Foster L.V. A Brief History of Mexico

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A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEXICO

168

stolen from the Terrazas clan. Emiliano Zapata had never stopped ﬁght-

ing and although he remained independent of the Constitutional Army,

he forced Huerta to ﬁght in the south as well as the north.

The revolutionary struggle resulted in the total militarization of

Mexico. Huerta closed all businesses on Sundays so civilians could

receive military training. The trains were preempted for military per-

sonnel, and the federal army grew from 50,000 to a quarter of a million

troops. When the number of volunteers was inadequate, the poor were

rounded up—outside a cantina, inside a jail—and tied up in a wagon

for transport to the ﬁeld. Huerta’s programs supplied fresh recruits

when they were most needed and were continued by others throughout

the revolution. One-third of the budget went to Huerta’s army.

Initially, Huerta was successful against the revolutionaries. In the

south the Zapatistas were driven into the mountains, and their village

Women in the Army:

Soldaderas

Yaqui Indian soldier of the Mexican

Revolution

(Courtesy of the

Bancroft Library)

he army of the north, whether

riding hard on the prairies or

commandeering the trains, was like a

massive migration of people. Women

joined their husbands, often foraging

for food and nursing the wounded,

but also as soldaderas (women sol-

diers), slinging a riﬂe over one shoul-

der, a child on the other. When the

federal government tried to banish

women from its army, the troops

threatened revolt.

Popular among the troops was

delita

The woman the sergeant adored

Because she was as brave as she

was pretty

So even the colonel respected her.

“Adelita,” a revolutionary folk song

169

supporters were placed in concentration camps. In the north Carranza

and Villa were pushed back. By 1914, Huerta controlled two-thirds of

Mexico, the ports, and the vast majority of its population. The war

effort was paid for by forced loans on businesses and taxes on oil—and

church support that revived the old anticlericalism of the Juárez reform

war. Debts were permitted by banks thanks to the ﬁnancial backing of

Great Britain and Lord Cowdray’s Mexican oil interests.

Huerta’s successes were reversed by the infusion of U.S. military aid

in 1914. The competition over oil between Britain and the United States

combined with the anti-Americanism of Huerta, moved Woodrow

Wilson to openly support Carranza and his Constitutionalists. These

armies of the north began taking cities from Huerta at the same time

Zapata and his bands of guerrillas took over more areas in the south.

The United States then intervened with its warships along the Gulf

coast, attempting to force Huerta to resign.

The U.S. effort backﬁred when marines landed at Veracruz and

thereby almost united all of Mexico behind Huerta. This insult to

Mexico’s sovereignty forced even Carranza and Zapata to denounce the

invasion. Wilson agreed to permit some South American countries to

mediate while he imposed an arms embargo at the port of Veracruz.

The Constitutionalists, still supplied from the northern border, gained

considerable ground in the ﬁghting. In negotiations, Britain and the

United States resolved their own disputes. The Huerta government was

bankrupted and isolated. Huerta sailed into exile on July 20, 1914. On

August 15, Obregón led the ﬁrst troops of the Constitutional Army into

the capital and Carranza, as ﬁrst chief, proclaimed victory for the revo-

lutionaries. The Porﬁristas had been defeated once again.

Anarchy

With Carranza’s whiskers

I’m going to weave a hat band

To put on the sombrero

Of his better Pancho Villa

“La Cucaracha,” a revolutionary folk song

Having successfully united against Huerta, the revolutionaries rediscov-

ered their differences. Villa and Zapata had been conﬁscating and redis-

tributing haciendas during the ﬁghting. Carranza, a political reformer

THE REVOLUTION OF 1910

A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEXICO

170

but not a social activist, disapproved. Too autocratic to listen to the

other side, Carranza could not understand that elections, especially

when they usually were rigged, were not the overwhelming concern

of most of those who had been ﬁghting—a change in the social order

was.

There were personality clashes, but also class differences in the

divide. Mostly Indian peasants had fought with Zapata under the sym-

bol of the Virgin of Guadalupe, soldiers wearing sombreros and white

peasant clothing who had been deprived of both land and water. Villa’s

army, the largest and most professional in the Mexican Revolution,

was more diverse but included many who had gone hungry—peons,

cowboys, and miners. Although these revolutionaries attracted their

share of intellectual supporters, most of the middle class had supported

Carranza. As Villa said to Zapata in their historic meeting in Mexico

City, the Carrancistas “are men who have always slept on soft pillows.

How could they ever be friends of the people, who have spent their

whole lives in nothing but suffering” (Quirk 1963, 135).

In October 1914 the various military factions gathered at the

Convention of Aguascalientes to select a provisional president. Villa

controlled the outcome, which meant that a puppet president, rather

than Carranza, was selected. The result was ﬁve more years of war.

Villa? Obregón? Carranza? What’s the difference? I love the

revolution like a volcano in eruption; I love the volcano, because

it’s a volcano; I love the revolution, because it’s a revolution.

The Underdogs, Mariano Azuelo, 1916

Each faction claimed its own capital, provisional president, and

issued its own currency. But Carranza, based in the port of Veracruz and

near the foreign-owned oil ﬁelds, was able to get an infusion of muni-

tions and mount the strongest army. Obregón, siding with Carranza,

defeated Villa in 1915 in the famous battle of Celaya with only half the

number of Villa’s 20,000 troops. Of the Villistas 4,000 died, 5,000 more

were wounded, and 6,000 were taken prisoner. Obregón claimed fewer

than 200 dead among his soldiers. By 1916 Villa was forced to retreat

to the Chihuahua hills where he had begun as a cattle rustler. But he

remained a dangerous threat to Carranza, raiding towns and attacking

the army.

As a bizarre aside to the upheaval, Pancho Villa provoked an inter-

vention by the United States in 1916. Having failed to mediate an end

171

to the ﬁghting, President Wilson recognized Carranza’s very successful

forces as the de facto government. Whether this abandonment by his

former supporter drove Villa beyond reason is unclear. Whatever the

cause, Villa’s men stopped a train in Chihuahua and shot 15 Americans.

Then Villa sent troops across the border into Columbus, New Mexico,

to acquire arms. Instead they terrorized the village, shouting “Death to

the gringos!” burning the town, and killing 18 residents.

Some in the U.S. Senate called for the occupation of all of Mexico.

Instead, Wilson sent a punitive expedition under General Pershing

to execute Villa. Violating Mexican sovereignty, Pershing searched for

many months but left without ever setting eyes on Villa. The expedition

cost the United States $130 million and a good deal of Mexican ill will.

Although Villa was somewhat contained in Chihuahua, the Carranza

government had other uprisings to control. The most important was

Zapata’s. Carranza sent an army of 30,000 against Zapata’s 20,000 and

attempted to return conﬁscated estates to wealthy hacendados. The

army managed to ﬁght Zapata back into the conﬁnes of the state of

Morelos, but later Zapata drove out the federal forces and organized an

independent government with its own land commission.

The Constitution of 1917

The ﬁrst chief controlled much of Mexico, yet the situation was far from

peaceful. Carranza also needed a constitutional convention in order to

bring about a new legal framework to legitimize his government and his

own election as president. Others supported the convention, but from

it they intended to incorporate the goals and aspirations of the many

peoples who had fought in the Revolution.

Hoping to revive the Constitution of 1857 with a few minor changes,

Carranza convened 200 national delegates in Querétaro on December

1, 1916. They were far from representative. Delegate qualiﬁcations were

so restrictive that relatives of Madero could not attend. All Zapatistas

and Villistas were barred, and 80 percent of the delegates were from

the middle class and only a third represented the military. Half were

well educated and many were young. Even with a stacked convention,

Carranza suffered a devastating defeat: under the leadership of Obregón,

his minister of war, radical amendments were made to the constitution.

With their nation still suffering from civil war, the delegates strug-

gled for two months to hammer out a constitution that would permit,

and even mandate, fundamental social change. The most astounding

amendment, Article 27, concerned land reform. Twenty-ﬁve hundred

THE REVOLUTION OF 1910

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words in length, it comprised half the constitution and was an expo-

sition on the relationship between private and public property, on

individual rights versus the public good. In a section that alarmed all

foreign corporations, it eliminated all monopolies on water and mineral

resources and, reverting to the Spanish law that Díaz had repealed, it

gave the nation rights to such natural resources. It made the communal

Indian ejidos inalienable and limited the size of estates. It provided for

land redistribution to be paid for by government bonds. And it restricted

foreign ownership to those who agreed to be treated like Mexicans: no

foreign interventions were to be allowed on their behalf.

Article 123 protected workers and destroyed debt peonage. A mini-

mum wage was mandated, adequate to provide for education, “lawful

pleasures,” and the subsistence needs of workers. Work hours and a

day of rest were also mandated, as was government insurance in times

of unemployment, retirement, sickness, and death. In addition, the

rights to organize, bargain collectively, and strike were granted by this

amendment. It was an amendment that protected Mexican workers to

the same degree as in industrial nations.

Many of the amendments included clauses that limited the role of

the church. Huerta’s considerable support from the church had revived

anticlerical sentiments among the revolutionaries. All church proper-

ties were proclaimed government property, without compensation.

Monastic orders were outlawed. Priests were not permitted to vote.

Important mandates for universal and free primary education stipulated

that only secular schools would be constitutional. Freedom of religion

was granted; the Catholic Church would no longer be the sole religion

permitted in Mexico.

For the ﬁrst time the social concerns of most Mexicans and most

revolutionaries were formulated. Institutions that had crippled the state

in the past were weakened: the church, foreign interests, and haciendas.

The Constitution of 1917 provided a legal framework for the govern-

ment that, though amended, continues to this day. It would take two

decades to implement.

The Carranza Presidency, 1917–1920

Even Carranza never openly challenged the constitution—perhaps

because the ﬁrst chief did not wish to acknowledge his humiliating

political defeat at a hand-picked convention. The constitution also

legitimized his election to a four-year term as president in March 1917.

The constitutional president simply ignored the rest of the provisions.

173

Carranza’s election did not usher in the end of the military phase

of the revolution; rather his policies continued the social violence and

ﬁghting. He did nothing to implement change, and he was properly

criticized for his failure to conform to the constitution. Instead of set-

ting up the commissions that would have implemented a minimum

wage, he fought the unions. Strikes, organized by the anarchist Casa del

Obrero Mundial, plagued industry. Because organized labor had sup-

ported Carranza, he had subsidized the various unions and permitted

them to be armed. But with the economy disrupted and foreign pow-

ers complaining, he banished the Casa del Obrero and disbanded their

armies. When the rail workers declared a strike, he conscripted the

workers into the army. Despite his efforts to weaken the unions, how-

ever, in 1918 the ﬁrst national organization, the Regional Confederation

of Mexican Workers (CROM), was formed.

In regard to land reform his performance was equally regressive. He

actually gave back communal ejido lands to the Porﬁristas. Further, he

The Trench, mural (c. 1930) by José Clemente Orozco in the National Preparatory School,

Mexico City

THE REVOLUTION OF 1910

A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEXICO

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was relentless in his pursuit of Zapata. The army killed thousands of

innocent civilians in its search for the rebel leader and burned crops and

killed cattle to starve even more. The Zapatistas responded in kind, blow-

ing up a civilian passenger train. Zapata wrote a letter to Carranza:

It never occurred to you that the Revolution was fought for the

benefit of the great masses . . . you have given or rented our

haciendas to your favorites . . . and the people are mocked in

their hopes.

Emiliano Zapata, 1919 (Meyer & Sherman 1983, 548)

Carranza responded with an elaborate plot to assassinate the revolu-

tionary hero. On April 10, 1919, his plot succeeded: Zapata was shot

point-blank in an ambush. His body was displayed to convince the

Zapatistas and the peasants for whom he had struggled so long that

their leader was, in fact, dead.

The End of Military Revolution: 1920

When Carranza’s presidential term ended, the revolution had ravaged

Mexico without accomplishing its primary social objectives. Carranza had

also undermined its liberal political objectives by instituting martial law

and rigging elections. He didn’t dare openly challenge the no reelection

clause of the constitution; he did try, however, to subvert it by nominating

one of his puppets to run against Álvaro Obregón, the minister of war.

Patience ran out with Carranza. Generals from around the country

declared against him; regions declared independence. It was Obregón

who ﬁnally chased him out of ofﬁce. Carranza’s presidency ended with

the corruption and violence typical of the period: he ﬂed with all the

public treasury he could carry, allegedly 20 train cars’ worth; he was

captured en route to Veracruz and shot.

The Devastation of War

Thinkers . . . prepare the Revolution; bandits carry it out. At the

moment no one can say with any assurance: “So-and-so is a

revolutionary and What’s-his name is a bandit.” Tomorrow per-

haps it will be clearer.

The Flies, Mariano Azuela, 1918

175

A decade of civil war devastated the people, countryside, and economy. As

armies of tens of thousands moved back and forth across the land, they

took with them whatever crops were in the ﬁelds and drove the cattle

along as provisions. Revolutionaries burned haciendas and destroyed

mills. Any crops they missed could not be harvested because the able-

bodied were carried off with the armies. In the cities, ﬁres raged, too; in

Mexico City alone more than 50 elementary schools were burned down.

Payment, when it couldn’t be avoided, was in chits or recently

printed paper called “money.” Each army printed currency as needed.

Not only were different currencies used in the various regions, but they

changed with the arrival of each new army, being exchangeable one day,

but not the next—except for Zapata’s coins, that is, which were minted

from the silver of conﬁscated mines. There was an unending supply

of money for the armies and inﬂationary prices for everyone else.

Guadalajara reported that the price of corn and beans tripled in 1918.

Mexicans were hungry during the Porﬁriato, but they were hungrier

during the revolution. Even when the government attempted to ﬁx

food prices, its efforts were inadequate. Transport systems, especially

the railroads, had been expropriated by the armies or destroyed in the

ﬁghting; slow grain distribution was one result. With the United States

and Europe engaged in World War I, not enough foodstuffs could be

imported to alleviate the problem. The amount of maize available per

capita was the lowest since colonial times. In 1917 the government

ofﬁcially recognized a corn famine. Malnutrition was common. Food

riots broke out in some towns. Others reported 100 deaths a day due to

starvation. Even in 1918 when there weren’t marching armies sweeping

the land, food production was low.

The War Economy

With the prolonged ﬁghting, Mexico’s economy should have stopped

short. Instead, World War I gave it a boost. Yucatecan henequén was

in high demand for cordage; proﬁts from its trade stabilized the revo-

lutionary government’s ﬁnances into the early 1920s. Oil and metals,

too, were in higher demand than ever because of the war. During the

Mexican Revolution, foreign oil companies bribed the armies to protect

their equipment and industry. Oil production boomed, and Mexico

became the fourth largest supplier in the world. Production, often

wasteful and exploitative—gasoline cost more in Mexico than abroad—

increased from almost 4 million barrels in 1910 to almost 200 million in

1921. Although the mines, mostly foreign owned, had suffered during

THE REVOLUTION OF 1910

A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEXICO

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the Huerta period, silver, zinc, and copper production under Carranza

increased and even surpassed that of the Porﬁriato—and prices had

never been higher.

The Mexican government was kept aﬂoat during World War I by its

trade and by the taxes on extracted materials. But when its debts were

reckoned, the nation couldn’t have been in worse shape. Foreign debt

was high even for Mexico: in 1923, it amounted to $750 million, three

times higher than after the ﬁrst round of ﬁghting when Madero took

ofﬁce. Then, there was an additional $1 billion of foreign claims against

Mexico for damage done to their companies during the Revolution. The

domestic debt was no less impressive. All those army chits and paper

monies and forced loans on businesses and the church became claims

against the government. And the military was a continuing ﬁnancial

burden, with many soldiers and ofﬁcers owed back pay. There were

years in which the cost of the military was 70 percent of expenditures.

Not even a war boom could ﬁnance so much debt.

The Revolutionary Reconstruction, 1920–1940

We too could produce a Kant or Hugo. We too could wrest iron

from the bowels of the earth and fashion it . . . We could raise

prodigious cities and create nations, and explore the universe.

Was it not from a mixture of the races that the Titans sprang?

José Clemente Orozco (translated by Ramón Eduardo Ruiz)

Commodity Production, 1910–1920

Year Corn Sisal Copper Oil Silver

1910 3,219,624 94,790 48,160 3,634,080 2,416,669

1912 2,062,971 139,902 57,245 16,558,215 2,526,715

1914 1,961,073 169,286 26,621 26,235,403 810,647

1916 ** 201,990 28,411 40,545,712 925,993

1918 1,899,625 140,001 70,200 63,828,326 1,944,542

1920 ** 160,759 49,192 157,068,678 2,068,938

In metric tons except oil in barrels; from John Womack in Bethell (1991, 133)

**-not available

177

Mexico ﬁnally was about to embark on a period of political stability. Its

leadership would be assumed by social revolutionaries such as Álvaro

Obregón, Plutarco Calles, and Lázaro Cárdenas. Each president would

lead Mexico toward social and economic changes as envisioned by the

Constitution of 1917. Only Cárdenas wasn’t from the north, however,

and only he would understand the indigenous communities that domi-

nated central and southern Mexico. With increasing political stability,

Mexico created a national identity as well, one that esteemed its blend-

ing of races into a new culture and a mestizo people. As a new Mexico

took shape, a few violent episodes occurred, but they did not succeed

in ripping the nation apart. Mexico was well on the way to solving its

conﬂicts without the military.

President Álvaro Obregón, 1920–1924

Obregón (1880–1928) brought political ingenuity, not just military

might, to the Mexican presidency. As one of the great military strategists

of the revolution, Obregón had won many battles, including the decisive

ones against Villa, with his Yaqui Indian soldiers and union supporters.

He was a listener, a general who could sit and discuss strategy with his

troops. He was a keen observer and chose his sides carefully and suc-

cessfully. Although committed to social change and the implementation

of the constitution, he was practical and knew how to compromise.

Knowing peace was imperative, Obregón granted an amnesty to all

factions. He appointed Villistas and Zapatistas to his government. In

exchange for remaining outside of politics, Pancho Villa was given a

ranch and substantial pension. A Zapatista was put in charge of the

Morelos troops that had once been the enemy. Other “generals” were

bought off by well-paid positions in the army, but in an attempt to sepa-

rate the government from the military, Obregón reserved most cabinet

posts for civilians.

Obregón was the ﬁrst revolutionary president committed to social

reform. He was well aware of the simmering discontent of the peasants

and organized labor who had received nothing after a decade of war.

He had fought alongside them and heard their complaints. As a ﬁrst

step toward implementing the land reforms mandated in the constitu-

tion, he granted the Indians title to their lands that had been stolen. He

also permitted peasants to keep the land they had occupied during the

Revolution. Worried that agricultural production would be adversely

affected if he moved too quickly on the haciendas before smaller enter-

prises got under way, Obregón’s land redistribution was signiﬁcant but

THE REVOLUTION OF 1910