Woodward D. Lloyd George and the Generals

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

suspected the French of having ulterior political and financial motives in the

Balkans.

Lloyd George’s violent outbursts and his threat to explode the unity of

command put the French exactly where he wanted them—on the defensive. On

the prime minister’s initiative, a resolution was passed which instructed the

permanent military representatives to study military operations for 1919. When

Foch learned of this infringement on his authority, he was enraged and threatened

to resign. When he made known his intentions to Lloyd George, the latter was

unmoved. Turning to Clemenceau, he said within Foch’s hearing, “There was a d

— sight too much of these Generals threatening to resign & that if they were

private soldiers they would be put up agst. a wall & shot.”

In the end the wording

but not the substance of this resolution was changed.

Although Lloyd George made his point that British interests must not be

ignored, he had much to answer for himself. What the British delegation dared

not tell the French in open council (although Wilson wanted to make a clean breast

of it) was that they planned to transfer British divisions to other theaters as soon

as the Allied line in the West was secure.

Such were the rubs and tensions of the

generalissimo experiment in mid-1918.

The conclusion of the “angriest” Supreme War Council yet, as Wilson called

it, was a prelude to another incident which threatened to wreck the unity of

command. On June 9, the Germans had launched a second diversionary offensive,

near Compiègne, the Battle of Matz, which ground to a halt on June 14 with no

dramatic results and with German reserves further depleted. As Correlli Barnett

has written, “Thresh about how he might, the situation was now closing darkly

round the German field commander. Clemenceau had been quite unshaken by the

German advance to the Marne. The decisive battle—in Flanders still—had yet to

be fought. However, German strength was melting.”

What is apparent today

about the declining strength of the German army, however, was not so obvious to

the weary Allied soldiers as they anxiously waited and wondered where the next

German blow would fall. Wilson even told the British ministers on July 8 that “the

Germans could now put in a bigger attack than they did on the 21st March.”

late as mid-June, the German high command thought of attacking Flanders next,

but the enemy still seemed too strong there to achieve decisive results. Hence,

Ludendorff turned once again to a diversionary attack against the French to draw

Allied reserves away from the north. Soon after the beginning of this offensive,

planned for July 15 around Rheims, he hoped to drive through British trenches

toward Hazebrouck. Aircraft and artillery, in fact, were transferred northwards to

participate in this attack against the British almost as soon as the Second Battle

of the Marne began in mid-July.

On the eve of this attack, there was near panic in London that Foch, who was

unfairly thought to be Clemenceau’s puppet, was prepared to leave Haig in the

lurch as he massed Allied reserves in front of Paris. On July 11, the War Cabinet

discussed “the danger that the French, for political reasons, might endeavour to

safeguard Paris at grave risk to the British front.” Smuts expressed concern that

“French reserves were being moved much too far South, bringing about a

LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS 317

distribution of reserves, as far as the British front was concerned, not dissimilar

to that existing before the attack of March 21st.” The War Cabinet decided that

Lloyd George should write Clemenceau “pointing out that General Foch was an

Allied and not merely a French Commander-in-Chief, and that he must treat the

Allied interests as a whole, making his dispositions on this basis and not mainly

from the point of view of French interests.”

Lloyd George also continued to

express concern about the French monopolization of American divisions. More

than the defense of Paris was involved in this, he believed. “Clemenceau had more

than hinted that he was getting hold of the American divisions in order to compel

us to re-fill our own,” he told Bonar Law, Milner, and Wilson on July 12. “This

was an unjustifiable attempt to put pressure upon us.”

To press the “queer

tempered old gentlemen” on the distribution of American troops, he thought of

dispatching Smuts and Borden to France, believing that these dominion leaders

were more likely to “prevail over Clemenceau” and would “have special influence

with Pershing.”

Much has been written about Haig’s allegedly broad view of the military

situation in July in contrast to the narrowness of the British government. Yet his

view of Foch’s direction of Allied reserves often mirrored that of the British

civilians. On July 13, he wrote the following in his diary: “Foch has made up his

mind that the main attack will fall on the French East of Rheims. Our information

does not bear this out. We fear that the enemy is preparing to put in a small attack

against the French, while his main blow is delivered elsewhere.”

On July 14, the tension between the British and French reached a climax. Foch

ordered four British divisions from Haig’s reserves to proceed south and four more

divisions to be held in readiness to move in the same direction. Previously the

generalissimo had moved the remaining six French divisions of the Detachment

de 1’Armèe du Nord (the French army group in Flanders) southwards, positioning

them at Beauvais, where they could reinforce the British front in an emergency.

As soon as Lloyd George learned of Foch’s orders, he convened an emergency

council of war in Sussex, where he was the guest of Riddell at Hurstpierpoint. It

was late evening when Milner, Wilson, Radcliffe, the D.M.O., Borden, Hankey,

Kerr, and Smuts gathered around the prime minister. Both Haig and Wilson still

expected the main German offensive to take place against the British. Fearing a

disaster for British arms worse than March 21, Lloyd George threatened to

countermand Foch’s transfer of the four British divisions south “unless Haig could

give a guarantee that Rupprecht would not attack him!” Although Smuts’s anxiety

matched Lloyd George’s, Milner and Wilson supported Foch’s actions, and their

steadying influence served the prime minister well. Before attempting to overrule

Foch’s orders, Lloyd George agreed to dispatch Smuts to general headquarters to

get Haig’s view of the situation. Smuts was also expected to pressure the French

to replace the British divisions sent south with American divisions. Apparently

Smuts’s mission was not enough to satisfy Lloyd George because as soon as the

meeting broke up Wilson telephoned Haig, instructing him to appeal to his

government under the Beauvais agreement if he thought Foch was “not acting

318 THE UNCERTAIN ROAD TO VICTORY

solely on military considerations” or if he believed that his front was

“endangered.”

On July 16, Smuts reported his findings to the Imperial War Cabinet. Haig, he

said, had initially thought that Foch had momentarily “almost lost his head in his

alarm at this situation”; consequently he had written him that he was “not inclined

to fall in with General Foch’s views until he had had a personal interview.” When

this meeting took place, German intentions were no longer a matter of conjecture;

they were attacking the French along a front of some fifty-five miles. After Foch

assured Haig that he planned to place the British divisions he received in a position

to return quickly to the north if the Germans attacked there, the field marshal

agreed to deliver the requested divisions. Haig also informed Smuts that his most

recent intelligence indicated that as many as nine of Rupprecht’s divisions had

been moved to the French front, and seven had already been identified in the recent

offensive. With only twenty-three fresh German divisions in a position to attack

him, he was much less anxious about the security of his army. Haig also defended

Foch’s distribution of the American divisions because their presence “had had a

remarkable effect in stimulating the French moral, without which…[he] doubted

if the French Army should have had any offensive spirit left.”

To his undying

credit, Haig, under immense pressure, acted correctly when the facts were known

to him. Two days later, however, he began to have second thoughts. Believing

that a German attack of between sixteen and eighteen divisions was imminent on

both sides of Kemmel, he attempted without success to retrieve two of the divisions

he had committed to the French.

Although Haig shared Lloyd George’s concern that Foch’s actions might

endanger the British front, his conduct during this critical test for the supreme

command was certainly more admirable than Lloyd George’s. Wilson told the

prime minister that he was far from certain that the German offensive underway

was the main attack; and Macdonogh took exception to Haig’s estimate of the

reserves available to Rupprecht, counting thirty-three fresh enemy divisions

instead of twenty-three.

Confronted with this military advice, it is not surprising

that Lloyd George continued to believe that the British had been badly served by

Foch. “If it should turn out that he had let us down in this matter,” he told Wilson

and Milner, “it would wreck the unity of command.”

Happily, a successful

French counterattack on the eighteenth derailed the German plan of attacking the

British and saved unity of command.

During these trying days, Lloyd George had difficulty finding a general whom

he could trust. He continued to hold Haig’s leadership in contempt and he wanted

to sack him. After criticism of the military authorities had surfaced during the first

meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet, Lloyd George had immediately moved to

establish a committee of the dominion leaders, the Committee of Prime Ministers,

which included Wilson and Milner. If he had his way, this committee would serve

as a hanging jury to remove Haig.

His motives were many and complex. If he

pushed a policy of protecting and expanding the empire in the East, he knew that

Haig would join with the offensive-minded Foch in opposing a limited role for

LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS 319

the British army in the West. He also believed that Haig was not making the best

use of men behind his line.

Moreover, Haig now seemed disinclined to assist

him in forcing Foch to station more American divisions in his sector which might

free British divisions for use away from France. General Cavan, the commander

in chief of the British forces in Italy, was scheduled to arrive in London soon, and

Lloyd George, apparently believing that his service away from the western front

had given him the proper perspective, contemplated putting him in Haig’s place.

When the prime minister discussed the removal of Haig with Milner, the secretary

of state for war was “not yet clearly convinced that a better substitute could be

found.” This infuriated Lloyd George. If Milner did not understand how important

it was to give the army new leadership, he told Hankey, he would find someone

who did. That someone, Hankey realized to his dismay, was himself.

When Cavan arrived in London, he was pressed very hard by the Committee

of Prime Ministers on July 23 about the possibility of achieving decisive results

against the Austrians. W.M.Hughes, the Australian prime minister, emphasized

the importance of “getting some hold on Austrian territory be fore the Peace

Conference.” Hughes, like the other imperial leaders, it must be emphasized again,

saw no hope of defeating the German army in the near future. “On the Western

front,” he argued, “it was evident that it would be a very slow business to drive

the Germans back to the Rhine. It did not appear possible to do this in the present

year, or next year, even with the American assistance, although, perhaps, it might

be accomplished the year after.”

Cavan generally went along with Hughes’ pessimistic forecast of military

operations in France and favored an Allied offensive in Italy. He was, however,

vague and uncertain about its results. Allied forces might penetrate Austria in the

direction of Trent, but they were unlikely to get very far because of the “difficult

mountain country.” On the other hand, Cavan would not fall in with Lloyd

George’s desire to deliver a decisive blow against the Austrians by an offensive

across the Piave into the plains. Such a movement, Cavan argued with some

justification, would expose Italian communications to a counter blow from the

north.

Cavan’s s inability to promise a decisive victory in Italy almost certainly

lowered his standing in the eyes of the prime minister.

Another disappointment was in store for Lloyd George when he talked with

Francesco Saverio Nitti, the Italian minister of the treasury, and Marquis Imperiali,

the Italian ambassador in London. It quickly became obvious that the Italians, who

had a wildly exaggerated view of Austria’s strength, were primarily interested in

receiving Allied assistance for defensive purposes. Although they made no

immediate demand for French or British soldiers, they expressed the desire to get

their hands on a few American divisions in the near future. When Wilson noted

that Foch and Pershing would be hostile to such a suggestion, Lloyd George,

perhaps to enlist Italian support against the generalissimo, “pointed out that one

of the difficulties of a united front arose from the fact that a General-in-Chief of

one nationality or another had to be chosen, and in the present case he was of

French nationality. He thought that perhaps too much advantage was being taken

320 THE UNCERTAIN ROAD TO VICTORY

of this fact, and that the whole scheme of a united command was thereby to some

extent weakened.”

This statement was indicative of Lloyd George’s mounting impatience over

Foch’s utilization of American divisions. (Pershing, of course, had his own ideas

about the use of American troops: he made clear his intentions of placing newly

arrived American divisions under his command in their own sector.)

On July 26,

at a meeting of the “X” Committee, Lloyd George

drew attention to the latest telegrams which indicated that the French were

intending to get the whole of the American Army into their sector. He was

convinced that this was part of the political game which General Foch was

playing at M.Clemenceau’s instigation. The whole object of it was, by

depriving us of the support of the American troops, to force us to keep up

our present total of 59 divisions regardless of the effect upon our industries

and national life generally. It was intolerable that the French should attempt

to put the screw upon us in that way and he was determined that if this

continued he would ask the authority of the Cabinet to refuse the French

any ships for the conveyance of American troops to France.

Later that day the War Cabinet gave Lloyd George the authority to use Britain’s

“shipping position, if necessary, as a lever to secure a fair redistribution of Allied

forces in the line on the introduction therein of the American divisions.”

August 2, a letter was duly sent to Clemenceau, threatening the French with the

reduction of British tonnage devoted to transporting Americans.

By this extreme policy Lloyd George hoped to gain the freedom of action to

reduce Haig’s force in the future and use Britain’s “surplus strength elsewhere—

in Italy, Salonica, Turkey, or Persia.”

As he schemed and plotted, the generals

in the West were moving in another direction. The Second Battle of the Marne,

which wrested the strategical initiative from Ludendorff, was an unmitigated

disaster for the Germans. The ground gained in their offensives in March, April,

and May proved to be a serious liability now that they were thrown back on the

defensive. The huge salients they had punched in the Allied front extended their

line, requiring an additional sixteen divisions for defense, and their troops in this

conquered territory “were lying out in open positions with no facilities for

defence.”

Although hardly anyone thought that Germany was beaten, the

initiative had now shifted to the Allies, reinforced by fresh Americans. Both Haig

and Foch had long hankered for a return to the offensive. In great secrecy, they

now took these plans seriously in hand. In late July, Foch, with the French army

having carried the heaviest burden recently, assigned Haig the leading role in the

Allied offensive planned for August 8.

Astonishingly the British civilians and even the C.I.G.S. were kept in the dark

about these plans.

Consequently, the discussion in London focused on military

operations in 1919 or even 1920. On July 25, Wilson completed a long and

rambling memorandum, “British Military Policy 1918–1919.” The Allied military

LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS 321

position now seemed much more favorable. The Germans were stalled in the West

and the East seemed secure for the immediate future. Germany was withdrawing

rather than sending troops to the Turkish theater; and the swirling chaos of Russia

made it impossible for Berlin to take hold in that country. Hence, although Wilson

had much to say about the importance of the East, his gaze was firmly set on the

desolate, shell-pocked battlefields of France, where he favored military operations

in 1918 to place the Allies in a position to fight a decisive battle in 1919. Lloyd

George’s desire to launch great attacks in either Italy or Palestine was given a cold

douche and an offensive in the Balkans was generally opposed.

When Lloyd George’s eyes fell on this memorandum, he was “bitterly

disappointed” at its “purely ‘Western front’ attitude.” It was “simply ‘Wully

redivivus,’” he grumbled to Hankey.

On July 31, the Committee of Prime

Ministers took up Wilson’s memorandum in a discussion notable for its

pessimism.

Milner led off the attack on Wilson’s thesis that Germany might be

defeated in 1919 in the West: “In his view the Western front was a candle that

burned all the moths that entered it.” Milner’s strategy for the future, even more

than Lloyd George’s, was political in nature. Convinced that Britain, even if she

strained her remaining manpower past the breaking point, could only play a

secondary role on the western front, he favored reducing Haig’s forces to thirty-

five divisions, utilizing the surplus thus created in other theaters where the British

role in the war might be magnified. If Britain gambled her last man in a bid for

victory in 1919, he argued, the result would almost certainly be a stalemate. Even

if the Germans agreed to talk peace, the voice of the empire would be reduced to

a whisper at any peace conference.

America would have an Army equivalent to 120 divisions, France perhaps

40, and the British Empire perhaps 23. When Australia said she wanted the

Pacific Islands, or Palestine, President Wilson would look down his nose

and say: That he had entered the War with quite different ideas in view, he

would say he had his 120 divisions ready to continue the War, and he would

ask what assistance we could give. Before we decided to put our Army on

the table next year and get it smashed to pieces he thought that this

consideration ought to be very carefully weighed.

Smuts agreed with Milner that it was hopeless to seek to defeat Germany in the

West: “He did not question that the Western front was the decisive front, but from

the beginning of the War it had always proved the fatal front.” The South African

general even maintained that “a purely military decision was not possible in this

war.” His strategy, like Milner’s and Lloyd George’s, was to concentrate British

military power “where the crust of the enemy’s resistance was thinnest…instead

of pressing for a purely military decision we should use our military strength where

we might exploit the economic and diplomatic position…. When Germany saw

her Allies being broken up she would probably make peace. In short, he would

depend as much on the moral and diplomatic as on the military factor.”

322 THE UNCERTAIN ROAD TO VICTORY

Lloyd George took exception with Smuts’s view that a good peace might be

obtained through negotiation. “He believed that a military victory was even more

important than the securing of the terms of peace we desired.” In no other way

might German militarism be smashed once and for all. The dilemma facing the

author of the “knock-out blow,” of course, was: Where could Germany be knocked

out? As a perplexed Hughes expressed it, where might “the Achilles’ heel of the

enemy be found”? Lloyd George made it clear that he was looking toward the

Italian theater once again, and he read from a secret report which indicated that

Austria-Hungary was a “doomed Empire.”

When these discussions resumed the next day, the civilians received their first

hint that an Allied offensive was about to be launched when Borden reported that

he had learned of secret movements of Canadian troops to participate in an attack.

When Wilson admitted that “he knew nothing of any forthcoming operation,”

Lloyd George was greatly agitated. Milner defended Foch by arguing that he had

the authority to plan and execute “minor operations” to rectify the line. But Lloyd

George, fearing another Passchendaele over the horizon, would not hear any

defense of Foch’s actions. “It was, he said, the business of the Government to

weigh up its resources. If they found that their forces were being reduced too low,

it was their business to exercise restraint on their Generals.” Weighing heavily on

his mind were the ominous recruiting figures for next year (Geddes maintained

that there would be only 170,000 recruits for the army for the whole of 1919) and

the dangerous situation being created by the withdrawal of skilled men from the

munitions industry for the army.

Foch, he continued, “had always been

somewhat reckless of human life…. He always seemed to proceed on the

assumption that the numbers of men were inexhaustible. Only in February of the

present year he had produced a calculation, according to which Great Britain still

had a reserve of 2,000,000 men.” More than this particular battle was at issue.

What if Foch ignored the British government in plotting strategy for 1919? A

Somme or Passchendaele style offensive was just as unpalatable under Foch as it

was under Haig.

The imperial leaders talked about “their constitutional position vis-à-vis General

Foch.” It was noted that the Beauvais agreement prevented the civilians from

interfering with the conduct of the war unless Haig, believing that his forces were

endangered, appealed to the government. Had Beauvais, then, destroyed any

influence the civilians might have over the generals? Such a situation could not

be allowed to stand. “It was pointed out that Field Marshal Haig was bound to

submit any big operation to the Government, that is to say, any operation of the

magnitude that would involve heavy casualties…. It was generally agreed that, if

General Foch were to decide on a plan such as that proposed by the Chief of the

Imperial General Staff, the British Government would not be functus officio.” In

reality, the unity of command gave Haig considerable latitude in the series of

offensives he launched in the summer and fall of 1918. If it had not been for the

protective shield of the generalissimo, Lloyd George who wanted “to limit our

LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS 323

strategy to our income” might have stopped him in his tracks, arguing that the

British army must conserve its strength.

At this meeting of the Committee of Prime Ministers, Lloyd George asked

Wilson if he “really thought in his heart that, with the means at their disposal, the

Allies could get a decision on the Western front next year, taking into consideration

the rate at which the American Army could be developed, and without assuming

the collapse of Austria?” Wilson, sensing that his head was on the block, began

to backpedal. A few minutes earlier, he had argued that he only approved of

“advances of a few thousand yards” to improve the Allied position in 1918,

assuring the ministers that “it was often a relatively cheap and easy matter to

advance a short distance.” Now, in response to Lloyd George’s direct question,

he said that he only proposed making prepa-rations for a great offensive in France

in 1919. “As the time approached we should be able to judge as to whether we

had any real chance of success. Otherwise, we could postpone.” Lloyd George

had heard this too many times in the past to be reassured; “he was in the position

of one, who, once bitten, was twice shy,” he grumbled.

But was it possible for the anti-German coalition, propped up by America, to

last until 1920? Lloyd George continued to argue that the collapse of Austria would

mean the end for Germany. But was this certain? Furthermore, would the Italians,

even if assisted by her allies, fight with determination? As a matter of fact, there

was grave concern that Italy might have a slight lead over Austria in the race to

drop out of the war. Despite the many imponderables about Britain staking

everything on a successful offensive in Italy, Wilson was instructed by the imperial

leaders to “report as to the possibility of knocking out Austria.”

To make certain that Wilson got the message, Lloyd George dispatched Hankey

to talk with him. The prime minister, Hankey bluntly told Wilson, believed that

he “was too much like Robertson. ‘lt is Irish instead of Scotch, but it is still whisky.’

“Wilson weakly responded that “he was dominated by the idea of not quarrelling

with our allies & more especially with Foch.” To get in the good graces of the

prime minister once again, he “explained a scheme he had for concentrating 12

divisions this winter on the Italian front.”

A few days later, however, Wilson

told the civilians that “unless Marshal Foch was in a position to set free the required

number of divisions at once or in the near future, no important attack could be

made [against Austria] before the snow fell.” In sum, although Wilson “regarded

the Italian theatre as a most promising one,” he “was afraid it was too late to do

anything this autumn.”

As Lloyd George and Wilson began to fall out over strategy, the Battle of

Amiens began. As the British army turned once again to the offensive, many

soldiers in the trenches were filled with apprehension. A young British staff

officer, Cyril Falls, who was later to become one of the most authoritative

historians of the war, wrote in the midst of the massive preparations for the assault:

“So the old tricks are coming out of the conjurer’s box. I have seen it too often

before—the Somme, Messines, Ypres, Cambrai—to be fully confident of a great

success on this occasion. But one thing is sure: if we take the knock this time after

324 THE UNCERTAIN ROAD TO VICTORY

Ludendorff has shown us how it is done, we may as well give up. On the whole I

am hopeful.”

With dominion troops given the leading role, Rawlinson’s Fourth

Army, assisted on its right by the French First Army, left its trenches on August

8. Supported by over 400 tanks and a swarm of aircraft, the infantry followed a

creeping barrage into the enemy’s fortifications. Caught completely by surprise,

the German center south of the Somme gave way. When dusk fell an advance of

from six to eight miles had been made with relatively small losses; many prisoners

and big guns had been captured.

German spirits had been lowered as much as British spirits were raised. The

psychological impact of the lumbering and menacing tanks, which were

impervious to machine guns and rifles, was especially devastating to German

morale. There is much truth to Ludendorff’s famous description of the events of

August 8 as “the black day of the German army.” German morale began to crack

for the first time in the West. Reserve divisions being pushed forward were called

“Black Legs” and “War Prolongers” by German troops in retreat. One German

soldier even yelled at the reinforcements: “We thought that we had set the thing

going; now you asses are corking up the hole again.”

Churchill’s account from the front was ebullient in its praise of Haig and his

troops. “There is no doubt,” he wrote Lloyd George, “Haig has won a very great

success which may well be the precursor of further extremely important events….

It seems to me this is the greatest British victory that has been won in the whole

war, and the worst defeat that the German Army has yet sustained.”

Haig’s splendid victory in no way altered Lloyd George’s dark view of

offensives in the West. Over lunch with Hankey on August 13, he admitted that

he did “not take a very sanguine view of our military prospects, in spite of recent

successes.” Intensely suspicious of the French, he told Wilson later that day that

he “was determined that our Army shall not be ruined by fighting instead of the

French.”

One result of this British success was that Haig’s position was now

secure. On behalf of the Imperial War Cabinet, Lloyd George sent him a message

of congratulations.

The reader, with the knowledge of hindsight, should not be too hasty to condemn

Lloyd George for his pessimism. The breakthrough of August 8 was no greater

than that achieved at Cambrai; and the Allied forces could not maintain their

momentum in the face of stiffening German resistance. The tanks, as John Terraine

has demonstrated, were not “war-winners” in their infant stage. They were slow,

often unreliable, and easy to knock out by artillery. By August 10, out of the 414

tanks committed to the battle, only 85 were still in action.

Of course, as the

official history admits, general headquarters might have made better use of this

promising instrument of war through more imaginative tactics.

The Germans had lost nothing strategically vital in this attack and they still

occupied more Russian and French territory than they held in 1917. Their forces

numbered over 2,500,000 men and a formidable defensive system protected

Germany from attack. Moreover, the French and British “were incapable, morally

and physically, of a massive and shattering breakthrough like that of March 21.”

LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS 325

The growing American forces seemed to hold the key to the total destruction of

the German army. In the opinion of Germany’s military and civilian leaders, as

Correlli Barnett has written: “It was not the present that was impossible; it was

the future.”

No imperial leader took a more pessimistic view of the military situation than

Smuts. Wilson had estimated that the Allies might launch a warwinning offensive

in 1919 with seventy reserve divisions because of the everincreasing strength of

the American forces. But were these numbers really sufficient for a decision in

1919? “I do not think so,” Smuts asserted in the Imperial War Cabinet on August

14. Believing that neither side could force a decision in the West, Smuts feared

that the Germans would direct their attention to the East in 1919. The thrust of

Smuts’s remarks was that Britain, with her Asian interests, had the most to lose

by continuing the war. Taking up where Lansdowne had left off, he argued:

It may well be that, by the indefinite continuance of the war, we shall become

a second or third-class Power, and the leadership, not only financially and

militarily, but in every respect, will have passed on to America and to Japan.

Europe will have fought itself out to a finish, and she will have been utterly

smashed, and not even the roots of future progress would be left in her….

I am very much against fighting it to the absolute end, because I think that,

although that end will be fatal to the enemy, it may possibly be fatal to us too.

Opposed to the Foreign Office’s definition of a sound peace in Europe which

assumed the total defeat of Germany, Smuts’s strategy continued to be that of

concentrating on “the weakest points of the enemy’s armour” to force the Germans

to accept a compromise peace.

On the following day, Smuts’s position was attacked from all sides during a

meeting of the War Cabinet that included the dominion prime ministers. Curzon,

whose zeal for the empire was unsurpassed, argued that Smuts exaggerated when

he painted a picture of “a great tide of invasion rolling against our Eastern Empire

while our efforts were being sterilized in the West.” It was his view “that it was

essential to go on hammering till Germany was definitely beaten and brought to

a different frame of mind, so that we could secure a peace which Germany would

keep and not have the strength to break.” Lloyd George accepted Smuts’s thesis

that the Allies might not be strong enough to defeat the German Army in 1919.

But he continued to insist that total victory over the enemy was essential to a

lasting peace. “He was convinced that we ought to go on until we could dictate

terms which would definitely mark the view taken by humanity of the heinousness

of Germany’s offence, and which would be the effective starting-point of a League

of Nations.”

The reader might ponder this irony. Lloyd George, the exponent of indirect

strategy, favored what amounted to imposing unconditional surrender on

Germany. Haig, whose strategy was designed to ruin the German army, was now

moving towards Smuts’s camp, arguing during the later discussion of armistice

326 THE UNCERTAIN ROAD TO VICTORY