Woodward D. Lloyd George and the Generals

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the British in March 1918 were better placed than the Germans in July 1917, who

had succeeded in blunting the first British assault.” On the other hand, the Germans

were able to call on more reserves in 1917 than Haig had at his disposal in 1918.

“Nevertheless,” Barnett argues, “the figures alone suggest that the British defence

system itself should have been capable of absorbing the German blow for some

days; even if paucity of reserves brought about a progressive later collapse.”

course, if the general reserve had been established, Haig might have been able to

draw immediately upon French reserves.

Although the Germans only outnumbered the British by about 6 to 4 along their

126-mile front, they had a superiority of 5 to 1 against the Fifth Army. Haig

unquestionably followed sound strategic principles by massing his troops in the

north, where, with his forces close to the sea, he could not give up much ground

without disastrous results. On the other hand, Gough had room to maneuver in the

south; and the French reserves were close at hand to give relief. Still Haig was

astonishingly complacent, refusing to redistribute his troops, as reports of the

German buildup in the south flowed to general headquarters. Gough later told

Lloyd George that he believed “Haig’s attitude was one of rather welcoming a

partial loss of ground on the idea—‘that’ll larn ‘em’ (the Govt.) for not doing what

he wanted, and for meeting the French wishes.”

A more balanced explanation

of Haig’s disposition of his troops is that he expected the Germans to have no

better success at breaking through than he had had at Somme and Passchendaele.

As for the question of Haig taking over more of the French line, it must be

remembered that Lloyd George, although he accepted the principle of assisting

the French by extending the British front, had left the arrangements to Haig and

Pétain. To be sure, Haig had probably agreed to extend his line to Barisis because

he feared that the Supreme War Council would force him to take over more of the

French line. When the permanent military representatives had suggested just that,

Lloyd George had fought Haig’s battle for him, only acquiescing to joint note 10

after gaining the field marshal’s approval. Two points must be emphasized: with

the British on the defensive, the French demand that the British take over more of

their line was difficult to refuse; and, secondly, Haig never implemented the

extension of his line beyond Barisis which the Supreme War Council attempted

to impose upon him.

Unfortunately, the French fortifications which the Fifth Army inherited were

in frightful condition. Furthermore, general headquarters had paid little attention

to defense since 1914 and the defensive tactics it attempted to copy from the

Germans were faulty. Too many men (approximately one third of the infantry)

were concentrated in the first line of defense, where they were exposed to German

artillery. Even then British resistance might have been stouter if the soldiers had

had time to dig. But Haig had delayed taking over the French front as long as

possible by continuing to attack and by arguing that he needed to maintain his

reserves for a resumption of the Flanders attack in the spring.

These

considerations suggest the conclusion that it is unwarranted to place the blame on

Lloyd George and his civilian colleagues for the German success.

LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS 287

In April the Morning Post began demanding an explanation of the March 21

disaster, aiming its guns at the government’s alleged failure to supply Haig with

men. On April 8, Repington wrote: “Why have the reiterated demands of the Army

for men remained unanswered? Who but Mr. Lloyd George is responsible for the

failure to supply the Army’s needs. I think that we shall have to be more ruthless

towards Ministers who have failed the country and that our easy tolerance of

incompetence is a public danger.” Gwynne chimed in with “Hundreds of

thousands of men who might have given us victory there in France were

squandered upon eccentric expeditions to points of minor consequence.” The

Globe argued that “the present situation is the inevitable result of our national

folly in allowing the war to be managed by men who know nothing of war,” and

the Daily News linked German success with “the events which began with the

Paris Speech, and ended with the dismissal of Sir William Robertson.” To restore

confidence in the government, the Star demanded the appointment of Robertson

as secretary of state for war.

Lloyd George bristled at this criticism, knowing that his government was in

danger if Parliament and the public came to believe that the politicians and not

the generals were responsible for the German breakthrough. Not surprisingly, he

hoped to make scapegoats of the generals, pressuring Haig to remove Gough

(which was done) and contemplating the replacement of the field marshal himself.

On April 4, the War Cabinet launched into a “wild discussion” about recalling

Haig. “There was no doubt that the feeling of the Cabinet was I think unanimously

agst. Haig & the whole G.H.Q. There was no question that all confidence is lost,”

Wilson wrote in his diary.

Haig, who had generally displayed remarkable coolness during the German

offensive, nobly offered to step down if he no longer enjoyed the confidence of

the government, noting that his conscience was clear for he had “done the best

with the means at my disposal.”

As always, however, the civilians were unable

to discover a better general.

After giving an explanation of the German success which amounted to an attack

on the army leadership in an unusual meeting with the heads of departments on

April 6, Lloyd George appeared before Parliament on April 9 when it reassembled

after its long Easter recess. In a combative mood, he was determined to disarm

his critics. Unfortunately, as he strove for effect, he made two claims which were

to come back to haunt him. The British army, he asserted, was actually stronger

at the beginning of January 1918 than it had been the previous January. Then, to

protect himself from the charge of meddling in strategy because of his interest in

a British offensive in Palestine, he said that in Egypt and Palestine there were only

three white infantry divisions “and the rest are either Indians or mixed with a very,

very small proportion of British troops in those divisions.” The first statement was

correct in respect to ration strength which included many noncombatants such as

labour battalions; but it was misleading if Lloyd George intended to maintain that

Haig’s combatant strength was stronger at the beginning of 1918 than it had been

at the start of 1917. The second statement was clearly wrong.

Allenby, in fact,

288 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE AND THE MAURICE DEBATE

commanded seven infantry divisions on March 21 which included only a small

number of native troops.

Encouraged by Wilson “to try and establish the confidence of the Army and of

the nation in some one General”

(himself naturally), Lloyd George went out of

his way to praise Robertson’s replacement, creating the false impression that the

new C.I.G.S. had predicted precisely where and when the German storm would

break. “I think it is one of the most remarkable forecasts of enemy intentions,” he

exclaimed, “that has ever been made.” The prime minister also used an interesting

parallel to defend the government’s commitment to “side shows.” “There was an

Empire which withdrew its legions from the outlying provinces of the Empire to

defend its heart against the Goths, and these legions never went back.”

On the

same day, Curzon told the House of Lords that the German success was not due

to Haig having insufficient men and equipment.

Just before Lloyd George appeared in Parliament, Maurice had informed the

War Cabinet that the Germans had launched an attack in Flanders between the La

Bassée Canal and Armentières. Maurice thought that it was only a

“demonstration,”

but Ludendorff, having failed to destroy the British reinforced

by the French around Amiens, had shifted his attention to the north. A weak

Portuguese division gave way, opening a gap which the Germans penetrated for

more than 31/2 miles the first day. When the Germans followed up this success

with another attack north of Armentières which forced Plumer to withdraw from

Messines and Wytschaete, the situation appeared desperate. On the night of 11–

12, Haig wrote his famous “Backs to the Wall” order of the day. By April 12, the

Germans had advanced two thirds of the distance they had to go to gain their

primary objective, Hazebrouck, a vital railway junction.

The mood in London was not improved by a memorandum prepared by the

usually unflappable Macdonogh, who had just returned from the front after

assessing the effects of the German March 21 offensive. His every sentence was

tinged with panic. “Germany is endeavouring to destroy the British Army and

decide the war by concentrating all her available reserves against the British front,”

he wrote. Britain was faced with “decisive defeat” unless France and the United

States gave extensive assistance and all British troops were withdrawn

immediately from Italy, the Balkans, and Mesopotamia.

The survival of the British army seemed to hinge on how well the new unity of

command would work. With Haig’s reserves committed to the battle and with his

army losing 70,000 casualties a week since March 21, the British cast covetous

glances at the French reserves, their only hope of immediate help. Foch was

supposed to be above all national considerations. But, unlike Eisenhower during

World War II, he had no machinery for a fully integrated Allied supreme

command. With no true counterpart of the Supreme Headquarters Allied

Expeditionary Force (S.H.A.E.F.) or Joint Chiefs of Staff, he relied upon his own

personal staff. The permanent military representatives offered him the best hope

of creating an Allied general staff, but he showed no inclination to use this body,

immediately recalling the French permanent military representative, Weygand,

LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS 289

after Beauvais to serve as his principal staff officer. As Terraine has pointed out,

“His technique was an outdated reversion to the personal command of earlier

centuries.”

Between Beauvais and the second German offensive, Lloyd

George’s colleagues in the War Cabinet, encouraged by Wilson, began to have

second thoughts about giving Foch the leading role in determining Allied strategy.

With no machinery for British input, Clemenceau, who was rightly considered a

fanatical French nationalist, might try to use Foch to further French rather than

Allied interests. These fears certainly had substance. “Do you know,” Foch once

told Clemenceau, “that I am not your subordinate?” “No, I don’t,” Clemenceau

retorted. “I don’t even want to know who put that notion into your head…. I

strongly advise you not to try to act on this idea, for it would never do.”

Alarmed

by the news of Weygand’s departure from Versailles and fearful that the permanent

military representatives where British influence might be felt were going to be

allowed to wither away, many British ministers started to dig in their heels. After

all, it had been fear of Pétain’s apparent defeatism rather than any attachment to

the principle of unity of command which had been decisive in the arrangements

made at Doullens and Beauvais. Even Lloyd George’s previous desire for unity

of command was colored by his determination to undermine Haig and Robertson

and force the Allies to look beyond the western front. When Clemenceau, almost

before the ink was dry on the Beauvais agreement, had suggested that Foch’s

authority be extended to the Italian front, the War Cabinet, apparently influenced

by Wilson, vetoed the idea. Also Lloyd George made it clear to the French premier

that he would not tolerate the collapse of the Versailles body. The British leaders

also readily accepted Wilson’s proposal that a senior British officer (General John

P.Du Cane) should be attached to Foch’s staff. Foch immediately accepted Du

Cane as a member of his staff, but Clemenceau expressed hostility to any British

effort to put Foch under the direction of Versailles.

The new German offensive which threatened to drive the British out of Belgium

and perhaps into the sea increased anxiety both in London and at general

headquarters that Foch might not commit French reserves to the British front soon

enough or in sufficient strength. After failing to convince Foch to take over some

of the British line on the day before the German attack in Flanders was launched,

Haig was convinced that the French meant “to bleed the British to the utmost.”

Foch’s initial response to the German attack seemed to justify this bitter remark.

He moved French troops to the north, but he was slow to commit them to battle.

Husbanding his reserves for the counterattack, he refused to relieve the exhausted

British soldiers while they were engaged in battle. His oft-repeated principle was

“‘No reliefs during a battle.’”

“General Foch viewed the battle front as one

whole; he regarded our army as bearing the brunt to good purpose, namely, in

order to keep the Allied reserves, which he did not wish to fritter away, intact,”

Maurice told the War Cabinet. His “object was to stablise the battle with the least

expenditure of reserves.”

But what if Foch had overestimated the dogged and

290 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE AND THE MAURICE DEBATE

heroic resistance of the British army as it largely absorbed the sledgehammer

blows of the German army? Fortunately he had not.

British resentment of the French, which simmered during this period, was going

to boil over during the months ahead and threaten to destroy the new unity of

command. For the moment, however, Lloyd George, assured of Foch’s good

intentions by Wilson, took the lead in giving Foch a title to match his new position.

On April 11, the War Cabinet discussed Foch’s desire to be recognized as Allied

commander in chief. Opposition was expressed to making Foch “Commander-in-

Chief of the Allied Forces in France” because the public had been told that “his

function was really that of Strategist-in-Chief.” Smuts finally offered the

compromise of “General-inChief,” which was accepted, and Clemenceau and

Foch were duly informed.

The distinction between general and commander in

chief, however, was soon blurred.

Faced with terrible losses which could not be made up from their own sources

of depleted manpower, the British civilians became obsessed with the

amalgamation of American troops with Haig’s forces. After the first German

offensive had stalled, Haig had warned his government that his manpower

situation would become “critical unless American troops fit for immediate

incorporation in my Divisions arrive in France in the meantime.”

With the

Germans employing approximately three of their divisions against the British for

every one against the French, the War Cabinet hoped to get the bulk of the

American combat troops arriving in France attached to Haig’s decimated and

battle-worn forces. Pershing, however, remained determined to create an

independent American army, resisting pressure from both the British and his own

government. Finally, Ludendorff’s continued pressure against the Anglo-French

forces forced the American commander in chief to bend. On April 24, he concluded

an agreement with Milner in London which accepted the temporary attachment

of the combat elements of six American divisions scheduled to arrive in May for

training and service with the British army.

When news of the Pershing-Milner agreement reached Paris, there was

emotional talk of Perfidious Albion. Earlier the permanent military representatives

had recommended in joint note 18 that Americans be amalgamated with the French

and British forces, and the French wanted their share of the fresh and unbloodied

Americans. Quite unfairly, Clemenceau and other French leaders, perhaps

encouraged by Repington, believed that the British government was holding back

a hidden army of about one million men in Britain.

This was nonsense. The

British government was scraping the bottom of its manpower barrel and

Parliament had just passed a new military act which extended the military age to

fifty years, and in a national emergency to fifty-five years.

At the fifth meeting of the Supreme War Council at Abbeville on May 1, Lloyd

George discovered that the tiger had his claws out. Why, Clemenceau demanded

to know, had the French not been consulted about the PershingMilner agreement?

“He reminded the Council that General Foch had been appointed to the supreme

command in France. This command was not given as a mere decoration. It

LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS 291

involved, amongst other things, serious responsibilities, including suitable

provision for the future.” If the British got 120,000 Americans in May, the French

premier insisted, the French must get 120,000 in June.

Lloyd George was conciliatory. The squabbling over the division of American

combat troops was bound to arouse Pershing’s suspicions. Surely, the American

commander in chief grumbled, he was not “to understand that the American army

was to be entirely at the disposal of the French and British commands.” Also, the

prime minister did not want unity of command to break down over this issue. With

Clemenceau apparently willing to allow the six divisions arriving in May to be

attached to the British army, he accepted Foch’s proposal to reconsider the

Pershing-Milner agreement in a meeting of Milner, Pershing, and Foch.

Subsequently the amalgamation of American combat troops with Allied divisions

called for in the PershingMilner agreement was allowed to stand for the immediate

future, but the six American divisions scheduled to arrive in May were not

specifically allocated to Haig. The conflict between Paris and London over the

utilization of American manpower was just beginning. In other actions the

Supreme War Council dissolved the Executive War Board and extended Foch’s

authority to Italy, which was now considered as part of the western front.

Although the Allied leaders did not realize it at Abbeville, the German advance

in Flanders had reached high tide. Once again Anglo-French resistance had proven

too strong, and time was running out on Ludendorff’s s gamble as Americans in

increasing numbers began to arrive in France. Ludendorff’s huge losses since

March 21 roughly matched Allied losses. Foch’s estimate of the military situation

which Maurice relayed to the War Cabinet during the dark days of mid-April had

proven correct: “If he [Foch] had to choose between playing his own hand or that

of Ludendorff, if he had to get to Berlin he would prefer Ludendorff’s ’s hand,

but as his mission was to check Ludendorff he preferred his own.”

Lloyd George returned from Abbeville to face the gravest threat yet posed to

his ministry. Following his and Curzon’s speeches of April 9 in Parliament,

newspapers still favorable to the army had begun to question the truth of their

statements. As usual, the Morning Post was the biggest thorn in the government’s

side. On April 17, Repington pointed out that it was not true that there were only

three white divisions in Egypt and Palestine on March 21. Elsewhere in the same

paper, Gwynne in a leading article accused the prime minister of using “fancy

figures” to mask what he alleged was Haig’s weakened position on the eve of the

German offensive. The following day, Gwynne continued his attack under the

heading: “BRING ROBERTSON BACK.” The Globe seconded this suggestion.

Ominously this rising criticism had its echo in Parliament. On April 18, the

Liberal politican Sir Godfrey Baring questioned Lloyd George’s statement that

Haig was stronger in January 1918 than he had been the previous year. Was not

Lloyd George including noncombatant units in his calculation? lan Macpherson,

the under-secretary of state for war, using figures produced in the adjutant

general’s department for the director of military operations (hereafter abbreviated

D.M.O.), asserted unequivocally that British “combatant strength” was stronger

292 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE AND THE MAURICE DEBATE

in January 1918.

Unfortunately the adjutant general’s department had

erroneously included 86,000 British troops in Italy as part of Haig’s army.

Maurice’s deputy, Colonel Walter Kirke, had given Macpherson these returns

without checking them for accuracy.

The press attacks, especially in the War Office’s mouthpiece, the Morning Post,

and Baring’s pointed question in Parliament made Lloyd George begin to fear that

a military conspiracy was under foot to place unfairly the blame for Haig’s defeat

squarely on him. Robertson seemed to be involved because Esher reported that

the former C.I.G.S. was seeing Repington every day. In an effort to neutralize

Wully, Lloyd George was quite prepared to support Haig’s suggestion that

Robertson go out to France as his second in command. Robertson, however,

refused, writing Haig that Lloyd George was just trying to get him out of London.

“My job is C.I.G.S. or nothing,”

he suggestively noted. Did Wully really believe

his own press and contemplate a comeback atop the wreckage of Lloyd George’s

government? Whatever Robertson’s motives, Lloyd George thought that he

perceived Wully’s hand at work when his eyes fell on the most recent weekly

summary, which he thought was the work of Maurice, Robertson’s alter ego on

the general staff. To the prime minister’s dismay the weekly summary prepared

by the office of the D.M.O. claimed that the Germans now had a superiority in

rifle strength of approximately 333,000, which, if true, would make a mockery of

Lloyd George’s previous comparisons of Allied to enemy rifle strength in

Parliament. When the weekly summary was brought to its attention on the twenty-

second, the War Cabinet was incredulous. How could a shift of this magnitude

take place almost overnight? The new figures “appeared to be utterly inconsistent”

with the War Office’s previous calculations, it was noted.

With the Morning Post at this very moment calling for “A CHANGE OF

GOVERNMENT,” Lloyd George believed that the War Office’s new numbers

were “all part of Robertson’s campaign.”

In an angry letter to the secretary of

state for war, Lloyd George pointed out what he considered were discrepancies

and omissions in the weekly summary, concluding: “From any point of view this

document is extraordinarily slipshod, and I suggest that a thorough investigation

be made as to how it came to be prepared and who is responsible for editing and

issuing it.”

Maurice, who had been in France from April 14 to April 17 and was about to

be replaced by Major-General P.de B.Radcliffe as D.M.O. as part of Wilson’s

housecleaning in the War Office, argues that he had no part in producing the new

figures in the weekly summary which was dated April 18.

Maurice nonetheless

later attempted to defend the calculations in the weekly summary against Lloyd

George’s contention that they were “cooked.” After an internal investigation

within the War Office, new figures were produced that lowered the Allied

inferiority in rifle strength to 262,000.

The revised figures, however, still did

not take into account the new muscle the British army now possessed in areas like

artillery, tanks, aircraft, machine guns, etc. But the awkward fact remained:

LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS 293

Germany had attained a clear, though temporary, superiority in rifle strength by

transferring divisions from Russia to France.

Another pointed arrow being fired at Lloyd George in the press concerned

Haig’s extension of his line, which Haig’s defenders claimed had been forced

upon him and was largely the cause of the collapse of the Fifth Army. After George

Lambert gave notice that he planned to ask a question in Parliament on this subject

on April 23, the War Cabinet discussed the government’s response and decided

that

a reply should be given in the sense that there was not the smallest

justification for the suggestion that this portion of the line [defended by the

Fifth Army] was taken over contrary to the judgment of Sir William

Robertson and Sir Douglas Haig; the arrangements in the matter were made

entirely by the British and French military authorities.

That afternoon Bonar Law put the government’s case to Parliament. When asked

by George Lambert if Haig and Robertson had been overruled by the government

on the extension of the British line in Barisis, Bonar Law responded that “the

arrangement was a military arrangement, made between the two military

authorities [Haig and Pétain].” When another member of the House, Mr. Pringle,

asked, “Was this matter entered into at the Versailles War Council at any time?,”

Bonar Law replied, “this particular matter was not dealt with at all by the Versailles

War Council.”

What Bonar Law said was essentially correct. Although Haig and Robertson

had raised objections, especially about Clemenceau’s demand that the British take

over French trenches beyond Barisis, the government had left the actual

arrangements to Haig and Pétain. The Supreme War Council, of course, had not

acted on the extension of the British line to Barisis that Haig and Pétain had agreed

upon prior to its meeting in early February; and it was this extension to Barisis to

which all the questions in Parliament were directed. Technically, then, Bonar Law

was right in asserting that the Supreme War Council had not forced Haig to take

over the additional line which he defended on March 21.

To Maurice, Bonar Law’s response was just one more incident of the

government’s attempt to shift all blame to Haig and the army for the German

breakthrough. Consequently, he moved closer to challenging publicly the

government’s statements in Parliament. Before taking such a drastic step,

however, he consulted his friend Robertson. Wully, practical as always, cautioned

Maurice to get his facts right and expressed doubts that “the days of L.G. are

numbered.” But he clearly approved of Maurice’s decision to write a letter for

publication in the press. “You are contemplating a great thing—to your undying

credit,” he wrote.

Maurice agonized for some time about violating the king’s regulations by

contradicting the government in the press. It would end his military career and

many would accuse him of rank insubordination. He even wrote a letter to Wilson

294 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE AND THE MAURICE DEBATE

on April 30, suggesting in so many words, that the government should set the

record straight. Wilson, as Maurice probably expected, made no reply. Instead the

C.I.G.S. noted in red on his letter that Maurice had never brought this to his

attention while he was still D.M.O.,

and it was a valid comment. According to

his one-sided account, “Intrigues of the War,” Maurice maintains that he was too

preoccupied with the German offensive to read Lloyd George’s and Curzon’s

speeches on April 9. Yet he writes in his diary on that day: “Curzon made a number

of absolutely untrue statements in H of L.”

Although Maurice later went to the

trouble of reading Lloyd George’s exact words in Hansard and noted in his diary

that the newspaper accounts had not revealed to him Lloyd George’s

misstatements, this would appear to be a rationalization for his failure to speak

out while he was still D.M.O. The press, for example, paid particular attention to

Lloyd George’s claim that Haig’s forces were stronger in January 1918 than they

had been in January 1917.

John Gooch has suggested that Maurice’s underlying motive was to spark a

national discussion which would result in the creation of a more efficient

machinery to conduct the war.

Others have argued that he hoped to salvage the

honor of the army and prevent the government from sacking Haig.

Lloyd George,

of course, believed that Maurice was involved in a military conspiracy against the

government. In truth, Maurice, a soldier of the old school, found the idea of

consorting with the military and especially the civilian enemies of Lloyd George

distasteful. He thought of involving Asquith, but quickly dropped the idea. When

he took his letter to the Morning Post on May 6, he emphasized to Gwynne and

Repington that he “had shown the letter to no soldier.”

In his own mind this kept

his hands clean. Yet, even if he had not actually shown his letter to Robertson, he

had certainly discussed its contents with the former C.I.G.S. Also, he had to be

aware of the ramifications of publicly attacking the government. The War

Cabinet’s ability to run the war, not its veracity, was the central issue. With some

papers pressuring Asquith to demand an investigation of the cause of the virtual

destruction of the Fifth Army,

any public stand on his part might give Lloyd

George’s opponents the necessary ammunition to destroy him. Gwynne

immediately sent Asquith a copy of Maurice’s letter, noting: “It is primarily an

affair for the House of Commons, since there is ample evidence in the letter that

the Ministers of the Crown have lied to the House of Commons.”

On the morning of May 7, Maurice’s sensational letter appeared on the streets

in the Morning Post, Times, Daily Chronicle, and Daily News. Maurice challenged

the truthfulness of the government on three major points: Bonar Law’s statement

of April 23 that the Supreme War Council had not been involved in the extension

of Haig’s line; Lloyd George’s assertion that the British army was stronger in

January 1918 than in January 1917, and his claim that Allenby commanded only

three white divisions in Egypt and Palestine.

The initial reaction of the press to “GEN. MAURICE’S BOMBSHELL,” as the

Star called it, reflected the seriousness of the situation. If the government had

really let Haig down as Maurice implied, the Daily Chronicle warned, “the country

LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS 295

could not view the Cabinet’s responsibility leniently.” The Westminster Gazette,

the primary organ for Asquith and his supporters, asserted: “It is now for the House

of Commons to assert itself and insist on a searching inquiry into General

MAURICE’s allegations, whatever the consequences to him or to the

Government.” Investigation or not, the Morning Post had already made up its

mind about Lloyd George’s fitness to retain power: “He has presumed to drive

the chariot of war. He would have been wiser to have left the management of those

fiery steeds to stronger and more experienced hands. If he had succeeded he would

have had the credit! As he has failed he must abide the consequences.” Many

papers such as the Times and the Manchester Guardian which had previously

supported the government made it clear that Lloyd George must not attempt to

dodge Maurice’s serious allegations.

The skirmishes the government had fought with its critics over the March 21

disaster were over. Now the battle had begun. The government was convinced

that Maurice’s letter was part of a military conspiracy despite his denials and its

apprehension was fueled by some truly fantastic rumors. On May 8, Hankey

recorded the following in his diary:

Mark Sykes called before the War Cabinet and told me in confidence “from

one Chinovnik to another” that Robertson had lunched with Asquith on the

previous day. Later I learned from Davies, who got it from Ll. G’s valet (!)

that a few days ago Robertson gave a dinner to Trenchard [the chief of air

staff who had created a stir in mid-April when he had resigned], Repington

& Gwynne…& Maurice, & that after dinner the party were joined by

Asquith & Jellicoe; that the Maurice letter was discussed, and that at the

end Robertson said he would have nothing to do with it.

One would not have been overly surprised to learn that Kitchener had returned

from the depths of the sea to add his name to this list of the “outs” of the military

establishment. Robertson, as a matter of fact, had lunched with Asquith on the day

Maurice’s letter was published, but the rest of this story was pure fantasy. Maurice,

having taken the plunge, retired into the background, making no real effort to work

with Lloyd George’s political enemies.

For any revolt in Parliament to succeed, Asquith had to give his wholehearted

support to it. As Esher had written Wilson a week earlier: “There is nothing to

fear so long as Asquith shrinks from office.”

Although Gwynne was now

prepared to accept Asquith over Lloyd George,

the former prime minister did

not want to return to power by destroying the government during this perilous

period. On the eve of the debate in Parliament about Maurice’s allegations, the

Westminster Gazette, which probably spoke for Asquith, made a remarkable

overnight switch in its position.

As for the House of Commons, its duty is plain. General MAURICE’s letter

is merely an opportunity for those whose real object is the overthrow of the

296 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE AND THE MAURICE DEBATE