Дахно І.І. Право Європейського Союзу: Англо-Українсько-Російський Глосарій
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141
same time, dere
g
ulation
stimulates the develop-
ment of new forms of
technology and contrib-
utes to removing barriers
to trade. Some observers,
however, blame techno-
logical progress for ena-
bling businesses and in-
dividuals to find a wa
y
round national regula-
tions more easily.
.
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142
Hard core restrictions
Refers to restrictions of
competition by agree-
ments or business prac-
tices, which are seen b
y
most jurisdictions as be-
in
g
p
articularl
y
serious
and normally do not pro-
duce any beneficial ef-
fects. They therefore al-
most alwa
y
s infrin
g
e
com
p
etition law. Unde
r
EC law, the most promi-
nent exam
p
les on the
horizontal level include
a
g
reements between
com
p
etitors that fix
p
rices, allocate markets
or restrict the
q
uantities
of
g
oods or services to
b
e
p
roduced, bou
g
ht o
r
su
pp
lied. Exam
p
les of
hardcore restrictions in
vertical relationships (i.e.
b
etween undertakin
g
s
o
p
eratin
g
at differen
t
levels of the
p
roduction
or distribution chain
)
are
resale
p
rice maintenance
and certain territorial re-
strictions. Provisions of
an a
g
reement which
contain such restrictions
are also referre
d
to as
black clauses
and
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143
p
revent the a
g
reemen
t
from benefitin
g
from a
block exemption. Fur-
thermore, a
g
reements
containin
g
black clauses
can onl
y
exce
p
tionall
y
be exempted on the basis
of an individual assess-
ment.
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Horizontal agreement
DEFINITION Arrange-
ment between actual o
r
potential competitors, i.e.
undertakings operating at
the same level of the
production or distribu-
tion chain, coverin
g
fo
r
exam
p
le research an
d
develo
p
ment,
p
roduction,
purchasing or commer-
cialisation. Horizontal
a
g
reements ma
y
restric
t
com
p
etition in
p
articula
r
where the
y
involve
p
rice
fixin
g
or market sharin
g
,
or where the marke
t
p
ower resultin
g
from the
horizontal co-o
p
eration
causes ne
g
ative marke
t
effects with res
p
ect to
prices, output, innovation
or the variety and quality
of products. On the other
hand, horizontal co-
operation can be a means
to share risk, save costs,
p
ool know-how an
d
launch innovation faster.
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144
In
p
articular for small
and medium-sized enter-
p
rises co-o
p
eration can
b
e im
p
ortant means to
ada
p
t to the chan
g
in
g
market place.
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145
Import duties
Customs duties an
d
char
g
es havin
g
an effec
t
e
q
uivalent to customs
duties
p
a
y
able on the
importation of goods.
A
g
ricultural levies an
d
other im
p
ort char
g
es
introduced under the
common a
g
ricultural
p
olic
y
or under the
s
p
ecific arran
g
ements
a
pp
licable to certain
g
oods resultin
g
from the
processing of agricultural
products
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Individual exemption
Decision of the Commis-
sion
p
ursuant to Article
81(3) EC Treaty to ex-
empt notified agreements
between companies from
the
p
rohibition of Art.
81
(
1
)
EC Treat
y
on the
basis of an individual as-
sessment (Block exemp-
tion regulation). In broad
terms, restrictive agree-
ments qualify for ex-
em
p
tion if their benefits
to general welfare (prod
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146
uct improvement, techni-
cal or economic prog-
ress, benefits to con-
sumer
)
outwei
g
h thei
r
restrictive effects on
competition.
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Infringement
proceeding
An infringement pro-
ceedin
g
is an action
a
g
ainst a Member State,
which fails to fulfil an
obli
g
ation under the EC
Treaty or under secondary
EU legislation. The pro-
ceedin
g
is led b
y
the
Commission on its own
initiative or at the request
of another Member State.
Individuals do not have
the
p
ossibilit
y
to force
the Commission to star
t
an infringement pro-
ceedin
g
. If
j
ustified, the
p
roceedin
g
can result in
a judgement of the Euro-
p
ean Court of Justice,
statin
g
that the Membe
r
State in question has in-
deed committed an in-
frin
g
ement. In case of
non-res
p
ect of such a
judgement, the Court can
impose a penalty pay-
ment on the failin
g
Member State in a sepa-
rate proceeding.
See: Articles 226—228
of the EC Treaty
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147
Intellectual
p
ro
p
ert
y
right (IPR)
General term for the as-
si
g
nment of
p
ro
p
ert
y
rights through, e. g., pat-
ents, co
py
ri
g
hts o
r
trademarks. These prop-
ert
y
ri
g
hts
g
ive the
holder the exclusive right
to exploit the innovation.
The holder thus has mo-
no
p
ol
y
p
ower on the use
of the item, normall
y
fo
r
a specified period of time
and within a s
p
ecific
g
eo
g
ra
p
hic area. This
p
ower allows the holde
r
of an intellectual prop-
erty right to restrict imi-
tation and du
p
lication of
the
p
roduct concerned.
IPRs
p
revent free ridin
g
by
other com
p
anies an
d
constitute an incentive to
undertake R&D efforts.
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Ioannina compromise
The Ioannina compro-
mise takes its name from
an informal meetin
g
of
forei
g
n ministers in the
Greek city of Ioannina on
29 March 1994. Amon
g
the decisions taken at the
meetin
g
was a Council
decision concernin
g
the
specific question of qua-
lified ma
j
orit
y
votin
g
in
an enlar
g
ed 16-membe
r
Community. The decision
Y
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148
was later ad
j
usted in the
light of Norway’s deci-
sion not to join. The re-
sultin
g
com
p
romise la
y
s
down that if members of
the Council re
p
resentin
g
b
etween 23 votes
(
the
old blockin
g
minorit
y
threshold
)
and 26 votes
(the new threshold) ex-
p
ress their intention of
o
pp
osin
g
the takin
g
of a
decision b
y
the Council
by qualified majority, the
Council will do all
within its
p
ower, within
a reasonable s
p
ace of
time, to reach a satisfac-
tor
y
solution that can be
ado
p
ted b
y
at least 65
votes out of 87.
Following the re-
wei
g
htin
g
of votes in the
Council of Ministers, the
Treat
y
of Nice
p
uts an
end to the Ioannina com-
promise.
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149
Joint control
Joint control exists where
two or more undertak-
in
g
s or
p
ersons have the
p
ossibilit
y
of exercisin
g
decisive influence ove
r
another undertaking. De-
cisive influence in this
sense normall
y
means
the power to block ac-
tions which determine
the strate
g
ic commercial
behaviour of an under-
takin
g
. Joint control can
b
e ac
q
uired le
g
all
y
or de
facto.
See Comentration
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150
Laeken
Declaration
One year after the Treaty
of Nice and the Nice
Declaration, which calls
for institutional reform to
b
e
p
ursued be
y
ond the
2000 Inter
g
overnmental
Conference
(
IGC 2000
)
,
the Euro
p
ean Council,
meetin
g
in Laeken,
adopted a Declaration on
the Future of the Euro-
p
ean Union, or Laeken
Declaration, on 15 De-
cember 2001, commit-
ting the Union to be-
coming more demo-
cratic, transparent and ef-
fective.
This Declaration
p
oses
60 tar
g
eted
q
uestions on
the future of the Union,
around four main
themes: the division an
d
definition of
p
owers, the
sim
p
lification of the
treaties, the institutional
set-up and moving to-
wards a Constitution fo
r
Euro
p
ean citizens. I
t
convened a Convention,
g
atherin
g
to
g
ether the
main stakeholders, in or-
der to examine the fun-
damental
q
uestions raise
d
by the future develop-
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