Encyclopedia of Russian History

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ments promised by OVR; instead, they wanted the

safety and protection provided by a strong gov-

ernment. Although the complex and clumsy pro-

paganda machine of OVR continued to attack

Yeltsin, a social question based on new principles

took hold and was answered in large part by the

new prime minister, Vladimir Putin. The extremely

strong public relations campaign of the Kremlin

against OVR played its part as well.

In the end, OVR received 13.3 percent of the

votes (third place), losing by nearly half to the KPRF

and to the Unity Party that had been created

shortly before the elections and had campaigned as

a party of regional power. Moreover, nearly half

the OVR votes came from four regions whose

elites remained loyal to the bloc: Moscow, Moscow

oblast, Tatarstan, and Bashkiria. In these regions,

the bloc brought forth most of its candidates in dis-

tricts where they already enjoyed a distinct major-

ity. In the Duma, OVR formed the OVR faction

(which delegates from Fatherland joined) and the

delegate group called “Regions of Russia,” which

opposed the Kremlin for a while. In the absence of

ideology and the disagreements associated with it,

this factionalism could not continue for long. Be-

ginning in mid-2000, a long process of unification

took place, and in December 2000, Unity, Father-

land, and All Russia officially merged into the party

“Unity and Fatherland” (“United Russia”) with

three co-chairs: Sergei Shoygu, Yuri Luzhkov, and

Mintimir Shaymiev. Two weeks later, the new

party was registered with the Ministry of Justice.

See also: LUZHKOV, YURI MIKHAILOVICH; PRIMAKOV,

YEVGENY MAXIMOVICH; UNITY (MEDVED PARTY);

WOMEN OF RUSSIA BLOC

BIBLIOGRAPHY

McFaul, Michael. (2001). Russia’s Unfinished Revolution:

Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin. Ithaca, NY:

Cornell University Press.

McFaul, Michael, and Markov, Sergei. (1993). The Trou-

bled Birth of Russian Democracy: Parties, Personalities,

and Programs. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution

Press.

McFaul, Michael; Petrov, Nikolai; and Ryabov, Andrei,

eds. (1999). Primer on Russia’s 1999 Duma Elections.

Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Interna-

tional Peace.

Reddaway, Peter, and Glinski, Dmitri. (2001). The Tragedy

of Russia’s Reforms: Market Bolshevism against Democ-

racy. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press.

IKOLAI

ETROV

FEAST BOOKS

Special paraliturgical books that register the annual

commemorative meals in a monastic community

throughout the calendar year.

Formally the Feast books are similar to West-

ern late medieval anniversary books in parishes and

brotherhoods. The Russian term for “feast book” is

kormovye kniga, literally “feeding book.” Kormy,

“feedings,” in memory of the deceased, correspond

functionally and genetically to anniversary meals

in Byzantine monasteries as well as in Western

communities. The Russian term reflects the idea

that by means of the donation, on the basis of

which the meal is established, the monks become

guests of the donor. “Feeding” the monks equals

alms to the poor, in return for which the monks

offer their liturgical services. Kormy were the most

representative and most expensive form of com-

memoration in Muscovite Russia. Regular kormy

usually took place on the anniversary of death or

on the name day of the deceased. In earlier times,

the dates of kormy were registered within the Us-

tav, the liturgical Rule. Probably as early as the be-

ginning of the sixteenth century, monasteries

began to register the dates separately in special Feast

Books, but the preserved manuscripts derive only

from the last third of that century and from the

seventeenth century. The entries range from brief

notation of date and name of the commemorated

person to elaborate detail concerning donor and do-

nation, the food to be served, and the burial place

within the monastery. Some Feast Books addition-

ally specify the menu throughout the year and con-

tain instructions concerning discipline of the

brethren, services, distribution of alms, and related

matters.

See also: DONATION BOOKS; SOROKOUST

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Steindorff, Ludwig. (1995). “Commemoration and Ad-

ministrative Techniques in Muscovite Monasteries.”

Russian History/Histoire Russe 22:433–454.

UDWIG

TEINDORFF

FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

The February Revolution (which, according to New

Style dates, actually took place in March) developed

out of a wave of industrial strikes in Petrograd from

FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

483

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

January to March 1917. It gathered force when

workers at Russia’s largest factory were locked out

on March 7 and when women workers at a few

factories, angered by the food shortages, marched

out from their factories on March 8 demanding

bread. Men at nearby factories joined them, and over

the next two days antigovernment demonstrations

grew to include most of the industrial work force.

By March 10 they were joined by students and

broad sections of the urban lower and middle

classes. Soldiers who were called out to help break

up demonstrations acted with reluctance. The gov-

ernment’s ordering of troops to fire into the crowds

on March 11 broke the fragile bonds of discipline

among the soldiers, who were mostly recent

draftees with the same grievances as the demon-

strators. A revolt by one detachment of the Volyn-

sky Guard Regiment the morning of March 12

(February 27 O.S.) quickly spread to other regi-

ments. By midday the government lost control of

the means of armed coercion and collapsed.

To this point the revolution had been mainly a

popular revolt, with little leadership. What there

was came from socialist activists at the factory level

and from individuals who emerged as organizers

of factory demonstrations and leaders in attacks on

police stations and other symbols of authority. The

revolutionary parties, whose main leaders were in

exile, played few leadership roles before March 12.

But leadership was necessary to consolidate the rev-

olution that had taken place in the streets. Two

groups stepped forward on March 12. One was a

group of Duma leaders who had watched the events

of the preceding days, concerned about their im-

plications for the war effort but also realizing that

this might offer the long-sought opportunity to

force Tsar Nicholas II to reform the government.

That evening they formed a “Temporary Commit-

tee of the State Duma,” which would take govern-

mental responsibility in Petrograd. They opened

negotiations with the army high command to se-

cure its support in forcing Nicholas to make con-

cessions. The involvement of these respected public

figures proved vital in the following days.

At the same time, a multiparty group of so-

cialist intellectuals met at the Duma building and

led workers and soldiers in the formation of

the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’

Deputies. This was a more avowedly revolution-

ary body, committed to making the street revolt

into a sweeping social and economic as well as po-

litical revolution. The Duma Committee and the

Petrograd Soviet leaders immediately, if warily, be-

gan to cooperate to consolidate the February Rev-

olution and to form a new government. On March

15 they announced formation of a Provisional Gov-

ernment that would govern Russia until a new gov-

ernmental system could be created by a Constituent

Assembly, which was to be elected by universal

franchise. The same day Nicholas II gave way to

the reality of events and the pressures from his

army commanders, and abdicated. News of the rev-

olution in Petrograd sparked mostly peaceful rev-

olutions in the cities and towns of Russia. New city

governments, drawn primarily from liberal circles

of educated society, replaced the old government

authorities, while alongside them local soviets of

workers and soldiers deputies sprang up.

The new government was drawn primarily

from the liberal political leadership of the country.

Its head, the minister-president, was Prince G. E.

Lvov, a well-known liberal. The socialist Petrograd

Soviet leaders promised to support the new gov-

ernment insofar as it pursued policies of which they

approved. This political situation, however, was

very unstable. The existence of the Petrograd So-

viet alongside the Provisional Government robbed

the latter of much of its actual authority, giving

rise to what quickly was dubbed “dual-authority”

(dvoyevlastie). The government had the generally

recognized official authority and responsibility but

not the effective power, while the Soviet had the

actual power but not responsibility for governing.

This situation emerged because the Soviet com-

manded the primary loyalty of the industrial

workers and garrison soldiers, the main bases of

power in Petrograd, and could call on this support

in a conflict with the government.

The February Revolution resulted not merely in

the overthrow of the monarchy and creation of a

new government, but in an unleashing of popular

self-assertion and the formation of thousands of

organizations dedicated to expressing popular as-

pirations. Factory committees, soldiers’ commit-

tees, trade and professional unions, cultural

clubs, minority nationalist organizations, feminist

groups, householders’ associations, and other or-

ganizations were created to safeguard and advance

the interests and hopes of the population in its var-

ied identities. These became a major force in the

later unfolding of the revolution as they asserted

themselves and as political parties and leaders

struggled to articulate their demands and win their

allegiance. Gaining control over popular activism

became one of the key tasks of the political elites

and would-be leaders of the revolution.

FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

484

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

As the new political system was unstable, it

took some time for the main contours of power

to become clear. While political parties remained

important, three broad political blocs quickly

emerged: liberals, moderate socialists, and radical

left socialists. The liberals, represented especially by

the Cadet Party (Constitutional Democrats), dom-

inated the first Provisional Government and then

shared it in coalition with the moderate socialists

from May to October. The moderate socialists—the

Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) pre-

dominantly—were the main force in the Petrograd

and most other soviets around the country. The

radical left—Bolsheviks, left-wing Mensheviks, and

SRs, anarchists—were at first a small minority

voice, but soon grew as the alternative to the “coali-

tion” of liberals and moderate socialists when the

Provisional Government failed to satisfy popular

aspirations. Socialism was the overwhelming po-

litical position in 1917, and therefore the conflict

between the moderate and radical socialists deter-

mined the main course of politics in 1917.

The moderate socialists, primarily Mensheviks

and SRs, took form first. A key development here

was the return of a group of socialist exiles from

Siberia in March. Under the leadership of Irakli

Tsereteli, a Georgian Menshevik, they established

the policy of Revolutionary Defensism as the basic

policy of the Petrograd Soviet (and, in fact, for most

soviets in the country). Revolutionary Defensism

spoke to the desire of the populace for an end to

the war by calling for a general negotiated peace

based on the principle of self-determination of na-

tions and without annexations or indemnities. At

the same time it addressed still strong patriotism

by calling for continued defense of the country un-

til this peace could be achieved. The Revolutionary

Defensists also were willing to cooperate with

the liberals in the Provisional Government, and

beginning in May some of their leaders entered

the government in what was called “coalition”

governments—that is, ones with liberals and so-

cialists, after massive antiwar demonstrations un-

derscored the weakness of the government and

strength of the Soviet.

A radical left opposition to these policies existed

from the beginning, but received a major rein-

forcement by the return of political exiles from

Western Europe. The most important of these

proved to be Vladimir Lenin, who electrified poli-

tics on his return in April by denouncing not only

the government, but also the policy of the domi-

nant Revolutionary Defensists. This made the Bol-

sheviks relatively impotent in the optimistic mood

of the spring of 1917, but positioned them to re-

ceive the support of the dissatisfied sections of the

population in the summer and fall as the policies

of the Revolutionary Defensists and the Provisional

Government failed to find a way out of the war or

to solve domestic problems.

The Provisional Government initiated impor-

tant and far-reaching reforms, especially in areas

of civil rights and individual and group freedoms.

However, the new leadership faced almost unsolv-

able problems. The desire for peace was immense,

and failure to make progress on ending the war

undermined both the Provisional Government and

the Revolutionary Defensist leaders of the Petrograd

Soviet. This problem was compounded by an enor-

mously unpopular, and unsuccessful, military of-

fensive in the summer, which drove the soldiers

and many others leftward politically. The govern-

ment also failed to move swiftly to meet the peas-

antry’s expectations for land reform. During the

summer and early fall the economy deteriorated

rapidly, food and other goods became ever scarcer,

crime rose, and other social and economic problems

multiplied, along with rising social tensions. De-

mands for autonomy or even separatism grew

among some of the national minorities. The cu-

mulative problems gave rise by June to a call for

“All Power to the Soviets,” a call for a more radi-

cal, soviet-based, government that would act more

vigorously to end the war and solve the many

problems. This resulted in massive street demon-

strations in favor of soviet power in July (the “July

Days”). This in turn was followed by an attack on

the government from the right on September 9–13,

the unsuccessful putsch by General Lavr Kornilov.

Meanwhile, the Provisional Government was un-

stable, undergoing fundamental restructuring (ac-

companied by violence and major crises) in May,

July, and September. During one of these Alexan-

der Kerensky, a moderate socialist, became head of

the government on July 21.

By September the radicals were winning re-

elections to the leadership of soviets, workers’ and

soldiers’ committees, and other popular institu-

tions. The Kornilov Affair gave an enormous boost

of support for the Bolsheviks and radical left. Bol-

shevik-led coalitions took the leadership of the

Petrograd Soviet—the most important political in-

stitution in the country—and soviets in Moscow

and elsewhere. This, in addition to the increasing

social problems and tensions, prepared the ground

for the October Revolution.

FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

485

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

See also: APRIL THESES; BOLSHEVISM; KORNILOV AFFAIR;

LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; MENSHEVIKS; NICHOLAS II;

OCTOBER REVOLUTION; REVOLUTION OF 1905

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acton, Edward; Cherniaev, Vladimir I.; Rosenberg,

William G., eds. (1997). Critical Companion to the

Russian Revolution, 1914–1921. Bloomington: Indi-

ana University Press.

Browder, Robert Paul, and Kerensky, Alexander F., eds.

(1961). The Russian Provisional Government, 1917:

Documents. 3 vols. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univer-

sity Press.

Frankel, Edith Rogovin; Frankel, Jonathan; and Knei-Paz,

Baruch, eds. (1992). Revolution in Russia: Reassess-

ments of 1917. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer-

sity Press.

Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. (1981). The February Revolution:

Petrograd 1917. Seattle: University of Washington

Press.

Koenker, Diane, and Rosenberg, William G. (1989).

Strikes and Revolution in Russia, 1917. Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press.

Lieven, Dominic. (1994). Nicholas II: Twilight of the Em-

pire. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Rabinowitch, Alexander. (1968). Prelude to Revolution: The

Petrograd Bolsheviks and the July 1917 Uprising.

Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Rabinowitch, Alexander. (1976). The Bolsheviks Come to

Power: The Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd. New York:

Norton.

Rosenberg, William G. (1974). Liberals in the Russian

Revolution: The Constitutional Democratic Party,

1917–1921. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press.

Service, Robert, ed. (1992). Society and Politics in the Russ-

ian Revolution. Basingstoke and London: Macmillan.

Smith, S.A. (1983). Red Petrograd: Revolution in the Fac-

tories, 1917–18. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer-

sity Press, 1983.

Suny, Ronald Grigor. (1972). The Baku Commune,

1917–1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Rev-

olution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Wade, Rex A. (2000). The Russian Revolution: 1917. Cam-

bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Wildman, Allan K. (1980, 1987). The End of the Russian

Imperial Army, Vol I: The Old Army and the Soldiers’

Revolt (March–April 1917); Vol II: The End of the Russ-

ian Imperial Army: The Road to Soviet Power and Peace.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

A. W

ADE

FEDERAL ASSEMBLY

For most of the Soviet period, Russia’s legislature

was a ceremonial, rubber stamp body called the

Supreme Soviet. Under Mikhail Gorbachev, how-

ever, Russia’s legislative structures underwent dra-

matic reform, becoming an arena for competitive

elections and debates on major policy issues.

From May 1990 until September 1993, the

Russian legislature consisted of the Russian Soviet

Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Congress of

People’s Deputies and a smaller body called the

Supreme Soviet, which was the full-time working

parliament. On September 21, 1993, President Boris

Yeltsin dissolved the RSFSR Congress and Supreme

Soviet after a protracted political confrontation

with its members over constitutional and policy is-

sues. He further decreed that elections to a new bi-

cameral parliament called the Federal Assembly

would be held in December 1993. This parliamen-

tary structure was to be given constitutional sta-

tus through a national referendum on a new

constitution to be held simultaneously with the

parliamentary elections. The elections and referen-

dum took place on December 12, 1993, and on Jan-

uary 11, 1994, the newly elected deputies convened

in Moscow for the opening of the new Federal As-

sembly.

The 1993 constitution provides for a mixed

presidential-parliamentary system with a directly

elected president and a prime minister approved by

parliament. The lower chamber of the bicameral

Federal Assembly is called the State Duma, and the

upper chamber is the Federation Council. The pres-

ident appoints the prime minister, and the Duma

votes whether to confirm the appointment. The

president has wide legislative powers, including the

powers of veto and decree. Decrees (ukazy) carry

the force of law, but may not violate existing law.

A decree remains in effect until the parliament en-

acts legislation that supersedes it. The Federal As-

sembly may override a presidential veto by a

two-thirds vote of each chamber.

The Duma may deny the government its con-

fidence. Upon the first vote of no confidence in the

government, the president may ignore the parlia-

ment’s action. But the president must either dis-

miss the government or dissolve the Duma if the

Duma votes no confidence a second time within

three months. The prime minister may submit a

motion of confidence to the Duma, which, if de-

FEDERAL ASSEMBLY

486

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

feated by the Duma, leads the president to decide

whether to dismiss the government or dissolve the

Duma.

The president may not dissolve the Duma

within one year of its election, nor during a state

of emergency or national state of martial law, nor

within six months of a presidential election. Par-

liament does have the right to remove the presi-

dent by impeachment, but the constitution requires

that both chambers, the Supreme Court, and the

Constitutional Court concur with the charges.

Legislation originates in the Duma and, if

passed, is sent to the Federation Council. If the Fed-

eration Council approves the legislation or fails to

examine it within fourteen days, the legislation is

sent to the president to be signed. If the Federation

Council rejects the legislation, the two houses may

form a commission to resolve differences. However,

the Duma may override a Federation Council veto

by a two-thirds vote. Following final action by the

Federal Assembly, legislation is sent to the presi-

dent, who must sign or veto the legislation.

ELECTIONS

The electoral system used in the December 1993

Duma elections was put into effect by presidential

decree, but its essential features have been preserved

under subsequent legislation. Duma elections em-

ploy a mixed system of proportional representa-

tion and single-member districts. Half of the Duma’s

450 seats are allocated proportionately to registered

parties that receive at least five percent of the vote

in a single nationwide electoral district. The other

225 deputies are elected in single-round plurality

elections in single-member districts.

Unlike the Duma, the Federation Council has

changed significantly in the manner in which its

members are chosen. The Constitution provides

that two individuals from each of Russia’s eighty-

nine constituent territorial subjects, representing

the legislative and executive branches of each re-

gion, are to be chosen as members of the Federa-

tion Council. The membership of the 1994–1995

chamber was chosen by popular election. A 1995

law provided, however, that thereafter the two

members would be the head of the executive branch

and the head of the legislature in each territorial

subject. Therefore the members of the Federation

Council were part-time members of the chamber

and full-time officials in their home regions. Typ-

ically they traveled to Moscow for a few days every

month for brief parliamentary sessions.

During the summer of 2000, President Vladimir

Putin again changed the method for selecting Fed-

eration Chamber members. Under the new law he

sponsored, all members were to be full-time dele-

gates chosen by the chief executive officers and the

legislative assemblies of the eighty-nine territorial

subjects. The members chosen do not need to re-

side in the region sending them, allowing regions

to send prominent businesspeople, retired military

officers, and influential politicians as their repre-

sentatives. The changeover was complete by the end

of 2001.

Most observers believe that the system for se-

lecting members of the Federation Council is likely

to evolve further. Many advocate holding direct

elections of senators, as in the United States. One

difficulty with this is the constitutional provision

stipulating that the two senators from each region

represent the executive and legislative branches.

LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS

Over the 1994–1995 and 1996–1999 terms of the

State Duma, no party or coalition held a clear ma-

jority. However, in both Dumas, deputies opposed

to President Yeltsin held a majority. Vetoes were

frequent, and in 1999 the Duma came within four-

teen votes of passing a motion to remove Yeltsin

through impeachment. Nonetheless, behind-the-

scenes bargaining over legislation was the norm.

The chairman of the Duma in 1994 and 1995, Ivan

Rybkin, was a communist but took a cooperative

approach to his dealings with the executive branch,

as did his successor as chairman, Gennady Seleznev,

also a communist. On some highly contentious is-

sues, such as the privatization of land, the branches

were deadlocked. On many other issues, however,

president and parliament were able to reach agree-

ment. Overall, the president eventually signed

about three-quarters of the laws passed by the

Duma between 1994 and 1999.

The December 1999 parliamentary election and

President Yeltsin’s subsequent resignation resulted

in a substantial change in legislative-executive re-

lations. The Duma that convened in January 2000

was far friendlier to the president, and President

Putin proved to be skillful in managing his rela-

tions with the Duma. By mid-2001 a coalition of

four pro-Kremlin political factions had come to

dominate the chamber, and the president was suc-

cessful in passing an ambitious reform agenda.

Much legislation that had been stalled under

Yeltsin, including land privatization, cleared both

chambers. So did many other laws, including a new

FEDERAL ASSEMBLY

487

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Labor Code, pension reform, simplified rules for

business licensing and regulation, and ratification

of the START-II treaty.

INTERNAL ORGANIZATION

In the Duma, political factions exercise substantial

collective power over agenda-setting, organization,

and procedures. The chamber’s steering body is the

Council of the Duma, which is made up of the lead-

ers of each of the party factions (i.e., each party

clearing the five percent threshold in the party list

vote) as well as the heads of each organized deputy

group possessing at least thirty-five members. The

Council of the Duma forges the political compro-

mises needed to reach agreement on important leg-

islation. In addition, the leaders of the factions

decide among themselves on the distribution of

chairpersonships of the standing committees. Com-

mittee chairpersonships are distributed in rough

proportion to factional strength, although under

Putin, pro-presidential factions control the most in-

fluential committees. The Duma is not divided into

“majority” and “minority” coalitions, although

some evolution in that direction began in 2001.

The Federation Council lacks a system of po-

litical factions and is organized around its chair-

man and standing committees. The 2000 reform

has led to significant changes in the way the cham-

ber operates. A pro-Putin caucus, called “Federa-

tion,” with approximately one hundred members,

came to dominate the legislative proceedings in

2001. One of its members, a Putin ally named

Sergei Mironov, was elected chairman of the cham-

ber in December 2001. President Putin’s legislative

reforms began to sail through the chamber with

almost no opposition. “Federation” was dissolved

in January 2002, but the chamber remained

strongly supportive of President Putin’s program.

THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY

IN PERSPECTIVE

The 1993 constitution gives the president prepon-

derant power in the political system. However, the

electoral system that uses party-list voting for half

the seats in the Duma, combined with the presi-

dent’s interest in seeking legislative legitimacy for

his policy agenda, has allowed the parliament to

exercise greater influence than President Yeltsin had

originally anticipated. During his first two years,

President Putin succeeded in marginalizing political

opposition in both chambers and securing parlia-

ment’s support for his legislative program, which

included measures strengthening the central gov-

ernment vis-à-vis the regions and laws intended to

improve the climate for investors and entrepre-

neurs. However, each chamber has developed a ca-

pacity for deliberation and decision making that

may make parliament a more effective counter-

weight to future presidents. Therefore it is likely

that the role of the Federal Assembly in the politi-

cal system will continue to evolve.

See also: CONGRESS OF PEOPLE’S DEPUTIES; DUMA; GOR-

BACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; PUTIN, VLADIMIR

VLADIMIROVICH; SUPREME SOVIET; YELTSIN, BORIS

NIKOLAYEVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chaisty, Paul. (2001). “Legislative Politics in Russia.” In

Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader, ed. Archie

Brown. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

McFaul, Michael. (2001). Russia’s Unfinished Revolution:

Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin. Ithaca, NY:

Cornell University Press.

Remington, Thomas F. (2001). The Russian Parliament:

Institutional Evolution in a Transitional Regime,

1989–1999. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Smith, Steven, and Remington, Thomas F. (2001) The

Politics of Institutional Choice: Formation of the Russ-

ian State Duma. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press.

HOMAS

F. R

EMINGTON

FEDERALISM

The Russian Federation, as its name implies, is a

federated political entity. However, this concept

continues to evolve and is periodically challenged

by a variety of political forces. Even if using one

of the simpler definitions of federalism—that of

“self rule plus shared rule” within a country—the

Russian case defies easy classification.

According to the Russian constitution, there are

eighty-nine distinct territorial entities within the

Russian Federation, with some based on ethnic

groups and others on territorial foundations. How

these entities fit together in the Russian political

system is a result of more than a decade of nego-

tiation and practice. After all, the initial challenge

was that while the Russian Socialist Federated So-

viet Republic (RSFSR) was called a federation dur-

ing the Soviet period, it was a unitary system in

practice. Thus, at the time of independence in 1991,

each of these political units had to renegotiate its

FEDERALISM

488

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

standing within the new state, which eventually

developed a system referred to as “assymetrical fed-

eralism.” A number of the ethnic–based republics,

for example, sought greater autonomy, or outright

independence.

The Federation Treaty of March 1992 was the

first step in formally resolving the question of pow-

ers and rights within the federated system. By the

end of that year, all but Chechnya and Tatarstan

signed the agreement, and the abstention of these

two republics raised questions of a possible splin-

tering of the Russian Federation. With the adoption

of the new Russian constitution in December 1993,

however, the Federation Treaty was enshrined in

the main legal basis of the country. Beginning in

1994, the government in Moscow worked out an

agreement with Tatarstan, as well as treaties with

the other republics of the Russian Federation, leav-

ing the Chechen Republic as the sole holdout. In-

deed, that part of the Russian Federation remains

contested and in the early twenty-first century is

mired in a bloody conflict.

There are several key issues that continue to

confront the federal structure in Russia. First, there

are questions concerning basic budgetary and tax-

ation rights. Are the regions able to create their own

financial bases from which to fund specific pro-

jects? From education policies to economic devel-

opment plans, problems exist as to what the

republics can do. Second, there remains a problem

of resource management on the national level. This

is particularly important in the energy and strate-

gic mineral fields. For example, control over energy

deposits in the Yamalo–Nenets okrug was contested

by that entity, the Tiumen oblast within which it

is located, and the government in Moscow. Third,

there are questions about the actual political power

of regional governors. During the late–Yeltsin era,

there was a tendency for the federal government to

appoint regional officials in order to better control

them from the center. Since that time, however,

these officials are elected, and a few of these have

begun to exercise real authority in their specific re-

gions. In addition, the Federal Council, the upper

chamber of the Russian legislature (similar to the

U.S. Senate), is designed to represent the interests

of these various subnational entities.

Given the vast territorial expanse of the Rus-

sian Federation, as well as the ethnic diversity of

the regions, political leaders in Russia at least sup-

port the idea of a federated political system. How-

ever, the history of unitary control, both during

tsarist and Soviet times, has yielded a legacy within

the bureaucracy and administration that is difficult

to change. In addition, the specific conditions and

needs of each region undoubtedly dictate the spe-

cific level of authority that may be attained through-

out the country. Most analysts and experts suggest

that “federalism” in the Russian Federation will re-

main a multi–level system that will continue to see

variations from region to region.

See also: FEDERATION TREATIES; NATIONALITIES POLICIES,

SOVIET; PEOPLE’S COMMISSARIAT OF NATIONALITIES;

RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kahn, Jeffrey. (2002). Federalism, Democratization, and

the Rule of Law in Russia. New York: Oxford Uni-

versity Press.

Kempton, Daniel R., and Clark, Terry D., eds. (2002).

Unity of Separation: Center–Periphery Relations in the

Former Soviet Union. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Ross, Cameron. (2003). Federalism and Democratization in

Post–Communist Russia. Manchester, UK: Manches-

ter University Press.

Stoner–Weiss, Kathryn. (2002). “Soviet Solutions to

Post–Soviet Problems: Has Vladimir Putin Really

Strengthened the Federal Center?” PONARS [Program

on New Approaches to Russian Security] Policy Memo

No. 283, October.

Walker, Edward W. (1995). “Designing Center–Region

Relations in the New Russia.” East European Consti-

tutional Review 4(1): 54-60.

OGER

ANGAS

FEDERAL PROPERTY FUND

The State Property Committee agency charged

with receiving and overseeing privatization of state

enterprises designated for privatization began op-

erations in October 1992 (under Anatoly Chubais)

in what became a large–scale sale of state enter-

prises. The first stage was voucher privatization.

Vouchers were sent to every man, woman, and child

in Russia. These voucher checks could be used to

purchase shares in what had previously been state

enterprises. Or they could be invested in managed

mutual funds or sold on the secondary market.

Enterprises slated for privatization were trans-

ferred to the Federal Property Fund. The initial stage

of privatization excluded enterprises of national

significance, such and oil and electric generation

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and those of military or strategic significance. Large

scale, non-military enterprises were transferred

subsequently in 1994–1995 and many were auc-

tioned off under what was called the “loans for

shares” program. When enterprises were trans-

ferred to the Federal Property Fund they were re-

quired to be converted into open joint stock

companies before privatization. The Federal Prop-

erty Fund was to oversee this transformation and

supervise the privatization process.

In the end the Federal Property Fund partici-

pated in the largest privatization program in eco-

nomic history, one that was replete with insider

advantages, corruption, bribery, and scandalous

underpayment by the ultimate owners. Privatiza-

tion was also incomplete because the government

maintained either a majority ownership or “golden

shares” that allowed a veto over management de-

cisions.

See also: PRIVATIZATION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gregory, Paul R., and Stuart, Robert C. (2001). Russian

and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure, 7th ed.

New York: Addison Wesley.

Hedlund, Stefan. (1999). Russia’s “Market” Economy: A

Bad Case of Predatory Capitalism. London: UCL Press.

AMES

R. M

ILLAR

FEDERATION TREATIES

On March 13, 1992, representatives of eighteen

of Russia’s twenty ethnic republics initialed a

treaty of federation with the Russian federal

government. Two republics—Chechnya and

Tatarstan—refused to sign. A separate agreement

was initialed by representatives of Russia’s oblasts

and kraya (administrative divisions) that same

week, followed several days later by a third agree-

ment with the country’s autonomous okruga (ter-

ritorial divisions) and the Jewish Autonomous

Oblast. On March 31, 1992, the three treaties,

which would be collectively referred to as the “Fed-

eration Treaty,” were formally signed into law. Af-

ter the formal separation of the Chechen and

Ingush Republics was ratified by the Sixth Congress

of Peoples’ Deputies in April 1992, the number of

republics under Russian constitutional law rose to

twenty-one. While Ingushetia signed the Treaty

upon its establishment, Chechnya refused to do so,

asserting that it had declared formal independence

in November 1991.

The April 1992 Treaty provided for a compli-

cated and vague division of powers between the fed-

eral government and Russia’s eighty-nine “subjects

of the federation.” It also required as many as one

hundred enabling laws, most of which were never

adopted. Symbolically, the most important provi-

sion was the Treaty’s designation of the ethnic re-

publics, but not the Russian Federation’s other

constituent units (oblasts, kraya, and autonomous

okruga), as “sovereign,” although it was not clear

what legal rights, if any, “sovereign” status en-

tailed. Some advocates of the republics argued that

it implied a right to refuse to join the federation as

well as a right of unilateral secession. Unlike the

USSR constitution in effect at the time of the dis-

solution of the Soviet Union in December 1991,

however, Russia’s Federation Treaty of 1992 made

no reference to a right of secession for the republics.

Nor did federal authorities agree that the republics

had a right to refuse to join the federation. The

Treaty also stipulated that the constitutions of the

republics had to conform to the federal constitu-

tion.

The intent of the drafters of the April 1992 had

been to include the Treaty’s provisions in a new

constitution for the Russian Federation. However,

the text of the Treaty was left out of the Russian

Constitution of December 12, 1993, although Ar-

ticle 11.3 stated that the distribution of federal and

regional powers is governed by “this Constitution,

the Federation Treaty, and other treaties (dogovory)

that delineate objects of jurisdiction and powers.”

Article 1, Part 2, of the constitution added that

“should the provisions of the Federation Treaty

. . . contravene those of the Constitution of the Fed-

eration, the provisions of the Constitution of the

Russian Federation shall apply.” In effect, the terms

of the Federation Treaty were superseded by the

federation provisions in the new constitution,

which did not identify the republics as sovereign

and was unequivocal in denying the subjects of the

federation a unilateral right of secession.

While the Treaty had limited legal significance,

its signing in early 1992 helped ameliorate some of

the tension between the Russian federal govern-

ment and the republics in the wake of the dissolu-

tion of the USSR. It also provided President Boris

Yeltsin with an important political victory. But it

left many critical issues unresolved, particularly the

legal status of Chechnya and Tatarstan. In Febru-

FEDERATION TREATIES

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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

ary 1994, Tatarstan agreed to become a constituent

unit of the Russian Federation pursuant to the

terms of a bilateral treaty. Chechnya would con-

tinue to refuse to join the federation, however, a

position that led to war between the Russian fed-

eral government and supporters of Chechen inde-

pendence later that year.

See also: CONSTITUTION OF 1993; FEDERALISM; RUSSIAN

SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ahdieh, Robert B. (1997). Russia’s Constitutional Revolu-

tion: Legal Consciousness and the Transition to Democ-

racy. University Park: Pennsylvania State University

Press.

Lapidus, Gail W., and Walker, Edward W. (1995). “Na-

tionalism, Regionalism, and Federalism: Center-

Periphery Relations in Post-Communist Russia.” In

The New Russia: Troubled Transformation, ed. Gail W.

Lapidus. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

DWARD

W. W

ALKER

FELDMAN, GRIGORY ALEXANDROVICH

(1884–1958), a pioneer in the mathematical study

of economic growth.

Grigory Alexandrovich Feldman, an electrical

engineer by profession, worked in Gosplan from

1923 until 1931. His report to the committee for

long-term planning of Gosplan, entitled “On the

Theory of the Rates of Growth of the National In-

come,” was published in 1928 and became the

basis for the committee’s preliminary draft of a

long-term plan. However, Feldman soon came un-

der attack for his ideas on the politically sensitive

subject of socialist industrialization and use of

mathematics in the heroic atmosphere of those

times. His numerical targets, though supported by

the head of the committee, proved too optimistic

and could not be realized. After some tendentious

criticism, Feldman’s career never recovered. Even

his later work on growth in the United States, an

early interest of his, could not be published. He ap-

parently spent several years in labor camps before

being released, quite sick, in 1953.

Feldman’s two-sector growth model was based

on the macroeconomic concepts of Karl Marx.

Feldman first demonstrated that the higher the ag-

gregate growth of an economy, the more capital

had to be devoted to the producers’ goods sector.

Net investment would have to be proportional to

the existing allocation of capital. The greater the

capacity to produce capital goods, the faster the

economy could grow, according to the model. Cap-

ital-output ratios in the two sectors could be min-

imized by working several shifts. This early growth

model, however, ignored likely scarcities of food,

foreign exchange, and skilled labor that would re-

sult when growth accelerated.

See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; GOSPLAN

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Domar, Evsey D. (1957). Essays in the Theory of Economic

Growth. New York: Oxford University Press.

Ellman, Michael. (1990). “Grigorii Alexandrovic Fel’d-

man.” In Problems of the Planned Economy, eds. John

Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman. New

York: Norton.

ARTIN

C. S

PECHLER

FELDSHER

Medical assistant.

Feldshers first appeared in Russia during the

eighteenth century, when they served as medical

assistants in urban hospitals or as army corpspeo-

ple. During the nineteenth century they played a

major role in rural medical systems. The law re-

stricted them to practice under a physician’s direct

supervision; many were nevertheless assigned to

run remote clinics on their own because of the

dearth of physicians in the countryside. Forced by

circumstances to tolerate such independent feldsher

practice, known as “feldsherism,” leading physi-

cians adamantly opposed granting it legal sanction.

“Feldsherism” remained a contentious issue as well

as a widespread practice well into the 1920s.

During the 1870s, many provincial zemstvos

established feldsher schools in order to raise feldshers’

overall qualifications. Opening feldsher practice to

women in 1871 brought growing numbers of ur-

ban women with gymnasium training into these

schools. By the twentieth century, the qualifications

of these newer feldshers and feldsher-midwives had

improved dramatically. As of 1914 there were more

than 20,000 civilian feldshers in Russia. Most served

in rural areas, but one-third worked for urban hos-

pitals, railroads, schools, and factories.

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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

The publication in 1891 of the newspaper Feld-

sher sparked the appearance of a feldsher profes-

sional movement. In 1906, local feldsher societies

formed a national Union of Societies of Physicians’

Assistants, which published the newspaper Feld-

shersky vestnik (Feldsher Herald) and lobbied on feld-

shers’ behalf. During the revolutions of 1905 and

1917, most feldshers identified with moderate so-

cialist parties. In 1918 the Union was dissolved; its

members entered the industrial medical union

Vsemediksantrud.

The Soviet regime ceased training feldshers al-

together in 1924, focusing instead on midwives and

nurses. Feldsher training was resumed in 1937, and

feldshers continue to serve as auxiliary medical per-

sonnel in Russia.

See also: HEALTH CARE SERVICES, IMPERIAL; HEALTH CARE

SERVICES, SOVIET

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ramer, Samuel C. (1976). “Who Was the Russian Feld-

sher?” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 50:213–225.

Ramer, Samuel C. (1996). “Professionalism and Politics:

The Russian Feldsher Movement, 1891–1918.” In

Russia’s Missing Middle Class: The Professions in Rus-

sian History, ed. Harley D. Balzer. Armonk, NY:

M. E. Sharpe.

AMUEL

C. R

AMER

FELLOW TRAVELERS

Intellectuals sympathetic to the Bolshevik cause and

later to the Soviet Union as a socialist state.

The term fellow traveler (poputchiki) was used

by Vladimir Lenin and other Bolsheviks to describe

those who agreed with the principles of socialism

but did not accept the entire Bolshevik program.

Lenin attacked these “petty-bourgeois fellow trav-

elers” for their weak understanding of theory and

tactics, and for leading workers away from revo-

lution. Leon Trotsky, in 1918, described the Left

Socialist Revolutionaries in similar terms because

of their vacillation on the October Revolution.

The pejorative sense of the term gave way in

1924, when Trotsky argued that fellow travelers

in literature could be useful for the young Soviet

state. He used the term to describe non-party writ-

ers who could serve the cause of revolution even

though they were not proletarians. In Literature and

Revolution, Trotsky argued that non-party intellec-

tuals were no longer a serious threat and could be

guided toward a proletarian view of the world. This

was followed by a Central Committee resolution in

1925 refusing to prefer one faction or theory of lit-

erature over any other.

The groups and individuals defined as fellow

travelers during the 1920s constituted a flourish-

ing artistic and literary culture that produced the

best Soviet literature of the decade. The most fa-

mous group was the Serapion Brotherhood, whose

membership included Konstantin Fedin, Yevgeny

Zamyatin, and Vsevolod V. Ivanov. These authors

believed that literature should be free from out-

side control, but were generally sympathetic to

the goals of the revolution. Others, perhaps less

favorably inclined toward the Bolsheviks but

nonetheless counted as fellow travelers, were Boris

Pilnyak, Isaac Babel, and Mikhail Bulgakov.

By the late 1920s, fellow travelers were com-

ing under increasing pressure from groups claim-

ing to represent the proletariat, such as the Russian

Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP). In 1932,

all independent organizations for writers and

artists disappeared and the Writers’ Union was cre-

ated. Fellow travelers were required to either join

the union and follow its rules or stop publishing.

By the end of 1920s, the term “fellow traveler”

had been taken up in other countries as a designa-

tion for people sympathetic to the Soviet Union and

especially for intellectuals who publicly expressed

support for Stalin. Romain Rolland and George

Bernard Shaw, for instance, praised the Soviet Union

and saw it as a real alternative to western political

systems. In the post–World War II era, “fellow trav-

eler” became a term of derision, applied by conser-

vatives to people who were communists in all but

party affiliation. Albert Einstein, for example, was

called a “dupe and a fellow traveler” by Time mag-

azine in 1949 for his outspoken belief in socialism.

See also: CULTURAL REVOLUTION; RUSSIAN ASSOCIATION

OF PROLETARIAN WRITERS; SERAPION BROTHERS; UNION

OF SOVIET WRITERS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Canute, David. (1988). The Fellow-Travellers: Intellectual

Friends of Communism. New Haven, CT: Yale Uni-

versity Press.

Maguire, Robert. (1987). Red Virgin Soil: Soviet Literature

in the 1920s. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

ARL

E. L

OEWENSTEIN

FELLOW TRAVELERS

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