attempted to convert him to
his Italian scheme. He also believed that he had Painlevé in his pocket.
4
Meanwhile, Robertson met with Foch and Cadorna on July 24. Russia’s collapse
was not allowed to intrude upon plans already made. In Lloyd George’s purple
prose, Robertson “flourished the Chantilly agreement in their faces and held them
to their bond, which was just as binding but more comprehensive than that of
Shylock, for it included the spilling of blood.”
5
In actual fact, both Foch and
Cadorna realized the dangers of flipflopping from one war plan to another. Such
infirmity of purpose was debilitating to the Allied cause, and Foch and Cadorna
agreed with Robertson that any change in Allied plans was “for the moment
impossible.”
6
Only after the present operations were over could a joint effort
against Austria on the Italian front be considered.
The Allied conference began on July 26 with a depressing report by Foch on
the consequences of Russia’s leaving the war. Lloyd George immediately pounced
on the suggestion that the Allies might eventually be forced to fall back on the
defensive. Calling this a “counsel of despair,” he urged the Allies to adopt military
plans to knock Turkey and Austria out of the war.
What was the use of our holding our own? Germany was in possession of
Belgium, North France, Serbia, and mistress of a great part of the Ottoman
Empire. Merely to hold on was, therefore, he claimed, to face a disastrous
peace.
To get Turkey out of the war was important, but to get Austria was
infinitely more so…. Short of this he could see nothing but the prospect of
going blindly to disaster.
Lloyd George’s words were coolly received. Foch questioned the ability of the
Allies to achieve “decisive” results against Turkey and Austria; and Thomas
pointed out “that the British and French troops were about to commence a very
heavy offensive, and he questioned the possibility, particularly in view of the
general weariness in France, of sustaining a further action in co-operation with
the Italians in September.”
7
Having failed to rally Britain’s allies to his peripheral strategy, Lloyd George
walked out of the conference in an angry and frustrated mood. He began “talking
wildly of resigning and ‘telling the country the truth.’”
8
Turning down an invitation
from Haig to witness the launching of his attack, he hurried back to London.
Robertson’s mood matched that of Lloyd George’s. Furious with the prime
minister for “his usual bomb” at the Allied conference, he wrote Kiggell, “This
LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS 183
was the worst conference I ever attended.”
9
To keep the wavering civilians on
course, he put pen to paper to poke holes in Lloyd George’s thesis that Russia’s
likely defection made it imperative to win a victory on the periphery. To the
contrary, he argued, if Russia left the alliance, making it possible for Berlin and
Vienna to transfer troops from the East to the West and allowing the Turks to
concentate all of their resources against the British, it was necessary to bring to
bear more, not less, of Britain’s military power in France.
10
Wully also took pains
to remind the members of the War Cabinet that they had pledged their “whole-
hearted support” to Haig.
11
Why, he wanted to know, were the civilians constantly
snapping at Haig’s heels when he was involved in the greatest battle ever fought
by the British army?
Robertson was especially on edge because of a division in the generals’ camp
that appeared in early August. Foch, who had supported Robertson’s “Western”
stance at Paris, now talked about the futility of continuing to hammer away on the
western front in 1918 if Russia fell out of the war. Foch, in fact, could hardly have
been more Lloyd Georgian about the conduct of the war after the present
campaigns were over. He spoke of concentrating on Germany’s allies
12
and of the
need to create a central body—an Allied general staff—to formulate and
An unhappy Sir William Robertson and his alter ego Major-General Sir Frederick
Maurice at the Paris inter-Allied conference in July 1917 where Lloyd George has
dropped “his usual bomb” on grand strategy.
184 STRAIN
coordinate Allied military operations. When the Allies resumed their discussions
at a conference at London on August 7– 8, Lloyd George sought to take advantage
of the Foch-Robertson split. He even discussed with Painlevé the idea of making
Foch supreme commander, but such a move was obviously premature and he dared
not revive the fierce passions of Calais. Hence he had to be satisfied with laying
the groundwork. “Had we really worked as one Government and one General
Staff,” he told the Allied conference, “it was his belief that we should already have
won the war.” The prime minister also lectured the ministers about leaving the
initiative with the generals—”the responsible Ministers should decide the Allies’
policy, whether they should try to detach any of the enemy Powers, and so on, and
then when the policy was decided the soldiers must conform their strategy to it.”
13
Lloyd George had hoped to delay Cadorna’s attack, which was scheduled to
start in about a week, until mid-September. By that time it might be possible to
shift the ten divisions and 400 guns to Italy that Cadorna said were necessary for
a decisive victory over Austria. In this, however, he got no support from Foch. On
August 7, Foch and Robertson at a military conference reaffirmed the decision
made two weeks earlier at Paris, with Foch agreeing “that it was now too late to
attempt to change the military plans for 1917.” Furthermore, both generals “agreed
that it is not possible to send any further batteries of artillery from the Western
Front to the Italian Front to be ready for action in September of this year. These
batteries would necessarily have to be withdrawn from the troops in action.”
14
Although Robertson succeeded in protecting Haig’s flanks at the London
conference, he saw alarming cracks appearing in the defenses of the “Westerners.”
“Unfortunately,” he wrote Haig, “Lloyd George has got the French with him as
well as the Italians. Foch is hopeless…. He seems to have made up his mind that
it is hopeless looking for good results on the West Front. This will make my task
much harder.” Foch’s suggestion of an Allied staff in Paris set alarm bells ringing
in his head: “As the French keep rubbing in that it is necessary to have a Central
Staff at Paris I can see Lloyd George in the future wanting to agree to some such
organization so as to put the matter in French hands and to take it out of mine.
However we shall see all about this.”
15
Haig, like Robertson, was adamantly opposed to raising Foch’s authority for
he had no faith in the Frenchman’s generalship (“the old man is done”) or his
strategy (“utterly stupid”). Moreover, “the idea of organising an Allied Staff in
Paris is quite unsound, even if a really good French Staff Officer were in
existence.”
16
Although sympathetic with Robertson’s s difficulties with the
civilians, Haig kept his distance. He had more important things on his mind—his
battle with the German army.
Haig’s initial thrust, hampered by buckets of rain, had achieved little.
Nonetheless, acutely conscious of the doubting Thomases in the War Cabinet,
Robertson and Haig put as optimistic a face as possible on the results of the first
days’ fighting, with Robertson emphasizing in the War Cabinet that French troops
were cooperating and the offensive was “progressing successfully.”
17
Haig’s
progress report to the War Cabinet was practically ebullient in spite of strong
LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS 185
German counterattacks which retook some of the ground gained in the initial
assault. Haig contended that “the total of his casualties exceeds ours very
considerably and not improbably by as much as 100%.” Viewing the initial stage
of his offensive, which proceeded by bounds, as a tactical laboratory for future
attacks, Haig was certain of ultimate success. ‘They [results of the battle] entirely
confirm our ability to overcome the enemy’s artillery even under the most
unfavourable conditions, and to assemble our troops for assault and launch the
assault even under the enemy’s direct observation. They confirm further that the
British Armies can be relied on to drive the enemy from any position by the
combined efforts of the infantry, artillery and aeroplanes and to do so without
undue loss.”
18
The reader may have noted that tanks were not mentioned in Haig’s report. Prior
to the British attack, the tank corps headquarters had sent a memorandum to
general headquarters warning that if the extensive drainage system in Flanders
was destroyed by bombardment, the terrain would quickly become a veritable
swampland; and indeed the tank had been neutralized by the mud. In choosing
Flanders, of course, Haig had been influenced by many factors, political,
strategical and so forth, but the fact remains that he saw the tank “in its present
state of development” as a “minor factor” in his choice of a battlefield.
19
Haig’s report to the War Cabinet also proves that he and his subordinates had
almost no understanding of the German army’s new elastic defensive system
which thinned the defenders in the first trenches. Captain G.C. Wynne, the British
authority on tactics in the West who played the major role in compiling the
Passchendaele volume in the official history, explains:
20
The enormous expenditure of ammunition and loss of two weeks of valuable
time of the preliminary bombardment was not only lavished upon a position
the Germans already regarded as a derelict extension of no-man’s land, but
it churned up a great stretch of country that was to exhaust the assaulting
battalions even to cross. The main objectives given to the assault troops
were those front-line regiments which the Germans from the outset regarded
as sacrificed, but which the compulsory halts in the advance enabled to rally
and to cause heavy losses before they were captured or slaughtered. These
delays also gave ample time for the counterattack divisions to make full
preparations.
21
The mud and water of Flanders, rather than faulty tactics, however, were more
responsible for stymieing Haig’s assault in August. The horrendous conditions
facing the British army in the Flanders quagmire have best been described by
Gough, who led the attack with his Fifth Army.
Many pens have tried to describe the ghastly expanse of mud which covered
this water-logged country, but few have been able to paint a picture
sufficiently intense. Imagine a fertile countryside, dotted every few hundred
186 STRAIN