Дахно І.І. Право Європейського Союзу: Англо-Українсько-Російський Глосарій
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151
ment of the Union so as
to
p
re
p
are in as broa
d
and trans
p
arent a wa
y
as
p
ossible for the nex
t
IGC.
$ $ ,
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$)% IGC.
> -
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$
>$
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, $ IGC.
Legal personality of the
Union
The question of the Un-
ion’s le
g
al status has
arisen primarily in con-
nection with its ca
p
acit
y
to conclude treaties o
r
accede to a
g
reements o
r
conventions, since the
Union, which com
p
rises
three separate Commu-
nities, each with le
g
al
p
ersonalit
y
(
Euro
p
ean
Communit
y
, ECSC an
d
Euratom
)
and two areas
of intergovernmental co-
o
p
eration, does not have
what is known in inter-
national law as «treaty-
makin
g
p
owers», that is,
the international ri
g
ht to
conclude a
g
reements
with third countries.
The Treaty of Amster-
dam contains no new
provisions on the subject,
as the Member States
failed to reach agreement
at the Inter
g
overnmental
Conference. Some ob-
servers ar
g
ue that the
p
roblem is non-existen
t
and there is nothin
g
to
p
revent the Union fro
m
concludin
g
a
g
reements
and assertin
g
its
p
osition
on the international
scene.
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152
Luxembourg
compromise
The Luxembourg com-
p
romise, reached in
January 1966, brought to
an end the so-calle
d
«em
p
t
y
chair» crisis,
France havin
g
refused to
take its seat in the Coun-
cil since Jul
y
1965. The
compromise was an ac-
knowled
g
ement of the
disa
g
reement existin
g
b
etween those who,
when a ma
j
or national
interest was at stake,
wanted the members of
the Council to do thei
r
b
est within a reasonable
space of time to find so-
lutions which all sides
could adopt without en-
croaching on their mu-
tual interests, an
d
France, which was in fa-
vour of keeping discus-
sions going until unani-
mous a
g
reement was
reached. Subse
q
uentl
y
other Member States
were to side with the
French point of view.
The com
p
romise has no
t
p
revented the Council
from takin
g
decisions in
accordance with the EC
Treat
y
, which
p
rovides
in man
y
cases for votin
g
by
q
ualified ma
j
orit
y
.
Nor has it hindered the
members of the Council
from making further ef-
forts to brin
g
p
oints of
view closer together be-
fore the Council takes a
decision.
D
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153
Market power
Stren
g
th of a firm on a
particular market. In ba-
sic economic terms,
market power is the abil-
it
y
of firms to
p
rice
above mar
g
inal cost an
d
for this to be
p
rofitable.
In com
p
etition anal
y
sis,
market power is deter-
mined with the hel
p
of a
structural anal
y
sis of the
market, notably the cal-
culation of market shares,
which necessitates an
examination of the avail-
ability of other producers
of the same or of substi-
tutable products (substi-
tutability). An assess-
ment of market
p
owe
r
also needs to include an
assessment of barriers to
entr
y
or
g
rowth
(
entr
y
b
arriers
)
and of the rate
of innovation. Further-
more, it ma
y
involve
q
ualitative criteria, such
as the financial re-
sources, the vertical inte-
g
ration or the
p
roduc
t
ran
g
e of the undertakin
g
concerned.
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M
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154
Market share
Measure for the relative
size of a firm in an in-
dustr
y
or market, in
terms of the
p
ro
p
ortion
of total out
p
ut, sales o
r
ca
p
acit
y
it accounts for.
In addition to profits, one
of the fre
q
uentl
y
cite
d
b
usiness ob
j
ectives of
firms is to increase mar-
ket share. This is because
market share, economies
of scale and
p
rofits are
often positively corre-
lated in market econo-
mies. In com
p
etition
p
olic
y
anal
y
sis, marke
t
shares are an import in-
dicator for the existence
of market
p
ower. In this
res
p
ect, one should no
t
onl
y
look at the absolute
market share level, bu
t
also at the market share
level relative to com-
p
etitors. However, even
firms with lar
g
e marke
t
shares do not necessarily
p
osses market
p
ower,
e.g. in cases where barri-
ers to enter the marke
t
concerned (entry barri-
ers
)
are ver
y
low and the
threat of entr
y
p
revents
the exercise of marke
t
power.
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Measures to combat
money laundering
Money laundering con-
sists in falsel
y
j
ustif
y
in
g
the origin of property or
:(
+
' $ -
*) -
'/ -
/
— 4> -
*
)
155
income accruin
g
b
y
wa
y
of a breach of criminal
law or in assistin
g
with
such an operation.
Given the scale of the
p
roblem, combatin
g
money laundering is now
a priority for the Euro-
pean Union. In the con-
clusions of the Tam
p
ere
Euro
p
ean Council on 15
and 16 October 1999, the
Heads of State and Gov-
ernment ex
p
ressed thei
r
desire to see mone
y
launderin
g
«rooted ou
t
wherever it occurs».
A number of instruments
have been ado
p
ted, the
two most important be-
ing:
x the Directive of 10
June 1991 on
p
revention
of the use of the financial
system for the purpose of
mone
y
launderin
g
, as
amended b
y
Parliamen
t
and the Council on 4 De-
cember 2001;
x the Convention on
mutual assistance in
criminal matters of 29
May 2000 and its Proto-
col, ado
p
ted b
y
the
Council on 16 Octobe
r
2001.
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29
2000 . ;
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2001 .
Monetary policy
Monetary policy is cov-
ered b
y
Articles 105 to
111 (former Articles 105
to 109) of the EC Treaty.
It is fundamental to eco-
nomic and monetar
y
union (EMU). Decision-
makin
g
p
rocedures var
y
according to the topics in
hand:
x for the issue of coins
by the Member States
*
' -
105-111
( 105-109)
& 0$-
) #. '-
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-
(
EM
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(EMU).
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> :
156
(Art. 106(2)), the coop-
eration procedure ap-
p
lies, after consultation
of the Euro
p
ean Central
Bank (ECB);for the for-
mulation of exchange-
rate
p
olic
y
g
uidelines
(Art. 111(2)), the Coun-
cil decides by a qualified
majority on a recom-
mendation from the ECB
or from the Commission
after consulting the ECB;
x for the im
p
lementin
g
measures referred to in
the Statute of the Euro-
p
ean S
y
stem of Central
Banks
(
ESCB
)
(
Art.
107
(
6
))
and the limits
and conditions unde
r
which the ECB is enti-
tled to impose fines (Art.
109(3)), the Council de-
cides by a qualified ma-
jority on a recommenda-
tion from the ECB an
d
after consultin
g
the
European Parliament and
the Commission;
x for technical adjust-
ments to the Statute of the
ESCB
(
Art. 107
(
5
))
, the
Council decides b
y
a
q
ualified ma
j
orit
y
on a
recommendation from the
ECB and after consultin
g
the Commission and ob-
tainin
g
the assent of the
European Parliament;
x for the exchan
g
e rate
of the Euro against non-
Communit
y
currencies
(Art. 111(1)), the Coun-
cil decides unanimousl
y
on a recommendation
from the ECB or the
Commission, after con-
sultin
g
the Euro
p
ean
Parliament.
The institutional provi-
sions (Articles 112—115)
—
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157
and transitional provisions
(
Articles 116—124
)
of
Title VII of the EC
Treat
y
(
economic an
d
monetary policy — for-
mer Title VI
)
have thei
r
own special decision-
makin
g
p
rocedures which
are se
p
arate from those
identified here.
(
116—124
)
VII
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124) VII &-
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Monitoring the
application of
Community law
The task of monitorin
g
the application of Com-
munit
y
law falls to the
European Commission as
the guardian of the Trea-
ties. It is an expression of
the fact that the Euro-
p
ean Union is based on
the rule of law and its
p
ur
p
ose is to make sure
that the law is observe
d
and actuall
y
a
pp
lied in
and b
y
the Membe
r
States. In exercisin
g
its
monitorin
g
function the
Commission takes care
to safe
g
uard the role
which is also assigned to
national authorities, par-
ticularl
y
the courts, in
this area.
Monitorin
g
the a
pp
li-
cation of the law ma
y
take the followin
g
forms:
x instituting infringe-
ment proceedings fol-
lowin
g
com
p
laints o
r
where cases are discov-
ered in the ordinar
y
course of events;
x court action a
g
ains
t
the other institutions;
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158
x
checkin
g
whether ai
d
g
iven b
y
the Membe
r
States is lawful;
x checking that the prin-
ciples prohibiting certain
types of agreements, de-
cisions and concerte
d
p
ractices and the abuse
of a dominant
p
osition
are observed.
The Commission’s an-
nual reports on the appli-
cation of Communit
y
law are an ex
p
ression of
the desire for transpar-
ency in dealings not only
with com
p
lainants bu
t
also with citizens an
d
members of parliament.
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.
Monopoly
Market situation with a
single supplier (mo-
no
p
olist
)
who — due to
the absence of competi-
tion — holds an extreme
form of market power. It
is tantamount to the ex-
istence of a dominan
t
position. Under monop-
ol
y
, out
p
ut is normall
y
lower and
p
rice hi
g
he
r
than under com
p
etitive
conditions. A monopolist
ma
y
also be deemed to
earn supra-normal profits
(
i. e.
p
rofits that excee
d
the normal remuneration
of the ca
p
ital
)
. A simila
r
situation on the deman
d
side of the market, that is
with a single buyer only,
is called monopsony.
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Monopsony
See Monopoly
' '
159
Ne
g
ative clearame t
yp
e
comfort letter
See Comfort letter
* -
)
*
Non-Community Goods =, ) # -
"
=/ )-
"-
)
N
n
160
Oligopoly
A market structure with
few sellers, who realise
their interde
p
endence in
taking strategic deci-
sions, for instance, on
price, output and quality.
In an oli
g
o
p
ol
y
, each
firm is aware that its
market behaviour will
distinctly affect the other
sellers and their marke
t
b
ehaviour. As a result,
each firm will take the
p
ossible reactions fro
m
the other players ex-
pressly into account. In
com
p
etition cases, the
term is often also use
d
for situations where a
few bi
g
sellers
j
ointl
y
dominate the competitive
structure and a frin
g
e of
smaller sellers ada
p
t to
their behaviour. The bi
g
sellers are then referre
d
to as the oli
g
o
p
olists. In
certain circumstances
this situation ma
y
be
considered as one of
collective
(
also
j
oint o
r
oligopolistic) dominance.
@
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O
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