Woodward D. Lloyd George and the Generals
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52. Lloyd George told the War Cabinet that “not less than four Departments” in addition
to Colonel Roure (who maintained that from 200,000 to 300,000 more combatants
could be found among men already mobilized) had criticized the army's use of
manpower. “We could not continue taking men from industries,” he continued, “and
practically raising a mutiny in this country in the rural districts, and among the
tribunals until we were convinced that the best use was being made of the men we
had taken.” Milner attempted to defend Haig’s utilization of men by emphasizing
the difference between the organization of an army fighting on its own soil with
“quiet” sectors and one fighting abroad on an active front as was the case with the
British. “I am not prepared to deny that there may be some truth in the charge that
our methods tend to err on the side of ‘eclecticism’ and lavishness of organisation.
But it is equally dangerous to err in the opposite direction,” he wrote in reference to
Roure’s report. For Roure’s report and Milner’s response, see Cabinet Paper G.T.
5277 of n.d., CAB 24/59, and Cabinet Paper G.T. 5532 of August 28, 1918, CAB
24/62. Also see War Cabinet (449), July 19, 1918, CAB 23/7, and “X” Committee
(21), July 16, 1918, CAB 23/17.
53. “X” Committee (21), July 16, 1918, CAB 23/17, and Hankey Diary, July 16, 1918,
1/3.
54. Committee of Prime Ministers (26A), July 23, 1918, CAB 23/44, and Hankey Diary,
July 23, 1918, 1/5.
55. Anglo-Italian Conference, July 24, 1918, CAB 28/4/I.C.-73.
56. Frank E.Vandiver, Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J.Pershing., 2 vols.
(1977), 2:926. Pershing chose the French over the British front, in part, because of
logistics. The rail lines running from his main bases made the northeast much more
accessible than the British front. Foch, of course, welcomed the relief that the
Americans gave the war-weary French army. The growing French control over
Allied transportation was another irritant to AngloFrench relations. The
centralization of transportation in France under Albert Claveille in July, Eric Geddes
warned the prime minister, gave Foch more control over “the detailed strategy of
the Allied Armies’ Commanders than any number of Conventions.” See Military
Operations, France and Belgium, 1918, 1:36, and Geddes to Lloyd George, August
8, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/18/2/18.
57. “X” Committee (25), July 26, 1918, CAB 23/17.
58. War Cabinet (452), July 26, 1918, CAB 23/7.
59. The American plan to have 100 divisions in France by 1919 was already in serious
trouble according to Reading, the British ambassador in Washington. “X”
Committee (25), July 26, 1918, CAB 23/17. In his letter to Clemenceau, the prime
minister warned that even a program of eighty divisions was not now possible
because the British could not increase their shipping tonnage and might even be
unable to maintain present levels. Lloyd George to Clemenceau, August 2, 1918,
Lloyd George MSS, F/50/3/9. Lloyd George also asked the king, who was about to
depart for France, to urge Haig to put in a request to the War Office that he have at
least ten American divisions. “Of course this is not cricket,” Wilson noted when he
discovered the prime minister’s machinations. Wilson Diary, August 5, 1918. There
can be no question that Parsons misses Lloyd George’s primary motive when he
writes “that the British reduced the flow of American troops to France in order to
advance their own economic interests and to constrict Wilson’s power to forge the
armistice and peace terms.” Edward Parsons, “Why the British Reduced the Flow
LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS 337
of American Troops to Europe in August–October 1918,” Canadian Journal of
History 12 (December 1977), pp. 173–91.
60. Hankey Diary, August 1, 1918, 1/5.
61. Wynne, If Germany Attacks, pp. 322–23.
62. Terraine, To Win a War, p. 106.
63. Apparently Foch was just as close-mouthed with his own government, with the
French ministers usually receiving only a few hours’ advance warning of an attack.
Wilson Diary, October 4, 1918, and Guinn, British Strategy and Politics, p. 85.
64. Wilson, “British Military Policy 1918–1919,” July 25, 1918, CAB 25/85. Despite
its “Western” slant, Haig was unimpressed by Wilson’s broad view of the war.
“Words! Words! Words! lots of Words! and little else. Theoretical Rubbish.
Whoever drafted this stuff will never win any campaign,” was his acid notation on
this memorandum. Haig MSS, no. 129.
65. Hankey Diary, July 30, 1918, 1/5.
66. Lloyd George later attempted to rewrite history, picturing himself as the optimist
and the British generals as the pessimists about the course of the war in the West.
See, for example, Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 2:1857–67.
67. An extreme example of Lloyd George’s violent opposition to attacks in the West is
found in his response to Hughes’s criticism during this meeting of the Salonikan
venture, which had locked up many Allied troops with little result thus far. “The
Salonican diversion,” Lloyd George countered, “had probably saved hundreds of
thousands of men from being engulfed in the mud of the Western front.” Committee
of Prime Ministers (27A), July 31, 1918, CAB 23/44.
68. See Committee of Prime Ministers (27B), August 1, 1918, CAB 23/44, and Churchill
to Lloyd George, July 7, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/8/2/25.
69. Committee of Prime Ministers (27B), August 1, 1918, CAB 23/44.
70. Hankey Diary, August 2, 1918, 1/5.
71. Committee of Prime Ministers (29A), August 8, 1918, CAB 23/44.
72. Falls, Great War, p. 374.
73. Ibid., p. 376.
74. Churchill to Lloyd George, August 10, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/8/2/30.
75. Hankey Diary, August 13, 1918, 1/5, and Wilson Diary, August 13, 1918.
76. This message gives the lie to the legend that Lloyd George refused to recognize
Haig’s achievements. Still, it is equally true that the prime minister unfairly tried to
give most of the credit to Foch (or unity of command). Committee of Prime Ministers
(29B), August 12, 1918, CAB 23/44, and War Cabinet (457), August 13, 1918, CAB
23/7.
77. Terraine, To Win a War, pp. 115–16.
78. Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1918, 4:156–57. Also see Liddell Hart,
Real War, pp. 436–37, and Barrie Pitt, 1918: The Last Act (1963), pp. 199-206.
79. Barnett, Swordbearers, pp. 353–54.
80. Ibid., p. 354.
81. Imperial War Cabinet (31), August 14, 1918, CAB 23/43. Smuts was especially
concerned at this juncture that the Germans might join hands with the Turks in Persia
and threaten India. Macdonogh, however, emphasized that the Germans only had
the 5th Caucasian Corps, “which was not of high fighting value,” in the Caucasus.
Eastern Committee (23), August 8, 1918, CAB 27/24.
338 THE UNCERTAIN ROAD TO VICTORY
82. War Cabinet (459), August 15, 1918, CAB 23/7. Amery wrote Smuts that he agreed
with much of what he had told the imperial leaders, but he argued that Britain must
fight on to 1920 if necessary to gain “the essentials of security,” i.e., dominant
position in the East. As for the West, Amery believed that it was “enough to secure
military superiority without actually carrying it out to its conclusion in the physical
expulsion of the Germans from France and Belgium.” Amery to Smuts, August 16,
1918, Smuts MSS, 684.
83. For Haig’s position, see Terraine, To Win a War, pp. 215–20. In early 1918, it should
be remembered, Haig had informed Smuts and Hankey that Britain might as well
make peace because she had already gotten a great deal out of the war overseas.
84. See “Report of the Committee of Prime Ministers. Preliminary Draft as a Basis for
Consideration,” August 14, 1918, CAB 23/44.
85. Clemenceau insisted that the United Kingdom had a pool of 2,000,000 men between
the ages of nineteen and forty-two even after the essential industries had been
provided for from which sufficient men could be drafted to maintain fifty British
divisions (in addition ,to ten dominion divisions) in France. As shown elsewhere,
Lloyd George had been pleased with Colonel Roure’s criticism of the army's
utilization of manpower; now Clemenceau was using this Frenchman’s calculations
against him. See Clemenceau (via Derby) to Loyd George, sent August 17, received
August 18, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/50/3/15. Lloyd George’s response was to
call Roure’s report an “unscientific, misleading and fallacious document.” Lloyd
George to Clemenceau, August 31, 1918, Lloyd George MSS F/50/3/17.
86. Committee of Prime Ministers (32B), August 16, 1918, CAB 23/44.
87. After Pershing, with Foch’s approval, took three of the remaining five American
divi sions from Haig and put them under his own command in late August, Lloyd
George became more determined than ever to resist the French (and now apparently
American) effort to force the British to maintain their existing number of divisions
in France. On August 26, he wrote an explosive letter to the British ambassador in
Washington: “Clemenceau and Foch mean to compel us to keep up our numbers on
the British front by refusing to take over the line. This policy would be fatal to the
British Empire as we have no reserve of men here which would enable us to keep
up anything approximating to the number of divisions we now maintain in the field,
and if we endeavoured to keep up that number until the summer of next year we
should be left with no army at all for the rest of the war. I cannot conceive of a more
disastrous plan from the British point of view. I mean therefore to fight it with every
available resource. Shipping is one of those resources and until the French and
Americans come to terms with us on the question of the line I do not propose to give
any further assistance in the matter of shipping.” Lloyd George to Reading, August
26, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/43/1/15.
88. Haig Diary, August 15, 1918, no. 130. Also see Terraine, To Win a War, p. 120.
89. Haig Diary, August 21, 1918, no. 130.
90. War Cabinet (461), August 20, 1918, CAB 23/7.
91. War Cabinet (462 and 464), August 21 and 27, 1918, CAB 23/7.
92. “X” Committee (27), August 31, 1918, CAB 23/17. Wilson would have been more
accurate if he had written the Drocourt-Quéant Line, Haig’s next objective.
93. Haig Diary, September 1, 1918, no. 131.
94. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 2:2030.
LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS 339
95. A likely reason for the War Office’s lukewarm attitude toward an offensive was that
d’Espèrey made his plans without consulting Milne, the commander of the British
forces, and never even visited the British sector. “One cannot help feeling here that
the French are playing their cards in this theatre solely for their own purposes,” Milne
informed Wilson. Milne to Wilson, July 27, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/47/7/35.
96. Anglo-French Conference, September 4, 1918, CAB 28/5/I.C.-74.
97. Hankey, Supreme Command, 2:837. This is also Lloyd George’s version in War
Memoirs, 2:1918–19.
98. Wilson Diary, September 4, 1918.
99. Liddell Hart, Real War, p. 439.
100. Military Operations: Egypt and Palestine, vol. 2, part 1, p. 35, and W.K.Hancock,
The Sanguine Years 1870–1919 (1962), p. 472. The magnitude of Allenby’s victory,
of course, now made the British position secure in the East. On the eve of his attack,
there had been concern, especially on Smuts’s part, about the loss of Baku even
though the War Office assured the ministers that Germany would not be “able to
take advantage of the comparative cessation of military operations on the Western
front during the winter months to indulge in any big campaign in the East.” Smuts,
however, believed as late as September 18 that “the initiative appeared to be passing
to the Turks.” See Eastern Committee (30 and 32), September 11 and 18, 1918, CAB
27/24.
101. J.T.Davies to Wilson, September 24, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/47/7/44.
102. War Cabinet (468 and 472), September 3 and 13, 1918, CAB 23/7.
103. Haig Diary, September 10, 1918, no. 131.
104. Milner to Lloyd George, September 17, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/38/4/17.
105. Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War, 1914–
1920, p. 362.
106. Haig Diary, September 21, 1918, no. 131, and Wilson Diary, September 23, 1918.
107. Lloyd George to Maclay, September 29, 1918, Lloyd George MS, F/35/2/82. Also
see Lloyd George to Milner, September 29, 1918, Lloyd George MSS, F/38/4/20.
As the Americans increased their share of the fighting, the French decreased theirs.
By November 11, the French “held only 40 miles of active front.” Military
Operations, France and Belgium, 1918, 5:584.
108. “X” Committee (29), October 19, 1918, CAB 23/17.
109. See Ralph Haswell Lutz, ed., The Fall of the German Empire, 1914–1918. 2 vols.
(1932), 2:460–63. Also see Lutz’s The Causes of the German Collapse in 1918,
trans. W.L.Campbell (1934), pp. 266–67, and Ludendorff’s reaction to Bulgaria’s
collapse, Ludendorff’s Own Story, 2:365–72.
110. See, for example, his comments in War Cabinet (489A), October 21, 1918, CAB 23/
14. Wilson pleased the Welshman by drawing up a plan for a great invasion across
the Danube and through Rumania during this period. Wilson Diary, October 22, 1918.
111. Allied Conferences, October 5, and November 2 and 4, 1918, CAB 28/5/I.C.-76, 89
and 93. Franchet d’Espèrey’s strategy, however, made the prime minister’s blood
boil. The French general, without consulting Milne, made a plan for the conquest of
Constantinople which largely excluded the British. “He and his colleagues,” Lloyd
George bluntly told Clemenceau on October 7, “did not consider that General
Franchet d’Espèrey in acting like this had behaved as an Allied Commander-in-
Chief. His plan was mainly political and not military.” The irony of Lloyd George’s
accusing someone else of being motivated by political rather than military
340 THE UNCERTAIN ROAD TO VICTORY
considerations in formulating strategy should not be lost on the reader. Allied
Conference, October 7, 1918, CAB 28/5/I.C.-79, and Hankey Diary, October 7,
1918, 1/6.
112. Rowland, Lloyd George: A Biography, chapter 11.
113. Entry of January 15, 1917, A Diary by Frances Stevenson, p. 139.
114. See, for example, Hankey, Supreme Command, 2:836–52.
115. See especially Terraine, To Win a War and Haig: Educated Soldier.
LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS 341
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